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This thesis examines the evolution of Colonial Office 
policy on industrialisation in West Africa between 1939 and 
1951, a case study in official attitudes towards problems of 
planned economic development on the eve of decolonisation. 
It assesses the conversion of officials to policies of 
diversification, and the constraints imposed on their 
development initiative. It analyses growing pressures on the 
Colonial Office from colonial governments to produce a 
coherent industrial policy, and officials' responses to 
individual manufacturing proposals. It considers the 
Office's unsuccessful attempts to gain acceptance for its 
policy from sectors of metropolitan opinion, particularly 
the Board of Trade, which saw colonial industrialisation as 
a threat to British export markets. 
The thesis assesses official discussions, conducted 
against a background of wartime collectivism, on promoting 
industry, involving debates on possible sources of capital, 
expertise and entrepreneurship; tariff protection to new 
industries; the limits of state control; and the inadequacy 
of existing administrative machinery in London and the 
colonies. It explores officials' views on private 
enterprise, especially expatriate capital, and their growing 
conviction that greater state control over economic 
development was politically necessary, preferably through 
publicly-owned corporations. Discussions on all these issues 
strained London's relationship with the colonial 
governments, especially when the Colonial Office briefly 
assumed a more interventionist role, which the thesis also 
examines. 
The conclusion is reached that the Office could not 
defend its wartime policy goals after the war, when the 
metropolitan government attempted to use colonial resources 
to resolve Britain's financial crisis. Through strict 
colonial import controls and the neglect of 
industrialisation, the British government gave development a 
bias towards primary production which demonstrated the 
Colonial office's error in assuming that its industrial 
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INTRODUCTION 
The economic consequences of British colonial rule have 
become a preoccupation not only for historians of 
decolonisation but also for those seeking to explain the 
apparent failure of former colonial territories to achieve 
balanced and sustained economic growth-. Some commentators 
detect a clear relationship between colonial rule and the 
'structural under-development' of the colonial economies, a 
condition engineered by Britain in the interests of the 
metropolitan economy. According to this interpretation, 
colonial rule ensured that the colonies were developed as 
sources of raw materials and as markets for metropolitan 
exporters2. Colonial authorities are claimed to have 
neglected the kind of economic diversification which might 
have given colonial territories secure economic foundations 
and the prospect of continuing development after 
independence. Specifically, it is claimed that colonial 
administrators either failed to encourage the growth of 
local manufacturing sectors, or obstructed such opportunites 
1 For surveys of the extensive literature on these problems, 
see J. Forbes Munro, Britain in Tropical Africa 1880-1960. 
Economic Relationships and Impact (1984); A. G. Hopkins, 
'African Economic History: The First Twenty-Five Years', 
Journal of African History, 30 (1989), pp. 157-63; C. C. 
Wrigley, 'Aspects of Economic History', in A. D. Roberts 
(ed), Cambridge History of Africa Vol. VII from 1905 to 1940, 
(Cambridge, 1986); D. Rimmer, 'The Economics of Colonialism 
in Africa', JAH, 19,2 (1978), pp. 265-73; D. K. Fieldhouse, 
'Decolonization, Development and Dependence: a survey of 
changing attitudes', in P. Gif ford and Wm. Roger Louis 
(eds), The Transfer of Power in Africa. Decolonisation 1940- 
1960 (New Haven, 1982); see also D. R. Fieldhouse, 
Colonialism 1870-1945. An Introduction, (1976,1983), ch. 2. 
Unless otherwise stated, the place of publication is London. 
2 See, e. g., A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West 
Africa (1973); E. A. Brett, Colonialism and Underdevelopment 
in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939, 
(New York, 1973). 
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for industrialisation as existed, allegedly in order to 
safeguard the flow of colonial primary exports, and to 
protect metropolitan 
colonial competition3. 
manufactured exports from local, 
Yet an examination of the years 1939-1951 reveals that 
the Colonial Office, the junction of relationships between 
the metropolitan and colonial governments, was actively 
attempting, for the first time, to construct a coherent 
policy on colonial industrialisation, as one element in a 
set of broad political, economic and social objectives, 
collectively intended to prepare the colonies for eventual 
self-government. 
In the Office's discussions, the West African colonies, 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast, held special prominence. 
Together representing the largest segment of the colonial 
empire proper, in size and population, these territories 
seemed far ahead of Britain's other African colonies in 
preparedness for self-government, the 'model' for the rest 
of Africa, and therefore increasingly the focus of 
metropolitan officials' attention. This tendency was only 
reinforced during and after the Second World War when the 
region became vital first in maintaining supplies of 
commodities essential to the war effort, and later not only 
as the lynchpin in the sterling area's dollar-earning 
strategy after 1947, but as the test-bed for the first phase 
of controlled decolonisation. For these reasons, a re- 
examination of London's interpretation of West African 
conditions appears to be warranted4. 
3 Brett (1973), pp. 72,115-116. 
4 On West African developments in this period, see esp. R. D. 
Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy 
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This was, unquestionably, a period of unusual strains, 
encompassing war and reconstruction, with their attendant 
economic dislocations and adjustments, punctuated by 
metropolitan financial crises, and an unprecedented degree 
of state economic intervention, both in Britain and the 
colonies5. It was also a period when Britain was under 
increasing pressure to justify its colonial role to 
domestic, colonial and international opinion6. Sandwiched 
between the interwar Depression, the experience of which 
exposed to criticism the inertia of traditional colonial 
'trusteeship', and the early 1950s, when a relative boom in 
commodity prices (stemming, in part, from the effects of the 
Korean War), together with concerted opposition to Britain's 
colonial presence, created new conditions for 
administrators, these years witnessed a systematic review of 
1938-48, (1982); C. R. Norduran, 'Prelude to Decolonisation in 
West Africa: the development of British Colonial Policy, 
1938-1947', University of Oxford D. Phil. thesis (1976). On 
the economic background, see Hopkins (1973); R. Howard, 
Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana, (1978); A. 
Phillips, The Enigma of Colonialism. British Policy in West 
Africa, (1989). 
5 For the impact of the war, see Sir John Shuckburgh, 
'Colonial Civil History of the War' (unpublished; 
mimeographed typescript, Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
Library, University of London); see also J. Darwin, Britain 
and Decolonisation. The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War 
World (1988), ch. 2; A. N. Porter and A. J. Stockwell, British 
Imperial Policy and Decolonization 1938-64. Volume I, 1938- 
51, (1987), chs. 4-7; D. Killingray and R. Rathbone (eds), 
Africa and the Second World War, (1986); R. D. Pearce, 'The 
Colonial Economy: Nigeria and the Second World War', in B. 
Ingham and C. Simmons (eds), Development Studies and 
Colonial Policy, (1987), pp. 264-92; N. J. Westcott, 'Sterling 
and Empire: The British Imperial Economy, 1939-1951', 
unpublished seminar paper, University of London Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, (1983). 
6 E. g. R. Smythe, 'Britain's African colonies and British 
propaganda during World War II', JICH 14,1 (Oct 1983), 
pp. 65-82; Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: the United 
States and the Decolonisation of the British Empire, 1941-45 
(Oxford 1977), pp. 121-286. 
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policy by the Colonial Office, representing the first, 
tentative steps towards planned decolonisation7. In 
particular, officials gathered and digested the unpalatable 
lessons of the 1930s, when surveys such as those by Hailey 
and Frankel had revealed the instability of the colonial 
economies and the extent of colonial poverty8. They became 
preoccupied with the problem of giving the colonies adequate 
economic foundations on which stable political and social 
structures could be modelled as the prerequisites for self- 
government. While the immediate symptoms of colonial 
economic vulnerability could, it was hoped, be addressed 
through improved welfare provision, made feasible by 
successive Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, there 
remained a long-term need to free the colonies from their 
crippling dependence on narrow export bases, enabling them 
to withstand world market fluctuations and to achieve 
greater economic self-sufficiency9. Increasingly, the 
7 For the Depression generally, see A. J. H. Latham, The 
Depression and the Developing World, 1914-39, (1981) and 
C. P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939, 
(Harmondsworth, 1987); for the Depression's impact on West 
Africa, see Hopkins (1973), esp. ch. 7; Roberts (1986), esp. 
pp. 443-54, and B. Ingham, 'Colonialism and the Economy of 
the Gold Coast 1919-45', in Ingham and Simmons (1987), 
pp. 264-92. On the beginnings of decolonisation, see Pearce 
(1982); R. D. Pearce, 'The Colonial Office and Planned 
Decolonisation in Africa', African Affairs, 83 (Jan 1984), 
pp. 77-93; J. Flint, 'Planned Decolonization and its Failure 
in British Africa', African Affairs, 82 (July 1983), pp. 389- 
411. 
8 Lord Hailey, An African Survey, (Oxford, 1938); S. H. 
Frankel, Capital Investment in Africa, (1938); see also D. J. 
Morgan, The Official History of Colonial Development Volume 
I (1980), pp. 28-33. 
9 On the evolution of British colonial development policy 
see Morgan (1980) Volume I, pp. 44-70; S. Constantine, The 
Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914-1940, 
(1984); D. Meredith, 'The British Government and Colonial 
Economic Policy 1919-1939', EcHR, 28,3, (1975), pp. 484-99; 
H. Johnson, 'The West Indies and the conversion of the 
British Official Classes to the Development Idea', Journal 
11 
Colonial Office accepted arguments in favour of economic 
diversification, and devoted considerable effort towards the 
problem of local manufacturing development. Officials 
concluded not only that industrialisation was a desirable 
strategy, but also that its promotion both justified and 
required state involvement. Initially hesitant, this 
recognition became more adventurous when, after 1943, the 
Office embarked on planning the post-war resumption of 
colonial development, a period which exposed tensions 
between the political and economic elements in colonial 
policy. The traditional emphasis on minimising the socially 
disruptive, and hence politically dangerous effects of 
economic modernisation, enshrined in the prewar ethos of 
'trusteeship', conflicted with a growing need to promote 
faster development, at first to satisfy colonial and 
international opinion, but increasingly in response to 
Britain's postwar financial problems10. 
The period after 1939 produced major shifts in the 
outlook of the Colonial Office, justifying a resurrection of 
the concept of the 'official mind'. At a time when clear 
political direction in colonial policy was often absent, the 
continuities and evolution of official thinking were of 
special importance. Substantial areas of policy were 
of Commonwealth and Comparctive Politics, 15,1 (1977), 
pp. 55-75; G. C. Abbott, 'British Colonial Aid Policy during 
the Nineteen Thirties', CJH, 5 (1970); D. G. M. Rampersad, 
'Colonial economic development and social welfare; the case 
of the British West Indian colonies, 1929-47', University of 
Oxford D. Phil. thesis (1979). 
10 J. M. Lee and M. Petter, The Colonial Office, War, and 
Development Policy: organisation and the planning of a 
metropolitan initiative, 1939-1945, (1982), esp. ch. 3; J. M. 
Lee, "'Forward Thinking" and War: the Colonial office during 
the 1940s', JICH, 6,1 (1977), pp. 64-79. 
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entrusted to an increasingly confident, interventionist and 
reforming official elite. An understanding of the complex 
processes which constituted decolonisation therefore 
requires an appreciation of the growing contribution made by 
metropolitan officials to the formation of policy. Moreover, 
as the very nature of colonial rule became more elaborate, 
the scope for divergence in the aims of metropolitan and 
locally-based administrators widened, especially once the 
state assumed new responsibilities". 
From the late 1930s, 'development' became central to 
the Colonial Office's self-attributed raison d'etre, the 
unifying theme in its functions and attitudes12. Before the 
Second World War, the Office's role had been largely 
reactive, shaped by ad hoc responses to local developments, 
cemented by the idea of trusteeship, and limited by a 
concern to respect the substantial autonomy enjoyed by 
colonial governments under devolved British rule13. The 
legacy of the Depression, wartime mobilisation and the need 
to plan postwar reconstruction, obliged the Colonial Office 
to be more assertive, to seek above all to anticipate local 
developments, and to devise new policies, methods and 
machinery, centred on the single goal of achieving 
controlled decolonisation at a time deemed appropriate by 
London. 
Although themselves satisfied that industrialisation 
was an important component of their decolonisation strategy, 
11 Lee and Petter (1982), pp. 210-15; Lee (1977); Sir Charles 
Jeffries, Whitehall and the Colonial Service: an 
administrative memoir, 1939-1956, (1972), passim. 
12 Lee and Petter (1982), ch. 4; Lee (1977), passim. 
13 Jeffries (1972). 
13 
Colonial Office officials found that fundamental obstacles 
circumscribed the implementation of their ideas. At a 
practical, immediate level, was the question of how colonial 
industries were to be promoted. Throughout this period, 
local sources of capital, expertise and enterprise appeared 
to be frustratingly scarce. In West Africa, the most obvious 
supply of these essential factors seemed to be the large, 
expatriate firms, such as the United Africa Company, who 
enjoyed both the necessary funds and a knowledge of local 
commercial conditions, based on their predominance in the 
region's import-export trade. Before 1939, however, the 
firms showed little interest in diversifying their 
activities into manufacturing, preferring the familiar 
waters of trade, made even more secure by their engineering 
of an effective oligopoly during the 1930s14. During the 
war, this conservatism was modified slightly, and several 
firms put forward proposals to establish manufacturing 
capacity in West Africa. In part, this may have been a 
response to the changing commercial environment, especially 
the introduction and postwar establishment of state- 
controlled produce marketing15. More important, perhaps, was 
14 P. Kilby, 'Manufacturing in Colonial Africa', in P. 
Duignan and L. H. Gann (eds), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960 
Vol. 4 The Economics of Colonialism, (Cambridge, 1975), 
pp. 488,491; D. R. Fieldhouse, Black Africa 1945-1980: 
economic decolonisation and arrested development (1986), 
pp. 10-11,46-47; Hopkins (1973), pp. 258-60,278; Howard 
(1978), pp. 108,157,208. 
15 D. Meredith, 'State controlled marketing and economic 
'development': the case of West African produce during the 
Second World War', EcHR, 39,1 (1986), pp. 77-91; D. 
Meredith, 'The Colonial Office, British Business Interests 
and the Reform of Cocoa Marketing in West Africa, 1937-1945' 
JAH, 29 (1988), pp. 285-300; J. H. Bowden, 'Development and 
control in British colonial policy, with reference to 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast, 1935-48', University of 
Birmingam Ph. D. thesis (1980). 
14 
the firms' desire to improve their relations with the 
colonial authorities, strained by the intense hostility of 
local opinion to their operations, and to be seen to be 
adjusting to the recent policy shifts emanating from London. 
However, the very hostility of West African opinion towards 
the firms, grounded in bitter memories of the 1930s, when 
produce prices were thought to have been kept artificially 
low by the firms' buying 'ring', undermined in 
administrators' eyes the firms' value as agents of economic 
modernisation16. Increasingly, the Colonial Office felt 
obliged to demonstrate that the state, not the firms, 
controlled West Africa's economic destiny. In order to 
minimise political friction, therefore, officials were drawn 
to consider means of widening the colonial state's role in 
economic management. 
What, then, of the entrepreneurial potential of the 
colonial governments? The governments of the interwar years 
have been accused of indifference, even hostility, towards 
industrial development, on the one hand because it 
threatened their chief source of revenue, duties on imports 
and exports, and on the other because of a deepening 
preoccupation with restricting the socially disruptive 
effects of economic development17. Concealed behind these 
motives, allegedly, was a predisposition towards defending 
British exporters' colonial markets. 
The colonial governments before the second World War 
have been unfairly condemned for their adherence to laissez 
16 Meredith (1986), PP. 80-1; Meredith (1988), p. 285-6; 
Hopkins (1973), p. 198-209. 
17 Brett (1973), pp. 300-11; Howard (1978), p. 23; Meredith 
(1975), p. 260-6. 
15 
faire principles18. On the contrary, they were active in 
promoting export agriculture and the transport 
infrastructure necessary to evacuate tropical exports, 
exposing themselves to subsequent criticism on the grounds 
that they reinforced the colonies dependence on primary 
exports and so maintained these territories at a level of 
underdevelopment advantageous to the metropolitan economy19. 
Certainly, little was done to promote industrialisation: 
tariff protection for new industries was commonly refused, 
nor were subsidies or credit provided, but here the main 
concern seems to have been to prevent the erosion of import 
revenue by import-substituting manufactures. Although 20 
limited assistance towards development became available 
under the 1929 Colonial Development Act, few governments 
submitted industrial proposals under this scheme21. However, 
the governments' activities never, before 1939, amounted to 
anything approaching economic 'management': rather, local 
governments saw their role as being to provide essential 
services which no other agency was willing to provide, in 
18 Pearce (1987), pp. 266-7. 
19 Brett (1973), pp. 300-11; Howard (1978), p. 23; I. M. 
Drummond, Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939, (1974), 
p. 435. 
20 On the development of manufacturing in West Africa 
between the wars, see Kilby (1975), pp. 472-92; R. Olufemi 
Ekundare, An Economic History of Nigeria 1860-1960, p. 117- 
85; Hopkins (1973), 262-3. 
21 Constantine (1984), pp. 195-226; D. G. Meredith, 'The 
British Government and Colonial Economic Development, with 
particular reference to British West Africa, 1919-1939', 
unpublished University of Exeter Ph. D. thesis, (1976), 
pp. 119-26; Meredith (1975), pp. 489-94. 
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order to create conditions attractive to private 
investors22. 
Arguably of greater significance was the outlook of 
local administrators. The largely negative influence of the 
trusteeship ideology permeated local governments long after 
its hold on the metropolitan official mind had weakened23. 
Notwithstanding their supposed rejection of modern British 
life and idealisation of African 'tribal' society, colonial 
administrators had rational, if unsophisticated, motives for 
conservatism between the wars, grounded in an over-riding 
preoccupation with maintaining political stability, and with 
doing so as frugally as possible. Confronted with 
subsistence economies and under-utilised resources, colonial 
governments concluded that African welfare could best be 
promoted through the expansion of primary production for 
export. 
Confidence in this minimal role for government was 
shattered by the Depression24. Ironically, when state 
intervention was most needed, if only to provide basic 
welfare services, colonial governments found their funds 
disastrously reduced by the decline in revenue from trade25. 
22 Pearce (1987), pp. 266-7; Forbes Munro (1984), p. 32; 
Fieldhouse (1982), p. 487. 
23 See, e. g., P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, 'Gentlemanly 
capitalism and British expansion overseas II: new 
imperialism, 1850-1945', EcHR, 40,1 (1987), pp. 1-26; J. M. 
Lee, Colonial Development and Good Government: a study of 
the ideas expressed by the British official classes in 
planning decolonization, 1939-1964, (Oxford, 1967); C. C. 
Ehrlich, 'Building and Caretaking', EcHR, 26,4 (1973), 
pp. 649-67; R. E. Robinson, 'The Moral Disarmament of African 
Empire 1919-1947', DICH, 8,1 (1979), pp. 86-104; Brett 
(1973), p. 75; Meredith (1975), p. 494. 
24 Forbes Munro (1984), p. 31. 
25 Ibid.. 
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This in itself was a further disincentive to experimentation 
with revenue-threatening industry. More importantly, the 
entire notion of development based on private enterprise was 
shaken26. 
This experience, together with wartime economic 
mobilisation, convinced administrators both in London and at 
the periphery that development required a substantial 
contribution from government, particularly in its 
planning27. Traditionally, the Treasury-inspired orthodoxy 
of colonial financial self-sufficiency had been the 
overriding constraint on greater activity by local 
governments. With the abandonment of this and the promise of 
metropolitan grant-aid after 1940, together with the 
possibility of increased revenues from progressive taxation, 
introduced with London's blessing, the prospects for 
government-sponsored development brightened28. 
Nevertheless, even when individual colonial governors, 
such as Burns in the Gold Coast and Bourdillon in Nigeria, 
favoured industrialisation, the problem remained that 
colonial governments were poorly equipped to promote 
development. Personnel shortages were aggravated by 
retrenchment in the 1930s and compounded by the depletion of 
staffs and the expansion of work during the war. Only 
26 P. Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa, 1920- 
1940, (1978), p. 91; W. R. Hancock, Survey of British 
Commonwealth Affairs II. Problems of Economic Policy 1918- 
1939, (1940,1942), p. 323; Lee and Petter (1982), p. 26. 
27 Ingham (1987), p. 251. 
28 On wartime taxation policy, see Shuckburgh (II), pp. 305- 
18. 
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gradually did establishments resume pre-Depression levels in 
the postwar years29. 
Faced with the problems associated with the operations 
of the expatriate firms, coupled to a growing recognition of 
the inadequacies of existing colonial governments to 
undertake effective economic development, the Colonial 
Office explored new means of harnessing the entrepreneurial 
potential of private capital within politically acceptable 
structures under public control. Against a metropolitan 
background of wartime collectivism, the Colonial office 
debated the value of public corporations in promoting 
development. However, what had originally been seen as a 
vehicle for industrialisation was eventually translated into 
a Colonial Development Corporation intimately associated 
with the postwar drive to promote dollar-earning primary 
production30. 
Overshadowing the problems of finding the resources 
needed to develop colonial industry was an even more 
fundamental obstacle, the longstanding opposition of 
influential metropolitan interest groups to competitive 
manufacturing within the colonial empire. This hostility 
derived not only from specific exporting sectors, such as 
the Lancashire cotton industry, but also from within 
Whitehall. The Board of Trade, acting to defend British 
manufacturers' interests, was the chief obstacle to the 
29 Jeffries (1972); Lee and Petter (1982), pp. 210-15; R. D. 
Pearce, 'Morale in the Colonial Service in Nigeria during 
the Second World War', JICH, 11,2 (1983), pp. 175-96. 
30 Morgan (1980) Volume II, ch. 6; M. Cowen, 'Early years of 
the Colonial Development Corporation: British State 
Enterprise Overseas during late Colonialism', African 
Affairs, 83, (Jan 1984), pp. 63-75. 
19 
Colonial Office's plans for industrialisation. After the 
war, the Board was joined by the Treasury, which resisted 
deviations from primary export production designed to earn 
or save dollars. 
Fundamentally, metropolitan policy-makers outside the 
Colonial Office assumed a complementary, non-competitive 
relationship between the British and colonial economies. In 
return for their agricultural and mineral exports, the 
colonies received British manufactured goods, a division of 
labour claimed to benefit both sides31. Proponents of this 
view, from Joseph Chamberlain onwards, understood colonial 
'development' to mean improved primary production for 
export, confirming the dependence defined in Hopkins' 
description of the 'open economy'32. The Depression, which 
converted the Colonial Office to a belief in diversifying 
the colonial economies, also strengthened the attachment of 
some British interests, articulated throught the Board of 
Trade, to 'safe' colonial markets, and accentuated their 
resistance to competition from indigenous manufacturing33. 
In 1934, and again in 1937, the Colonial Office 
attempted to obtain Cabinet authorisation for limited 
colonial industrialisation. Each attempt was abortive34. 
These experiences shaped the Office's subsequent tactics. 
The Office learned that little progress was possible without 
31 See, e. g., Meredith (1976), 
p. 286f . 
p. 129f; Constantine (1984), 
32 Hopkins (1973), ch. 5; Forbes Munro (1984), p. 62; 
Constantine (1984), pp. 228,286; Meredith, (1975), p. 495; 
Brett (1973), pp. 72-3. 
33 Brett (1973), p. 71. 
34 Meredith (1975), pp. 495-497; Meredith (1976), pp. 131- 
9; Drummond (1974), pp. 441-2. 
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the approval of Whitehall. Despite some encouraging 
indications of a softening of attitudes during the war, and 
an apparent willingness by the Board of Trade to adjust to 
changed postwar trading patterns, this approval eluded the 
Colonial office throughout the period under consideration. 
After the war, when other sections of the metropolitan were 
to show an unaccustomed interest in colonial development, 
the Colonial office was obliged to set aside the ambitious 
ideas produced during the reconstruction planning debate, 
and acquiesce in a short-sighted metropolitan attempt to 
solve the sterling crisis by developing colonial 
resources35. This was seen particularly in the control by 
Britain of the supplies which colonial diversification would 
have required. Wartime shortages of basic development 
materials were followed not by the expected liberalisation 
of exports to the colonies, but by a selective policy which 
considered colonial needs inferior to those of Britain and 
more lucrative export markets36. The Colonial office's brief 
experience of relatively untramelled speculation about the 
possibilities of colonial development proved to have been 
founded upon a misconception of the wider goals of the 
metropolitan government, goals which the office had little 
power to influence. 
35 For the growing literature on postwar colonial 
development, see, e. g., Morgan (1980) Volume II; P. S. Gupta, 
'Imperialism and the Labour Government', in J. M. Winter 
(ed), The Working Class in Modern British History, 
(Cambridge, 1983), pp. 112-15; R. Hyam, 'Africa and the 
Labour Government, 1945-1951', JICH, 16,3 (1988), pp. 148-9; 
D. K. Fieldhouse, 'The Labour Governments and the Empire- 
Commonwealth, 1945-51', in R. Ovendale (ed), The Foreign 
Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951, 
(Leicester, 1984); A. E. Hinds, 'Sterling and Imperial 
Policy, 1945-1951', JICH, 15,2, (1987). 
36 Morgan (1980) II, ch. l. For statistics of imports into 
West Africa, see tables 1-3 below. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPACT OF WAR ON DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
1939-1942 
The period between September 1939 and the end of 1942 
was one of new and exacting challenges for colonial 
administrators both in London and in West Africa. On the one 
hand there were responsibilities arising from the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1940; on the other was the 
impact of war on the colonial economies and administrations. 
During this period, the latter effectively circumscribed the 
former. Progress with development was limited by shortages 
of money, materials and personnel. Initially, colonial 
economic policy was dominated by the need to reduce colonial 
demands on metropolitan production, through reduced 
consumption, and to efforts to protect sterling, through 
currency controls. Although these concerns persisted 
throughout the period, and beyond the duration of the war 
itself, from 1942 they were joined by the aim of maximising 
the colonial contribution to the Allied war effort, through 
the production and evacuation of valuable raw materials. 
Coping with these tasks left officials little time to 
reflect on the longer-term issues involved in economic 
development. Furthermore, officials in London and West 
Africa still lacked adequate machinery for economic 
planning. Although this deficiency was recognised, little 
had been accomplished by the end of 1942 to equip either 
London or local governments to produce, evaluate and 
implement the detailed, integrated programmes of development 
which metropolitan officials increasingly saw as essential. 
Despite these problems, some, admittedly fragmented, 
consideration was given to post-war colonial reconstruction. 
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It is, therefore, possible to trace the evolution in these 
years of official attitudes to important development themes, 
including the potential role of manufacturing in securing 
more diversified production. These attitudes were often 
shaped in response to local developments which obliged the 
Colonial Office to raise the subject of colonial 
industrialisation, historically a sensitive one, with its 
colleagues in Whitehall, to obtain an authoritative policy 
ruling for transmission to the colonial governments. In the 
process the Office revealed its own guarded approval for the 
growth of manufacturing, but there persisted in the response 
of other government departments an ambiguity towards this 
question which formed an unsatisfactory basis for the 
elaboration of policy. 
The impact of war 
With the outbreak of war, London immediately urged the 
colonial governments to retrench. The colonial war economy 
had three central features. First, colonies were asked to 
reduce or avoid expenditure of foreign currency, especially 
dollars. Secondly, they were urged to control imports 
through licencing systems. Finally, they were encouraged to 
introduce, or extend, direct taxationl. 
Under wartime conditions, it seemed likely that the 
development initiative would be stillborn. MacDonald's 
successor, Lord Lloyd, briefly considered inserting into the 
1 For the impact of the war, see Parliamentary Papers (1946- 
47) Cmd. 7167 x. 403 The Colonial Empire, 1939-1947; Sir John 
Shuckburgh, 'Colonial Civil History of the War, Volume It, 
unpublished manuscript, (University of London Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies Library); Porter and Stockwell (1987); 
Lee and Petter (1982), chs. 2 and 3; Killingray and Rathbone 
(1986), pp. 1-19. 
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CD &W Bill a clause suspending its operations for the 
duration. The Treasury, although interested in the economic 
contribution the colonies could make to the war effort, 
remained doubtful about the prospects for advancing the 
'social' aspect of development. During the 'Phoney War', a 
working compromise was reached between the Treasury and the 
Colonial Office, but as conditions deteriorated in summer 
1940, the Treasury view prevailed. On 11 June 1940, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary, George Hall, warned that 
little progress could be expected under the new Act because 
of the shortage of resources and personnel2. In September 
1940, stringent criteria were set out restricting 
applications for metropolitan assistance to schemes with a 
direct bearing on the war effort, and which required only 
local resources3. Consequently, except in the West Indies, 
whose proximity to the still neutral United States convinced 
Churchill of the political necessity of progress with 
development, CD &W provision was all but suspended4. 
As the war progressed, concern arose in the Treasury, 
echoed in the Economic Department of the Colonial office, 
that not enough was being done by local governments to curb 
non-essential imports, and imports from the dollar area. By 
May 1940, the need to economise on shipping space took 
precedence over concern to limit the spending of foreign 
exchange, and required more rigorous import control by 
colonial governments5. Lloyd's successor, Moyne, therefore 
2 Constantine (1984), p. 257. 
3 CO 859/41/1, circular despatch from Lloyd, 10 Sept 1940. 
4 Lee and Petter (1982), pp. 104-105. 
5 Bowden (1980), p. 83. 
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urged local governments to restrict imports still further, 
to save on scarce shipping space and foreign exchange, and 
to ease the demands on metropolitan production. He called 
for tighter import licensing, especially on dollar goods. 
Moyne also requested measures to reduce consumption through 
increased taxes, such as had been introduced in Britain, 
whose taxation levels the colonies were encouraged to 
emulate6. Since the outbreak of war, officials in London and 
the colonies had been concerned about inflation, fuelled by 
the shortage of imported goods7. Taxation was seen, 
primarily, as an anti-inflationary mechanism, although its 
extension during the war had important future implications 
for colonial government revenues. 
Initially, London expected that the colonies' chief 
wartime role would be to supply raw materials and foodstuffs 
for Britain and her allies. By summer 1940, the Colonial 
Office was revising this view8. At least until 1942, 
colonial resources were often more a liability than an 
asset, because of the loss of important European markets and 
the shipping shortage9. Before 1939, over 40 per cent of the 
exports from Britain's African territories had gone to 
markets outside the Empire, mainly in Europe and the USA. 
Because of the disruption of normal trade, colonial produce 
often lay unsold and unshippable. 
6 PP (1940-41) Cmd. 6299 viii 1, Certain Aspects of Colonial 
Policy in War-Time, 5 June 1941. On developments in 
metropolitan taxation policy in this period, see W. K. 
Hancock and M. M. Gowing, History of the Second World War UK 
Civil Series. British War Economy, (1949), pp. 170,327-8. 
7 Bowden (1980), p. 86. 
8 CO 852/348/9, minute by Melville, 12 June 1940. 
9 Shuckburgh It p. 103. 
25 
The most important legacy of the 1930s was the Colonial 
Office's belief that steps were needed to stabilise primary 
producers' incomes10. The February 1940 Statement of Policy 
recognised the dependence of many colonies on limited 
agricultural resources. Because the value of agricultural 
produce was liable to fluctuate, colonial governments could 
not depend upon the secure revenues necessary for sustained 
development. This had been the underlying economic 
justification for CD &W aid. One consequence of producer 
insecurity, reinforced by the experience of the West African 
cocoa 'hold-ups' in 1937-38, was officials' interest in 
methods of regulating produce marketing. In 1938, the Nowell 
Commission, which investigated the structure of marketing in 
the region, recommended state intervention to ensure fairer 
prices for African producers. Under existing arrangements, 
the largest European trading firms had combined to form 
'pooling' agreements for buying agricultural produce. To 
African producers, this concentration of the European 
trading firms' activities along oligopolistic lines 
demonstrated the firms' attempts to pay the lowest possible 
price for West African produce. Despite the intensity of 
African hostility towards the firms, and despite the Nowell 
Commission's recommendations for a statutory marketing 
scheme, the Colonial office was unwilling to attempt to 
loosen the oligopoly's hold. Its steps to reactivate the 
Colonial Empire Marketing Board were intended to assist the 
existing export trade, for example through market research 
and technical advice. Although the office recognised the 
economic, and ultimately the political problems of 
10 Bowden (1980), p. 76. 
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agricultural over-specialisation, and to the domination of 
the export trade by the European oligopoly, it lacked the 
confidence to create an alternative marketing system, 
fearing the firms' obstruction. This sense of helplessness 
in the face of what officials saw as inevitable developments 
towards larger economic units and reduced competition does 
not necessarily imply official endorsement of the activities 
of European traders, but suggests that the Colonial Office 
had not begun to explore seriously the need to extend state 
economic intervention. 
Increasingly, however, the wartime mobilisation of 
colonial resources and, later, the need to plan postwar 
development, undermined the official bias towards non- 
intervention". The growth of produce surpluses, especially 
of cocoa and oilseeds in West Africa, gave local governments 
strong political arguments for assisting local producers, in 
order to avoid unrest, especially in wartime12. London 
established the West African Cocoa Control Board in 
September 1940, to buy cocoa at a fixed price through 
licenced buying agents, with African producers being 
promised 'fair' prices13. 
An alternative, or complement, to stabilising the West 
African economies through improved produce marketing was 
economic diversification into new activities such as the 




pp. 29,36-9,48,54-6,76; Meredith (1988), pp. 285- 
12 M. Cowen and N. J. Westcott, 'British Imperial Economic 
Policy During the War', in Killingray and Rathbone (1986), 
p. 42. 
13 Bowden (1980), pp. 84-5; Meredith (1986), pp. 77-91. 
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processing of raw materials before export, and the 
manufacture of consumer goods. As Bowden argues, at the 
outbreak of war, the Colonial Office did not see industrial 
development either contributing substantially to the war 
effort, or providing a solution to long-term colonial 
economic problems14. On the other hand, the Office did not 
obstruct the introduction of manufacturing industries 
showing promise of long-term viability15. 
In August 1940, Arthur Greenwood, then a Minister 
without Portfolio, assured the Commons that the entire 
question of produce surpluses, and the possible 
establishment of storage and processing facilities in the 
colonies, was being considered by a sub-committee of the 
Cabinet's Economic Policy Committee16. The extension of 
controls on non-essential imports into the colonies was 
another factor prompting questions on the scope for colonies 
to develop import-substituting industries to help meet the 
shortage of metropolitan exports. The Colonial Office was 
initially sceptical about the potential for local 
manufacturing as a remedy, chiefly because it seemed 
impossible to supply the necessary machinery from Britain, 
and because exchange restrictions made it undesirable to 
release dollars to buy machinery from the USA17. In December 
1940, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, George Hall, 
admitted that little progress had been made in developing 
14 , p. 88. 
15 Ibid.. 
16 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 364, col. 1339,21 Aug 
1940. 
17 CO 852/348/9, minute by Melville, 12 June 1940. 
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manufacturing for war purposes, mainly because of the 
shortage of necessary 18 plant. When questioned about the 
steps being taken in the colonies to compensate for the loss 
of overseas markets, for example through local processing 
and manufacturing, Hall replied that the preparation of a 
statement would involve an unjustifiable amount of work for 
off icials -9 . 
However, guarded encouragement for industrialisation 
emerged during a major Lords debate on colonial economic 
policy conducted the day before Hall's discouraging speech. 
Replying to Lord Farringdon, one of Labour's spokesmen on 
colonial affairs, who spoke of the importance of freeing the 
colonies from their over-dependence on raw material exports 
and who demanded assistance for local industrial development,, 
Lloyd expressed interest in manufacturing. He recognised 
Britain's duty to help foster healthy colonial economies: 
They should not merely depend upon one 
industry or upon the export trade of primary 
products, but, within the range of what is 
economically sane and sound, you should try 
to develop a reasonable number of secondary 
industries in the Crown Colonies. 
Though endorsing the desirability of diversification, Lloyd 
admitted that such a policy would be difficult to implement, 
and emphasised the mutual duties between Britain and her 
colonies, 
the Mother Country, whose taxpayers provide 
large sums for the defence of the Crown 
Colonies, muss have its interests taken into 
consideration". 
18 PD C, 367, cols. 518-9,4 Dec 1940. 
19 Ibid., cols. 1239-40,18 Dec 1940. 
20 
_Parliamentary 
Debates (Lords), 118, cols. 123-40,17 Dec 
1940. 
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In this context, the British 'interests' referred to were 
those of exporters of manufactured goods. 
Economic diversification: the option of manufacturing 
Any sketch of the 'official mind' of the Colonial 
Office in the period 1939-1942 on major questions of 
economic policy depends upon scattered, and relatively rare, 
statements. Not only was the pressure of business acute, 
inhibiting long-term reflection. The Colonial Office was 
also unaccustomed to codifying its economic, or, indeed, 
other policies, in a readily accessible form. As Clauson, 
who ran the Office's Economic Department later commented, 
Ever since the Economic Department was formed 
in 1934, we have regarded it as one of its 
functions to endeavour to promote a common 
economic doctrine not only within the office, 
but also in the Colonial Empire generally. 
There was no question, until the out-break of 
the war, of reducing this common economic 
doctrine to a stated formula. It was rather a 
question of dealing with problems as they 
arose in accordance with certain unstated 
principles, wich were inherent in our 
general policy . 
This reluctance to produce generalised policy statements was 
reinforced by the still strong bias towards treating 
problems on a 'Geographical' basis, rather than thematically 
across the colonial territories. While this had begun 
to 
crumble the practice continued to find loyal adherents among 
conservative senior officials, and contributed to a major 
division of official opinion on how best to pursue the 
development policy22. 
21 CO 852/503/7, minute, 2 Sept 1942. 
22 Lee and Petter (1982), p. 28; Meredith (1988), pp. 
286-7. 
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Compounding these problems was the lack of continuity 
in the Colonial Office's political leadership. Between 
September 1939 and the end of 1942, the Office served five 
Secretaries of State. It was difficult, therefore, to 
sustain the momentum following Cabinet's initial approval of 
the CD &W policy. Although Moyne, in his twelve months' 
tenure, showed a personal commitment to progress with 
development, neither he nor his successors matched 
MacDonald's vigour in advancing new lines of policy. Not 
until the appointment of Oliver Stanley in November 1942 did 
the Colonial Office achieve comparative stability at its 
head. 
Some indication of the Colonial Office's private views 
on industrial development is provided by its reactions to a 
memorandum on export trade policy produced by Lord Stamp of 
the War Cabinet's Economic Secretariat during September 
194023. This attracted the attention of Colonial Office 
officials because the Government had accepted its 
recommendations in principle. Its most pertinent sections 
explained that in wartime it was necessary to examine 
whether the shortage of imported British goods for the 
colonies should be met by steps to produce similar goods 
locally. The memorandum favoured encouraging 'reasonably 
economic' colonial industries, especially those based on 
23 The Survey of Financial and Economic Plans, or 'Stamp 
Survey', was Whitehall's response to requests in July 1939 
for a review of government departments' mobilisation plans. 
See Alec Cairncross and Nita Watts, The Economic Section 
1939-1961. A study in economic advising, (1989), pp. xi, 11- 
14; Alec Cairncross, Years of Recovery. British Economic 
Policy 1945-51, (1985), p. 55; Sir D. N. Chester (ed), Lessons 
of the War Economy, (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 3-4. 
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local produce, which could be established using mainly local 
labour24. 
The Colonial Office decided to send the memorandum to 
the colonies, though some senior officials questioned its 
assumptions, especially the definition of `economic' 
industries. As Caine commented, opinions on this question 
varied considerably: 
The enthusiasts for local industry will 
regard anything capable of physical operation 
as reasonably economic irrespective of its 
cost, while the believers in strict laissez 
faire, if there are any left, will regard 
nothing as economic which requires av stige 
of protection from outside competition2 . 
Clauson, too, advised caution. He claimed that the Economic 
Department of the Colonial Off ice was 'wholeheartedly 
sympathetic' to colonies which seized the opportunity 
provided by the war to establish 'sound' secondary 
industries, but, he pointed out, wartime conditions were 
abnormal, and industries introduced under these 
circumstances might lose their economic justification after 
the war: 
It would be a disaster if one of the by- 
products of the war was a monstrous spawning 
of uneconomic industries in the Colonial 
Empire, and we should be greatly and rightly 
blamed if any part of the responsibi. kty for 
it could be placed upon our shoulders . 
Some of these apprehensions were incorporated in 
Moyne's covering note which accompanied the depatch in March 
24 BT 11/1368, P(E & F)(40)115, War Cabinet Survey of 
Economic and Financial Plans, 'Export Trade Policy', 18 Sept 
1940; CO 852/349/4, circular despatch from Moyne, 22 Mar 
1941; E. L. Hargreaves and M. M. Gowing, History of the Second 
World War - UK Civil Series Civil Industry and Trade, 
(1952), pp. 70-73. 
Co is4-[sSq'c, 
25 zi'L minute, 27 Nov 1940. 
26 Ibid., minute, 28 Nov 1940. 
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1941. Fully agreeing with Stamp's argument that economic 
industry in the colonies should be encouraged, Moyne pointed 
out that it nevertheless reflected short-term, that is, 
wartime, considerations: colonial governments would need to 
take a long-term view. He stressed that a colony would 
derive little benefit from establishing an industry which 
could not produce goods comparable in quality and price to 
those previously imported. The more dependent an industry 
was on protection, the more likely it was to be a burden 
rather than an asset to a colony, although he recognised 
that 'special measures' might be needed to counter attempts 
to 'stifle' a local industry, for example where competitors 
resorted to 'dumping'. 
Secondly, Moyne reminded the colonial governments that 
he could not overlook British exporters' interests. Most 
colonies, he contended, benefited from their links with 
Britain, notably in the field of defence (a timely example), 
and, while local interests should remain paramount, 
industrial development should be tailored to do the minimum 
possible damage to British exporters. In addition, the 
entire market of a colony ought not be reserved for local 
industries: not only should existing British suppliers 
retain some business, but local consumers would benefit from 
the efficiency encouraged by some foreign competition27. 
More revealing indicators of the Colonial Office's 
priorities can be derived from the early consideration given 
to the question of post-war reconstruction. The Committee on 
Post-War Problems, the Colonial Off ice's response to the 
'false dawn' of reconstruction planning, was established in 
27 Ibid., circular despatch, 22 Mar 1941. 
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March 1941 to examine a broad range of questions expected to 
arise after the war. The Committee, apparently the first of 
its kind to be created by a Whitehall department, was 
primarily a fact-finding body28. The importance of its 
discussions is that they enabled the two officials with the 
greatest experience of economic affairs, Clauson and Caine, 
to speculate on likely post-war conditions in the colonies. 
Clauson's ideas drew heavily on the experience of 
developments after 1918. Foreseeing a shortage of goods and 
shipping during the 'transition' period at the end of the 
war, he feared that without government intervention, there 
would be a boom followed quickly by a slump: 
After the last war economic forces were 
broadly speaking left unchecked, and primary 
producers in the period immediately after the 
war reaped a rich harvest owing to the high 
prices which they received for their goods. 
The consequences, so far as most colonial 
producers at any rate were concerned, were 
almost wholly evil. In the first stage they 
received more money than they knew what to do 
with; much of it was wasted; and exaggerated 
ideas of the value of their products and 
numerous expensive tastes were acquired . 
High raw material prices, he went on, had raised the price 
of goods produced from them, a situation which had persisted 
after raw material prices fell. Wartime experience of bulk 
purchase by government could usefully be continued after the 
war, enabling colonial governments to control the supply, 
28 CO 859/80/3, minutes by Jeffries, 4 Mar 1941 and 
Parkinson, 6 Mar 1941; CAB 117/251, `CO Committee on Post- 
War Problems', 15 July 1941; PD(C) 373, col. 593,16 July 
1941. The Committee was chaired by Lord Hailey and comprised 
four Assistant Under-Secretaries: Dawe (head of the Africa 
Division), Jeffries, Clauson and Burns, the latter then 
temporarily 'beachcombing' in the Colonial office between 
his Governorships of British Honduras and the Gold Coast. 
29 CO 852/503/9, CPP 65, 'Colonial economic problems in the 
Reconstruction Period', 31 Mar 1941. 
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and hence the price, of raw materials, thereby limiting the 
scale of the expected post-war 'boom'. Furthermore, colonial 
governments could reserve their profits from selling 
commodities during the boom to supplement prices paid to 
producers during the subsequent slump. 
Some rise of price to the producers would of 
course have to be allowed in order to 
compensate them for the higher prices which 
they would have to pay for their 
requirements; but if any additional profits 
were earned it would, at any rate in backward 
places like West Africa, be better to keep 
them under control and dole them out in the 
ensuing slump than to let them get 
prematurejy into the hands of the 
producers . 
Clauson subsequently emphasised the need to end the 'wild' 
short-term price fluctuations characteristic of the inter- 
war years31. Thus he had prefigured paternalistic 
justifications for the system of state produce marketing 
eventually created in post-war West Africa. 
On development as such in the reconstruction period, 
Clauson again felt important lessons could be learned from 
post-1918 experiences. There must be no repetition, he 
argued, of the 'unco-ordinated' and 'badly conceived' 
development which had occurred then, with ambitious post-war 
schemes, initiated during the brief 'boom', in some cases 
leaving colonies with heavy debt burdens during the 
protracted slump. Clauson envisaged three main lines of 
future development policy. First, the encouragement of 
economic diversification would continue, for example through 
the increased production of food for local requirements. 
30 Ibid.. 
31 CO 852/504/5, CPP(123)1, 'The overseas trade of the 
British Colonial Empire before, during and after the War', 
16 Feb 1942. 
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Secondly, the 'discreet' policy of encouraging secondary 
industries on an 'economic' or 'near economic' basis would 
continue. Here, Clauson's choice of words is instructive, 
underlining the continuing delicacy of the subject, as 
perceived by the Colonial Office, within metropolitan 
circles. Clauson saw the object of this policy as enabling 
colonies to supply simple items for themselves, thereby 
releasing local purchasing power for expenditure on more 
sophisticated, imported, goods. The third aspect of 
development policy, he thought, would be the expansion of 
commodity production, either in terms of volume, where 
suitable markets could be found, or of value, in cases where 
raw materials could be processed locally32. 
Caine's submission to the Post-War Problems Committee, 
was also cautious in predicting future development. He 
warned that Britain faced severe financial difficulties, and 
that domestic reconstruction would make substantial demands 
on metropolitan resources. Therefore, colonies should first 
try to finance development from their own resources, using 
their sterling balances being built up in London as a useful 
source of development capital. Caine also felt that wartime 
produce marketing arrangements, together with increased 
taxation, and the likely post-war scarcity of consumer 
goods, could be expected to swell government revenues. On 
the other hand, Caine warned that the supply position would 
be difficult. He showed a degree of prescience not always 
shared by metropolitan commentators: 
I think we must count on some appreciable 
time elapsing before material is freely 
32 CO 852/503/9, CPP 65,31 Mar 1941. 
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available 55om this country for Colonial 
development . 
Not only would the postwar resumption of development 
probably take longer than many hoped. The expected shortage 
of metropolitan goods could not be alleviated by the 
promotion of manufacturing in the colonies. Caine's reasons 
once again reflect the subject's controversial nature: 
... a definite policy of promoting any big industrial development would be (a) unlikely 
to produce any quick results (b) likely to 
produce a lot of uneconomic industries and 
(c) certain to produce trouble with United 
Kingdom manufacturers 
A more positive view of colonial industry surfaced at 
the Committee on Post-War Problems in May 1941. At its third 
meeting, the Committee agreed in principle that industrial 
development should be encouraged notwithstanding any 
opposition from British manufacturers. It was also agreed 
that more information was needed on the extent of industrial 
development in the colonies to date35. A questionnaire was 
therefore sent to all colonies in an attempt to rectify the 
Colonial Office's ignorance. The Office possessed nothing, 
for example, to compare with the information on colonial 
primary production collected for the pre-war Economic 
Surveys. Even at this stage, officials recognised their 
ignorance as an obstacle to reconstruction planning. Besides 
requesting information on the scale and type of 
manufacturing in the colonies, the Office asked whether 
assistance in the form of protective tariffs had been 
33 CO 852/503/8, CPP 52, 'Thoughts on reconstruction in the 
Colonial Empire', (n. d., but probably Apr 1941). 
34 Ibid.. 
35 CO 967/13, CRC(41) 3rd meeting, 1 May 1941 (the Committee 
was briefly known as the 'Reconstruction' Committee). 
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granted or was judged to be 
survival, and whether these 
compete, with exports from 
Empire or the USA36. The L 
delicacy of these subjects. 
What is striking about 
necessary to these industries' 
industries competed, or might 
Britain, other parts of the 
atter two queries indicate the 
the sparse official references 
to industrial development in this period is the absence of 
attempts to explore the advantages of manufacturing. The 
subject was not, apparently, yet of major concern. The 
Office showed no outright hostility to such development: on 
the contrary, it welcomed industry likely to survive without 
artificial protection. However, officials spent little time 
discussing the promotion of industry. Given the additional 
work which the war had produced for the Colonial Office, 
this is not surprising. This apparent indifference was not 
shared by the West African colonial governments, and the 
multiplication of proposals to establish industries after 
1942 obliged the Colonial Office to re-examine its 
attitudes, and, most importantly, to air this traditionally 
thorny issue in Whitehall. 
The machinery of economic development 
Spring 1941, when Moyne succeeded Lloyd, saw not only 
the Colonial Office's first limited exercises in preparing 
for post-war reconstruction, but also growing concern within 
the Office to revive CD &W policy, an early victim of 
worsening conditions after the fall of France. Bowden argues 
that the impetus for this came from Churchill's instruction 
36 CO 852/368/12, circular despatch, 'Secondary industries 
in the Colonies', 27 May 1941. It is not known whether any 
replies to this despatch have survived. 
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to Moyne, in February 1941, to implement the welfare 
proposals of the West India Royal Commission, a matter made 
urgent by the grant of military bases in the West Indies to 
the United States, to which Britain had to demonstrate good 
faith by pursuing constructive colonial policies, to stem 
the tide of American anti-colonialist rhetoric37. Moyne, who 
chaired the Royal Commission, had witnessed colonial 
poverty, and was convinced of the need for development. He 
sought to capitalise on Churchill's directive by extending 
it to the colonies generally38. The Colonial Office did not 
universally share Moyne's optimism. Sir Cosmo Parkinson, 
recalling the disappointment when development was curtailed 
in 1940, feared that activity might have to be suspended 
again, 'which would be deplorable from every point of 
view'39. Moyne, however, suspected that the absence of 
development proposals denoted that local governments assumed 
that the CD &W Act had been suspended, and he sought to 
correct this impression40. In June 1941, Moyne addressed the 
need to balance the maximum use of colonial resources for 
the war effort, and the desire to safeguard the welfare and 
further development of the colonies. He urged colonial 
governments not to waste resources so that development would 
not impede war production. However, he emphasised the need 
to maximise the colonial contribution to the war effort, and 
said little about how local governments could promote 
37 Bowden (1980), p. 130; see also Lee and Petter (1982), 
pp. 104-6. 
38 Ibid.. 
39 CO 852/482/6, Parkinson to Moyne, 28 Mar 1941. 
40 Morgan (1980) I, pp. 91-2. 
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development41. Nevertheless, Moyne encouraged colonial 
governments to submit essential development schemes. Moyne's 
references to accelerated development may have been merely a 
'sweetener', making palatable the calls for increased 
taxation and tighter import controls which formed the main 
thrust of his despatch. Yet, privately, Moyne rejected as 
'unthinkable' any suggestion that colonial living standards 
could be lowered further42. 
These attempts to reactivate the CD &W policy led also 
to renewed discussions on development planning, and on the 
administrative machinery this would require. A central 
feature of the new policy was that future development should 
be planned. Colonial governments had been invited to prepare 
development programmes, covering a period of years. The 
intention to give assistance 'primarily towards planned 
development' was one of the chief differences between the 
new legislation and the Colonial Development Act of 192943. 
Echoing Clauson's anxiety, Jeffries called for careful 
planning to avoid the 'undesirable consequences' which would 
follow the inevitable post-war 'reaction'. Schemes approved 
under the CD &W Act would have to complement each colony's 
general development plan44. Moyne, too, stressed the need to 
begin planning in readiness to resume development when 
possible: 'Past experience warns us of the danger of 
starting work on ill-considered lines for want of the 
41 See above, p. 2. 
42 CO 852/482/6, minute, 1 Apr 1941. 
43 Morgan (1980) It p. 89. 
44 CO 859/80/3, minute, 4 Mar 1941. 
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necessary forethought'45. More problematic, however, was 
creating the machinery required to co-ordinate planning. In 
1940, the intention had been to establish advisory 
committees in the Colonial Office (development and research, 
to examine applications for assistance. The creation of 
these committees had been deferred indefinitely, since few 
development schemes were expected. Once colonial governments 
had been encouraged to prepare development programmes and to 
apply for grants in June 1941, the Colonial office had to 
examine its existing machinery. Officials believed that at 
least one of the committees originally proposed should now 
be established46. One factor which convinced officials that 
an advisory committee should be formed was a desire to 
placate the ever-vigilant Treasury47. Moyne, aware of 
Churchill's distaste for further expansion among Whitehall's 
advisory bodies, wanted the new supervisory work to be done 
by Colonial Office staff48. In November 1941, the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Advisory Committee (CDWAC) was 
established, comprising five senior officials, including 
Caine and the Financial Adviser, Sir John Campbell, and 
chaired by Lord Dufferin, Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
between 1937 and 1940. It soon transpired, however, that 
IS 
there was insufficient work for the Committee. Hall 
in January 1942 that the Committee demanded only one hour 
per week of Dufferin's attention aroused public criticism, 
45 CO 852/482/6, minute, 1 Apr 1941. 
46 CO 583/262/30498/1941-43, minute by Jeffries, 17 Sept 
1941. 
47 Ibid., minute by Parkinson, 19 Sept 1941. 
48 Ibid., minute by Moyne, 23 Sept 1941. 
41 
itself soon to reach new heights in the wave of 
recrimination and self-examination following the collapse of 
Malaya in February 194249. The CDWAC was a mere stop-gap. 
Dependent on proposals from the colonial governments, it was 
no more capable of seizing the initiative in development 
than its predecessor, the CDAC, had been. It was not 
equipped, nor was it intended, to tackle broad policy 
questions, such as economic diversification, 
industrialisation, or government's economic role. The 
decision to make the Committee entirely official in 
composition suggests a reluctance to include 'unofficial' 
advisers in the Colonial Office's discussions. 
The colonial governments, like London, lacked adequate 
planning machinery. Wartime mobilisation had reduced the 
strengths of colonial administrations, already depleted by 
retrenchment in the 1930s. Hailey believed the solution was 
not to recruit 'specialists', academic or commercial, but to 
make a facility with economic questions, as opposed to 
subjects such as health or agriculture, a normal requirement 
of staff recruited into the Colonial Service, and colonial 
governments should regard economic production as one of 
their normal activities50. 
Bourdillon had sought a full-time economic adviser to 
assist Nigerian development, specifically, responsible for 
co-ordinating his government's development activities. He 
doubted, however, whether a development organisation could 
be built in Nigeria 'from the bottom upwards', as the 
49 On the reactions to the losses in the Far East, and the 
resulting criticism of Britain's colonial record, see Louis 
(Oxford, 1977), pp. 135-39. 
50 CO 967/13, CRC(41) 4th meeting, 6 May 1941. 
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Economic Department of the Colonial Office had been, since 
the Lagos Secretariat lacked the Office's network of 
contacts. The central problem, however, was the wartime 
scarcity of suitable personnel51. This prompted Bourdillon 
to argue that too rigid an insistence on the grouping of 
development schemes into coherent programmes might stifle 
planning entirely, and that flexibility was necessary if any 
progress were to be made52. 
The Colonial Office's apparent failure to create 
satisfactory supervisory and initiatory machinery attracted 
criticism within Britain. In June 1942, Conservative MPs 
called for a 'Colonial Development Board', responsible to 
the Secretary of State for all existing advisory committees, 
and for spending the Colonial Office's annual Vote53. The 
Office decided to establish an Economic Advisory Committee 
in 194354. The Fabian Colonial Bureau suggested that a 
Development and Welfare Commission should be created for 
West Africa, an idea inspired by the Colonial Office's only 
wartime exercise in establishing regional development 
machinery, the formation of the West Indies' Development and 
Welfare Commission in 1940. This body, deemed essential by 
the West India Royal Commission, was to collaborate with 
local governments in planning development. This step was 
closely linked to Churchill's concern to placate American 
51 CO 583/253/30463/1940, Bourdillon to MacDonald, 11 Mar 
1940; note of discussion with Bourdillon, 30 Apr 1940. 
52 CO 583/262/30519/1942, record of discussion between Sec. 
of State, Bourdillon and senior officials in Colonial 
Office, 27 May 1942. 
53 PD C, 380, cols-2025-6,2032,2034-8. 
54 See below, ch. 2, pp. ion-2 
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opinion by pressing ahead with CD &W in the neighbouring 
West Indies55. The Commission's work was slow, however, 
partly owing to shortages of both personnel and materials56. 
This precedent convinced the FCB that a similar 
organisation was needed for West Africa57. Above all, the 
Bureau was concerned about the time taken for development 
schemes to be discussed in the West Indies. The Bureau 
concluded that development planning for West Africa could 
not begin too soon, if co-ordinated development were to be 
achieved within a 'reasonable' period of the war's end. This 
work required a group of full-time Commissioners, to make 
enquiries, examine plans, and discuss with local officials 
the needs of each colony58. The fundamental difficulty, as 
perceived by the Colonial Office, was to find suitable staff 
for a Commission, but it was also feared that its 
investigations would create burdens for local 
administrators, distracting them from war work59. 
These discussions exposed a problem implicit in 
development policy since its inception, namely whether the 
initiative in development should come from London or from 
the colonies. More conservative officials opposed increased 
metropolitan intervention. The February 1940 Statement of 
Policy explained that development planning required 
55 See above, pp. g -q . 
56 Morgan (1980) I, pp. 137-40. 
57 Rhodes House Library, Oxford MSS Brit. Emp. s365, Fabian 
Colonial Bureau Papers, 67/1 f26, Rita Hinden to Cranborne, 
5 Oct 1941. 
58 Ibid.. 
59 CO 859/81/8, minutes by O. G. R. Williams, 31 Oct 1942 and 
Dawe, 5 Nov 1942. 
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appropriate machinery and personnel both in the colonies and 
in Britain, but stressed, however, that their work must be 
co-ordinated, but also collaborative, London's role being to 
assist and guide, not to dictate policy60. 
In the Colonial Office, some believed that practice had 
strayed from intention. Dawe, head of the Africa Division, 
sympathised with calls for a Development and Welfare 
Commision for West Africa because he thought this would be 
both more practical and more constructive than the existing 
system of centralised Colonial Office control of CD &W 
expenditure61. Future progress would require a means of 
making funds available to colonial governments without the 
reference of detailed individual schemes to London: 'a 
policy of devolution is the right road to efficient action 
in this as in other matters'. While the Secretary of State 
should continue to determine broad lines of policy, Dawe saw 
no reason why colonial governments, which enjoyed 
considerable latitude in spending their own revenues, should 
not have similar freedom with CD &W funds. Addressing the 
question of machinery, he suggested that if colonial 
secretariats had to be augmented, regional commissions, on 
the West Indian model, might be suitable: 
But whatever organisation 
should have some roots in t 
develop the theorising, 
impractical features which 
concomitant of over 
bureaucracy62. 
60 Cmd. 6175, Statement of Policy... 
61 CO 859/81/8, minute, 5 Nov 1942. 
62 Ibid.. 
is set up, it 
: he soil and not 
unreal and 
seem to be the 
centralised 
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Centralising views effectively compounded a circular 
problem, since it was precisely the dearth of local 
expertise which constrained a more energetic approach to 
development by many colonial governments. Moreover, however 
much the Colonial Office might have desired a free hand in 
dispensing CD &W grants, accountability to the Treasury was 
a central feature of existing arrangements, and if increased 
funds were to be obtained in future, Parliament had to be 
convinced that money was being spent carefully. Some 
officials therefore saw the requirement that detailed 
schemes had to be submitted before applications for CD &W 
money could be considered as an encouragement to responsible 
spending by colonial governments63. 
Official attitudes towards private enterprise 
However useful politically the CD &W Act of 1940 had 
been portrayed by its advocates, especially MacDonald, the 
sums it provided for development were minute in relation to 
the tasks facing would-be developers. The urgent need to 
improve social welfare standards in the colonies using 
metropolitan funding had been uppermost in the minds of 
those who devised the CD &W policy. Although assistance was 
also to be available for economic development, official 
thinking on this was less clear. The new policy implicitly 
assumed that private capital would remain responsible for 
most economic development. As Caine observed, it was 
certainly not the policy of His Majesty's 
Government to attempt a solution of Colonial 
63 CO 583/262/30519/1942, minute by Gater, 21 Nov 1942; 
ibid., minute by Macmillan, 23 Nov 1942. 
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economic problems by lavish and unthinking 
distribution of money64. 
On the other hand, Caine had predicted that two wartime 
policy adjustments would help local governments to increase 
their development resources: first, the new marketing 
arrangements, which were swelling the colonial sterling 
balances held in London, and secondly, the introduction or 
extension of taxation65. Moyne, too, referred to this 
welcome result of taxation designed to curb consumer 
spending. He argued that colonial governments should build 
up reserves for peacetime use: 
It seems to me definitely preferable that 
Colonial Governments, if they are able to do 
so, should accumulate surplus balances now 
which they can use for purposes of 
reconstruction and development after the war, 
without having to have recourse to assistance 
under the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act, rather than that such balances should be 
surrendered now and applicatttons for 6 assistance be made at a later date 
Bourdillon did not share this optimistic view of the 
financial prospects of colonial governments. He warned that 
the unspent 'surplus' revenue described by Moyne would not 
arise in his territory, where budget balancing still posed 
problems67. 
Official uncertainty about future government aid 
underlined the importance of private capital, prompting 
questions about official attitudes to private enterprise, 
which, in West Africa, effectively meant the large 
64 Morgan (1980) I, p. 97. 
65 CO 852/503/8, CPP 52, Apr 1941. 
66 Cmd. 6299, Certain Aspects of Colonial Polices... 
67 CO 583/262/30498/1941-43, Bourdillon to Moyne, 17 July 
1941. 
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expatriate firms. This raises questions about official 
perceptions of the relative value of private and public 
enterprise in promoting colonial economic growth. 
The depressed 1930s, especially the west African cocoa 
hold-ups, left a legacy of bitterness in the region against 
the operations of large European firms, such as the United 
Africa Company. The hostility felt by African producers 
towards the UAC was a source of growing concern to colonial 
governments in the late 1930s. Relations between the Company 
and local governments were strained. In Bourdillon's view, 
it was impossible to separate in the minds of local 
producers the formation of the cocoa trading oligopoly and 
falling prices68. However, he was adamant that where a 
conflict of interest arose between African producers and the 
European firms, the government's duty was to support the 
former. 
Late in 1938, MacDonald tried to encourage closer 
understanding between the West African governments and 
commercial interests. The responses provided ample evidence 
of the firms' unpopularity. The principal African grievance 
appeared to be the 'monopolistic' character of the 
operations of firms such as the UAC. Local officials, 
however, did not believe that the UAC kept the prices it 
paid to African producers deliberately low: they assumed it 
was in the Company's interests to raise African purchasing 
power, thereby increasing the market for imported goods. Nor 
did the governments share the view, widespread among 
Africans, that the 'pooling' agreements between firms and 
68 CO 554/122/10/33650/1939, Bourdillon to MacDonald, 16 Feb 
1939. 
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the low prices paid to producers were inextricably linked: 
instead, officials argued that depressed world prices for 
primary produce had forced these agreements on the 
participating firms. However, local administrators agreed 
that the UAC, for example, was 'ruthless' against potential 
competitors. 
The governments were equally unanimous that they could 
do nothing to improve relations between local populations 
and the firms without risking their own credibility, as they 
would be seen to be colluding with the firms69. Bourdillon 
believed one solution might be for the UAC to appoint 'a 
really first-class resident Director with plenty of 
imagination and a free hand in purely local matters... '70. 
Certainly he thought the UAC ought to be more open in its 
operations, explaining its actions and consulting educated 
Africans. Governor Hodson of the Gold Coast was more 
vigorous, calling for a radical change of policy: 
So intense is the feeling of mingled hatred 
and fear with which the people as a whole 
regard the Company that no half-measures will 
suffice to eradicate it. 
In his view, the UAC should abandon its selling agreement, 
and soften its attitude towards competitors7l. 
The reactions of the Colonial Office to this problem 
offer insights into officials' general opinions on big 
business. What is most clearly conveyed is a sense of 
impotence in the face of an inevitable evolution towards 
concentration in commerce and industry, and resignation to 
69 Ibid., memo. by H. T. Bourdillon (summarising replies to 
MacDonald's despatch of 8 Nov 1938), 17 May 1939. 
70 Ibid., Bourdillon to MacDonald, 16 Feb 1939. 
71 Ibid., memo. by H. T. Bourdillon, 17 May 1939. 
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conflict when modern business methods confronted 'primitive, 
trading habits. As one official commented: 
The objects of 'big business' and the natural 
trading instincts of Africans are poles 
apart, and there is always bound to be 
resentment and friction where the two meet. 
This is just one of the problems raised by 
the impact of European and African 
civilization72. 
Whereas in Britain, public opinion was apparently reconciled 
to restricted competition, a recent example being the 
agricultural marketing Acts, opinion in West Africa had not 
accepted similar developments among the expatriate firms73. 
Acknowledging that the-tendency towards 'monopoly' might not 
benefit the entire community, and 
the UAC of its attitude towards 
comments revealed a fatalistic, 
that some relaxation by 
competitors, officials' 
6. 
even Darwinian outlook, 
seeing the struggle being waged in West Africa as both 
inevitable and necessary: 
The difficulties at present being experienced 
in West Africa are the result of a clash 
between primitive native customs and advanced 
western methods. The practices of the U. A. C. 
are the practices of modern trade, and the 
native has got to be acclimatized to these 
practices sooner or later. It is very likely 
that his primitive trade methods are 
picturesque and attractive, but that is not a 
sufficient reason for doing what simply 
amounts to putting the clock back. 
Since Africans had to be integrated into the modern 
practices likely to be dominant in the future, it was all 
the more desirable that the UAC, for example, should take 
Africans more closely into its confidence74. Nevertheless, 
72 CO 554/122/33650/1939, minute by Melville, 20 Jan 1939. 
73 Ibid., minutes by Melville, 8 Feb 1939 and 28 June 1939. 
74 CO 554/122/33650/1939, memo by H. T. Bourdillon, 17 May 
1939. 
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as the African becomes more Europeanised it 
is to be hoped that he will become more 
reconciled to the dominance of big business - just as we ourselves hav had to do. It may 
however be a long process 
'5. 
Above all, the Colonial Office, like the colonial 
governments, saw little it could do to encourage firms like 
the UAC to conciliate local African interests76. Ultimately, 
the initiative was left squarely with the firms themselves. 
The UAC was similarly critical of local administrators 
in West Africa. Bemoaning the lack of openings for 
commercial investment in the British colonies, the Company 
alleged that there was no co-operation in development 
between local governments and trading firms. Lord Trenchard, 
Chairman of Unilever, privately criticised the governments 
for being too ready to defend 'native' interests, whereas 
their chief concern should be to improve trade. In his view, 
colonial governments had done 'little or nothing' to promote 
development, for example by encouraging private enterprise, 
being afraid that this would provoke accusations of 
exploitation of Africans. Because of this climate, Trenchard 
claimed, firms such as the UAC were obliged to look for 
investment opportunities outside British territories, for 
example in French and Belgian colonies77. The latter point 
was, as presumably had been intended, of particular concern 
to the Secretary of State78. Yet Trenchard's principal 
75 CO 554/125/14/33650/1940, 
Jan 1940. 
minute by O. G. R. Williams, 29 
76 CO 554/122/33650/1939, minute by O. G. R. Williams, 24 Jan 
1939. 
77 CO 554/122/10/33650/1939, note of meeting in Colonial 
Office with Lord Trenchard, 24 July 1939; ibid., Trenchard 
to MacDonald, 25 July 1939. 
78 Ibid., MacDonald to Trenchard, 4 Aug 1939. 
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grievance appears to have been that commercial 
representatives in West Africa were not accorded the social 
status they expected from colonial administrators, evidence, 
it was alleged, of a continuing official snobbery against 
'trade', and of a tendency to dismiss business methods as 
'grasping and unscrupulous'79. 
Apparently attempting to improve its relations with the 
Colonial Office, Trenchard wrote to Lloyd, placing the 
Company's resources in Britain and overseas at the disposal 
of the government80. However, Caine warned his colleagues to 
look this 'gift horse rather closely in the mouth': while it 
might be attractive to use UAC machinery in West Africa, in 
view of government personnel shortages, it was essential to 
consider the effect on African opinion. To accept the UAC's 
offer might suggest a surrender by the government to the 
'monopoly'81. Caine's misgivings were echoed by his senior 
colleagues, and the Office decided simply to acknowledge the 
UAC's offer82. 
Nevertheless, when it was eventually decided to 
introduce bulk purchasing and marketing of West African 
cocoa, through the West African Cocoa Control Board, the 
government sought the large European firms' help. The Board 
was staffed by officials from the Colonial Office and 
representatives of the West African firms. These firms also 
became the Board's local buying agents. The system of 
79 Ibid., letter to MacDonald, 25 July 1939; CO 
554/125/14/33650/1940, minute by Gater, 16 Feb 1940. 
80 CO 554/125/33649/1940, letter to Lloyd, 23 May 1940. 
81 Ibid., minute, 25 May 1940. 
82 Ibid., minutes by Dawe, 27 May 1940 and Parkinson, 28 May 
1940; letter to Trenchard, 29 May 1940. 
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licensing introduced maintained the firms' dominant position 
in the cocoa trade. The quota system for buying also 
reinforced the existing oligopoly, since quotas were awarded 
on the basis of a firm's performance in the years 1936-39. 
The system benefitted the European firms immense. ( -y, enabling 
them to retain their respective shares of the cocoa trade, 
and to preserve their profits and interests generally83. 
Caine raised a lone voice against the new trading 
structure, demanding rationalisation of the scheme to permit 
the entry of new firms, and a more flexible quota system. 
The WACCB's operations offended his economic liberalism, 
since its allocation of quotas sacrificed the principle of 
efficiency, discouraging cost-cutting by making the margin 
necessary to cover marketing costs that of the least 
efficient participating firm. Caine was rare in being 
prepared to offend European firms by widening the scheme to 
include African and 'Syrian' traders84. Clauson, in 
contrast, defended the European firms, not only because he 
feared the consequences of encouraging the formation of a 
new class of African 'plutocrats', but also because any 
incursion by 'Syrian' traders might erode British profits85. 
The position of the European firms was further 
strengthened by the creation, in May 1942, of the West 
African Produce Marketing Board, to replace the WACCB. A 
consequence of the increased value of West Africa's produce 
after Allied military reversals in the Far East in February, 
83 Bowden (1980), pp. 85,141; Cowen and Westcott (1986), 
p. 43. 
84 Lee and Petter (1982), pp. 87-8. 
85 Minute, 5 May 1941 cited in Bowden (1980), p. 141. 
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the new Board was responsible for exports of oilseeds and 
palm oil in addition to cocoa. Originally proposed by the 
UAC, keen to safeguard its future import trade and to 
exclude potential competitors, the WAPCB continued the 
firms' advantages86. 
State controlled produce marketing was an ad hoc 
response to special conditions: though not recognised as 
such by officials at the time, it was a basis for greater 
economic management by government, the implications of which 
were analysed later in the war. Though temporarily 
strengthening the position of the expatriate firms, 
controlled marketing was a particularly important example of 
state intervention, involving the key sector of most 
colonial economies, the export of primary produce. It was 
introduced, however, primarily in order to avoid unrest 
among the region's producers, emphasising the Colonial 
Office's pre-war reluctance to reform marketing, and hence 
to confront the firms' entrenched power. 
Of particular interest to this study are the responses 
of colonial officials to the business practices of European 
firms engaged in manufacturing, in addition to trading, in 
West Africa. In Nigeria, in 1940, Bourdillon uncovered, 
through interception of the Company's telegrams, efforts by 
the West African Soap Company (WASCO), another Unilever 
subsidiary, to stifle a small Syrian-owned soap factory in 
Kano. WASCO undersold its new rival, the Niger Soap Company, 
in its 'home' market around Kano, and seemed likely to force 
it out of business. Bourdillon abhorred this 'ruthless 
86 Ibid., pp. 137-8; Cowen and Westcott (1986), p. 42-3; 
Hopkins (1973), p. 259; Meredith (1986), p. 81. 
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crushing' of useful local enterprise, and warned London that 
unless it acted, he would publicise the affair widely in 
Nigeria and Britain87. 
Bourdillon's methods and stance alarmed the Office. Not 
only was the Governor guilty, as one official put it, of 
'commercial espionage', misusing cable censorship to derive 
his information, but also his motives in seeking to 
intervene in a private commercial quarrel were dubious88. 
Clauson, for instance, sympathised with WASCO, which he felt 
had protected itself from a rival which had broken previous 
pricing agreements. It was not government's responsibility 
'to enforce commercial discipline and honesty': even less 
was government's duty to protect 'foreign' firms 'from the 
consequences of their own dishonesty'. Politically, the 
entire question was extremely delicate, because if 
Bourdillon's actions became known to Unilever in London, 
their Managing Director, the Member of Parliament Clement 
Davies, might raise the matter in the Commons, giving 
ammunition to American critics who already believed that 
Britain used wartime censorship to its own commercial 
advantage. In Clauson's view, Bourdillon should be told to 
drop the question89. Sir Cosmo Parkinson, suspecting that 
Bourdillon had developed an obsession against Unilever and 
its subsidiaries, observed that as the Governor had already 
approached WASCO, he could hardly be told to forget the 
incident90. 
87 CO 852/290/1, telegram, 3 Nov 1940. 
88 Ibid., minute by Clauson, 8 Nov 1940. 
89 Ibid.. 
90 Ibid., minute, 9 Nov 1940. 
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Unilever supplied the Colonial Office with a 
confidential resume of the Nigerian incident, claiming that 
in the first three years of its operation, the Niger Soap 
Company had, by deliberate underselling, taken roughly one 
third of WASCO's trade in the Kano district. WASCO had, 
therefore, used similar methods against the Niger Soap 
Company, and from October 1940 sold soap at a similar price 
to that of its rival's product. Unilever thereby regained a 
'satisfactory' share of the soap market. Although denying 
any intention of forcing the NSC out of business, Unilever 
warned that if the Company attempted further encroachments 
it would be met with 'normal methods of competition91. Caine 
commented: 
I think it is clear that we should be quite 
wrong in regarding the action taken by the 
United Africa Co. as something int nsically 
wicked which ought to be prohibited . 
Accordingly Lloyd cautioned Bourdillon against intervening 
in a commercial dispute of this nature93. 
Divided opinion was revealed between Bourdillon and 
influential officials in London over acceptable business 
practice. Caine, for instance, believed the Governor was 
attempting to introduce vague ideas of equity into commerce: 
it was mistaken to criticise competition on the assumption 
that a large concern did not require such techniques in 
order to maintain a virtual monopoly. On the contrary such a 
concern could only maintain its position by price-cutting, a 
'pretty effective check' on consumers being exploited. 
91 Ibid., note by Mellor (Unilever), 10 Dec 1940. 
92 Ibid., minute, 12 Dec 1940. 
93 Ibid., telegram to Bourdillon, 24 Dec 1940. 
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The WASCO incident revealed divergent views, too, 
within the Colonial Office, a divergence increasingly 
apparent as the war progressed, between officials whose 
responsibilities were primarily economic, and those whose 
position in 'Geographical' departments gave them broader 
responsibilities, with obligations to take political 
considerations into account when discussing economic 
questions. For example, while both Clauson and Caine, of the 
Economic Department, criticised Bourdillon's actions in the 
WASCO episode, and were opposed to government interference 
in commercial relations, Dawe rejected this position, both 
because of the particular local circumstances g a., 
S la. e_Q 
of the unusual political climate in Britain resulting from 
the existence of the wartime Coalition government. In Dawe's 
opinion, the Economic Department was suggesting that the 
'struggle' between the UAC and its competitors in West 
Africa should be left to resolve itself, and implying that a 
policy of non-intervention was representative of the 
metropolitan government's views. In fact, observed Dawe, the 
British government was temporarily 
holding very different opinions on 
relation to industry: 
Under the stress of war 
is obviously interfering 
never interfered before 
most drastic action to 
private enterprise in t] 
community . 
composed of parties 
the state's role in 
the Government here 
in trade as it has 
and is taking the 
direct and curtail 
he interests of the 
However, since this interference was occurring in wartime, 
it was unwise to draw broad conclusions from current 
practice, either for or against government intervention. Of 
94 Ibid., minute, 31 May 1941. 
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immediate concern was the political dimension to recent 
developments in West Africa. The problem raised by the WASCO 
incident concerned economic issues only superficially: 
fundamentally, it revealed a racial clash between large 
European firms and small, non-European interests, a 
potential source of political controversy. When matters 
reached a certain intensity, believed Dawe, government had 
to intervene. Particularly in wartime, thought Dawe, 
government could not ignore the strong feelings provoked by 
firms such as the UAC. He concluded that the political 
motives behind Bourdillon's actions were therefore 
'thoroughly sound'95. Moyne also sympathised with 
Bourdillon, hoping that WASCO's actions would not lead to 
the exploitation of African consumers, and noting that if 
the Company succeeded in consolidating its monopoly and 
increased prices 'unduly', the government would have to step 
in96. On this occasion, economic arguments outweighed the 
political arguments of Bourdillon and Dawe, and the Colonial 
Office took no action against WASCO. Nevertheless, the 
tension between the two aspects of policy remained, becoming 
familiar in subsequent official discussions. 
Also revealing were London's reactions to Bourdillon's 
decision, in September 1940, to invoke the Defence 
Regulations and veto a UAC scheme to mill flour at Kano 
except under licence, because he feared the political 
repercussions of this apparent attempt to stifle African 
enterprise97. Clauson was highly critical of Bourdillon, 
95 Ibid.; see also minute by Parkinson, ibid., 1 June 1941. 
96 Ibid., minute, 13 June 1941. 
97 CO 852/291/8, Bourdillon to Lloyd, 23 Sept 1940. 
58 
opposing 'discrimination' in favour of African enterprise. 
He concluded that it would be 'disastrous' if the Colonial 
Office favoured the local population, 
for the African has neither the capital nor 
the experience to go any distance in the 
development of secondary industries, and if 
we are to accept the principle that the white 
man is not to be allowed to develop such 
industries, they will not in fact be 
developed, ! Kept very slowly and very 
inefficiently . 
Accordingly, Lloyd queried the need to protect African 
enterprise in the way proposed, adding that competition 
'might in some ways be healthy for it'99. 
In the absence of greater willingness by government not 
only to intervene in economic affairs, but also to engage 
directly in production, the burden of future economic 
development seemed destined to fall upon the only apparent 
alternative reservoir of capital and entrepreneurial skill, 
the European firms. This may partly explain many senior 
officials' reluctance to risk offending the firms by 
confronting them over their activities in West Africa. The 
firms had, as Trenchard had reminded the Colonial Office, 
the option of transferring their interests to other parts of 
Africa. Far from confronting the firms, the Colonial Office 
gave them a valuable role in wartime marketing arrangements. 
On the other hand, the manner in which taxation was 
introduced in Nigeria, for example, suggests that officials, 
not only in West Africa, but also in London, were becoming 
aware of the possibilities of drawing on the wealth-creating 
potential of large concerns such as the UAC for the wider 
98 Ibid., minute, 30 Sept 1940. 
99 Ibid., Lloyd to Bourdillon, 11 Oct 1940. 
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benefit of colonial populations, foreshadowing, perhaps, 
later arguments on the need to promote healthy, but 
controlled, private enterprise. However, it is hard to 
detect any substantial shift in official attitudes in this 
period towards the state's economic role. Officials 
responsible for economic questions showed little interest in 
the possibility of state enterprise as an integral component 
of post-war development: there was little discussion of the 
scope for government experiments in production, such as 
manufacturing. It is because officials continued to assume 
that the initiative in economic development would rest with 
private enterprise that the relationship of the firms with 
government is important. As Clauson observed: 
Actually except in the most primitive 
communities, most impulse and initiative 
would, and should, come from private 
individuals, and the role of the government 
would be rather to indicate the general lines 
of policy dictated by the economic position 
of the country, to endeavour so far as 
possible to direct private initiative into 
useful channels, and to prevent action 
contrary to definite 19 the public 0 interes 
But how representative were these views of the opinions 
of Clauson's colleagues? Reflections by officials during 
this period on the proper functions of the state are rare. 
However, the Colonial Office's Economic Department was 
prompted to record its views in response to a paper 
commissioned for the Committee on Post-War Problems from the 
young West Indian economist, W. A. Lewis, then teaching at 
the London School of Economics. Lewis's paper, circulated in 
August 1942, examined the f low of capital into the British 
100 CO 852/503/17, 'The problem of raising the standard of 
living in the British Colonial Empire', 8 Mar 1942. 
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colonies. The key problem was that the London capital 
market, while prepared to participate in certain sectors of 
colonial economies, especially mineral development, was 
reluctant to consider 'risky' propositions, such as 
secondary industry. Government policy had concentrated on 
raising capital for public works rather than for productive 
enterprise. Moreover, while such local capital as existed 
tended to be re-invested in agriculture, the little locally- 
owned non-mining industry which had developed in West Africa 
had drawn heavily on local savings, with the result that 
most factories were established on a limited scale. 
Lewis suggested that government could remedy the 
problem of financing industry either by guaranteeing private 
investments or by itself lending capital. A further 
suggestion, much discussed later in the war, was for the 
British government to establish a colonial finance 
corporation, to lend capital to approved concerns. Lewis 
dismissed as irrelevant traditional hostility towards public 
enterprise based on the argument that bureaucratic 
management precluded commercial efficiency. This ignored 
conditions in West Africa, where the choice was between 
public or private monopolies. Significantly, Lewis did not 
accept as an argument for state enterprise the claim that 
private firms made excessive profits. If this were true, 
then the remedy lay in effective taxation policies101. 
Lewis's paper was enthusiastically received. Dawe 
minuted: 'I wish we could get a few more outside 
contributors of this intellectual standard'102. Clauson 
101 CO 852/505/3, CPP 152(10), 'Some aspects of the flow of 
capital into the British Colonies', circulated 4 Aug 1942. 
102 Ibid., minute, 14 Sept 1942. 
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regarded the paper as the best yet produced for the Post-War 
Problems Committee103. Caine, however, rejected some of 
Lewis's assumptions, particularly the criticism that 
colonial governments, by concentrating their activities on 
the provision of public works, services and transport, and 
not investing directly in production, had thereby neglected 
the development of colonial economies: 
It is unduly minimising the activities of 
colonial governments to suggest that because 
they have merely spent their money on this 
kind of thing, instead of investing it in 
factories, etc., they have done nothing to 
assist the capital development of their 
territories. There is still probably a very 
good deal to be said for the now somewhat 
old-fashioned view that this is the proper 
sphere of investment for Governments 
04. 
Furthermore, Caine denied that colonial governments had 
been, as often alleged, even more steeped in laissez faire 
ideology than was the metropolitan government, and pointed 
to their role in providing the infrastructure necessary for 
development. In his view, it was perhaps truer to say that 
colonial governments had not lived up to the expectations of 
some sections of opinion. By concentrating on the provision 
of an infrastructure, colonial governments, claimed Caine, 
could enable private enterprise to produce at maximum 
efficiency105. 
There is little evidence that the war had, by 1942, 
altered the Colonial Office's basic assumption that private 
enterprise was the major agent of colonial economic 
activity. Hence, the scope for state 
involvement in 
103 Ibid., minute, 12 Aug 1942. 
104 Ibid., minute, 13 Aug 1942. 
105 Ibid.. 
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production was not examined. This is in marked contrast to 
the situation in West Africa, where local governments showed 
a growing interest in promoting development, including 
diversification. 
Local proposals for industrial development 
Though they received little encouragement from London 
between 1939 and 1942, the West African governments were 
increasingly willing to explore the development of local 
manufacturing, particularly import substitution. Local 
Governors, notably Bourdillon and Burns, were already 
anticipating the post-war period, unlike the Colonial 
Office, whose first serious efforts at reconstruction 
planning did not begin until spring 1943. In Nigeria, 
Bourdillon seized the opportunity created by wartime 
conditions. He aimed to develop food production and 
processing, and the production of palm oil. However, he 
believed that local shortages of capital and expertise 
demanded government initiative, both in funding and 
operating new enterprise. He sought London's permission to 
operate suspense accounts to finance schemes of this 
sort106. 
Although some in the Colonial Office queried this 
departure from orthodox methods of finance, both the 
Financial and Agricultural Advisers supported Bourdillon, 
and the Governor was given the permission he sought107. Here 
106 CO 852/269/8, Bourdillon to MacDonald, 30 Nov 1939. 
107 Ibid., minute by J. B. Williams, 18 Dec 1939; minutes by 
Sidebotham, 19 Dec 1939, Stockdale, 28 Dec 1939 and 
Campbell, 29 Dec 1939; ibid., MacDonald to Governor, 
Nigeria, 9 Jan 1940. 
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was an early example of the effect of war on official 
attitudes. As the Financial Adviser commented: 
Normal accounting seems to me quite impracticable, in cases of this kind; it just 
will not work. And, after all, we are at war 
- when many ' ormal' things go, and must go, by the board1J9. 
Bourdillon subsequently sought CD &W funds, totalling 
L50,000, to help establish industries, arguing that in the 
initial stages of such development, government direction and 
control were 'essential' if 'sound' industries were to be 
established. He envisaged that these Government-sponsored 
schemes would eventually be transferred to African 
management, not to European or Syrian entrepreneurs109. The 
Treasury, however, objected, arguing that the CD &W Act was 
not intended to finance potentially economic propositions. 
The CDWAC subsequently endorsed the Treasury's view that CD 
&W money could not be used for the kind of short-term 
finance which Nigeria needed110. 
The Gold Coast Government was also interested 
industrial development, demonstrated by its reactions to the 
proposal by Achimota College, put forward in 1942, to 
establish an Institute of West African Arts, Industries and 
Social Science. The scheme, first mooted in 1937, was 
approved by the West African Governors' Conference in 1939, 
and by the Advisory Committee on Education in May 1940. 
Responding to the war and the consequent stimulus to local 
108 Ibid., minute by Campbell, 29 Dec 1939. 
109 CO 583/262/30498/1941-43, Bourdillon to Moyne, 17 July 
1941. 
110 Ibid., Syers (Treasury) to Dawe, 3 Dec 1941, enclosing 
note on meeting with Treasury, 11 Nov 1941; ibid., minute by 
Boyse, 18 Dec 1941. 
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industrial development, Achimota had already created 'pilot' 
units, including one manufacturing bricks and tiles"'. The 
scheme's backers believed that the Institute would help to 
accelerate local production, provide the trained personnel 
necessary for manufacturing and contribute to post-war 
reconstruction planning. A fundamental assumption was that 
African development would be better served by a large number 
of small production units, run co-operatively, and spread 
throughout the country, than by concentrated industrial 
112 production in a few centres. 
Governor Burns, already considering post-war 
development, strongly supported the scheme. In particular, 
he saw it as a means of absorbing some of the 'ever 
increasing' number of youths who left school and could not 
find employment in the Civil Service or in commerce. The 
Institute could help by providing craft and industrial 
training. In Burns's view, to delay the scheme would be to 
miss a 'golden opportunity' to provide against one of the 
1 
most important difficulties probable after the war13. 
Once again, London's response was guarded. Clauson had 
misgivings about the qualifications of the scheme's 
unofficial backers, one of whom was the 'progressive' film 
producer, John Grierson. More importantly, he was unhappy 
that the Institute, in addition to its educational and 
research functions, was to engage in productive enterprise. 
111 CO 96/775/1/31401/1941, Burns to Moyne, 8 Nov 1941; 
Shuckburgh I, pp. 300-1. 
112 CO 554/130/33685/1942, 'Memorandum on the proposed 
Institute of West African Arts, Industries and Social 
Science', 18 July 1942. 
113 Ibid., Burns to Moyne, 16 Jan 1942. 
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This sort of activity, he thought, should be under the 
direction of the Gold Coast Secretariat's Economic 
Department. 
Later, when detailed comments on the scheme were 
requested from the Economic Department of the Colonial 
Office, sympathy was expressed with the goal of economic 
diversification. It was admitted that in the past colonies 
had been vulnerable to world market fluctuations, over which 
producers had no control. Therefore, anything which would 
broaden West Africa's economic base was considered valuable. 
Also, the spread of education called for greater 
occupational variety than was currently available, as it was 
thought undesirable that the only opportunities open to 
educated Africans should be clerical. Doubts were expressed, 
however, about the apparent bias shown by the Institute's 
sponsors against large-scale enterprise, and their 
preference for 'cottage' industry, an outlook thought to 
derive from the enthusiasm of anthropologists and 
sociologists for traditional social organisation. It was 
considered unrealistic to try to shelter Africans from the 
social evils already witnessed where large-scale development 
had occurred, for example in the Transvaal or on the 
Copperbelt. Not only would educated Africans resent such 
paternalism, but also if large-scale enterprise proved to be 
the most economical, then it was bound to develop, as it had 
114 done in India, China and Japan. 
114 Ibid., minute by Carstairs, 15 Sept 1942. Carstairs was 
an Assistant Secretary in the Economic Department, soon to 
become head of its Production branch. The general points he 
raised do not seem to have been taken up by his colleagues. 
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The Allied military reversals in the Far East early in 
1942 placed new demands on West Africa and stimulated local 
industrial development. There was an increased drive to 
maximise raw materials production for the Allied war effort. 
Shortages of commodities replaced earlier surpluses, and in 
March 1942, London requested the African colonial Governors 
to intensify local production to make good the loss of Far 
Eastern supplies: '... the foodstuffs and minerals of the 
African dependencies have become a vast armoury for the war 
effort'115. The most important immediate consequence of this 
was the major extension of state-controlled produce 
marketing, and the transformation of the West African Cocoa 
Control Board into the West African Produce Marketing 
Board116. In turn, the West African Governors were 
encouraged to examine the question of ensuring that the 
requirements needed to maintain maximum production were met, 
including a review of the scope for manufacturing locally 
the consumer goods needed to absorb rising African incomes, 
117 and to act as incentives to greater productivity. 
Similarly, there was a relative loosening of restrictions on 
consumer goods imports118. The Colonial office recognised 
that if the colonies were to maintain and increase 
production, they would have to receive goods in return, and 
115 Quoted in Cowen and Westcott (1986), p. 44. See also 
Hargreaves (1988), pp. 52-3, and N. J. Westcott, 'Sterling and 
Empire: The British Imperial Economy, 1939-1951', 
unpublished seminar paper, University of London Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, 1983, p. 4. 
116 Meredith (1986), pp. 80-1. 
117 CO 852/506/1, Moyne to WAGC , 17 Jan 1942. 
118 Bowden (1980), p. 139. 
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not merely credits. Without some immediate reward, producers 
were unlikely to keep up their efforts119. 
The obstacles to local industrial development, and the 
Colonial Office's responses to them, are illustrated by the 
proposal, in spring 1942, for Achimota College to 
manufacture textiles. This was a modest scheme to establish 
a textile unit of 19 hand-looms and one semi-automatic loom. 
Its annual output was expected to be about 45,000 yards of 
36 inch cloth. Given the Gold Coast's normal minimum imports 
of cloth, about 25 million yards per annum, the Achimota 
unit posed no serious threat to the import trade120. Burns 
was initially cautious, fearing that Achimota might over- 
reach itself, and that the demand for locally-produced cloth 
might not survive the war, and that unless the local 
industry received tariff protection, it could not compete 
. with imported British goods121 
Nevertheless, when the proposal was formally submitted 
to London in May 1942, it was backed by the Gold Coast 
government, which saw the experiment as a means of expanding 
and improving the small local weaving industry, which faced 
extinction because of its dependence on imported, machine- 
spun yarn, supplies of which were now difficult to obtain. 
It was therefore felt necessary to encourage local cotton 
spinning. A further advantage of the plan was that it would 
stimulate local cotton-growing. Initially, the textile unit 
was expected to be supplied with cotton from Nigeria and the 
119 CO 852/504/5, CPP 123(1), memo. by Clauson, 'The 
overseas trade of the British Colonial Empire before, during 
and after the War', 16 Feb 1942. 
120 CO 852/370/12, minute by O. G. R. Williams, 1 May 1942. 
121 Ibid. ', Burns to O. G. R. Williams, 2 Feb 1942. 
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Belgian Congo, but it was hoped that this would eventually 
be replaced by Gold Coast cotton. As the local production of 
cotton increased, it was planned to establish similar 
textile units elsewhere in the territory122. 
The Colonial Office was at first sceptical about the 
Achimota proposal. It was thought that African weavers would 
be slow to learn how to operate and service anything but the 
simplest type of spinning machinery and hand loom123. 
Clauson's contribution seems particularly inappropriate, in 
view of the technical training currently being given to 
African military personnel: 
We have no knowledge whether possible mill- 
hands exist in Nigeria; we do know that many 
negroes are unfit for the jloýb4 because their 
hands are too large + clumsy . 
Clauson had evidently learned little: he used precisely the 
same argument when opposing a proposal from Uganda in 1937 
to develop a cotton weaving plant125. However, the Achimota 
scheme was approved in June 1942, and permission was granted 
for Achimota College to seek funding from the Gold Coast 
Legislative Council126. Among the reasons for the Office's 
sympathy with the scheme were concern at the ailing 
condition of local weaving, and the promise that local 
textile production would help ease the shortage of imported 
122 Ibid., Acting Governor, Gold Coast to Cranborne, 1 May 
1942; ibid., minute by O. G. R. Williams, 1 May 1942. 
123 Ibid., minute by O. G. R. Williams, 23 Feb 1942. 
124 Ibid., minute, 30 Apr 1942. 
125 D. M. Meredith, 'The British Government and Colonial 
Economic Development, with particular reference to British 
West Africa, 1919-1939', unpublished Ph. D. thesis, 
University of Exeter, 1976, p. 135. 
126 CO 852/370/12, minute by O. G. R. Williams, 16 June 1942; 
ibid., Cranborne to OAG, Gold Coast, 17 June 1942. 
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cotton goods127. The Colonial Office was also assured by the 
staff of Achimota that the textile unit could survive 
without artificial support, such as tariff protection128. 
The Office saw good reasons for proceeding quickly. Not only 
would the project require little machinery from Britain, and 
little skilled manpower, but also if successful, the unit 
would demonstrate that manufacturing of this sort was 
feasible in West Africa129. Another reason for official 
approval was that the proposal was already well known in 
West Africa: if the Colonial Office delayed the scheme, it 
risked being accused of putting British business interests 
before a 'promising' opportunity to help African 
130 development. 
The Achimota project depended, however, on obtaining 
the necessary machinery from Britain. Because of the current 
limits on the export of goods to markets outside the dollar 
area, the Colonial Office required the Board of Trade's 
permission for machinery to be earmarked for Achimota. This 
meant raising the entire question of colonial manufacturing, 
to which the Board was traditionally hostile. For example, 
when the CD &W Bill was under preparation in 1940, the 
Board urged that the new assistance should not be used to 
encourage the development of 'uneconomic' colonial industry: 
127 Ibid., minute by O. G. R. Williams, 1 May 1942. 
128 CO 554/130/33685/1942, minute by O. G. R. Williams, 10 Apr 
1942. 
129 Ibid., minute by O. G. R. Williams, 6 June 1942. It does 
not appear that the Office was aiming to demonstrate this 
point to any particular audience, but rather sought to 
establish an important general principle, presumably so as 
to be able to reinforce its position if obliged to defend 
other industrial proposals against metropolitan criticism. 
130 Ibid., minute by Dawe, 10 June 1942. 
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it assumed that the Advisory Committee to be created to 
consider grant applications would bear this concern in 
mind131. Whereas Caine thought this reasonable, agreeing 
that care should be taken, as had been in administering the 
Colonial Development Fund after 1929, to avoid subsidising 
uneconomic industries competing with British manufacturers, 
higher authority in the Colonial Office felt that the Board 
of Trade should not be the arbiter of what was an 
'uneconomic' industry132. 
Similarly, the Board was unenthusiastic in its response 
to the 'Stamp memorandum', already described. R. J. Shackle 
took issue with the Survey's apparent complacency at 
overseas industrialisation, pointing out that unless this 
process were gradual, it would severely affect British 
interests. As for the assertion that colonies should be 
given 'every encouragement' to industrialise, this went 'too 
far'. Wartime encouragement of colonial industries would 
ignore Britain's post-war requirements for export markets. 
The fact that Britain was likely to emerge from the war a 
debtor, 'entirely dependent' on its exports, was a powerful 
argument against encouraging overseas diversification133. 
The Board of Trade's continuing concern about the colonies' 
future as markets for Britain was similarly revealed by its 
reactions to the Colonial Office's circular telegram of 5 
June 1941, which had asked colonial governments to tighten 
131 CO 859/40/7, R. M. Nowell (Board of Trade) to Caine, 3 
May 1940. 
132 Ibid., minutes by Caine, 7 May 1940, Shuckburgh, 9 May 
1940 and Dufferin, 10 May 1940. 
133 BT 11/1368, P(E & F)(40)115 War Cabinet Survey of 
Economic and Financial Plans 'Export Trade Policy', 18 Sept 
1940, with marginal comments by Shackle. 
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import controls. The Board was annoyed not to be consulted 
over so important an area of policy134. 
In view of the pre-war difficulties of Lancashire, the 
Board of Trade was inevitably sensitive to foreign textile 
competition. The question of cotton goods supplies to West 
Africa had already become controversial in Whitehall long 
before the Achimota proposal. Late in 1940, the Cotton Board 
urged the Board of Trade to take action to curb Indian 
competition in colonial markets135. The problem was thought 
to be especially serious in West Africa, where exports of 
Indian textiles to Nigeria in the first quarter of 1940 were 
five times the level in the same period in 1939. The 
Association of West African Merchants (AWAM) believed that 
India might take 98 per cent of the Nigerian bleached goods 
market unless London acted (the figure in 1936-38 had been 
three per cent). The basic problem, as ever, was that 
Lancashire could not compete with Indian prices. British 
manufacturers were particularly concerned about their 
postwar prospects: it might then be politically impossible 
134 Lee and Petter (1982), p. 85-6; this question remained of 
concern to the Board of Trade after the war, as is discussed 
below in ch. 5. 
135 BT 175/1, CB 241, Cotton Board 22nd meeting, 12 Nov 
1940; ibid., CB 261, Cotton Board 24th meeting, 26 Nov 1940. 
The Cotton Board, created under the Cotton Industry 
Reorganisation Act (1939), and reconstituted the following 
year as a statutory body, was responsible for streamlining 
the cotton industry by closing 'surplus' factories. 
Appointed by the President of the Board of Trade and based 
in Manchester, the Board, representing employers and 
workers, supervised a drastic 'concentration' of the cotton 
industry between 1940 and 1942, when about one third of 
working mills were closed. From 1942, the Board was to be 
active in discussions on the cotton industry's post-war 
prospects. [See Hargreaves and Gowing (1952), pp. 46-8,344, 
364,392; Marguerite Dupree (ed), Lancashire and Whitehall: 
the diary of Sir Raymond Streat Volume One: 1931-39, 
(Manchester, 1988), pp. xi-xxi, 47-8]. 
72 
to act, given the seeming inevitability by 1942 of Indian 
devolution. The Board of Trade agreed that political 
considerations indicated the need for immediate measures. 
The President of the Board therefore called for a quota 
system in colonial markets, and thought that the AWAM might 
1 
. 
be persuaded to limit its purchase of Indian textiles36 
The Colonial Office rejected this proposal, arguing 
that it was unreasonable to expect West Africa, already 
suffering from loss of markets for its main exports, to pay 
enhanced prices for cloth. Moyne claimed that a fundamental 
principle was at stake: 
Since the latter part of the 18th Century, 
when an attempt to reserve the trade of the 
American Colonies for the benefit of the 
mother country led to disastrous 
consequences, it has been the declared policy 
of H. M. G. not to use the powers of control 
which it possesses ove the Colonial Empire 
for purely selfish ends 37. 
Moyne explained that the existing quota against Japanese 
textiles had already given rise to 'considerable resentment' 
in West Africa, and that the Board's proposal was 
irreconcilable with the principles of 'trusteeship'; 
moreover, it would create a dangerous precedent, which it 
would be difficult to deny to other British industries, 
where Indian, and possibly even colonial, competition was 
involved. The Colonial office feared that a quota system 
might provoke political unrest, and it doubted whether 
colonial populations could afford anything but the cheapest 
136 CAB 71/3, LP(41)16, 'Competition between Indian and 
United Kingdom Textiles in Colonial Markets. Note by the 
President, Board of Trade', 8 Feb 1941. 
137 Ibid., LP(41)21, 'Competition between Indian and U. R. 
textiles in colonial markets. Note by the Colonial 
Secretary', 13 Feb 1941. 
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goods, given the twin local problems of falling produce 
prices and rising prices of essential goods. Moyne concluded 
that Lancashire's true concern was its post-war future: 
I feel very strongly that, if Lancashire 
wishes to retain its trade after the war, it 
should do so by the ordinary commercial means 
of r Ging its prices to a competitive level 
g0 
When the Lord President's Committee discussed the question 
in February 1941, Moyne, supported by the Secretary of State 
for India, Leo Amery, who was concerned about the possible 
political reactions in India, convinced his colleagues that 
the Cotton Board's request was impracticable. Instead, the 
Committee asked the Treasury and the Board of Trade to 
investigate other measures to secure Lancashire's colonial 
13 markets9. 
Early in May 1942, Macmillan approached Dalton, the 
President of the Board of Trade, on the supply of sufficient 
cotton piece goods to Africa to stimulate raw materials 
production. Acknowledging that West Africa's cotton goods 
allocation was generous, he explained that more goods were 
needed to raise the region's productivity, and that the 
Colonial Office was considering small-scale, local textile 
production to supplement British supplies, and sought 
140 Dalton's help in obtaining second hand textile machinery. 
Dalton's reply was discouraging. He argued that West Africa 
had already received 'generous' allocations of cotton goods 
138 Ibid.. 
139 CAB 71/3, LP(41) 4th meeting, 14 Feb 1941. On the Lord 
President's Committee's responsibilities for major questions 
of economic policy, see Chester (1951), pp. 8-9 and Hancock 
and Gowing (1949), pp. 219-220. 
140 CO 852/370/12, Macmillan to Dalton, 4 May 1942. 
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73.6 million square yards in 1941, compared to 82.5 million 
square yards in 1939), and that an additional eight million 
yards, originally intended for Asian markets, had recently 
been diverted to West Africa. He therefore saw no 
justification for a local textile industry. Moreover, he 
envisaged problems in recruiting skilled labour locally, and 
argued that the reconditioning of second hand machinery in 
Britain, or the manufacture of new 
efforts away from essential war . work 
141 
Parallel to these discussions, 
plant, would divert 
another scheme to 
produce khaki cloth in West Africa was being considered by 
the War Office. The proposal, involving the construction of 
a textile plant at Abeokuta in Nigeria, was to produce one 
million yards of cloth per annum, thereby saving on shipping 
space. The necessary cotton would be grown and ginned 
locally. It was hoped that full production could be reached 
within a year. The Colonial Office showed little initial 
interest, because it was reluctant to encourage an industry 
14 which might have no economic justification after the war2, 
However, officials were subsequently assured by Achimota 
College that the military scheme complemented its own plans 
to expand local textile production, avoiding the 'evils' of 
industrialisation on the usual European model143. The 
military authorities had been persuaded by Achimota that its 
textile scheme could supply the training needed for the 
Abeokuta workforce, which led the War Office to ask the 
141 Ibid., Dalton to Macmillan, 15 May 1942. 
142 Ibid., Cullen (Ministry of Supply) to Clackson (DDPC), 
24 May 1942. 
143 Ibid., minute by O. G. R. Williams, 1 May 1942. 
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Colonial Office to consider the Achimota plans 
favourably144. 
On 30 June 1942, a meeting was held in the Colonial 
Office to discuss these two proposals. Representatives of 
the War Office, the Ministry of Supply and the Board of 
Trade also attended. The key problem discussed was the 
supply of machinery for the plants at Achimota and Abeokuta. 
The Ministry of Supply warned that the manufacture of new 
textile machinery for export was problematic. The Board of 
Trade added that there would be difficulties in exporting 
second hand machinery. One of the undertakings reached in 
the reorganisation of the British cotton industry, begun 
immediately before the outbreak of war, was that machinery 
from factories closed under 'concentration' would not be 
sold abroad. The Board would have preferred the additional 
textile production to be in Britain, because of West 
Africa's importance to Lancashire. Clauson pointed out that 
other Whitehall departments thought the West African 
proposals worthwhile, providing insurance against the loss 
of supplies from Britain and India. He also argued that the 
schemes would give useful experience of industrial 
development in West African conditions. The meeting agreed 
that the West African Governors should be asked to examine 
the proposal, and that meanwhile the Board of Trade would 
examine the question of machinery supplies145. Soon 
144 Ibid., Fisher (War Office) to O. G. R. 
1942. 
Williams, 8 June 
145 Ibid.,, note of meeting held in Colonial Office, 30 June 
1942. Since 1941, the Board of Trade had been similarly 
unenthusiastic towards proposals by the Government of 
Ceylon 
to develop a textile industry, arguing that new plant was 
difficult to supply and quoting the undertaking on second- 
hand machinery given to the Cotton Board. In May 
1942, the 
Governor of Ceylon was informed that London could not 
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afterwards, the Board reported that no second hand machinery 
was available for Abeokuta, since any proposal to export 
plant from the 'concentrated' industry would raise a 
difficult question of principle146. Undeterred, the Colonial 
Office approached the Ministry of Supply. Referring to the 
Abeokuta project, Creasy wrote: 
Our position in the Colonial Office is quite 
clear; we should be very glad to see this industry established and the sooner the 
better, as it will form a useful guide for 
the consideration of future developments in 
regard to textile manufacture in West 
Africa147. 
The Colonial Office believed that the necessary machinery 
could be found in Britain, if the project were deemed 
important to the war effort. However, the Office did not 
think it was worth making a very strong case for the 
adoption of the War Office scheme, unless 'special wartime 
considerations' were involved, since the output of the plant 
would be 'trifling' compared to West Africa's total textile 
requirements. On the other hand, Creasy felt that the 
military authorities' interest was quite different, 
originating in the problem of supplying enough cloth from 
India and Britain. If the Abeokuta project could benefit the 
War Office quickly, there were grounds for trying to secure 
the machinery needed from 'concentrated' mills in Britain. 
It will no doubt be possible for the Board of 
Trade to devise some means of placating the 
industry, and, even if that proves difficult, 
it is obvious that in the last resort the 
consider assisting any scheme not of demonstrable value to 
the war effort [Shuckburgh I, p. 292]. 
146 Ibid., J. R. Willis (Board of Trade) to Creasy, 8 July 
1942. 
147 Ibid., letter to Calder (Ministry of supply), 15 July 
1942. 
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industry's pos 1-rjr position must not be the deciding factor . 
Nevertheless, textile development in West Africa received a 
fresh blow when the Crown Agents reported that the Board of 
Trade had vetoed the supply of machinery to Achimota since 
the larger Nigerian scheme had similarly been refused149. 
The fate of these projects appeared to be sealed only days 
later when the War Office told the Colonial office that it 
had been estimated that the Abeokuta factory would not 
become operational for nearly two years, rendering the 
project pointless in the military's eyes, an opinion shared 
by the Ministry of Supply. While an alternative scheme to 
produce cloth in the Belgian Congo would be examined, the 
War office intended to postpone a final decision until it 
had received a full report from its representative in West 
Africa150. 
At this stage, the Resident Minister in West Africa, 
Lord Swinton, intervened. Swinton, later prominent in the 
reconstruction debate, doubted that West Africa could supply 
much more to the Middle East theatre than manpower, since 
all the region's raw materials were needed in Britain and 
the USA, and producing them would demand all West Africa's 
energies. On the plans to produce cloth for the military, 
Swinton believed the deciding factor in locating the factory 
should be how quickly it could become productive. Although 
he did not dismiss the Abeokuta project out of hand, he 
148 Ibid.. 
149 Ibid., E. Ringwood (Crown Agents) to O. G. R. Williams, 18 
July 1942. 
150 Ibid., Maj. F. C. Fawcett (War Office) to Creasy, 22 July 
1942. 
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thought that in view of the time factor, the most sensible, 
if politically delicate, choice would be to arrange for 
increased production from the established textile industry 
in the Belgian Congo. Swinton acknowledged that there would 
be hostility in Britain to any extension of textile 
factories in Africa with British Government funds, because 
this would be seen as subsidising post-war competition. One 
solution, he thought, might be for the Ministry of Supply to 
lend the necessary plant, as was happening in British 
factories. This plant would remain British Government 
property and could therefore be removed after the war. 
Alternatively, a British firm might be allowed to operate 
'shadow' factories in Africa, providing the necessary 
expertise and personnell51. In the event, the military 
authorities in West Africa advised the War Office that the 
textile industry in the Belgian Congo should be extended in 
preference to establishing a new plant in Nigeria, and 
Swinton endorsed this suggestion152. However, the changed 
military situation in late 1942 persuaded the War Office to 
abandon the scheme entirely153. 
Meanwhile, there remained the original Achimota 
proposal. The scheme's principal advocate, the Art 
Instructor at Achimota, Meyerowitz, was reluctant to abandon 
his plans in the face of the Board of Trade's opposition. He 
tried to convince the Board that the project had merits 
irrespective of any connection with a military textile 
151 CO 852/502/19, letter to Bishop, 31 July 1942. 
152 CO 852/370/12, telegram to Cranborne, 11 Aug 1942. 
153 Ibid., Macmillan to Dalton, 7 Dec 1942. 
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scheme, and requested the Colonial Office's support154. 
Within the West Africa Department, O. G. R. Williams was not 
optimistic: 
I do not believe that the Board of Trade is 
at present at all interested in post-war 
textile production in West Africa. Indeed, I 
should expect them on general grounds to be 
rather suspicious of it. 
Significantly, he admitted that in exchanges with the Board 
of Trade, the Colonial Office had emphasised the relation of 
the Achimota project to the Abeokuta scheme in order to get 
1 the Board to consider the former proposal at all55. 
William Is comments were soon borne out when the Board of 
Trade informed the Colonial Office that 'however 
meritorious' the Achimota project might be, it was difficult 
to justify the manufacture and export of textile machinery 
from Britain, bearing in mind the current policy of 
restricting exports of machinery to essential war 
purposes156. Williams replied that the Achimota scheme 
should be considered on its own merits, and that its fate 
should not hinge upon decisions concerning other proposals 
which had different purposes. He explained that the Colonial 
Office's chief interest in the Achimota textile unit was its 
long-term value as an educational project, creating the 
conditions necessary for the spread of technical knowledge 
in West Africa. Accepting that these were not considerations 
which would interest the Board of Trade, he nevertheless 
argued that the question was 'of great significance' both to 
154 Ibid., letter to O. G. R. Williams, 5 Aug 1942. 
155 Ibid., letter to H. Meyerowitz, 7 Aug 1942. 
156 Ibid., J. R. Willis (Board of Trade) to O. G. R. Williams, 
25 Aug 1942. 
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Accra and the Office on 'important grounds of policy'. 
Adding that the proposed plant would ease the cotton goods 
supply position in West Africa, he asked the Board to 
reconsider its earlier decision157. 
Williams's request was reinforced by the personal 
intervention of Macmillan, who wrote to the Board of Trade 
in similar terms at the prompting of Sir Keith Hancock, the 
expert on colonial issues158. This initiative produced a 
markedly different response from the Board of Trade. 
Harcourt Johnstone, the Secretary for Overseas Trade, told 
Macmillan that the Achimota project had his Department's 
sympathy: if reconditioned second-hand machinery were not 
available, then approval would be given for new textile 
plant to be manufactured for the project159. In the event, 
no suitable machinery was found, and the Board of Trade 
informed the Crown Agents that orders for new equipment 
could be placed160. The importance of the West African 
proposals for local industrial development in 1942 is that 
they forced the Colonial Office to address specific 
problems, such as the supply of textile plant, as well as 
general policy issues, such as the metropolitan government's 
attitude to colonial industrialisation, and to leave the 
relative security of internal Office discussion for the 
exposed arena of inter-departmental debate. 
157 Ibid., letter to Willis, 30 Sept 1942. 
158 Ibid., letter to Waterhouse (Board of Trade), 1 Oct 
1942. 
159 Ibid., letter to Macmillan, 7 Oct 1942. 
160 Ibid., J. R. Willis to O. G. R. Williams, 16 Nov 1942. 
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Towards a policy on industrial development 
The Colonial Office was probably encouraged to 
persevere with this question by recent developments in the 
broader consideration given to the issue of colonial 
industrialisation. Although this matter had been raised on a 
number of occasions during 1942, the Colonial Office still 
required an 'authoritative' ruling, because of the 
persistent hostility to the idea among other government 
departments. Moreover, besides the West African schemes, 
proposals for manufacturing were being received from East 
161 Africa, reinforcing the case for clear policy guidelines. 
The Office agreed to refer the subject to the Cabinet Africa 
Committee, established in 1942 to complement the work of the 
16 Resident Minister in West Africa2. 
At this stage, there is little evidence that the 
Colonial Office regarded industrialisation as a solution to 
West Africa's fundamental economic problems. Nor was the war 
regarded as an opportunity to cultivate an import- 
substituting sector in the region. The Office's attitudes to 
industrial development continued to betray some of the 
divisions detectable in earlier discussions. However, 
evidence of official support for limited industrialisation 
exists. This has already been seen in the West African 
Department's willingness to defend the Achimota scheme. 
Earlier, Clauson had emphasised that the purpose of 
161 During 1941, in 
chiefly at supplying 
support from the East 
question was examined 
Board. See Shuckburgh 
(1986), p. 55. 
sport-substituting industries, aimed 
military needs, had developed with 
African governments, and the entire 
by the East African Civil Supplies 
I, pp. 282-3 and Cowen and Westcott 
162 CO 852/431/1, minute by Carstairs, 2 Sept 1942. 
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industrial development was to release local purchasing 
power, which could be re-directed towards more sophisticated 
imported goods. In other words, although industrialisation 
would reduce imports of simple goods such as soap and 
matches, this would be balanced by increased imports, for 
example from Britain, of goods which could not be produced 
locally. Therefore, provided development were not so rapid 
as to cause economic dislocation elsewhere (and in practice 
he saw no prospect of this), Clauson felt that London was 
bound to support it as essential to the general strategy for 
raising colonial living standards-63. 
Subsequent discussions, however, suggest that the Board 
of Trade, especially, was less inclined to distinguish 
between manufacturing designed to broaden colonial import 
markets, and manufacturing which, more immediately, would 
erode British export markets, affecting Lancashire 
especially. The war had not eroded the Board's suspicion of 
colonial manufacturing, as its tenacious resistance to the 
growth of a West African textile industry demonstrates. 
While the Colonial Office could admit, privately, that 
its ideas on industrial development had evolved gradually, 
officials saw no radical break in policy, and there 
persisted a characteristically bureaucratic preference to 
discern a broad continuity in policy objectives. Thus, 
Clauson could reflect in 1942, on metropolitan policy 
towards colonial industrialisation: 
Here it is true that views to-day are not the 
same as they were 8 or 10 years ago, but even 
then the Government was not preventing, and 
indeed had not the power to prevent, the 
establishment of industrial undertakings in 
163 CO 852/504/5, CPP 123(1), 16 Feb 1942. 
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the Colonies. What it did have the power to 
prevent, and did discourage, was the 
establishment of highly protected ipustries 
under the cover of a revenue tariff 
While Clauson left open the question of future policy on 
protection, suggesting that this would depend largely on any 
post-war settlement, Caine's ideas were clearer. Although he 
felt that colonial industries were 'fairly certain' to 
develop, he believed that 'for a long time' they would be 
restricted to the 'simpler' kind of factory. On assistance 
to 'uneconomic' industries, for example by tariff 
protection, Caine argued that it was 'impossible to 
challenge the logic of the full free-trade case on the 
assumption of full freedom in every aspect of the economic 
process'165. Caine's preference for a general liberalisation 
of the economic order was accompanied by an understanding 
that much depended on still unresolved questions of 
international commercial policy. He was not optimistic that 
a consensus spanning Whitehall could easily be reached on 
colonial industrialisation, a question he considered still 
liable to produce 'violent controversy'. He recalled the 
Office's recent attempts to compose suitable policy 
guidelines for local governments, noting how they had all 
failed because interdepartmental agreement in London had 
proved elusive. Referring to the internal discussions which 
had preceded the despatch of Moyne's circular in March 1941, 
Caine remembered how difficult it had been for the Colonial 
Office to agree on how much of the accompanying 'Stamp 
16 memorandum' on export trade policy should be included6. 
164 CO 852/505/3, minute, 12 Aug 1942. 
165 CO 852/503/7, minute, 26 Aug 1942. 
166 Ibid.. 
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On 16 September 1942, the Cabinet Africa Committee, 
chaired by Cranborne, discussed a Colonial Office paper on 
industrial development. Cranborne referred to a widespread 
impression that London opposed colonial manufacturing, and 
to the resulting belief that the initiative was left with 
the colonies. He wanted to reassure the colonies that London 
sympathised with their aims, and had the necessary machinery 
to consider the problems involved. The representatives of 
the Ministries of Production and Supply both disclaimed any 
bias against colonial industry. The Board of Trade, 
similarly, promised not to obstruct any scheme for 
manufacturing benficial to the war effort, but observed that 
some schemes, while economic in wartime, might not be so 
afterwards: there was a danger that some colonies might use 
the war as a pretext for establishing post-war industries 
requiring a high degree of protection167. After this 
meeting, there was some support in the Colonial Office for 
the establishment of an interdepartmental committee to 
consider proposals for industrial development. Gater, 
however, agreed with the Ministry of Production that this 
was unnecessary, since the question could always be referred 
to the Africa Committee. The deciding factor, however, was 
Churchill's recent call for a reduction in the number of 
168 
standing committees in Whitehall. 
While there had been some progress towards an agreed 
Whitehall policy on industrial development in Africa, in 
that the question was being discussed interdepartmentally 
167 CO 852/431/1, meeting of War Cabinet Africa Committee, 
16 Sept 1942. 
168 Ibid., minute to Creasy, 14 Oct 1942. 
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after several years of sterile silence, the Colonial office 
still had to emphasise, in its advice to colonial 
governments, that only industries contributing directly to 
the war effort could be considered. This was the central 
message of a telegram sent by Cranborne to the East African 
Governors' Conference in October 1942. However, the Colonial 
Office promised full support to any project which met this 
requirement, especially if the project drew only on local 
resources169. Perhaps as evidence of its good faith, the 
Colonial Office subsequently circulated this telegram to the 
Africa Committee. 
If circumstances seemed unfavourable to discussion of 
long-term policy, the Colonial Office still needed a 
clarification of Whitehall's views on more immediate aspects 
of colonial industrialisation. As the Office told the Africa 
Committee, the military presence in West Africa, and the 
shipping shortage, had made it necessary for the region to 
try to meet military requirements from local resources. 
Consequently, certain types of industry had been stimulated, 
and craft skills promoted among the local population. 
However, recent changes in the military situation, notably 
the Allied victories in North Africa in autumn 1942, seemed 
likely to reduce the demands made on West Africa. The 
Colonial Office therefore needed to determine how far 
wartime developments could be harnessed to promote local 
civilian needs. The office reminded the Africa Committee 
that manufacturing in West Africa would assist the war 
effort by reducing the demand for British goods; moreover, 
169 CO 852/480/12, 
1942. 
Cranborne to Secretary, EAGC, 19 Oct 
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the authorities in West Africa, including the Resident 
Minister, would appreciate a statement of the British 
Government's attitude to the general policy questions 
involved, judging from the welcome which greeted the advice 
already sent to the East African Governors' Conference. 
Finally, the Colonial Office reassured the Committee that 
there were no signs of large-scale industrialisation in West 
Africa. Those industries established to date were modest 
concerns, mostly based on the processing of local primary 
170 produce. 
When the Africa Committee discussed the Colonial 
Office's memorandum in February 1943, the Board of Trade 
explained that in peacetime, it 'viewed with a critical eye' 
any colonial industrialisation harmful to Britain's export 
trade. However, in wartime, the situation was different, 
with the fewer demands being made on Britain's exporting 
capacity the better. This was why the Board had acquiesced 
in the arrangements made for dealing with industrial schemes 
in East Africa. Nevertheless, the Board argued that even 
where industries could be established which did not require 
imported machinery, the possible effects of such development 
on the post-war British export trade should be borne in 
mind. The Committee agreed, however, that the kind of 
industries emerging in the colonies were unlikely to 
threaten British interests. The Ministry of Production, 
however, was concerned that industrial development might 
divert colonial labour from raw materials production. Dawe 
replied that West Africa faced a labour surplus because of 
170 CO 852/480/12, War Cabinet Africa Committee, A(43)2, 
'Secondary industries in West Africa', 12 Feb 1943. 
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the reduction in military-related work, and problems were 
likely to arise in finding work for those with industrial 
skills who were left unemployed. Inevitably the Board of 
Trade raised the delicate subject of protection, and warned 
against long-term assurances to colonial governments on this 
question. Oliver Stanley, who became Colonial Secretary in 
November 1942, and who had been President of the Board of 
Trade from 1937 to 1940, agreed that protection was an 
important issue, but did not elaborate. Dawe explained that 
the Colonial office did not seek to promote industries which 
could not support themselves. He added, however, that the 
Office believed that some industries would require initial 
protection. The Committee concluded by asking the Colonial 
Office to prepare a telegram to Swinton, similar to that 
sent to East Africa, in the light of the Committee's 
discussion, and in consultation with the Government 
Departments concerned171. Before this telegram could be 
drafted, a new phase of the Colonial Office's wartime 
deliberations on economic development had been entered, with 
the beginning of a prolonged debate on post-war 
reconstruction, prompted by calls from Swinton in West 
Africa for guidelines on future colonial economic policy. 
This debate and its repercussions form the subject of the 
next two chapters. 
The Colonial Office had not, by late 1942, achieved an 
unequivocal endorsement by the British government of the 
value of colonial manufacturing development: the limited 
approval given to such development was conditional, and 
171 Ibid., War Cabinet Africa Committee, A(43) 1st meeting, 
19 Feb 1943. 
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cannot be divorced from the wartime considerations which 
produced it. Industrial development, it was agreed, was 
acceptable in the short term, provided it could demonstrate 
its value to the war effort. Whitehall, and especially the 
Board of Trade, remained noticeably reluctant to enter into 
long-term policy commitments on the question. The Colonial 
Office had not, therefore, secured the firm policy 
guidelines on long-term, post-war industrial development 
which it had sought: these discussions lay ahead. It 
remained to be seen whether the relative softening of 
Whitehall's attitudes were more than a temporary policy 
adjustment. 
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CHAPTER TWO: PLANNING FOR PEACE: THE PLACE OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN COLONIAL OFFICE RECONSTRUCTION 
THINKING, 1943-1946 
The Allies' improved military fortunes late in 1942 
enabled serious thought to be given to planning for peace. 
In Britain, this extended debate on reconstruction was 
encouraged and focussed by the publication of the Beveridge 
Report on social security in November 19421. The Coalition 
Government's response was to create a Committee on 
Reconstruction Priorities to examine Britain's likely post- 
war financial circumstances, and the calls which would be 
made on the country's resources2. In contrast to the war's 
first phase, the period after 1943 made possible, and indeed 
required, serious and sustained consideration of the problem 
of colonial industrialisation. 
The Colonial office was not immune to the enthusiasm 
for reconstruction which gripped Whitehall. In February 
1943, Dawe of the Africa Division told his colleagues that 
as the war receded from West Africa, the office would have 
to prepare for a 'new phase' of activity, an opportunity to 
resume development in the region. Despite continuing 
external constraints, such as shortages of material and 
personnel, Dawe believed that much could be done using 
labour freed from war work, and locally available 
materials3. A fundamental question implicit in official 
discussions after 1943, however, was London's proper role in 
1 On the metropolitan reconstruction debate, see J. M. Lee, 
The Churchill Coalition 1940-1945, London 1980, pp. 112-41; 
P. Addison, The Road to 1945. British Politics and the 
Second World War, London 1975, pp. 211-69, and K. Jefferys, 
'British politics and social policy during the Second World 
War', Historical Journal, 30,1 (1987), pp. 123-44. 
2 Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War, London 1986, p. 238. 
3 CO 554/132/33718/1943. minute by Dawe, 9 Feb 1943. 
90 
planning reconstruction, which in the colonial context, 
meant the resumption or initiation of development. At the 
beginning of 1943, Stanley declared that the colonial 
governments would be responsible for the detailed planning 
of development, the metropolitan government's role being to 
establish a broad policy framework, and to offer advice, 
funds and expertise, enabling local governments to achieve 
targets they themselves set4. At this stage, it was still 
assumed that the initiative in development would come from 
the colonies, not from London. However, concern had been 
growing that neither the colonial governments nor the 
Colonial Office was yet equipped to promote an active 
development policy. Labour's chief spokesman on colonial 
affairs, Arthur Creech Jones, voiced these doubts early in 
1943. Creech Jones highlighted problems increasingly evident 
as post-war planning gathered pace. He attacked the Colonial 
Office for its reticence, especially its failure to 
publicise its policies and activities. He called for more 
research into colonial problems, and for a streamlining of 
the Colonial Office's 'cumbersome and slow' machinery. Yet 
Creech Jones wanted the Office to be more assertive in its 
dealings with local governments, and resisted calls being 
made, particularly by some Conservative MPs, for the 
establishment of a 'Colonial Development Board', 
representing 'big interests'. He defended the Colonial 
Secretary's authority and responsibilities from the 
encroachments of a Colonial Development Board, although he 
endorsed long-standing calls for a joint Standing Committee 
4 PD C, 386, col. 250,20 Jan 1943. 
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of both Houses of Parliament to oversee colonial affairs and 
make the administrative machine more accountable5. 
While the Colonial Office continued to circumvent such 
fundamental criticism of the instruments of colonial rule, 
it recognised the serious gaps in its knowledge of colonial 
conditions, widened by the war's interruption of routine 
information-gathering. For example, information on colonial 
government finances was sparse, and officials in London were 
reluctant to demand more detailed statistics from already 
burdened local administrators. However, as Caine argued in 
April 1943, without adequate information, effective planning 
was impossible. In the case of colonial finances, fears that 
the activities of the newly formed Colonial Economic 
Advisory Committee might reveal embarrassing lacunae in the 
Office's knowledge led to steps being taken, in November 
1943, to gather the necessary data6. 
The Colonial Office also realised that its own 
machinery for development planning was inadequate. The 
Committee on Post-War Problems had already covered much of 
the ground it was meant to, but had never been seen as more 
than a fact-finding body, and even the term 'reconstruction' 
was dropped from its original title so as to avoid 
misinterpretation of its role7. The Committee was dissolved 
in 19448. During a Commons debate in April 1943, Stanley 
5 PD(C) , 380, cols. 2025-2027,24 
June 1942; Arthur Creech 
Jones, 'The Colonial Office', Political Quarterly, (Jan-Mar 
1943), pp. 19-32. For a discussion of a First World War 
precedent to the Colonial Development Board proposal, see D. 
Killingray, 'The Empire Resources Development Committee and 
West Africa 1916-20', JICH, 10,2 (1982), pp. 194-210. 
6 Morgan (1980) I, p. 182; CO 852/408, minute, 20 Nov 1943. 
7 See above (chl, pp. 35-8 ). 
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admitted that the Colonial Office lacked satisfactory 
resources to handle economic questions, and floated the idea 
of an 'Economic Advisory Council' to advise him on the major 
principles of development9. Some officials, however, were 
unenthusiastic. Experience with the CDWAC had not been 
inspiring, and it was decided to wind up the Committee as 
quickly as possible. It was equally clear that officials 
sought to delay the creation of an economic advisory 
committee, not simply to postpone the intrusion of external 
advice into the Office's affairs, but so that the new body 
could be unveiled in time to coincide with the Office's 
expected approach to the Treasury for an extension of the CD 
&W Act. Senior officials hoped that the new Colonial 
Economic Advisory Committee (CEAC) would satisfy critics of 
the Office and of the alleged lack of a coherent policy on 
development planning, but they remained at best lukewarm to 
its creation, the Permanent Under-Secretary describing it as 
the 'least objectionable' kind of body which could be 
devisedl0. 
The Colonial Office's continuing misgivings about local 
governments' condition to undertake effective development 
planning were revealed in February 1943, when Dawe asked his 
colleagues to consider the adequacy of West Africa's 
planning machinery. He favoured a central development staff 
in the region, supervised by the Resident Minister, to be 
'an energising and co-ordinating unit'. Discussions with 
Stockdale, the Comptroller for Development and Welf are in 
8 Shuckburgh I, p. 21. 
9 PD C, 388, col. 1492,15 Apr 1943. 
10 CO 852/510/29, minute by Gater, 17 Apr 1943; Morgan 
(1980) I, p. 182. 
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the West Indies, convinced Dawe that West Africa required a 
fully-staffed Development Commissioner, under Swinton, to 
deal with development plans for the whole regionll. Gater 
agreed, and Stanley was enthusiastic12. 
Stanley informed Swinton of the suggestion, which was 
intended to 'impart the necessary drive and impetus to 
development'. Although Swinton welcomed the proposal he 
doubted whether a Commissioner of Stockdale's abilities 
could be found for West Africa13. However, when Swinton 
consulted the West African governments, he encountered 
resistance. While the governments wanted to proceed with a 
'forward' development policy, and accepted the need for some 
regional co-ordination, they were wary of a 
Development Commissioner with executive powers. They sought 
to retain their freedom of action, and resented any threat 
of metropolitan encroachment on their authority, an outlook 
liable to be challenged by the single-minded, even 
authoritarian bearing of Swinton. The governments of Nigeria 
and the Gold Coast claimed that they already had large 
expert staffs, and that supplementary expertise was 
unnecessary -a surprising argument given recurrent 
indications to the contrary14. Swinton suggested instead 
that a Development Adviser should be appointed to advise him 
11 CO 554/132/33718/1943, minute, 9 Feb 1943. 
12 Ibid., minute, 16 Feb 1943 and minute by Stanley, 19 Feb 
1943. 
13 Ibid., telegram, 2 Mar 1943. 
14 Ibid., telegram, 10 Marh 1943; John Kent, 'The 
International Dimensions of British West African Policy 
1939-1949', (unpublished Ph. D thesis, University of 
Aberdeen, 1985), pp. 335-42. 
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directly15. Stanley replied that he had not intended the 
proposed Development commissioner to have anything more than 
an advisory role16. As Swinton had predicted, however, 
suitable candidates were scarce17. 
During 1943, the capacity of the West African 
governments to play a dynamic role in development came into 
question. For example, Swinton confided to Stanley his 
misgivings about the local administrations: 
AI look back on my work here, I have rather 
regretfully to admit an undue proportion of 
the ideas on development of secondary 
industries and co-operation has come from 
myself and my office. 
Swinton did not deny that these governments possessed 
imaginative and experienced personnel, but felt they were 
poorly employed, partly because they were preoccupied with 
other problems, and partly due to ineffective communication. 
This convinced him of the need for a suitably qualified 
Development Adviser18. 
The problems increasingly revealed as the planning 
exercise evolved were illustrated by the Gold Coast 
government's early attempts to produce a development plan. 
Early in 1943, Burns sent a summary of the territory's 
development proposals to London. The Colonial Office was 
disturbed by their apparent bias towards improving the Gold 
Coast's infrastructure, particularly its health and 
education services, to the neglect of economic development, 
15 CO 554/132/33718/4/1943, telegram, 10 Mar 1943. 
16 Ibid., telegram, 31 Mar 1943. 
17 Ibid., Stanley to Swinton, 18 June 1943; see also Pearce 
(1982), pp. 70-1. 
18 Ibid., letter to Stanley, 1 July 1943. 
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seen in London as essential if the territory were eventually 
to support the cost of welfare provision19. Further evidence 
of local governments' problems came from Bourdillon, who 
explained that the Nigerian Secretariat, as currently 
organised, could not produce a comprehensive development 
plan, yet he opposed the appointment of a Development 
Adviser, arguing that Nigeria's development plan should be 
drawn up by those officers who would be responsible for 
implementing it20. 
London increasingly recognised the need to review the 
practice of leaving the initiative in development planning 
to local governments, but this challenged the traditional 
division of responsibilities between the Colonial Office and 
local administrations. Within the Office, the traditional 
view, championed by Dawe, loyal to the primacy of the 
'local' initiative, was eroded by a belief that progress 
with development required London to have greater influence 
on local governments. Dawe believed that the 'heretical 
convictions' he had expressed in November 1942 would become 
the 'orthodoxy of tomorrow'21. His impatience with the 
existing system of CD & W, which, he believed, was too 
restrictive, centralising and bureaucratic, matched 
Bourdillon's frequently voiced exasperation with the 
requirement that detailed development schemes had to be 
19 CO 96/776/8/31475/1943, Dawe to Burns, 17 Mar 1943. 
20 CO 583/263/30560/1943, note of discussion between Dawe 
and Bourdillon, 10 June 1943; ibid., notes of meetings 
between Stanley, officials and Bourdillon, 22 June 1943 and 
2 July 1943. 
21 See above, (chl, pp-4k-5 ) 
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submitted by colonial governments for examination by the 
Colonial Office and Treasury22. 
The alternative view, favouring greater centralisation, 
was advanced by Caine in a seminal memorandum of 16 August 
1943. Even earlier, Caine had called for an overhaul of the 
Colonial Office's entire machinery, enabling it to refute 
'the constant accusation of dilatory procedure and holding 
up business because of Civil Service 2 red tape'3. In April 
1943, Caine succeeded Sir John Campbell as Financial 
Adviser, acquiring responsibility for the co-ordination of 
development policy. In the following months, he became 
frustrated, concluding that the existing development 
machinery did little to encourage 'constructive work', and 
was inadequate in terms of personnel and expertise. The war 
offered a convenient excuse for the lack of progress, but 
Caine doubted that matters would improve much after the war 
under the current procedure24. In his view, the fundamental 
problem was that the Office's machinery was designed to 
receive and assess development schemes originating from 
local governments. This assumed, falsely, Caine believed, 
that the governments were equipped to produce such schemes. 
In fact, few schemes were being produced, because the local 
machinery needed to stimulate 'original and coherent 
thinking' on development was 'virtually non-existent'. This 
22 Ibid., draft brief by Cohen for discussions with 
Bourdillon, 21 June 1943; CO 583/262/30519/1942, minute by 
Dawe, 23 June 1943. 
23 Minute of 11 July 1940, quoted in M. Petter, 'Sir Sydney 
Caine and the Colonial Office in the Second World War: A 
Career in the Making'. CJH, 16,1, (Apr 1981), p. 71. 
24 CO 852/588/2, memo., 16 Aug 1943, reprinted in Porter and 
Stockwell (1987), pp. 183-90. 
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repeated the warnings Caine had given in August 1942, when 
stressing the colonial governments' need for expert help in 
development planning25. 
Caine criticised the Colonial Office's passivity and 
reluctance to seize the initiative in development. He 
attacked the impression being encouraged by the Office that 
the wartime hiatus in development was an opportunity for 
local governments to produce comprehensive development 
plans, a claim he considered far-fetched, since no plan yet 
received in London 'nearly approached the ideal of 
completeness'. Development planning required skills beyond 
those necessary for routine administration, as well as 
uninterrupted thought. Simply to expand the colonial 
secretariats would not achieve these goals. Nor did Caine 
see the Development and Welfare Organisation in the West 
Indies, designed to advise and encourage colonial 
governments, as a helpful precedent, since it, too, could 
only examine schemes put forward by the governments. Caine 
argued that improved regional machinery had to be matched by 
a strengthening of London's machinery, and called for a 
strong, central organisation 'in or attached to' the 
Colonial office, competent to initiate development, to 
encompass the whole field of economic development, and 
to 
examine systematically the problems ahead. The Colonial 
Office, he believed, needed to abandon its caution, its 
reluctance to offend 'local', or rather local official 
26 opinion. 
25 CO 852/505/7, minute, 26 Aug 1942. 
26 CO 852/588/2, memo., 16 Aug 1943. 
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Caine's memorandum illustrates the divergence of 
opinion within the Colonial Office on the proper role of 
metropolitan officials in planning development. His 
arguments clearly challenged traditional assumptions, 
defended by the Geographical Departments of the Office, and 
advocated forcefully by Dawe. Significantly, when the West 
Africa Department began preparations for a draft memorandum 
on West African planning in 
Department was not consulted27. 
March 1943, the Economic 
In consequence, the West 
Africa Department was not always familiar with wider 
official thinking on economic issues. For example, in April 
1943, O. G. R. Williams, head of the Department, confessed his 
ignorance of any clearly formulated policy on industrial 
development28. 
Nevertheless, Caine's memorandum evoked sympathy within 
the Office. As one colleague commented: 
It seems then, to end where Mr. Caine ends, 
that we must recognise as illusory the hope 
that Colonial Governments with present 
resources will ever be able to present from 
their end any projects which are not small 
scale and makeshift. In particular they will 
be unable to produce the wide concerted and 
well-integrated plans covering all aspects of 
developmment which alone can ensure success 
and elainate the risk of wasted money and 
effort . 
Senior officials accepted the need to strengthen development 
machinery in West Africa and London. Broadly, colonial 
governments were expected to provide local knowledge and 
technicians, while London's role was to provide the 
'stimulus', expertise and, most important, the necessary 
27 CO 554/132/33718/1943, minute by Caine, 5 Apr 1943. 
28 CO 96/775/1/31401/1941, minute, 29 Apr 1943. 
29 CO 852/588/2, memo. by Benson, 19 Aug 1943. 
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finance. It was agreed that this might necessitate regional 
organisations enjoying executive powers, depending on local 
circumstances, to assist and encourage colonial governments. 
Moreover, the need was recognised for a development 
organisation in Britain, based in the Colonial office, 
possibly throughthe temporary employment in London of 
technical personnel, who would be available to make field 
investigations30. 
The practical steps taken by the Colonial Office to 
improve both the local and central development machinery in 
the summer of 1943 were twofold. At the local level, a 
Development Adviser, responsible to the Resident Minister, 
was eventually appointed for West Africa. His principal 
function was to co-ordinate development planning, and to 
examine development schemes before their submission to 
London31. However, the problems facing the new Adviser 
largely nullified his appointment. In particular, the West 
African governments were jealous of their powers, a 
potential obstacle to greater regional co-ordination of 
development planning, compounded by a prevailing hostility 
30 Ibid., note of discussion between Gater, Battershill, 
Caine, Benson and Eastwood, 20 Aug 1943. Parallel to these 
discussions was a broad-ranging examination of the fitness 
of the Colonial Service to fulfil the tasks required by a 
'forward' colonial policy. A basic obstacle to reform was 
the conservatism of metropolitan officials, opposed to 
fusion with their idiosyncratically selected colleagues in 
the field. Moreover, centralisation of the service appeared 
to conflict with the need to demonstrate Britain's 
commitment to the development of local self-governing 
institutions, intimately bound to local populations; see CO 
967/22, WP(42)249 'Colonial Service Reorganisation', 11 June 
1942; Jeffries (1972), passim; Lee and Petter (1982), 
pp. 210-205; CO 967/22, minute by Jeffries, 2 Feb 1944; CO 
852/215/4, minute by Jeffries, 25 July 1944. 
31 CO 554/132/33718/1/1943, 'Post-War Planning for West 
Africa', despatched 31 Aug 1943. 
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to any new regional organisation to succeed the Resident 
Minister's Office. Hall and his staff found themselves 
relegated to a consultative role, providing information to 
experts employed by individual governments. Hall who, like 
Swinton, doubted the abilities of local officials, resigned 
late in 194432. 
Centrally, the Colonial Office's major initiative was 
to create the Colonial Economic Advisory Committee (CEAC) in 
September 1943, to advise on questions of economic policy, 
especially those revealed by development programming33. 
Among CEAC's members were figures with colonial experience, 
such as Hailey and Bourdillon, academics, including the 
economists Evan Durbin, Sir Hubert Henderson and Professor 
Lionel Robbins, and representatives of British industry and 
labour. The committee's secretary, until November 1944, was 
the economist W. A. Lewis, temporarily attached to the 
Colonial Office. Caine, as Financial Adviser, attended 
regularly, as did Clauson, who became the Committee's Vice- 
Chairman. Procedural wrangles soon emerged. The Colonial 
Office tended to see the Committee as a body to which 
matters could be referred on an ad hoc basis. Some members 
of CEAC, especially Lewis, advocated a systematic review of 
development problems by the committee, to provide 
conclusions forming the basis of advice to local 
governments34. However, when Stanley addressed CEAC's second 
meeting in December 1943, he explained that the committee 
32 Kent (1985), pp. 346-7. 
33 Morgan (1980) I, p. 184. 
34 CO 852/510/30, minute by Lewis, 22 Nov 1943. 
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would be asked for advice mainly on questions of principle, 
35 rather than on detailed matters. 
Local interest in industrial development 
Despite the apparently poor condition of local 
development machinery, the early initiative in the 
reconstruction debate apparently came from West Africa 
rather than from London, and obliged the Colonial Office to 
address the range of issues involved in promoting economic 
development, notably those posed by industrialisation. A key 
role was taken by the Resident Minister, Swinton. As 
Colonial Secretary from 1931 to 1935, Swinton had tried to 
co-ordinate the Colonial Office's approach to economic 
policy. He oversaw the creation of an economic financial 
section of the Office's General Department, which became the 
separate Economic Department in 1934, and which was 
responsible for the pre-war series of Economic Surveys of 
the Colonial Empire. Swinton also singled out the young LSE 
graduate, Sydney Caine, for early promotion within the 
Office36. In February 1943, Swinton revealed his thoughts on 
future economic policy for West Africa, on the assumption 
that economic controls would continue into the immediate 
post-war period, with the regulation of imports, exports and 
shipping. Swinton identified help to the primary producer as 
the chief policy objective, involving steps to encourage 
organised marketing and increased production for the 
internal market. But in order to help foster more balanced 
colonial economies, Swinton was also keen to promote local 
35 Co 990/1, CEAC 2nd minutes, 9 Dec 1943. 
36 J. A. Cross, Lord Swinton, Oxford 1982, pp. 111-13. 
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secondary industries, seeing potential for expansion in 
industries stimulated by wartime conditions. This, he 
believed, would benefit primary producers, whose produce 
could thereby be processed cheaply for the local market. 
Living standards, too, would rise as former 'luxury' goods 
came within the reach of local populations. Finally, 
industrial development would absorb the growing numbers of 
educated Africans, particularly demobilised African soldiers 
with technical skills, who were a potential 'nucleus' of 
talent around which new industries could develop. Since the 
current shortages of both shipping and materials were likely 
to persist after the war, Swinton believed priority should 
be given to projects least dependent on imported machinery, 
and to schemes which could absorb demobilised troops37. 
Before the Colonial Office could respond to Swinton's 
memorandum, it received from him a request for a ruling 
London on tariff protection. Swinton explained that he could 
not plan either agricultural or industrial development 
satisfactorily unless he knew whether some degree of 
protection would be permitted, although he disclaimed any 
intention of promoting 'artificial' production behind tariff 
walls38. Swinton believed that the Colonial territories 
should be allowed to develop 'simple' and economic 
industries, and to become more self-sufficient in food. 
Although he opposed 'artificial' protection, he thought that 
both agriculture and industry should be protected against 
outside competition. He argued that development like this 
would, on balance, benefit British industry, since the 
37 CO 852/480/11, WAWC(CM)4,24 Feb 1943. 
38 CO 852/480/11, letter to Stanley, 16 Mar 1943. 
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resulting increase in living standards and purchasing power 
would enable the colonial populations to import more 
sophisticated goods which Britain could supply39. 
The West African governments, represented on the Civil 
Members Committee, endorsed Swinton's ideas on 
industrialisation40. Like Swinton, the Governors believed 
that raw materials production would remain vital to the 
region, but felt that local processing and other industries 
should be encouraged, provided these were economic and 
justified by local needs rather than geared to an export 
market. The Committee shared Swinton's view that 'moderate' 
protection, through tariffs or subsidies, would be needed to 
prevent local industries being 'slaughtered' by import 
competition4l. Local governments had been encouraged by 
Stanley's speech at oxford on 5 March 1943 in which he 
promised the British Government's support for the 
development of colonial industries where the local market 
could support them, or where they were a necessary adjunct 
to existing agriculture. Stanley 
unacceptability of 'unnatural 
industrialisation behind 'abnormal' 





African governments saw this as compatible with the views 
expressed in Swinton's memorandum43. 
39 CO 852/503/18, WP(43)205, 'Post-War Commercial Policy'. 
40 CO 554/132/33712/1/1943, WAWC(CM)(7), 9-10 Mar 1943. The 
Committee comprised the four West African Governors, with 
Swinton as Chairman. It replaced the West African Governors' 
Conference as the key regional co-ordinating body in January 
1943 [see Kent (1985), p. 151]. 
41 CO 554/132/33712/1/1943, WAWC(CM)(7), 9-10 Mar 1943. 
42 CO 875/16/16, speech to Oxford Conservative Association, 
5 Mar 1943. 
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The governments of both Nigeria and the Gold Coast 
continued to show interest in schemes to promote industrial 
development. Shortly before he retired from Nigeria in 1943, 
Bourdillon told the Colonial Office that industrialisation 
was essential if the territory were to improve and maintain 
its financial position44. Bourdillon continued to advnnata 
industrial development, arguing that the prosperity of most 
colonies could be improved greatly by 'a considerable 
measure of industrialisation', but he thought industry 
should not supplant agriculture. As living standards rose 
and populations grew, the demand for locally produced food 
would rise, and so industrialisation and agricultural 
improvements should go hand in hand. Nor did Bourdillon 
propose 'artificial' industrialisation. He was interested in 
appropriate developments which could be started quickly, 
such as the processing of local raw materials (for example, 
cotton spinning and weaving), introducing diversification 
giving colonial incomes greater stability45. 
Similarly, in the Gold Coast, the government proceeded 
with plans to establish a West African Institute, one of 
whose functions would be to investigate the potential of 
industrial development schemes46. In March 1943, Stanley 
confirmed that the Governor's proposals of August 1942 had 
been formally submitted as a scheme under the 1940 CD &W 
43 CO 554/132/33712/1/1943, WAWC(CM), summary of 3rd 
meeting, 7 June 1943. 
44 CO 583/263/30560/1943, note of meeting between Bourdillon 
and senior officials, 22 June 1943. 
45 Sir Bernard Bourdillon, The Future of the Colonial 
Empire, London 1945, pp. 51-3; ------, 'Colonial Development 
and Welfare', International Affairs, (1944), pp. 369-80. 
46 See above, (chl, pp. bti - 46 ). 
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Act47. The scheme's cost over a five year period was 
estimated to be L127,000. Towards this, London was asked for 
a capital grant of L52,000, to help finance buildings and a 
number of production units, including a brick and tile 
factory and an industrial textile unit48. The immediate 
function of the Institute, given wartime needs, was to 
promote local manufacture of bricks, tiles, pottery and 
textiles to meet local demands. Although the Institute's 
economic soundness was questioned by some officials in 
London, notably Clauson, because of the scheme's basically 
educational nature, its advocates hoped that these doubts 
would be dispelled by the presence of an economist, and of 
men with practical experience49. 
The work of the Institute raised an important question, 
one which recurred in this period of reconstruction 
planning, over the relative merits of 'village' versus 
'factory' industry. Carstairs, head of the Production 
Department of the Colonial Office's Economic Division, 
remarked that the authorities of Achimota College, the 
Institute's sponsors, favoured the former model of 
development, apparently from a belief that workers' 
interests were less secure under factory production. But as 
Carstairs pointed out, 'cottage' industry was equally prone 
to 'sweating' and unacceptable conditions, which were more 
easily controlled under factory conditions. He was equally 
dismissive of another of Achimota's claims, that village- 
47 CO 554/130/33685/1943, telegram Burns, 1 Mar 1943. 
48 Ibid., Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies 
(ACEC), 121st minutes, 25 Mar 1943. 
49 Ibid., note by H. B. Lawrence, 10 June 1943. 
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type industry would be squeezed out by cheaper and more 
efficient factory production, a view which appeared 
ultimately 'to rest on aesthetic rather than on economic 
considerations'. He rejected the view that factory-produced 
goods were necessarily inferior to those of cottage 
industry, and questioned the relevance of such criteria to 
West African conditions50. Carstairs had already criticised 
the apparent antipathy of the Institute's promoters towards 
the modernising impact of development51. 
A major influence shaping the West African governments' 
attitudes towards industrialisation, at least in early 
discussions on post-war planning, was the need to prepare 
for the smooth demobilisation of local troops. The Civil 
Members' Committee believed that industrial development was 
vital to the demobilisation and resettlement programme52. 
However, while the message repeatedly issuing from West 
Africa was that demobilised troops would want new forms of 
employment appropriate to the skills they had acquired 
during the war, thereby breaking away from traditional 
patterns of life and seeking higher living standards, a 
sharply contrasting view was taken by the Colonial Office's 
Labour Adviser, Orde Browne, who toured West Africa between 
November 1943 and March 1944. Following discussions with 
many local administrators, Orde Browne concluded that 
demobilised troops would not, generally, 
employment opportunities, as had been asserted: 
50 CO 96/775/1/31401/1941, minute, 5 May 1943. 
51 CO 554/130/33685/1942, minute, 15 Sept 1942. 
demand new 
52 CO 554/132/333712/1/1943, WAWC(CM)(15), summary of 3rd 
meeting, 7 June 1943. 
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The African is usually well contented with 
the tribal mode of life, given that it is in 
reasonably favourable circumstances, and he 
does not share the Englishman's fear of 
unemployment, lack of housing, assurance for 
illness and old-age, and the various other 
features of industrialised Europe. He sets a 
high value on undisturbed leisure, (though 
this does not mean idleness) which is the 
main advantage of his own mode of living, and 
this attitude seems likely to encourage a 
more general return to village life than 
might be expected. 
It was possible, he thought, to exaggerate the special 
requirements of demobilised troops; furthermore, transport 
problems were likely to delay their return from service 
abroad, allowing ample time to prepare for their 
reabsorption53. 
The Nigerian and Gold Coast governments, however, were 
less confident. As Governor Richards commented on the 
situation facing the returning Nigerian soldier: 
In the immediate post-war period he will be 
glad to rejoin his relations at home, but 
when he has had time to look round and 
compare his tribal life with what he has peen 
elsewhere I doubt if he will be satisfied . 
Initially, the Gold Coast government shared Orde Browne's 
view. In July 1944, Burns told Stanley that many demobilised 
Gold Coast troops would return to their villages and resume 
their former occupations55. By June 1945, however, officials 
doubted whether the majority of returning soldiers would 
happily revert to a life of peasant agriculture, preferring 
skilled employment and higher wages56. In both Nigeria and 
53 CO 554/139/33764/1944, 'Report on a tour in West Africa 
November 1943 to March 1944', June 1944. 
54 CO 554/139/33764/1945, letter to Stanley, 27 Feb 1945. 
55 CO 96/781/31475/1944, despatch, 26 July 1944. 
56 CO 554/139/33764/1945, OAG, Gold Coast, (Gurney) to 
Stanley, 14 June 1945. 
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the Gold Coast, therefore, 
demobilisation remained an 
industrialisation. 
the prospect of imminent 
incentive to encourage 
Among the thorniest issues raised by Swinton in his 
discussion of industrialisation was the question of tariff 
protection for new industries. The caution with which the 
Colonial Offices handled this issue arose from continuing 
uncertainty during the reconstruction debate about the 
extent to which international trade would be liberalised 
after the war. Under Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement 
signed in February 1942 with the United States, in return 
for materials supplied under Lend-Lease, Britain was 
committed to working with the United States to secure 
general tariff cuts and eliminate discriminatory trading 
practices. For Britain, the question was whether this 
undertaking would affect the system of Imperial Preference 
constructed during the 1930s. Within the War Cabinet, this 
was a highly divisive issue, Imperial Preference being 
championed by Beaverbrook and Amery. The uncertainty created 
by cabinet divisions was not helped by Churchill's 
unwillingness to take a firm line on the issue57. Throughout 
the post-war planning debate, the future of Imperial 
Preference and of tariff policy remained unresolved. 
Although negotiations with the United States began in 1943, 
no firm decisions were reached, although both sides agreed 
on the desirability of a commercial convention on lowering 
tariffs, for a high level of employment to encourage freer 
trade, and on the abolition of quantitative restrictions on 
57 C. Thorne, Allies of a Kind, (Oxford, 1979), pp. 92-102. 
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trade58. It was another year before talks resumed, with the 
Treasury, under Keynes'influence, arguing that Britain's 
bleak post-war financial prospects required a conciliatory 
approach to the United States. The American position at this 
stage was that the Article VII commitment included the 
abolition of all preferences, while tariff cuts could be 
agreed bilaterally. British negotiators, however, felt that 
the loss of Imperial Preference should be matched by a US 
offer of substantial and wide-ranging tariff cuts59. In July 
1944, at the Bretton Woods Conference, a major step forward 
was taken with Britain's agreement to the establishment of 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the 
financial bases of multilateralism. However, as late as July 
1945, Churchill could claim, during the Potsdam Conference, 
that Britain was not committed to abandoning Imperial 
Preference60. Only after the abrupt termination of Lend- 
Lease in August 1945, and the consequent need to secure a 
dollar loan from the United States, did Britain eventually 
ratify the Bretton Woods Agreement in December 1945, 
promising to make sterling freely convertible one year after 
the loan became effective, and agreeing to 'non- 
discrimination' in trade, involving the removal of 
quantitative restrictions on US exports to Britain from the 
end of 1946. Furthermore, Britain and the United States 
agreed to co-operate towards the reduction of tariffs and 
the elimination of preferences6l. 
58 M. W. Kirby, The Decline of British Economic Power since 
1870, (1981), pp. 93-4. 
59 Ibid.. 
60 Thorne (1979), p. 513. 
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Until at least the end of 1945, therefore, the outlook 
for international trade policy, and specifically for future 
tariff levels, remained unclear. Within Whitehall, however, 
there were indications of a shift of opinion in favour of 
freer trade. In January 1943, the War Cabinet's Inter- 
Departmental Committee on Post-War Commercial Policy, 
chaired by Sir Arnold Overton of the Board of Trade, 
produced a report demonstrating this shift at least among 
some key officials62. The Overton Report favoured a general 
multilateral commercial convention, under which existing 
preferences, including Imperial Preferences, would be cut to 
half their 1939 level, a concession believed vital to secure 
agreement with the United States. The Report recommended 
that the protective (but not the revenue) element in tariffs 
should be set between 10% and 25%. Moderate state 
subsidisation of industries, and a temporary period of 
quantitative import restriction after the war, were 
advocated, coupled to the establishment of a Commercial 
Union to complement the proposed International Clearing 
Union63. The Report was endorsed by the majority of the 
Committee's members, representing the Board of Trade, the 
Department of Overseas Trade, the Dominions Office, the 
Foreign Office and the Cabinet Economic Secretariat. The 
61 Ibid., p. 675; Kirby (1981), pp. 95-7; Hinds (1987), p. 148. 
62 L. S. Pressnell, External Economic Policy Since the War 
Volume 1 The Post-War Financial Settlement, (1986), p. 101. 
63 CAB 117/68, 'Report of the Committee on Post-War 
Commercial Policy', 6 Jan 1943. Intimations of the shift to 
'multilateralist' thinking in the Board of Trade can be 
found much earlier, e. g. in Shackle's June 1941 memorandum 
on economic reconstruction (CAB 123/53), which urged a 
modification of Imperial Preference in order to secure US 
co-operation in postwar trading arrangements. See Cairncross 
and Watts (1989), pp. 96-7. 
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Treasury, however, remained cool, one of its 
representatives, Sir Hubert Henderson, being especially 
critical of the threat to the system of Imperial 
Preference64. The Board of Trade and the Department of 
Overseas Trade had, however, concluded that the best hope 
for future commercial stability lay in a general 
liberalisation of world trade. The Secretary of the 
Department of Overseas Trade, Harcourt Johnstone, told the 
Chancellor, Sir John Anderson, in January 1943, that the 
experience of the inter-war years suggested that a lowering 
of trade barriers would encourage international trade, 
assisting Britain's balances of trade and of payments. In 
particular, he sought an end to quantitative import 
restrictions. These had, he conceded, benefited British 
industry before the war, for example by limiting colonial 
imports of foreign cotton goods. However, the evidence now 
suggested that British exporters regarded such restrictions 
as the 'most serious obstacle facing them'65. 
Though not invited to participate in the Overton 
Committee, the Colonial Office made comments which were 
appended to the Overton Report. The Office generally 
favoured the Report's multilateralist recommendations, 
believing that if these were associated with schemes to 
regulate primary production and to establish an 
International Clearing Union, the colonial territories would 
benefit from the increase in commodity demand from a general 
expansion of world trade. The office explained that 
hitherto, most colonial tariffs were intended to raise 
64 Pressnell (1986), p. 102. 
65 CAB 123/221, Harcourt Johnstone to Anderson, 15 Jan 1943. 
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revenue, but that there had been a recent tendency to use 
tariffs to shelter secondary industries. While the Office's 
policy on this question had never been defined precisely, it 
had been customary to accept modest protection. Although the 
Office believed that the proposed 25% ceiling on ad valorem 
duties was acceptable, it warned of possible hostility from 
the colonies. Finally, the Office linked the issue of 
Preference to that of colonial development finance, arguing 
that British public opinion was more likely to acquiesce in 
financial assistance towards development if Britain 
continued to enjoy tariff advantages in the colonial 
territories66. In general, however, the Office was moving 
towards a more explicitly multilateralist position, a trend 
which continued and was supported by Clauson and Caine, the 
leading spokesmen on economic affairs. Thus, in August 1945, 
Clauson could assert that the complementary interests of 
Britain and the colonies would benefit from an expansion of 
world trade under freer conditions. While both required 
'moderate' protection for some industries, both would suffer 
from widespread, high protection. He conceded, however, that 
whereas the developed British economy required limited but 
comprehensive protection, the colonial economies needed 
greater protection for a smaller number of emerging 
industries, although they could not afford to give high 
protection to basically uneconomic industries. Since freer 
trade would benefit the colonies, they could afford to make 
concessions on preferences if the markets for their produce 
consequently grew. Believing that metropolitan and colonial 
66 CAB 117/68, 'Report of the Committee on Post-War 
Commercial Policy', 6 Jan 1943. 
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interests lay in negotiated tariff cuts, Clauson concluded 
that the Colonial Office could not obstruct collaboration 
with the United States over commercial policy. 67 
Uncertainty about the post-war international economic 
order therefore overshadowed the Colonial Office's 
continuing discussions on industrial development. Until 
major questions of policy were agreed at an international 
level, the Office could not gauge the long-term outlook for 
colonial economic policy. Nevertheless, a tentative attempt 
was made, late in 1943, to forecast post-war conditions. 
Generally, officials predicted a continuing demand for most 
types of colonial produce, though demand for some 
commodities, such as copper and bauxite, was expected to 
fall, therefore local governments were advised to consider 
promoting alternative sources of employment and income. 
Wartime shortages of capital and consumer goods, and of 
personnel, were expected to continue, at least during the 
'transition' phase and the switch to peacetime production. 
Personnel shortages, it was thought, might be eased by 
drawing on the technical training which ex-soldiers had 
received. Finally, because import controls would persist, 
officials in London believed that local anti-inflationary 
measures would have to continue, involving price controls 
and taxation68. If these were the Office's general 
assumptions about the future, there remained the immediate 
task of responding to Swinton's memorandum. Swinton's ideas 
on economic policy were generally accepted by the Colonial 
67 CO 852/584/1, minute, 21 Aug 1945. 
68 CO 990/2, CEAC(44)11, 'Effects of war-time changes in 
colonial economic structure and organisation' (n. d. ). 
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Office69. However, Swinton had concentrated on post-war 
development, whereas the Office was still thinking in the 
shorter term, specifically on how industrial development 
could be used to ease colonial import shortages70. For the 
Colonial Office, the basic problem was that in view of the 
Board of Trade's position, expressed to the War Cabinet 
Africa Committee, a policy ruling from the Cabinet was 
needed before local governments could be advised on long- 
term industrial development. Clauson therefore felt that the 
Office should concentrate on shorter-term issues when 
communicating with Swinton, and postpone statements on long- 
term policy7l. 
Similarly, on the related questions of industrial 
development and protection, Caine urged his colleagues to 
'go cautiously': while nothing should be done to obstruct 
industries of direct value to the war effort, subject to the 
availability of plant, it was not yet possible to formulate 
a general long-term policy on industrial development, and no 
commitments could be made to a lengthy period of protection. 
Moreover, the whole question of industrialisation was likely 
to be referred to the recently established CEAC72. Caine's 
caution was echoed in the Colonial Office. In May 1943, it 
was agreed that the time was not yet ripe for giving Swinton 
guidelines on long-term industrial development policy73. 
69 CO 852/480/11, summary of WAWC(CM)4 (Memorandum by Lord 
Swinton on Economic Policy), Aug 1943. 
70 CO 852/480/11, minute by Creasy, 12 Mar 1943. 
71 Ibid., minute, 15 Mar 1943. 
72 Ibid., minute, 29 Apr 1943. 
73 Ibid., minute by Carstairs, 15 May 1943. 
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This did not satisfy Stanley, who demanded a more 
substantial response from the Office74. A further meeting 
was held at the end of May to discuss the Office's reply to 
Swinton. Again the difficulties of giving clear policy 
guidance arose. However, it was recognised that local 
governments needed some indication of policy in order to be 
able to plan ahead. It was agreed that some idea of 
acceptable levels of protection in the projected post-war 
international economic order could be derived from the 
recent Cabinet paper on Post-War Commercial Policy. 
Officials also believed that it would be possible to suggest 
the types of industry which were acceptable in principle, 
without approaching other Whitehall departments for their 
views. Nevertheless, it was agreed that colonial governments 
should be instructed to refer specific schemes to London for 
approval75. 
Against this background of general sympathy for freer 
trade, but doubts over the precise means to this end, the 
Colonial Office discussed its response to Swinton's request 
for guidance on tariff policy. Within the Office, the most 
sustained criticism of protection for colonial industries 
came from Caine, who saw subsidies as the appropriate 
alternative. He pointed out that most of the items which the 
Colonial Office hoped to see produced by colonial industry 
were simple articles. However, if protection kept the prices 
of these products higher than those of equivalent imports, 
the burden might fall on poorer consumers. 
74 Ibid., minute, 24 May 1943. 
75 Ibid., minute by Carstairs, 28 May 1943. 
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However plausible it may look at first sight 
there is no intrinsic justice in making the 
consumers of an article pay for the 
assistance which on grounds of public policy it is necessary to extend to producers, and 
wherever it is feasible it is better and more 
equitable that the cost should be spread over 
the general body of taxpayers by giving the 
assistance in the form of a subsidy or in 
some other way whichoes not involve a 
direct increase of price 6. 
Here, Caine drew on a suggestion made in the Overton 
Report77. His arguments were incorporated into Stanley's 
reply to Swinton, eventually despatched in June 1943. 
Stanley explained that it was not yet possible to give 
an authoritative statement on long-term policy towards 
industrial development, which would require the Board of 
Trade's agreement, and in light of the international 
discussions on commercial policy, the Colonial Office could 
not yet make public pronouncements on industrial policy. In 
any case, he argued, in wartime, private companies could not 
engage in industrialisation, other than that required for 
the war effort. Nevertheless, in order to assist local 
governments to consider industrial potential in their 
development plans, Stanley offered some guidelines. First, 
he assured Swinton that no colonial industry viable without 
protection would be obstructed because it might compete with 
British industry. Nor did he believe 'insuperable' 
objections would be raised in principle to local industries 
requiring only 'moderate' protection. However, he warned 
against industrial development behind high tariff barriers, 
geared towards the export trade, arguing that such 
76 CO 852/480/11, minute, 31 May 1943. 
77 CAB 117/68, 'Report of the Committee on Post-War 
Commercial Policy', 6 Jan 1943. 
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industries would in effect be being subsidised by the local 
consumer. Stanley showed particular interest in industries 
which involved the processing of local primary produce. 
Finally, he repeated Caine's argument by suggesting that 
where an industry needed government assistance, subsidies 
should be considered as an alternative to tariffs78. 
Swinton was pleased with this broad outline of policy, 
and reassured Stanley that he had 'strenuously discouraged' 
any idea of developing protected industries geared to the 
export trade. He defined an 'economic' industry as one 
which was locally economic without a high protective tariff. 
Within this definition, he saw much potential, although he 
told the West African colonial governments that plant was 
available only for war-related industry79. 
A striking feature of the Colonial Office's discussions 
on planning between 1943 and 1946 is the continuing stress 
on the need to provide social welfare and political 
development with secure economic foundations. The planning 
of post-war development revealed differences of opinion 
between London and West Africa on reconstruction priorities. 
In particular, the Colonial Office feared that too much 
attention was being paid by local governments to social 
welfare and not enough to the establishment of sound 
economic foundations on which the colonies could construct 
an adequate welfare infrastructure80. External observers of 
colonial affairs, notably the Fabian Colonial Bureau, shared 
this anxiety. For example, the Bureau was highly critical of 
78 CO 852/482/2, letter to Swinton, 5 June 1943. 
79 CO 852/480/11, letter to Stanley, 22 June 1943. 
80 See above,, p. 95. 
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the first report of the Development and Welfare Comptroller 
in the West Indies, when this was debated in the Commons in 
April 1943. The Bureau was concerned at the report's neglect 
of industrial development, and feared that the region's 
'dilapidated' economy would be propped up with superficial, 
though necessary, social improvements, whereas the 
fundamental need was to tackle the causes of colonial 
poverty, not its 81 symptoms. This view was explicit in 
Caine's memorandum of August 1943, and was shared by his 
82 colleagues. Similarly, a discussion paper sent to the 
colonial governments in April 1944 warned that it would be 
impossible for the British taxpayer to bear the sole burden 
of raising colonial living standards. The chief goal of 
metropolitan assistance would therefore be to develop the 
colonies so that they would be able to pay for the services 
demanded by local conditions: 'It is therefore of the first 
importance that attention should be paid first of all in the 
planning of development to the improvement of economic 
conditions and the increase of the real income available to 
Colonial communities. Stanley repeated this point when '83 
addressing CEAC in December 1944. Referring to the Colonial 
Office's plans to extend the 1940 CD &W legislation, he 
said that the purpose of the new Act was to enable the 
colonies to develop their own resources, allowing them to 
support 'decent' living standards: 'Nothing could be worse 
than to give Colonial peoples the idea that the Colonial 
81 Empire, vol. 5, no. 6, (March 1943). 
82 E. g., CO 852/588/2, memo. by Benson, 19 Aug 1943. 
83 CO 96/781/31475/1944, Papers on Colonial Affairs No. 3, 
(C. M. No. 3), 'The Planning of Social and Economic Development 
in the Colonial Empire', Apr 1944. 
119 
Development and Welfare Act was a permanent subsidy to their 
social services which the tax-payer of this country would 
undertake to pay without thought either of return, or indeed 
supervision'84. Here are views strongly reminiscent of those 
expressed by the Treasury during the preparation of the CD & 
W Bill in 194085. Similarly, local governments were told in 
November 1945 that the primary concern in development was 
economic improvement, and that a 'proper balance' had to be 
achieved between economic development and social welfare. Of 
the two, economic development was said to be the more 
important, because without it, the colonies would be unable 
to maintain improved welfare standards, although it was 
recognised that the development of social services could 
contribute indirectly to economic development. As Stanley's 
successor, George Hall, explained: 
I emphasise the fundamental character of 
economic development, because the 
possibilities of expansion in the social 
services are commonly immediately apparent 
and, as a matter of administrative 
organisation, are directly the concern of 
particular departments, while economic 
development is at once a more general 
responsibility and a sphere in which toe 
desirable course is less easy to determine8 . 
These examples demonstrate that although the Colonial 
Office, no less tham any other department in Whitehall, 
absorbed the optimism of the 'reconstruction' phase, it 
retained a fundamentally realistic attitude towards 
development priorities, a realism grounded in years of 
84 CO 990/1, CEAC 9th minutes, 19 Dec 1944. 
85 See above, p. 40-- 
86 Cmd. 6713 Colonial Development and Welfare. Despatch dated 
12th November, 1945 from the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to Colonial Governments, PP(1945-46), xix, 35. 
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frustrating experience in trying to arouse metropolitan 
interest in, and funding for, the colonies. For the Colonial 
Office, the central goal of policy was to become 
increasingly clear, if deceptively simple and easily 
confused with an earlier phase of colonial rule more wedded 
to rhetoric than to substance. It was, in effect, to 
encourage the colonies 'to stand on their own feet' both 
politically and economically87. 
Given this official emphasis on promoting economic 
development, what place did industrialisation occupy in the 
Colonial office's reconstruction priorities? The Office's 
thinking on industrial development in West Africa had been 
underpinned by the belief that with the decline in war- 
related economic activity in the region as the military 
situation improved late in 1942, a recession in local 
employment was likely. By April 1943, however, officials 
were less certain, especially in view of the proposal to 
develop an air route between Accra and the Middle East. It 
seemed that local industries would not be needed so urgently 
to absorb surplus labour88. Moreover, it is clear both from 
public statements and private comments that the Colonial 
Office's discussions presumed that most colonies were, and 
would remain, primarily agricultural economies. For example, 
Stanley, while personally attracted to promoting 
diversification, apparently harboured no illusions about 
altering radically the structure of colonial economies. 
Improved living standards would, he thought, depend upon 
87 CO 999/1, CEDC 1st minutes, 7 Oct 1946. 
88 CO 852/480/11, minute by R. E. Robinson, 23 Apr 1943; 
ibid., minute by O. G. R. Williams, 27 Apr 1943. 
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improvements in agriculture89. Stanley was consistent in his 
views. Two years later, from the Opposition benches, he told 
the Commons: 
When we come to a discussion of economic 
questions in the Colonies, although the 
development of secondary industries may catch 
one's imagination - and I should be the last 
to underrate its importance - for the vast 
majority of the 60,000,000 people, it means 
agriculture90. 
Nevertheless, the view persisted in the Colonial Office that 
colonial poverty was due, at least in part, to dependence on 
primary production, and that industrialisation could help 
raise living standards91. Yet judgements on the desirability 
of individual proposals were apt to become blurred under 
abnormal wartime conditions. Characteristically, it was 
Caine who warned of this potential problem. He 
differentiated between the need to secure supplies of a 
commodity such as cement for a colony, possibly through 
local production, and the more general desirability of 
promoting industrial development. He thought it a 'fatal' 
error to confuse these two objects, and warned that the 
promotion of local manufacturing for its own sake might even 
impede, rather than stimulate, the local production of 
scarce goods92. 
As the reconstruction debate gathered pace during 1943, 
the Colonial Office's public pronouncements on 
industrialisation became more confident. Speaking to the 
89 PD C, 402, cols. 462-3,20 July 1944. 
90 PD(C)j, 425, col. 269,9 July 1946. 
91 CO 852/578/5, Cmd. 6529 Colonial Products Research 
Council. First Annual Report 1943-1944, May 1944. 
92 CO 852/482/3, minute, 30 Oct 1943. 
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Oxford Conservative Association in March, Stanley spelt out 
the broad themes of British colonial policy, concentrating 
on the need for economic development. Echoing the central 
thesis of the 'Dual Mandate' philosophy, Stanley explained 
that colonial economic growth would benefit both local 
populations and the world. While the colonies were, and 
'probably must remain' predominantly agricultural, the 
potential value of industries, in absorbing skilled labour, 
ought not be overlooked. He saw no threat to metropolitan 
interests in the emergence of colonial industries serving 
local markets and complementing local agriculture, but 
warned against fostering 'unnatural and uneconomic' 
industries behind high tariffs93. 
These comments were elaborated in Stanley's major 
policy speech in the Commons in July 1943. On this occasion, 
Stanley took care to speak of limited industrialisation: 
That growth must be reasonable. I cannot 
think of anything more fatal to the economics 
of the Colonies than a rash, mushroom, 
industrialist growth, fostered by high 
protective tariffs unrelated either to local 
products or to local markets 4 
Appropriate types of development, he suggested, might 
include raw materials processing and the manufacture of 
simple goods not requiring imports of raw materials. 
However, he stressed that in wartime, only those industries 
contributing to the war effort could be encouraged. Stanley 
said that while 'moderate' tariff or other protection to 
local industries might be necessary initially, industries 
dependent on 'excessive' government help would not be 
93 CO 875/16/16, speech, 5 Mar 1943. 
94 PD C, 391, cols. 66-8,13 July 1943. 
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welcome, because of their possible adverse long-term 
economic effects. Conscious that the subject remained 
controversial, Stanley sought to pre-empt British 
manufacturers' fears: 'My own belief is that a wise 
expansion of secondary industry in the colonies will not 
react adversely upon our export trade as a whole, and will 
in the long run prove beneficial'. He argued that in post- 
war conditions, Britain's chief asset would be her 
accumulated industrial skill, and that it would increasingly 
be in the field of sophisticated manufactured goods that 
Britain would be able to compete overseas. Furthermore, it 
would no longer be possible to rely on Imperial Preference 
to shield British industry from foreign competition: 'To 
enable us to compete in the Colonial territories in the 
cheapest classes of goods would need preferential treatment 
so great as to question our position as trustees for the 
territories'. In any case, argued Stanley, such treatment 
would be self-defeating, because the cost of such preference 
would be passed on to the colonial consumer, causing local 
markets to contract. As he concluded: 
The more the Colonies are able themselves to 
supply their own cheaper necessities, the 
more will be available from the surplus for 
overseas purchase and the more will be 
available to buy the better class of goods 
which need skill in their manufacture, and in 
which, therefore, the export industries of 
this cguntry will be able to compete on fair 
terms . 
Significantly, Stanley's speech made no reference to 
industries geared to exporting. Although most of the 
Colonial office's discussions in this period concerned 
limited industrialisation catering to local needs for 
95 Ibid.. 
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simpler manufactures, the question of export-orientated 
production was not entirely absent. For instance, in 
December 1942, Burns proposed establishing in the Gold Coast 
a furniture industry targeted at the British market96. 
Stanley discouraged the idea, arguing: 
The chief justification for the establishment 
of secondary industries in the Colonial 
Empire is usually a local demand for the 
goods produced, since an internal market of 
this kind gives a much greater measure of 
stability than a market overseas, where the 
possibilities of competition and other 
obstacles to trade are largely incalculable. 
In Stanley's view, the furniture project should concentrate 
on supplying the 'less discriminating' local market97. 
However, the implication appears to be clear: it was one 
thing to encourage local production which would only compete 
with an already apparently doomed British export trade in 
cheap goods; it was quite another to promote external 
competition in the domestic British market. 
Stanley's speech of July 1943 formed the basis of the 
Colonial Office's discussions on industrial development for 
the remainder of the 'planning' phase, that is, up to the 
end of 1946. It was also the source of guidelines 
subsequently issued to the West African governments. The 
Office's references to the subject tempered caution with 
qualified optimism. For example, the memorandum on post-war 
planning, sent to West Africa in August 1943, explained that 
certain questions, including industrialisation, could not be 
addressed fully until after the war, because they involved 
larger policy issues, such as the future of tariffs, which 
96 CO 852/371/1, despatch to Stanley, 15 Dec 1942. 
97 Ibid., despatch to Burns, 10 Apr 1943. 
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required international agreement. The Office believed, 
however, that Stanley had provided enough short-term 
guidance in his Oxford and Commons speeches98. 
An important factor contributing to the Colonial 
Office's growing willingness to discuss and defend 
industrialisation was the apparent softening, more 
pronounced during 1943, of the Board of Trade's views on 
this traditionally vexed question. The Board's constructive 
attitude towards a number of East African industrial schemes 
early in 1943 prompted Dawe to comment: 'In the past the 
Board of Trade, as guardian of the interests of home 
industry, has been our chief obstacle in attempting to 
establish a wider point of view with regard to the 
development of secondary industries in the Coloniest99. 
Stanley, a previous President of the Board, added, 
ironically: 'Clearly the President... is more progressive or 
more amenable than some of his predecessors'100. 
Firmer evidence of the Board's changing views came in a 
memorandum produced in July 1943 on 'U. K. Participation in 
Empire Secondary Industry'101. In this, the Board admitted 
that, in the past, because of the need to protect employment 
at home, little 'official' encouragement had been given to 
British firms to establish industries overseas. While this 
need remained, the wartime stimulation of industrial 
development in other countries required a review of 
98 CO 554/132/33718/1/1943, 'Post-War Planning for West 
Africa', (n. d. ). 
99 CO 852/480/1, minute, 5 May 1943. 
100 Ibid., minute, 6 May 1943. 
101 CO 852/409/13, 'U. K. Participation in Empire Secondary 
Industries', July 1943. 
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Britain's possible role. An obstructive policy might 
ultimately be counter-productive. Industrialisation, for 
example in the Dominions and India, would, the Board argued, 
proceed whether or not British interests offered to 
participate, but a refusal to help might encourage these 
countries to promote inefficient and uneconomic industries 
behind high tariff wallsl02. If Britain did not participate, 
foreign competitors would. Moreover, co-operation in this 
development would enable Britain to share in the developing 
world's growing prosperity, and would partly off-set the 
damage done to British exporters, by creating an initial 
demand for British capital goods, and a continuing demand 
for accessories and spares. Non-economic considerations were 
also relevant: 
From the wider political angle, so far as the 
Dominions and India are concerned, resistance 
to local industrial development is bound to 
lay us open to the charge that we are 
interested only in our own prosperity and not 
in theirs. 
The Board emphasised that no firm undertakings could yet be 
given about future supplies from Britain of capital 
equipment, adding that many of the questions raised by 
industrialisation in the Empire were unanswerable pending an 
agreement on future international economic relations. 
102 The Federation of British Industries had already reached 
this conclusion in its February 1943 report on 'The future 
of British export trade': "We must face the fact that, 
whether we like it or not, the establishment of secondary 
industries in what were previously non-industrialised 
agricultural and mining regions is going to forge ahead 
rapidly after the war. If we participate willingly and co- 
operatively in this movement we should not only be able to 
secure extensive orders for our constructional industries - 
the very industries that will be in greatest need of 
assistance at the end of the war - but also should be able 
to play a part in shaping the world trading system of the 
future" [CAB 117/199,23 Feb 1943]. 
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Nevertheless, it was felt that these questions should 
be addressed before the war's end. The Board's tentative 
guidelines assumed that no co-ordinated planning of 
industrialisation by Empire governments was likely, given 
the degree of state control over private enterprise which 
this might require. Hence, British firms should be willing 
to consider development proposals as they arose, and the 
British Government should encourage firms at least to 
investigate such schemes. In its reasoning, however, the 
Board betrayed signs of a lingering, if camouflaged, 
scepticism: 
Even where they have good reason to think 
that the results of such investigations may 
prove negative, they will stand a better 
chance of quashing unhealthy projects if they 
can, as the result of a careful technical 
investigation, prove them to be so than if 
they adopt a nonpossumus attitude. 
Unco-operative firms would weaken their case for future 
government help when their interests were threatened by 
developments overseas. The British Government's role should 
be to discuss broad questions of development with other 
Empire governments, 'and to apply - but very discreetly -a 
certain amount of "braking" designed so far as possible to 
delay final ad hoc conclusions until the general position is 
clearer'103. An apparent fatalism in the Board of Trade's 
views is evident, too, in a memorandum it submitted to the 
War Cabinet Reconstruction Committee in June 1944. Surveying 
the long-term prospects for British exports, the Board 
concluded that a liberalisation of world trade was essential 
to a revival of British exports. Significantly, the domestic 
textile industry was cited as a traditional export trade 
103 Ibid.. 
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whose decline was likely to continue after the war104. If 
the Board saw this decline as inevitable and irreversible, 
then this may explain why the Board's opposition to colonial 
textile development, much in evidence up to 1942, apparently 
eased thereafter. 
Similar views emerged in a Treasury memorandum on 
'Overseas Investment in the next few years', circulated in 
January 1944 following interdepartmental discussions. The 
memorandum's central message was that after the war, care 
would be needed in Britain's external investments. 
Significantly, it was assumed that Lend-Lease might not 
continue long after the defeat of Germany. On overseas 
industrialisation, the Treasury echoed the Board of Trade's 
line, namely that participation by British interests might 
be the only means of compensating for the resulting damage 
to British exports, especially of consumer goods. British 
participation would not only yield profits, but would also 
establish markets for British exports of plant and 
expertise. The future spread of industrialisation overseas 
seemed probable, but the Treasury argued that Britain should 
not oppose this, except where it would cause 'violent 
displacements' to British exports. While 'excessive' tariff 
or other protection would still be resisted, some exceptions 
were acceptable, enough to safeguard against 'hopelessly 
uneconomic industrialisation'. Moreover, the Treasury 
continued: 'It is in our interest to see rising standards of 
104 T. J. Miller, 'The Board of Trade and British Economic 
Reconstruction 1940-49: the regeneration of exporting 
industries', (unpublished M. Litt. thesis, Stirling 
University, 1986), pp. 70-1. 
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living generally, and not least when they come from an 
improvement in the balance of a country's economy'105. 
Neither the Board of Trade nor the Treasury referred 
specifically to colonial industrialisation in their 
submissions. This suggests a continuing tendency to assume 
an identity of interests between the metropole and the 
colonies, or at least a continuing belief that colonial 
economies were subject to greater metropolitan influence 
than those of other parts of the Empire and elsewhere. The 
Board of Trade clearly had in mind industrialisation in the 
Dominions, whose economic policies Britain could no longer 
control, as post-Ottawa experience had demonstrated. 
However, the Treasury's memorandum was subsequently amended, 
at the Colonial Office's request, to state that the colonial 
territories should have a claim on British investment second 
only to home requirements106. It seems likely that this 
evidence of policy revision by two major Whitehall 
departments, however vaguely delineated, encouraged 
officials in the Colonial office to maintain a tenacious 
stance on colonial industrialisation. Nevertheless, it 
remained to be seen whether the Treasury and Board of Trade 
were prepared to extend to the colonial empire the more 
liberal approach to industrialisation which they seemed 
ready to apply to the Dominions. Even more, it remained to 
be seen how the Board of Trade would react to specific 
proposals for colonial industrial development, particularly 
those for textile industries, given the difficult future 
105 CO 852/554/7, 
years', Jan 1944. 
106 Ibid.. 
'Overseas investment in the next few 
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already being predicted for the British cotton industry, and 
the tradition 
Lancashire. 
of hostility to such development from 
As Caine predicted, industrial development was one of 
the first questions to be referred to the Colonial Economic 
Advisory Committee. The full activation of the Committee was 
delayed by Stanley's absence in West Africa, and it was not 
until early 1944 that its discussions on industrialisation 
began107. From the outset of CEAC's work, there were 
indications that its role was being managed carefully by the 
Colonial Office. For example, an attempt by Sir Hubert 
Henderson, a vocal critic of the apparent ascendency of 
multilateralist thinking in Whitehall, to raise the 
questions of commodity regulation and Imperial Preference 
proved unsuccessful'08. Both matters were affected by the 
Article VII negotiations, and were still before the War 
Cabinet and therefore highly confidential. Senior Colonial 
Office officials considered it inappropriate to refer such 
major policy issues to CEAC109. More immediately, officials 
could not agree on the text of a memorandum on 
industrialisation for CEAC. With relief, they accepted an 
offer by Lewis, CEAC's Secretary, to draft a paper on the 
subject11°. Lewis later explained that his memorandum was a 
107 PD C, 396, cols. 177-8,19 Jan 1944. 
108 CO 852/586/9, letter to Lewis, 21 Dec 1943; ibid., 
minute by Lewis, 21 Dec 1943. Henderson had been the only 
member of the War Cabinet Committee on Post-War Commercial 
Policy to oppose the Committee's Report, produced in January 
1943. 
109 Ibid., minutes by Caine, 23 Dec 1943, Clauson, 24 Dec 
1943 and Caine, 6 Jan 1944. 
110 CO 852/482/2, minute by Caine, 24 Dec 1943. 
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personal statement, written before he entered the Colonial 
Office"'. It was a comprehensive survey of the question, 
analysing claims made by proponents of industrialisation and 
addressing some of the problems involved. Lewis identified 
four main advantages of industrial development, beginning 
with the employment of under-utilised labour development in 
agricultural economies. Agricultural improvements, could be 
expected to release labour which industry could absorb. 
Lewis therefore saw a close relationship between 
agricultural and industrial development. Further, 
industrialisation would make possible a redistribution of 
colonial external purchasing power, which, together with 
higher average incomes from more remunerative industrial 
employment, would raise living standards generally. Also, 
diversification through industrial development would bring 
greater economic stability, while enriching communities 
through the transmission of new skills. Lewis did not 
believe that the British Government had actively blocked 
colonial industrialisation in the past, despite promptings 
by British manufacturers. However, he argued, little had 
been done to encourage industrial development. Lewis 
strongly advocated colonial industrial growth. As an 
economist, he was convinced of the benefits to be derived 
from economies of scale, and of developing groups of 
industries simultaneously in the same region, arguing that 
in this way the necessary utilities could be provided more 
cheaply. Instead of the 'gradual evolution' of 
manufacturing, Lewis called for a 'sudden jump' in 
in CO 990/1, CEAC 3rd minutes, 15 Feb 1944; ibid., 
CEAC(44)15, 'The Development of Secondary Industry in the 
Colonial Empire' (n. d. ). 
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development, a stance likely to alarm the Colonial Office. 
In other respects, Lewis's views were more conventional. For 
instance, he considered that the best opportunities for 
colonial industry lay with the processing of local raw 
materials and import-substitution, suggestions in line with 
the Colonial Office's thinking. Lewis felt that colonial 
industries might require initial, possibly even permanent, 
protection, where external competitors tried to under-sell 
and squeeze out local concerns, but he opposed artificial 
support of local industries through high prices, arguing 
11 that this would damage their competitiveness2. 
Symbolic of the improving relations between the 
Colonial Office and the Board of Trade concerning colonial 
industrialisation was Caine's willingness to send the Board 
a copy of Lewis's memorandum, with an invitation to 
participate in CEAC's discussions113. Although the Board 
judged the memorandum's case for industrial development to 
have been 'soberly and convincingly' stated, and closer in 
spirit to its own optimistic interpretation of the future 
availability of capital for overseas investment than the 
Treasury's more chilling forecast, there remained some 
unease about the Colonial Office's position. Two particular 
dangers worried the Board: first that Britain might be 
required to devote some of its limited capital to 
establishing 'redundant and inefficient' plants, whose sole 
justification was their location in the colonies; secondly, 
that such enterprises might secure tariff protection, 
injuring Britain's exporters and 
112 Ibid.. 
impoverishing local 
113 BT 11/2441, letter to Nowell, 7 Feb 1944. 
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markets114. These doubts resurfaced during informal talks, 
arranged at the Board of Trade's suggestion, with 
representatives of the Colonial Office, held in April 1944. 
Specifically, the Board asked how far the Colonial Office 
was committed to colonial industrialisation at virtually any 
cost, and how quickly such development would be pursued. 
It fell to Caine to provide the Office's response. His 
voice was becoming increasingly authoritative: in April 
1944, he was promoted to Assistant Under-Secretary with 
direct responsibility for the Economic Division, while 
retaining his supervision of all CD &W planning115. Caine 
attempted to reassure the Board of Trade by describing the 
displacement of pre-war laissez faire attitudes on colonial 
industrialisation by more active conceptions of London's 
responsibilities. However, he thought that there was no 
prospect of 'substantial' industrial development in the 
colonies until after the war, and explained that no 
decisions had yet been taken on the practical implications 
of this new policy. 
Caine's conciliatory presentation of the Office's case 
was also an attempt to dispel any alarmist assumptions held 
by the Board. For example, he explained that little had yet 
been achieved in planning colonial infrastructures, let 
alone secondary industries, and that there had been little 
response to the Colonial Office's request, in the previous 
summer, for development plans from the colonial 
116 governments. This informal discussion apparently 
114 Ibid., minute by Skevington, 22 Feb 1944. 
115 Petter (1980), p. 80. 
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satisfied the Board of Trade that the Colonial office was 
not, after all, 'hatching widespread plans for industrial 
development'. The Board was relieved that the Office's ideas 
on development were still apparently 'embryonic', 
representing no shift towards rapid development, or towards 
industrialisation for its own sake, as the Board had feared. 
The Board, however, declined Caine's invitation to 
participate in CEAC's deliberations on industrial policy, 
being content that contact had now been established with the 
Colonial Office, and that Caine had promised to keep the 
Board supplied with the relevant CEAC documents. As Nowell 
minuted to his Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Percival 
Liesching: 
It seems to me that this is a far more 
satisfactory arrangement than for the Board 
of Trade to be represented as such on the 
Committee, a position which we might find 
highly embarrassirq when decisions on policy 
have to be taken 
When CEAC's discussions on industrialisation began in 
earnest during spring 1944, strong views on the subject soon 
emerged among the Committee's members. Bourdillon drew 
attention to the subject's importance and controversial 
nature. He suspected that 'the whole of British industry' 
1 
was opposed to the development of colonial manufacturing18. 
His views were undoubtedly coloured by his recent Nigerian 
experiences with the UAC. Bourdillon certainly believed that 
British industry was largely to blame for the lack of 
industrial development in Nigeria. In view of the past 
116 BT 11/2441, note of meeting between CO and BoT 
officials, 4 Apr 1944. 
117 Ibid., 14 Apr 1944. 
118 Co 990/16, CEAC(Industry) 3rd minutes, 17 Apr 1944. 
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absence of an active government policy on colonial 
industrialisation, and the inadequacy of local capital and 
expertise, the 'only hope' for such development was British 
finance and skill, neither of which had been attracted. 
Bourdillon thought that this negative response had been 
'short-sighted', arguing that industrial development would 
increase colonial wealth and hence the capacity to import 
more valuable British goods. In effect, the opposition of 
British industry had been counter-productive, stifling the 
growth of what could have been a large export market119. 
One of the most controversial aspects of CEAC's 
discussions on industrialisation concerned the view, shared 
by several Committee members, that development should be 
concentrated in the most favourable locations, rather than 
be spread evenly throughout the colonies. Evan Durbin 
advocated this course, arguing the need to maximise on 
available resources. Instead of gradual social and economic 
development, he favoured a focussing of energy on the rapid 
modernisation of a single large area, such as Nigeria120. 
However, Durbin neglected the 'political' argument against 
selective development, which would favour one territory at 
the expense of others. The Colonial Office could not ignore 
local susceptibilities in this way. Yet it could be argued 
that in its concentration on West Indian development after 
1942, admittedly prompted by Churchill's concern to smoothe 
Anglo-American relations, the Colonial office had done 
precisely this. Between them, Lewis and Durbin were calling, 
119 Bourdillon (1945), pp. 52-3. 
120 Co 990/16, CEAC(Industry) 3rd minutes, 17 Apr 1944. 
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early in 1944, for large-scale, -, revolutionary, ' industrial 
development in selected territories. 
This position was rejected by Caine, who defended 
gradual development in a large number of territories 
according to their potential and needs. He argued that this 
might produce as much development, in aggregate, as any 
121 'concentrated' effort. Durbin and Lewis, however, 
continued their campaign for a more radical approach. Durbin 
believed that industrial development was the only route by 
which colonies could escape poverty, and that if Britain 
failed to promote faster industrialisation, it would be 
condemning them to 'permanent economic and social 
darkness'122. He saw important practical justifications for 
'concentrated' development, chiefly that Britain lacked the 
resources to develop the whole colonial empire 
simultaneously. He estimated the cost of even moderate 
industrial development, spread throughout the colonies, at 
L500 million to L600 million per annum. He feared that 
Britain would 'fritter away' capital on numerous projects 
which, in total, did not comprise a balanced development 
programme in any single colony123. Lewis, too, argued that 
'concentrated' development was more likely to produce 
genuinely economic enterprise than attempts to spread the 
development effort thinly throughout the colonies, which 
would, he believed, promote uneconomically small 
124 industries. 
121 CO 990/17, CEAC(Industry)(44)5, 'Possible scope for 
industrialisation in the Colonies', 25 Apr 1944. 
122 Ibid., CEAC(Industry)(44)7, note, 4 May 1944. 
123 Ibid.. 
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Lewis's ideas on concentrated development were 
clarified in a memorandum written by him and subsequently 
circulated to CEAC's Industry Sub-Committee. He saw the pre- 
war experiment with trading estates in Britain as a model 
for development, offering a means of achieving economies of 
scale in providing industrial infrastructures making 
otherwise unattractive projects ultimately economic. His 
fundamental argument was that it was inappropriate to judge 
development propositions on a factory by factory basis, 
since by this criterion, few colonial enterprises would be 
economic. Furthermore, concentrated development, being more 
efficient, could be competitive, essential if new industries 
were to survive. 
development could 
industrialisation125. 
Equally, being planned, concentrated 
avoid any undesirable effects of 
However, one major reason for the 
Colonial Office's opposition to concentrated development was 
the fear that it might create a standard which would raise 
expectations in other territories which could not be 
satisfied126. 
Although in other matters Bourdillon was an ally of 
Durbin and Lewis on CEAC, he differed from them on the 
desirable rate of industrial development, fearing the social 
consequences of rapid industrialisation127. Significantly, 
Caine, though opposed to 'revolutionary' development, was 
prepared to accept the disturbance of traditional social 
124 CO 990/16, CEAC(Industry) 5th minutes, 15 June 1944. 
125 CO 990/17, CEAC(Industry)(46)26, memorandum by W. A. 
Lewis and F. E. V. Meyer, 'The Analysis of Secondary 
Industries', Feb 1946. 
126 CO 990/16, CEAC(Industry) 5th minutes, 15 June 1944. 
Comment by Caine. 
127 Ibid., CEAC(Industry) 3rd minutes, 17 Apr 1944. 
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institutions by industrial development, especially in those 
areas of Africa still organised tribally. However, he 
believed that the social impact of industrialisation could 
be moderated, for example through effective labour 
legislation128. From this, and from other observations by 
Caine, it is clear that he did not obstruct proposals for 
industrial development because of fears for their 
consequences on traditional societies. On the contrary, he 
was one of the most 'progressive' officials in the Colonial 
Office, repeatedly stating the case for modernisation in the 
Colonial Empire. Furthermore, Caine appears to have retained 
these views. Late in 1946, citing the Nigerian example, he 
stated that rapid development was impossible without a 
'social revolution', including fundamental changes in the 
system of land tenure, the implication being not that the 
price of rapid development would be an unacceptable social 
revolution, but rather that major social changes were the 
concomitant of urgently needed economic development1290 
In its advice to local governments, the Colonial Office 
stressed the need to balance economic and social 
considerations in promoting development: 
A policy promising rapid increase in income 
may be unwise if it involves the sudden 
disintegration of an established social 
system; though, on the other hand, the rigid 
maintenance of old social habits may be 
unwise they impede all economic 
progress 
128 Co 990/17, CEAC(Industry)(44)6,25 Apr 1944. 
129 CO 852/588/3, note of meeting in CO, 29 Nov 1946. 
130 CO 96/781/31475/1944, 'The Planning of Social and 
Economic Development in the Colonial Empire', Apr 1944. 
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At this stage in the debate on post-war planning, the 
Colonial Office could offer only this inconclusive formula. 
Ultimately, local governments would have to determine the 
acceptable degree of social disturbance. The implications of 
modernisation, however, remained of concern to the Office. 
In the Commons in July 1944, Stanley acknowledged that 
industrial development in West Africa would have 'a fearful 
impact' on traditional social organisation, and stressed the 
importance of adequate preparation for that change. This, he 
explained, was why he had established the Colonial Social 
Science Research Council to study the social effects of 
colonial industrialisationl3l. However, Stanley dismissed 
the suggestion by one Member of Parliament that West Africa 
faced an 'industrial revolution': 
I do not think that he means to conjure up 
the idea that as we, in the early part of the 
19th century, changed from a country 
predominantly agricultural into one 
predominantly industrial, so, after the war, 
something of that kind will happen in West 
Africa. There is going to be no industrial 
revolution in that sense, but a considerable 
increase in secondary industries and in 13 industrial work2. 
CEAC's report on manufacturing industries was 
eventually drafted by Caine. In it, the moderate views of 
the majority of the Committee, and of the Colonial Office, 
triumphed, and the radical suggestions on industrial 
concentration were omitted. The report assumed that improved 
colonial living standards required some development of local 
manufacturing, but it concluded that it would not be in the 
colonies' interests to foster 'artificial' and 'uneconomic' 
131 PD(C) , 402, cols. 
462-3,20 July 1944; CO 901/1, CSSRC 
2nd minutes, 5 Sept 1944. 
132 PD C, 402, cols. 462-3,20 July 1944. 
140 
industries dependent on long-term government protection, 
whether by tariffs, import controls or subsidies. The report 
did not recommend particular industries, but favoured those 
based on the manufacture of goods for export from local raw 
materials, or goods for local consumption from either local 
or imported raw materials. The possibility of manufacturing 
goods for export from imported materials was not excluded. 
Caine's influence can be seen in the report's treatment of 
the protection issue. The Committee accepted the case for 
special assistance to new industries, particularly for those 
temporarily unable to withstand outside competition. The 
preferred forms of government assistance were subsidies 
rather than tariff protection and import controls, a view 
reflecting Caine's argument that subsidies distributed the 
burden of assistance more equitably among the population, 
and that competition stimulated industry and encouraged 
l3 efficiency 3. The report's rejection of artificial 
protection for uneconomic industries, and its advocacy of 
subsidies delighted the Board of Trade, where these 
guidelines were regarded as 'impeccable'. The only problem, 
in the Board's view, was that Caine's moderating influence, 
obvious in the report, and thought to represent the 'wisest 
and sanest' view, might be challenged, not only by CEAC, but 
also in the political arena. It could not, therefore, be 
assumed that Caine's opinions would remain dominant, and the 
Board privately reserved to itself the right to challenge 
any deviation by the Colonial office towards the prolonged 
13 imposition of high tariffs4. 
133 CO 852/578/5, CEAC(44)32, 'The Development of 
Manufacturing Industries', 29 Aug 1944. 
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CEAC recognised that industrial development would 
involve 'some disturbance' of established social 
institutions, and that it would be necessary to 'soften' the 
impact of social change. 
At the same time, we are convinced that a 
policy of opposing any kind of industrial 
development because of the dangers of such 
social stresses would be mistaken, and that, 
provided that due care is taken in smoothing 
the transition, substantial changes in the 
social structure must be accepted as a 
necessary cost of progress. 
Again, the proximity to Caine's expressed views is striking. 
Finally, the Committee admitted its divisions over the 
desirable rate of industrial development. However, while 
alluding to the arguments over the relative benefits of 
'concentrated' as opposed to evolutionary growth, the report 
left this question open135. 
Durbin and Lewis had, therefore, failed to have their 
views endorsed by CEAC. Undeterred, they camaigned for more 
radical policies, elaborating their ideas in a memorandum on 
planning prepared for CEAC's Agenda Sub-Committee, of which 
they were members-36. This paper rejected the conclusions of 
CEAC's report. It called for the fastest practicable 
economic development, enabling the colonies more quickly to 
reach the position from which they could finance their own 
social development, and because self-government would 
require secure economic foundations. The memorandum 
envisaged a two-fold development strategy based on the 
encouragement of complementary agricultural and industrial 
134 BT 11/2441, minute by Skevington, 3 July 1944. 
135 CO 852/578/5, CEAC(44)32. 
136 CO 852/588/2, CEAC(44)38, Agenda Sub-Committee Third 
Report, 'Memorandum on Planning', 14 Sept 1944. 
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'revolutions': agricultural development would release labour 
for industry; in turn, industry would create both an 
expanded market for farmers and cheaper goods. Work should 
therefore begin by promoting agricultural change in regions 
selected as suitable for industrial development. Once again, 
CEAC's more radical members called for concentrated 
development. The memorandum urged the creation of a few 
industrial centres, rejecting the widespread development of 
small, isolated factories, protected behind subsidies, 
tariffs and so on, as the main Committee's report had 
suggested. The latter approach, the memorandum argued, would 
waste money, because it was not an economic method of 
1 creating the infrastructure necessary for development37. 
Official reactions to the Agenda Sub-Committee's 
memorandum were predictably cool. Caine defended CEAC's 
original report against the criticisms of the Committee's 
more radical members. He thought that the report embodied a 
set of 'moderate' proposals through which `significant if 
unspectacular advances' were possible. Caine advocated the 
immediate circulation of CEAC's report, which had Stanley's 
general blessing, to local governments138. Clauson supported 
Caine, regarding the Agenda Sub-Committee's suggestions as 
'a plea for revolution as opposed to evolution'139. The 
issues raised by Durbin and Lewis were subsequently put to 
Stanley in a series of questions on future policy. However, 
these questions, in the Colonial Office's view, involved 
broader and fundamental problems of political and social 
137 Ibid.. 
138 CO 852/578/5, minute, 4 Oct 1944. 
139 Ibid., minute, 4 Oct 1944. 
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policy, which were themselves under consideration throughout 
the 'planning' phase. CEAC, prompted by Durbin and Lewis, 
asked Stanley outright whether industrial policy would be to 
promote 'concentrated' development, or to grant equal 
facilities for the encouragement of industry in every 
colony140. Stanley replied that the development of 
manufacturing would probably be determined by the practical 
advantages enjoyed by certain areas. However, he thought 
that in future, as much weight should be given to developing 
a balanced and diversified economy in every colony as to any 
advantages accruing from 'concentrated' development141. 
Lewis resigned from the Secretaryship of CEAC in November 
1944, accusing the Colonial Office of obstructing 
alternative ideas on development142. Durbin, equally 
frustrated, threatened to resign from CEAC. His proposal 
that Lewis be made a full member of the Committee was not, 
however, taken up by Stanley143. 
The Colonial Office decided to circulate a memorandum 
based on CEAC's report to the colonial governments. A number 
of amendments were made to the Committee's original 
recommendations, and the circular despatch was approved by 
Stanley on 14 December 1944144. The revised version 
explained that no attempt had been made to suggest 'rapid' 
140 Lee and Petter (1982), pp. 210-11; Morgan (1980) I, 
pp. 191-3. 
141 CO 990/1, CEAC 9th minutes, 19 Dec 1944; Morgan (1980) 
It pp. 189-93; Lee and Petter (1982), pp. 216-9. 
142 CO 852/586/9, minute, 30 Nov 1944; Lee and Petter 
(1982), pp. 212-3. 
143 CO 852/586/7, letter to Stanley, 22 Dec 1944; ibid., 
letter to Durbin, 14 Feb 1945. 
144 CO 852/578/5, minute by Caine, 15 Dec 1944. 
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or 'revolutionary' change, and omitted the section of CEAC's 
report concerning the desirable rate of development. 
Instead, it summarised the acceptable steps which could be 
taken to promote development. In an expanded section on 
'Special assistance to new industries', Caine underlined the 
benefits of government subsidies, while playing down the 
possible role of tariffs and import quotas. The new version 
stressed the value of providing, at public expense, training 
and supervision, and in some cases a market for manufactures 
in government housing and other schemes, or to supply 
government institutions145. Similarly, Caine's earlier 
misgivings about protective tariffs were repeated. Again his 
argument was that tariffs placed the burden of support for 
industry on the consuming public, rather than on the whole 
body of taxpayers, with the result that those least able to 
pay paid the most, whereas the purpose of industrial 
development was to raise living standards. As a broad 
guideline, however, the despatch suggested that ad valorem 
duties should not exceed 33 per cent, and that if tariffs 
were imposed, 'impartial' tariff boards should be 
established to regulate them. Finally, import restrictions 
were discouraged, on the grounds that they impaired 
efficiency by reducing competition, and that consumers were 
left open to exploitation by monopolies or 'rings'146. The 
Board of Trade approved of the memorandum, but stressed the 
desirability of close liaison between colonial governments 
and London on proposals for industrial development, adding 
145 Ibid., minute by Caine, 25 Oct 1944. 
146 CO 852/578/6, circular despatch, 'The Development of 
Manufacturing Industries', 27 Feb 1945. 
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that local governments should avoid any final decisions 
which might jeopardise the outcome of the continuing Anglo- 
American discussions on Article VII147. 
At this point it is appropriate to examine the interest 
shown in industrialisation by the West African governments, 
and the response of Whitehall and metropolitan interests. On 
the basis of the positive signals it had received from West 
Africa up to 1943, the Colonial Office believed that local 
administrators were anxious to experiment with industrial 
development. The period between 1943 and 1946 saw not only 
an increase in planning for post-war development and 
discussions on the optimum means of pursuing that 
development, but also witnessed several modest but 
significant attempts to establish manufacturing in the 
region. In the Gold Coast, for example, Burns' concern to 
provide for the resettlement and rehabilitation of 
demobilised troops led him to favour industrial development, 
including projects to manufacture bricks and tiles, soap and 
textiles148. Burns assumed that the Gold Coast's economic 
base would continue to be chiefly agricultural, but he 
believed there were various small-scale industries which 
could be developed to the population's benefit149. As in 
many other spheres, however, planning in West Africa was 
hampered by inadequate economic intelligence. In July 1944, 
for example, the Development Adviser, Noel Hall, confessed 
that he could not speak with authority on the future of 
147 BT 11/2441, minute by Willis, 19 Dec 1944; ibid., minute 
by Shackle, 10 Jan 1945; CO 852/578/6, letter from Helmore, 
13 Jan 1945. 
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local industries developed during the war, because it was 
difficult to establish precisely what development had 
occurred. He concluded, however, that West African labour 
productivity was very low, and that it could not be assumed 
that low wages meant that local labour was cheap: on the 
contrary, thought Hall, it was very expensive per unit of 
product150. This interpretation contrasted strongly with the 
view popularly held during the 1930s, especially among 
British manufacturers, that colonial industry would enjoy 
the unfair advantage of cheap, non-European labour. Hall's 
analysis may have encouraged the Colonial Office to promote 
a positive policy on manufacturing, by supplying a 
justification for assisting such development, but it is 
unclear whether Hall's views were given a wider audience, 
including the Board of Trade. However, Hall detected a 
fundamental problem in assessing the potential role of 
industry in West Africa, namely the predominance of 
subsistence economies. Consequently, he argued, local 
incomes could be raised significantly through a relatively 
small effort. There was, therefore, very little incentive 
for local populations to succeed in a money economy, a 
precondition for industrial growth151. 
The promotion of local textile manufacturing appealed 
strongly to both the Nigerian and the Gold Coast governments 
in this period. From the Gold Coast, Burns reported in July 
1943 that useful experiments had begun in Avatime, Southern 
Togoland, to train weavers, using locally grown cotton. 
These trials were assisted by the West African Institute, 
150 CO 852/587/4, letter to Clauson, 1 July 1944. 
151 Ibid.. 
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and received government funds. The scheme's aim was to 
develop a village-based weaving industry, using hand-spun 
cotton. Initially, the scheme appeared successful, producing 
high quality cloth which found a ready local market152. 
Progress continued, and in October 1944, the Institute's 
Textile Officer reported that a new industry had in effect 
been created. Local hand-loom weavers were described as 
skilful, easy to train and adaptable to regular working 
hours. Output per worker had increased more than fourfold to 
seventeen yards per month, and the aim was to double this 
figure. It was estimated that production would reach one 
thousand yards per month early in 1945153. Consequently, 
Hall revised his earlier comments, concluding that improved 
methods had transformed African productivity. If this were 
sustained it could radically alter the competitiveness of 
local industries, and undermined previous estimates of their 
capacity to survive. Moreover, this change had important 
implications for future attempts to promote development: 
It is looking, to my mind, more and more 
probable that tariffs, subsidies and other 
economic impedimenta will very rarely be 
appropriate under West African conditions and 
that the direct nurturing of small industrial 
groups in order to improve both their 
organisation, technical methods and 
individual productivity will become the more 
represenýgive method of handling these 
problems 
In the Colonial Office, Clauson believed that there was a 
'good future' for development, under 'proper guidance', of 
the type in Avatime155. By early 1945, the textile scheme in 
152 CO 852/481/2, letter to Stanley, 31 July 1943. 
153 CO 852/574/6, letter to Clauson, 12 Oct 1944. 
154 Ibid.. 
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Avatime appeared to be thriving. Forty three looms were in 
operation, and some three hundred spinning wheels had been 
distributed, about half of which were in regular use, 
producing cloth valued at about L100 per month156. 
If officials in West Africa and in the Colonial Office 
were enthusiastic about the possibilities for textile 
development in the region, the problem of metropolitan 
reactions remained. The British cotton goods industry, 
already declining before 1939, would inevitably be affected 
by the development of competitive manufacturing overseas, as 
the inter-war experience of India's textile development had 
demonstrated. Lancashire had been ravaged by wartime 
concentration and contraction of output for export. Its pre- 
war decline had been accelerated, with the closure of one 
third of its cotton mills and the halving of its labour 
force. Cotton goods exports fell from 1,393 million square 
yards in 1939 to reach their nadir of 374 million square 
yards in 1943157. Late in 1942, the Board of Trade's Post- 
War Reconstruction Section examined the industry's long-term 
export prospects, concluding that there was no hope of 
Lancashire recovering its former export trade. Although an 
increase in incomes in countries such as India and China 
would create a growing demand for cotton goods, the Board 
doubted that Lancashire would benefit, since both these 
important markets were effectively 'lost' to British 
manufacturers. Africa, however, was seen as a large 
155 Ibid. letter to Noel Hall, 18 Nov 1944. 
156 CO 852/574/9, Burns to Stanley, 6 Feb 1945. 
157 D. H. Aldcroft, The British Economy. Volume 1: The Years 
in Turmoil 1920-1951, (Brighton, 1986), p. 180; Miller 
(1986), p. 23. 
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potential market for cheap cotton goods, but not necessarily 
for Lancashire's products: 'Under no reasonably conceivable 
circumstances', felt the Board, 'can Africa offer a market 
to take the place of India'. Lancashire, it was argued, 
would be wise to concentrate its production on high grade, 
specialist goods for which its experience, and its skilled 
labour force, best equipped it158. A similarly bleak picture 
of the industry's exporting future emerged in a Board of 
Trade memorandum on 'Post-War Exports', submitted to the 
Cabinet Reconstruction Committee in June 1944. Intended to 
counter what was seen as a strengthening assumption 
Britain's ability to achieve a major increase in its share 
of postwar world trade, the memorandum concluded that for 
traditional staple industries, such as textiles, this was 
unlikely unless they became more competitive, and unless 
overseas markets grew in prosperity owing to a 
liberalisation of world trade159. Against this depressing 
backdrop, the reactions of the Cotton Board to colonial 
textile manufacturing are of particular importance. The 
Board was likely to be highly sensitive to the threat of 
added difficulties stemming from new overseas competition. 
To some extent, the Cotton Board shared the Board of Trade's 
fatalism towards probable industrial development overseas. 
According to a memorandum sent to the Board of Trade and the 
Colonial Office, the Cotton Board was resigned to 
industrialisation in the Dominions. However, where the 
colonial empire was concerned, the Board believed that 'a 
158 BT 11/2021, 'Cotton Industry. Industrial Rehabilitation 
and Labour Requirements'. (D. R. I. 10) Oct 1942. 
159 CAB 87/14, R(I)(44)5, 'Post-War Exports', 23 June 1944. 
150 
more realistic attitude was possible', since no entrenched 
interests yet existed. The Board accepted that colonial 
industrialisation would occur regardless of opinion in 
Britain, and accepted the argument that colonial primary 
over-specialisation made these economies vulnerable, 
although the Board suggested that the proper solution might 
be to reform the colonial marketing structure. However, it 
warned of the potential drawbacks of industrialisation, 
including decline of village crafts, and the unsuitability 
of locally-grown cotton for the kinds of textile industry 
apparently being considered160. Though concerned about 
overseas competition, the Cotton Board was realistic enough 
to recognise the likelihood of such development, which, 
given low local labour costs, might not require tariff 
protection. The Board therefore seemed to adopt a positive 
attitude towards colonial industrialisation, and was 
prepared to 'participate constructively'161. 
The Cotton Board's interest in this general question 
had been sharpened by a recent Board of Trade decision to 
permit the export of textile machinery to Kenya, on the 
condition that most of the machinery would be second- 
hand162. The Cotton Board sought clear guidelines for use in 
similar situations in the future, and called for a 'sane' 
policy on colonial development. Prominent in guiding the 
Board's discussions was its Chairman, Sir Raymond Streat, a 
former secretary of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce. 
160 CO 852/482/4, 'Development of Cotton Spinning and 
Weaving in Empire countries', 14 Sept 1943. 
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From July 1943 onwards Streat developed his contacts 
with the Colonial Office. He considered it futile to attempt 
to stifle colonial textile industries, but he believed the 
question could be handled in a realistic and constructive 
spirit, benefitting British interests. As he told Sir Arnold 
Overton of the Board of Trade: 
Any policy evolved by us which would command 
whole-hearted sympathy in London might be 
likely to receive criticism from the rank and 
file, who may take a narrow view, but I think 
myself that the times and the outlook at 
large necessit to the taking of a long view 
by Lancashirel°3. 
Streat sought a positive response from Lancashire, and took 
the initiative by approaching the Board of Trade for 
discussions. Uppermost in Streat's mind was the need for 
Lancashire to collaborate financially in colonial 
development, though he understood the need for tact, given 
Lancashire's traditional hostility to overseas competition. 
Overton agreed to act as an 'honest broker' between the 
164 Cotton Board and the Colonial Office. Streat's attitude 
was more enlightened than that of his colleagues on the 
Cotton Board: significantly, he had approached Overton 
before seeking the Board's authorisation. At the Board's 
meeting on 28 September 1943, he warned that textile 
development in the Empire would proceed irrespective of 
Lancashire's views. However, demands for protection for 
colonial industries would arise, obliging the Cotton Board 
to protest, exposing itself to charges of opposing colonial 
development. But, argued Streat, if the Cotton Board 
163 BT 11/2441, letter, 15 Sept 1943; Dupree (198)7, Vol. II, 
pp. 138-41, entry for 28 July 1943. 
164 BT 11/2441, letter to Caine, 21 Sept 1943; Dupree 
(1987), pp. 154-5, entry for 17 Sept 1943. 
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participated, for example by establishing an investment 
corporation, it could influence the course of development: 
An attempt could then be made to establish 
the position that only goods which could be 
made on an economic basis should be produced 
locally and that Lancashire should supply all 
other cotton goods. There would then be no 
need for a comprehensive tariff nor could 
Lancashire be charged with obstructing 
Colonial developments. 
Constructive co-operation, in other words, offered a means 
to limit the possible erosion of Lancashire's share of the 
colonial market. After 'a powerful debate', Streat's 
colleagues empowered him to hold preliminary talks with 
Overton165. 
Streat's conciliatory posture was evident when he and 
other representatives of the Cotton Board met officials from 
the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade in October 1943. 
He spoke of the need to devise a constructive policy towards 
the development of colonial cotton manufacturing. Here, the 
Cotton Board seemed to be distancing itself from the 
hostility to such development it knew persisted in 
Lancashire. Streat believed that both Caine and Overton had 
been impressed with the 'realism' of the Cotton Board's 
stance166. For the Board of Trade, Overton pointed out that 
much overseas industrialisation, stimulated by the war, was 
'inevitable'. It was in Britain's interests, he argued, to 
encourage sound development, and to participate in it, for 
the benefit of the British machinery industry. Against this 
background, Caine's observation that some colonial 
165 BT 175/2, CB 1468a, Cotton Board 97th meeting, 28 Sept 
1943; Dupree (1987), pp. 158-9, entry for 28 Sept 1943. 
166 BT 175/2, CB 1550a, Cotton Board 99th meeting, 26 Oct 
1943. 
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industrialisation was likely, necessary and desirable was 
largely uncontroversial. Streat went on to suggest the 
creation of an investment corporation, financed jointly by 
Lancashire and London, to participate in developments 
approved of by the colonial authorities. The corporation's 
aim would be to achieve co-ordination among the interested 
Lancashire firms, to avoid competition among them167. Here, 
then, was evidence of a metropolitan interest group 
attempting to accommodate itself to the challenge of 
overseas, specifically colonial, industrialisation. It 
remained to be seen how the Cotton Board would react when 
faced with concrete proposals to establish mills, as opposed 
to abstract discussions. 
While the 
industrialisation 
broad implications of colonial 
were being discussed in Britain, 
developments in West Africa were gathering pace, focussing 
the attention of interested British parties more sharply on 
this question. The first major problem to arise in relation 
to West African textile development concerned local attempts 
to foster village textile industries. A basic difficulty was 
that the output of hand-spun cotton yarn did not match the 
demand of weavers. Noel Hall drew attention to this problem 
in July 1944, contrasting the improvements achieved both in 
quality and output on the weaving side with the low 
productivity of the spinning side168. In October 1944, it 
was predicted that the future of the industry depended 
167 CO 852/482/4, note of discussion between representatives 
of the Cotton Board, Board of Trade and Colonial Office, 14 
Oct 1943. The official response to this suggestion is 
discussed in chapter III. 
168 CO 852/587/4, letter to Clauson, 1 July 1944. 
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largely on an expansion in yarn supply169. Although hand- 
weaving was an economic proposition, hand-spinning offered 
little hope of expansion, being technically inefficient, and 
was unlikely to support a 'modern' industry170. However, as 
Tempany, the Colonial Office's Agricultural Adviser argued, 
after his tour of West Africa in 1943-44, hand-spinning had 
other advantages. For instance, in Northern Nigeria, it 
played an important role in informal economic participation 
by women, and, though uneconomic, produced substantial 
amounts of yarn171. Late in 1944, the Gold Coast authorities 
began to investigate improved methods of spinning cotton, in 
order to safeguard the industry's future172. The solution 
seemed to lie in powered spinning. The West African 
Institute agreed to provide machinery and advice, and the 
Gold Coast Government financed the project to the extent of 
L13,000. The government's ultimate aim was to transfer the 
scheme to a specially formed local company173. 
In Nigeria, meanwhile, external interests were 
examining the possibilities of textile production on a 
factory basis. In March 1944, the United Africa Company 
proposed building a textile mill in Zaria Province, with 
about 5,000 spindles and 200 looms, producing some two 
million square yards of cloth annually, and employing around 
300 people. It was thought that the capacity of the mill 
169 CO 852/574/6, Hall to Clauson, 12 Oct 1944. 
170 Ibid., Clauson to Noel 
171 Shuckburgh (I), p. 24; 
31 Oct 1944; ibid., minute 
172 CO 554/136/33685/1945, 
Williams, 20 Dec 1944. 
173 CO 852/574/9, Burns to 
Hall, 18 Nov 1944. 
CO 852/574/6, minute by Tempany, 
by Caine, 3 Nov 1944. 
letter from Noel Hall to O. G. R. 
Stanley, 6 Feb 1945. 
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might eventually be increased five-fold174. The UAC sought 
the Colonial Off ice's help in obtaining machinery for the 
Zaria project. The problem was Lancashire's expected need 
for new textile plant to re-equip after the war, while no 
second-hand machinery seemed to exist which would not 
require extensive re-conditioning. The UAC therefore needed 
to be able to satisfy a potential manufacturer that official 
permission to export new machinery would be granted175. 
Caine approached the Board of Trade on the UAC's behalf, 
requesting help in securing the necessary export licence, 
assuming that the Board accepted the Colonial Office's view 
that where a good case existed, colonial textile 
manufacturing should not be obstructed176. Although 
sympathetic, the Board of Trade viewed the matter as 'very 
delicate', and promised nothing until the Cotton Board had 
177 been consulted informally. 
The Board of Trade told the Cotton Board that it did 
not believe export licensing should be used to obstruct 
overseas orders for textile machinery, and that it would be 
'extremely embarrassing' for the British Government to be 
accused of manipulating export controls against the kind of 
development being proposed by the UAC. In the Board's view, 
development of this sort was inevitable, but suspicions 
persisted in the colonies that Lancashire was able to 
influence the British government over the direction of 
174 BT 175/3, CB 3354a, Cotton Board 129th meeting, 19 Dec 
1944. 
175 CO 852/574/6, letter from A. R. I. Mellor (UAC) to Caine, 
6 Sept 1944. 
176 Ibid., letter to Nowell, 14 Sept 1944. 
177 Ibid., letter from Caine to Mellor, 13 Oct 1944. 
156 
colonial development. Streat endorsed the Board of Trade's 
general policy, and promised not to obstruct the UAC 
proposal, though he doubted if suitable machinery would be 
found for export to Nigeria, and warned of protests from 
Lancashire178. As the Board of Trade told the Colonial 
Office, however, a means had to be found of enabling the UAC 
to contact the Cotton Board without the impression being 
given that schemes such as that for Nigeria were being 
subordinated to Lancashire's wishes. The Board advised the 
Colonial Office to inform the UAC that neither the Cotton 
Board nor the Board of Trade opposed textile development in 
principle, but that much depended on the precise methods 
proposed by the Company. However, the Board of Trade added 
that it hoped that such development would involve the 'least 
possible interference' with Britain's cotton export trade, 
'the importance of which as an asset in our post-war economy 
His Majesty's Government cannot afford to underrate'179. 
The UAC's subsequent discussions with the Cotton Board 
were apparently amicable. Frank Samuel, Managing Director of 
the UAC, explained that the Company was not expecting its 
Nigerian scheme to be a short-term commercial success but 
wanted to respond positively to the colonial authorities' 
interest in manufacturing. If the Nigerian government 
rejected the scheme, the UAC, said Samuel, would not be 
perturbed, but if the government did favour the new policy, 
then the Company wanted to participate. The Cotton Board, 
too, promised not to obstruct such developments, or the 
178 CO 852/574/6, note of meeting between Streat and BoT 
officials, 26 Oct 1944. 
179 Ibid., Nowell to Caine, 30 Oct 1944. 
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export of machinery from Britain, but it requested reports 
on the scheme's progress, and sought some influence on 
development so as to restrict the damage done to 
Lancashire's export trade. The Board also asked for 
assurances, first that the UAC would not seek tariff 
protection from the Nigerian government against British 
cotton imports; secondly that the Company would inform the 
Board about the project's progress, and finally, (a point 
made at the insistence of the Board's trade union members), 
that the Company would recognise any trade union 
organisation which existed or might develop in association 
with the scheme. The UAC envisaged no problems on these 
points, and confirmed that it expected no high tariff 
protection180_ 
As Streat had predicted, Lancashire was unenthusiastic 
about these proposals. This emerged during discussions 
between the Colonial Office, the Cotton Board, the Board of 
Trade and the UAC, held in March 1945181. Nevertheless, it 
appeared that British interests understood that they could 
not seek the Board of Trade's intervention on their behalf 
with the Colonial office to stop such development. The UAC 
emphasised that its Nigerian scheme was not expected to be 
profitable, and might incur substantial losses, at least 
initially. The Company described the project as the logical 
outcome of its commitment to the Colonial Office's 
industrial development policy. More important was the UAC's 
180 BT 175/3, CB 3354a, Cotton Board 129th meeting, 19 Dec 
1944; CO 852/574/7, Streat to Helmore, 13 Jan 1945; Dupree 
(1987), pp. 228-9, entry for 7 Dec 1944. Streat described his 
discussion with Samuel as 'an ominously historic interview'. 
181 CO 852/574/7, note of meeting, 8 Mar 1945. 
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statement that it did not intend to seek protection for its 
mill against imported textiles, and that the mill would 
produce a plain grey cloth no longer manufactured in 
Britain. Caine advised that the Nigerian Government was 
unlikely to commit itself on protection, and would require a 
free hand. He explained that the colonial Office supported 
the UAC's scheme, believing that Nigeria was an appropriate 
experimental site, and that there would have to be strong 
reasons for not proceeding. The Board of Trade foresaw no 
major difficulty in granting an export licence for the 
necessary textile machinery, but warned no date for the 
issue of a licence could be provided, because future 
machinery production would have to be allocated between the 
demands of re-equipping British industry and of overseas 
development. Nevertheless, the Board confirmed that the 
export licensing system would not be used to hinder colonial 
industrialisation. The outcome of this meeting was that the 
UAC's scheme secured the 'blessing' of the Colonial Office 
and the Board of Trade, and the 'acquiescence' of the Cotton 
Board. Accordingly, the UAC was encouraged to make a 
detailed investigation, liaising with the Development 
Adviser in Nigeria, after which it could apply for the 
182 
export licence for the machinery it required. 
The process of local consultation in Nigeria revealed 
obstacles to the UAC's scheme apparently unforeseen either 
by the Company or by the Colonial Office. The available 
evidence suggests a change of attitude in Nigeria towards 
182 Ibid.; on the UAC's 
Sir F. Pedler, 'British 
Colonial Africa', P. 
Colonialism in Africa 11 
Colonialism, (Cambridge, 
commitment to diversification, see 
planning and private enterprise in 
Duignan and L. H. Gann (eds), 
370-1960. Volume 4 The Economics of 
1975), p. 118. 
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the benefits of industrialisation, as well as on the 
desirability of constitutional advance, following the 
retirement of Bourdillon and his succession by Sir Arthur 
Richards183. An indication of the government's future 
reservations came in November 1944. Replying to a Treasury 
enquiry, Richards explained that large-scale 
industrialisation was not planned, although a number of 
projects were being considered. F. E. V. Smith, Richards' 
Development Adviser, saw little point in establishing 
factories unless their products were cheaper than similar 
imports. Conversely, he appreciated the possible benefits of 
a textile industry in Nigeria, involving perhaps one quarter 
of a million people in cotton growing. He concluded, 
'Industrialisation for its own sake was valueless, but 
industrialisation with a background of development could be 
of great benefit' 184. Over the next two years, the Nigerian 
government was to apply increasingly searching criteria in 
assessing proposals for manufacturing development. The 
government initially favoured the UAC's scheme. However, it 
stressed that it would not welcome an industry which 
competed with the peasant weaving industry it hoped to 
expand and develop. The government's explicit aim was to 
avoid unnecessary and, evidently, undesirable, urbanisation. 
Another factor which may have contributed to the apparent 
shift in the government's thinking during 1944 was 
metropolitan government pressure for increased supplies of 
colonial raw cotton. Local consumption by the weaving 
183 See, e. g., Pearce (1982), pp. 84,137-8,179-80. 
184 CO 583/271/30572/1944, note of discussion with Treasury 
on present and post-war development plans for Nigeria, 9 Nov 
1944. 
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industry had depleted Nigeria's cotton exports in 1943. 
Local officials concluded that if Nigeria were to export 
more cotton, the local population had to be encouraged to 
buy imported cotton cloth, not locally made goods. The 
Acting Director of Agriculture believed that increased raw 
cotton exports depended upon cutting local industry's 
consumption which suggests that this sector of the Nigerian 
economy had expanded during the 185 war. 
The Nigerian Government's own plans for developing a 
peasant textile industry were outlined in April 1945. A five 
year programme, costing over L90,000, was envisaged, and was 
expected to employ large numbers of workers both directly 
and indirectly. Despite the 'primitive' and uneconomical 
methods which would be used, the government hoped that with 
proper supervision, major improvements in peasant production 
were possible. The decision to foster 'cottage' industry was 
partly influenced by the opportunity it offered to give 
profitable spare-time employment to women, and full-time 
work to peasants at times when agricultural work was less 
demanding, thereby safeguarding their cash incomes. More 
fundamental, however, was the government's wish to avoid 
'the embarrassments of undue centralisation' in the scheme, 
retarding urbanisation and hence stemming the decline of the 
villages. Eight 'territorial centres' were to be created, 
which would conduct surveys and research into improved 
186 methods, and provide training . 
185 Hinds (1985), pp. 112-16. 
186 CO 852/574/7, CDWAC No. 577, 'Nigeria: Development of the 
Peasant Textile Industry in Nigeria', 25 July 1944; CO 583/ 
288/30572/1948, 'A Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare 
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161 
Nigeria's village textile industry, like the Gold 
Coast's, soon faced the problem that yarn production did not 
satisfy the demand of local weavers, creating bottlenecks at 
the weaving stage. A possible solution was to encourage the 
UAC to produce yarn at its proposed mill187. During spring 
1945, the tone of the Nigerian Government's statements on 
the UAC proposal became noticeably cooler. Smith told the 
Colonial Office that it was of the 'utmost importance' that 
the Company's scheme should not compete in any way with the 
local peasant industry, and that if the UAC wanted a mill in 
Nigeria, they would have to co-operate with the government 
by producing yarn for the village industry188. Records of 
discussions held in June 1945 in London suggest that the 
Nigerian Government's purpose in establishing a village- 
based industry was to prevent a population 'exodus' to the 
towns, which factory development might encourage. But, 
because hand-spinning threatened to prevent the rapid 
expansion of the village weaving industry, the government 
would countenance a factory producing yarn in sufficient 
quantities. This strategy was also attractive because it 
would obviate purchases of expensive imported yarn price 
from African merchants189. The Colonial office sympathised 
with Nigeria's plans, and agreed to support them190. In 
August 1945, London approved a free grant of L53,450 towards 
the scheme under the CD &W Act'91. 
187 CO 852/574/7, F. E. V. Smith to Samuel (UAC), 21 Mar 1945. 
188 Ibid., letter to Creasy, 16 Apr 1945. 
189 Ibid., note of meeting in CO1 7 June 1945. 
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Meanwhile, the Gold Coast government had been 
investigating the prospects for local industrial 
development. In May 1945, the Industrial Development Sub- 
Committee of the Government's Economic Development Committee 
presented its report, 'the result of a purely preliminary 
examination'192. Its findings were not encouraging. Its 
basic assumption was that after the war, the Gold Coast's 
role would be as a market for overseas manufacturers. 
Therefore while it was 'desirable on some grounds' to 
broaden the Gold Coast economy by introducing manufacturing, 
the report rejected industrial production geared towards an 
export market (except, perhaps, the manufacture of high 
quality furniture), and considered that it would be 
'dangerous' to promote industries catering for the local 
market in competition with imported goods. The report gave 
no justification for these conclusions. Generally, the 
report argued, there was more scope for government 
assistance to village industries and crafts, than to factory 
production. Even here, the prospects for developing the 
wartime experiments in import substitution appeared bleak. 
The Sub-Committee thought it unlikely, for example, that 
good, locally-made bricks could 'ever' compete in cost with 
other building materials, nor were there grounds for 
government assistance to the local production of tiles for 
commercial use. Similarly, although the Gold Coast now 
produced about half its pre-war imports of soap, a 
development spurred by the 50%-75% increase in the price of 
imported soap, the report saw little room in this field for 
192 CO 852/587/9, enclosure 1 to CEAC(Ind. )(45)21, May 1945. 
163 
government activity193. On textile manufacturing, the report 
was equally resolute: 'There can be no question of 
establishing textile factories in the Gold Coast, but there 
are possibilities of developing weaving as a village 
industry', an interest derived from experience of the 
Avatime project in Togoland. This experiment, conducted 
jointly by the Gold Coast government and the West African 
Institute, was expected to overcome the bottleneck in yarn 
194 supply by establishing powered spinning. 
By July 1945, however, there seemed little prospect of 
the textile machinery needed by West Africa becoming 
available before the end of 1946. A further complication was 
that Nigeria's textile development scheme depended upon the 
appointment of a 'European' textile expert. Problems emerged 
when the West African Institute's Textile Officer applied 
for the vacant post in Nigeria. As the Colonial office 
noted, it had to be decided whether his expertise was more 
important to Nigeria or to the Gold Coast, where progress 
was going to be impeded by delays in securing textile 
machinery. In contrast, officials believed that considerable 
progress with the Nigerian scheme was possible even without 
imported British machinery. Noel Hall felt that it would not 
be consistent with recent decisions on the Institute's 
future role for it to undertake commercial development 
arising from its research work. The Institute agreed to 
release its Textile officer, on the assumption that the Gold 
Coast's own plans for textile development would not thereby 
be compromised, and Stanley accordingly approved the 
193 Ibid.. 
194 CO 852/574/9, despatch from Burns, 6 Feb 1945. 
164 
transfer195. This incident, minor in itself, demonstrates 
that the shortage of skilled personnel, much discussed 
during the war, remained a major limiting factor on progress 
with development. 
Shortly after this episode, however, disquieting 
reports emerged from the Gold Coast. Concern at the 
declining quality of cloth produced in Avatime, and fears 
that existing stocks of cloth were unfit for the local 
market, convinced local administrators that the project 
required both 'competent commercial management' and proper 
technical supervision. Indeed, it subsequently became 
necessary for the government to intervene by purchasing the 
Avatime cloth from its peasant producers and reselling 
it196. In this light, the Gold Coast Government saw the 
expected delay in securing spinning machinery from Britain 
as an opportunity to reconsider the entire Avatime 
197 scheme. 
Similarly, early in 1946, there were fresh indications 
that the Nigerian government was reconsidering the benefits 
of expatriate-run textile projects. Besides the UAC's 
proposal, another scheme was now under consideration, a plan 
by Haighton's Ltd., a Lancashire cotton-spinning f irm, to 
build a textile mill. In January 1946, the Nigerian 
government told the UAC that if the latter's textile scheme 
threatened cotton goods imports into Nigeria, then the 
government would consider levying an excise duty on locally- 
195 CO 852/574/7, despatch to OAG, Gold Coast, 6 July 1945. 
196 CO 852/574/9, despatch to Stanley, 22 July 1945; ibid., 
saving to Hall, 27 Aug 1945. 
197 CO 852/574/9, despatch to Stanley, 22 July 1945. 
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produced cotton cloth, in order to compensate for lost 
revenue from import duties'98. Richards told George Hall 
that both the UAC's and Haighton's projects required careful 
examination, since Nigeria possessed no legislation to 
control or licence industrial development199. Referring to 
Haighton's scheme, Richards offered detailed objections to 
factory development. He pointed to the problems of providing 
adequate housing and food were urban industry to develop. He 
objected especially to factory growth in Lagos, whose 
existing housing and social problems he believed would be 
aggravated. Richards doubted that textile factories would 
create much employment, rejecting this as an argument in 
their favour. He feared not only that textile mills would 
compete with the nascent peasant industry favoured by the 
government, but also that the territory's import revenue 
from cotton goods would suffer. The one point which Richards 
was willing to concede was that factory spinning of cotton 
yarn would supply village weavers with raw material200. 
The Nigerian government's response to Haighton's 
project provoked varied reactions in the Colonial Office. In 
one official's words, the objections listed by Richards 
constituted a report 'so luke-warm as to amount virtually to 
rejection'201. Rosa considered that 'small beginnings', if 
properly regulated, would help smoothe the transition from 
an agricultural to a mixed economy. He dismissed Richards' 
198 CO 852/574/10, F. E. V. Smith to A. G. Dawson (UAC, Lagos), 
11 Jan 1946. 
199 Ibid., saving, 11 Jan 1946. 
200 Ibid.. 
201 Ibid., minute by Rosa, 26 Jan 1946. 
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fears that factory industry would compete with village 
industry, arguing that if conditions in the villages were 
basically sound, factory development would not necessarily 
lead to migration to the towns. Similarly, he thought that 
Richards' fears about falling Government revenue were 
unconvincing, since this was likely to be only a 
'transitional' problem: moreover, the goal of industrial 
development was to raise living standards, which would 
increase Nigeria's taxable capacity. More serious, however, 
in Rosa's view, was the apparently anti-industrial outlook 
implicit in Richards' despatch. He believed it necessary to 
decide whether industrial development was desirable, in 
which case some urbanisation had to be accepted, and an 
effort made to attract reputable and qualified 
industrialists to undertake development in the colonial 
202 empire. 
These comments were supported by Rosa's colleague, 
Monson, who thought the Nigerian government's aim seemed to 
be 'the creation of a rustic economy whose passing in this 
country is lamented over by writers like G. R. Chesterton'. 
Like Rosa, he thought that village industry was compatible 
with factory development. One problem, he thought, was 
official ignorance of village conditions. He agreed that 
factories would have to be sited properly and operate under 
acceptable conditions. If circumstances in Nigeria were as 
difficult as Richards suggested, then an 
industrial 
203 
licensing system should be introduced. 
202 Ibid.. 
203 Ibid., minute, 31 Jan 1946. 
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Caine regarded Richards' arguments as a vindication of 
his own warnings of the risks of allowing colonial 
governments to control industrial development. He believed 
that they would be more adept at preventing than at 
encouraging development. Caine agreed with his colleagues 
that the Nigerian Government's attitude was obstructive and 
threatened the whole policy of factory-based industrial 
development, but, precisely for this reason, he believed 
that the Government should not be equipped with a licensing 
system empowering it to control development204. Caine also 
criticised the Nigerian administration's preference for 
hand-weaving, arguing that this disregarded the economics of 
production, and the question of benefits to the consumer. 
However, he detected a more serious underlying problem, with 
potentially embarrassing repercussions for perceptions of 
Government policy: 
It has been a common place of criticism of 
Colonial policy in the past that both the 
home Government and Colonial Governments have 
prevented the development of manufacturing 
industries in the Colonies. I have always 
strenuously denied such a policy and know of 
no substantial evidence for it in the past. 
If however the attitude of the Nigerian 
Government is maintained, it will be 
impossible any longer to deny that the 
Government is pursuing a policry5 directly 
adverse to industrial development 0 
If, for social reasons, it were felt necessary to protect 
Nigeria from the 'evils' of industrialisation, then, thought 
Caine, this should be stated frankly, and not concealed 
behind an impossibly selective attitude to such development. 
204 The protracted discussions on industrial licensing are 
dealt with in Chapter III. 
205 Co 852/574/10, minute, 6 Feb 1946. 
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He elaborated his views forcefully, advocating a liberal 
economic framework for colonial modernisation: 
Personally, I think it is both economically 
and socially wrong and politically impossible 
to prevent a considerable degree of industrial development in a Colony of the 
size and resources of Nigeria and I think 
that a policy of the kind now indicated by 
the Nigerian Government can lead only to the 
arbitrary building up of special privileges 
as they select one firm rather than another, 
e. g. the U. A. C. rather than the firm under 
consideration here, as eligible for 
permission to try their hand at 
industrialisation; to the preservation of 
inefficiency and uneconomic techniques merely 
because they are traditional; and to a 
permanent retardation in the making available 
to the consumer in Nigeria of increased 
quantities of goods at lower prices, in other 
words, the raising of the standard of living. 
Caine concluded that the Colonial Office should tell 
2 Richards plainly that his policy was unacceptable06. 
However, the Nigerian government's misgivings about 
the Haighton's scheme deepened when discussions revealed 
that the Company was not planning to use local raw 
materials, but hoped to manufacture cotton piece goods more 
cheaply in Nigeria, using imported British or Egyptian yarn, 
than it could do in Britain. The resulting product could 
then be exported, for example to South Africa. This 
proposition was quite unacceptable to the Nigerian 
Government, which felt that Nigeria would gain only an 
207 unwelcome stimulus to urbanisation. 
Meanwhile, the UAC had been both surprised and 
disturbed by the Nigerian Government's threat of an excise 
duty on locally-produced cloth, and immediately suspended 
its project for a mill at Onitsha, a site selected in 
206 Ibid.. 
207 Ibid., F. E. V. Smith to O. G. R. Williams, 20 Feb 1946. 
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preference to the Company's original choice of Zaria. The 
Company admitted that local production would affect cloth 
imports, but saw its scheme as a long-term operation, 
accepting that it might take several years for production 
costs to match the price of imported material. Furthermore, 
although the UAC had not considered asking for protection as 
such for local development, it saw a safety margin in the 
existing revenue duties208. The Company's Managing Director, 
Samuel, believed that the Nigerian government's thinking was 
muddled: 
Surely the purpose of the establishment of 
industry is the raising of the economic level 
and wealth of the country, thus enabling the 
people to consume larger quantities of other 
types of imported goods which will yield 
their normal import revenue, and greater 
quantities of heavy duty and excise goods 
such as cigarettes, beer etc. 
No firm, he thought, would invest in a textile industry in 
Nigeria with the prospect of an excise duty being imposed 
209 immediately after its factory started production. 
The Nigerian government elaborated its thinking in a 
letter to the UAC of February 1946. The government denied 
being opposed to industrial development as such, but 
explained its anxiety to consider proposals for 
manufacturing in relation to their long-term value to the 
territory. Because each proposal would have to be judged on 
its merits, the government was unwilling to issue any 
general endorsement of industrialisation. Specifically, the 
government doubted that the UAC's scheme would benefit 
Nigeria generally, seeing, for instance, no evidence that 
208 Ibid., Samuel (UAC) to Dawson (UAC, Lagos), 21 Jan 1946. 
209 Ibid.. 
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the proposed mill would generate greater demand for local 
cotton at an increased price (an issue not previously raised 
by the government). While the scheme would, admittedly, 
benefit perhaps 2,000 workers, the consequent increase in 
the government's responsibilities, stemming from urban 
growth, might, on balance, make the development a liability. 
Furthermore, unless the UAC could demonstrate that it could 
produce goods locally which were 'substantially' cheaper 
than imported goods, the government was unwilling to forgo 
the average one million pounds per annum which it derived 
from import duties on cotton goods210. 
In March 1946, Trenchard, Chairman of UAC, wrote to 
Richards, querying the government's decision to raise the 
excise duty question at so late a stage, together with 
fundamental doubts about the entire scheme211. Richards' 
reply was conciliatory, assuring Trenchard that the Nigerian 
government was anxious to examine manufacturing 
possibilities, and welcomed the UAC's help. He suggested 
further discussions between the Colonial Office and the 
Company212. The UAC's disenchantment by this stage was 
understandable. The Company had assumed that the Nigerian 
government favoured a measure of industrialisation, 
especially the development of a textile industry which would 
meet publicly expressed criteria, since it involved a local 
raw material, would find an adequate local market and 
required no specific protection213. The UAC felt that it had 
210 Ibid., Smith to Dawson, 20 Feb 1946. 
211 Ibid., letter, 28 Mar 1946. 
212 Ibid., letter, 13 Apr 1946. 
213 Ibid., Samuel to Dawson, 29 Mar 1946. 
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been unjustly criticised in the past for opposing 
industrialisation in order to protect its own trading 
interests, citing in its defence the rejection of its pre- 
war industrial proposals. It repeated that it had pursued 
its textile scheme in order to demonstrate its willingness 
to place its resources at Nigeria's disposal, even though 
214 the project had little attraction commercially. 
The Nigerian government's stance evoked unusual 
sympathy for the UAC within the Colonial Office, where 
Lagos' arguments against the Company's scheme were 
considered even weaker than those used aginst the Haighton's 
project, especially since the former intended to use locally 
grown cotton215. Prompted by the difficulties raised by 
these textile schemes, George Hall wrote to Richards saying 
that he shared Richards' concern to avoid the problems 
resulting from uncontrolled industrial development. 
On the other hand, it seems to me that it is 
possible for a government to be a little too 
cautious in its attitude towards proposals 
for new industrial development and by setting 
its requirements too high to run the risk 
that no development will take place at all. 
Hall sought Richards' confirmation that it was not his 
policy to discourage factory-based development, adding: 
... there is no doubt 
in my mind that 
industrial development in itself offers one 
of the most promising means we can have of 
raising the general level of prosperity of 
the people in a country like Nigeria. 
Echoing the advice given in Stanley's February 1945 circular 
despatch on manufacturing, Hall dismissed the suggestion 
that a textile mill in Nigeria would be desirable only if it 
214 Ibid.. 
215 Ibid., minutes by Rosa and Monson, 6 Mar 1946. 
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used local raw materials, arguing that if the promoters 
believed they could operate profitably with imported 
216 materials, they should not be obstructed. 
Richards' response drew on a seemingly limitless supply 
of counter-arguments. The Governor assured Hall that he did 
not aim to obstruct factory development, 'provided it does 
not compete with peasant industry'217. Apparently for the 
first time, Richards complained that industrial development 
would compete with agriculture for labour. Further, because 
agricultural living standards were low, industry would be 
able to obtain labour cheaply, which might encourage 
accusations that the government was assisting the British 
capitalist to exploit African labour. This, claimed 
Richards, accounted for his reservations about industries 
based on imported raw materials. To be profitable, he 
believed, these would have to keep wage costs low. Richards 
may, too, have had one eye on the growth of trade unions in 
Nigeria, a process greatly accelerated by the war, and, 
specifically, on recent experience of the general strike 
called by the Railway Workers' Union in 1945218. Richards 
concluded with an even more fundamental and immediate 
problem: the inability of his Secretariat yet to produce a 
well-considered policy on industrialisation, given that the 
Director of Commerce and Industries, whose function this 
219 would be, had only recently been appointed. 
216 Ibid., letter, 12 Apr 1946. 
217 Ibid., letter, 28 May 1946. 
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219 CO 852/574/10, letter, 28 May 1946. 
173 
The Colonial office and representatives of the Nigerian 
government discussed the broad problem of industrialisation 
in London between May and July 1946. It became obvious that 
Nigerian officials feared the social consequences of 
industrial development. The Development Adviser, F. E. V. 
Smith, denied being opposed to 'rational' development, 
citing his government's approval of the UAC's plywood- 
producing scheme at Sapele, a project first mooted by the 
Company early in 1943220. The essential difference between 
this and other industrial projects, he argued, was that in 
the case of Sapele, if the venture failed, the workers could 
resume their previous way of life with minimal disruption, 
whereas a major urban development which failed would create 
serious housing and unemployment problems for the 
Government. Caine considered such arguments irrelevent. He 
did not dispute the need to control the location of industry 
and working conditions: the key question was whether the 
Nigerian government, unlike the Colonial Office, opposed 
factory development221. 
The record of these official discussions is, 
unfortunately, incomplete. However, the Nigerian 
government's counter-arguments to textile factory 
development continued to be inconsistent. In July 1946, 
Smith questioned the sincerity of the UAC's interest in 
textile development, arguing that its proposed mill, whose 
production could cost Nigeria about L100,000 per annum in 
lost revenue, would not become profitable for 'at least' ten 
220 CO 852/377/3, letter from F. Samuel to Creasy, 21 Jan 
1943; ibid., letter from Acting Chief Secretary, Lagos, to 
Samuel, 17 May 1943. 
221 CO 852/574/10, record of meeting in CO, 30 May 1946. 
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years. Nevertheless, he added that such development would 
encourage an influx into Nigeria of British firms and 
immigrant entrepreneurs, both Indian and 'Syrian'222. Here 
possibly, we are closer to the government's overriding 
concerns, particularly the need to avoid political friction 
at a time of major constitutional, as well as economic and 
social, change. Further insights into the government's 
anxieties emerged in its response to a report on West 
African conditions by Raymond Firth, Secretary of the 
Colonial Social Science Research Council, who toured the 
region between July and October 1945. Firth noted the rapid 
postwar increase in urbanisation in West Africa, especially 
in the coastal towns. The resulting problems included severe 
overcrowding, high rents, unemployment, the disruption of 
families and juvenile delinquency223. Richards agreed that a 
study of labour migration and its effects was necessary. 
There is at present a serious drift of 
population from the countryside to the towns. 
In order to solve this problem it is 
essential that we should know more about the 
type of worker micr24 ing and his precise 
reasons for so doing . 
Richards, consistently opposed to constitutional reform, 
feared an influx of Ibos into the larger commercial and 
administrative centres of the Northern Provinces (where the 
UAC's mill was to be built), which he thought of 
'considerable' political importance. 
222 Ibid., note of meeting in CO1 15 July 1946. 
223 CO 901/2, CSSRC(45)50, 'Social Science Research in West 
Africa', 23 Nov 1945. 
224 CO 927/66/1, despatch Hall, 24 July 1946. [This interest 
in a study of West African labour migration was shared by 
the Gold Coast government, see despatch from Gurney, (Gold 
Coast) to Hall, 10 Sept 1946]. 
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The incursion is by no means universally 
welcomed by the inhabitants of the areas invaded and is liable to exert an adverse 
effect ucji the existing Native court 
structure . 
Resistance such as this convinced the Colonial Office, 
by late 1945, that the centre needed to exert greater 
influence in promoting development. In his circular despatch 
of November 1945, Hall told local governments that he was 
considering the need for stronger machinery in the Office to 
handle development plans quickly and effectively. Subsequent 
discussions in the Office produced the suggestion for a 
Colonial Economic Development Council to replace CEAC, and 
renewed pressure from Caine for new executive machinery in 
London capable of initiating development. In turn, it was 
recognised that if the Colonial Office were to play a more 
active role in directing development, taking responsibility 
rather than passively considering plans submitted by the 
colonial governments, its own organisation would have to be 
reinforced. Hall proposed a small, 'high-powered' committee, 
with business representatives, to supervise the work of the 
existing committees and ensure action on their reports. 
Hall's Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, 
believed the key problem was the need to establish guiding 
principles on the fundamentals of economic policy, including 
industrialisation. Hitherto, he felt, the Colonial Office 
had allowed external interests to take the initiative: 
instead, the office should itself have positive policies226. 
225 Ibid.. 
226 CO 852/591/7, minutes by J. B. Williams, 23 Nov 1945 and 
14 Dec 1945. 
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The CEDC's creation was announced in June 1946. Its 
function was to advise on the framing and review of 
development plans and on general questions of economic and 
financial policy227. The Council discussed industrial 
development in December 1946. It concluded that the response 
by local governments to Stanley's despatch had been 
'disappointing', suggesting a degree of inertia, even of 
opposition, where this subject was concerned, although the 
creation of Departments of Commerce and Industry by some 
governments, including the Gold Coast's and Nigeria's, was 
seen as a 'promising' indication of local initiative. 
Although the Council did not recommend appropriate kinds of 
industry for the colonies, it stressed the importance of 
selecting industries using local raw materials, and 
requiring a minimum of skilled, and a maximum of unskilled, 
labour. The Council also thought that outside expertise 
should be replaced by local talent as soon as possible228. 
The evidence suggests that by 1946, the Colonial Office 
had become much less squeamish about the possible impact of 
economic development of African societies the West African 
governments appeared. Caine in particular seized the 
opportunity to advocate a more dynamic, modernising approach 
to development. Existing African patterns of social 
organisation were, he believed, an obstacle to economic 
change, stifling the emergence of local enterprise. Once 
again, he distanced himself from previous policies of 
227 CO 852/586/8, CEAC 16th minutes, 24 June 1946; CO 999/1, 
CEDC ist minutes, 7 Oct 1946. 
228 CO 999/1, CEDC 7th minutes, 16 Dec 1946. 
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minimising social change in the wider interests of 
stability. This was mistaken since change was unavoidable: 
I do not pretend to any great knowledge, but 
I have a strong impression that many social 
evils of urbanisation are developing in 
Africa because of an unwillingness to admit 
that the urbanised, de-tribalised native has 
come to stay, and must be properly provided 
for. 
This was demonstrated, he thought, by the divergence in 
thinking on industrialisation between the Colonial Office 
and the government of Nigeria. Moreover, Caine recalled the 
episode when Lewis, as Secretary to CEAC, had proposed 
'revolutionary' change in the agricultural and industrial 
sectors, and the questions thus raised about the 
compatibility of rapid economic change with broader 
political and social policies. In Caine's view, it was time 
to reconsider the negative response which the Colonial 
Office had given to pleas for 'revolutionary' economic 
development229. Andrew Cohen was in complete sympathy with 
this view. He, too, was convinced that 'native' institutions 
had to be adapted to social and economic change. The 
emphasis of future policy would have to shift from tradition 
to efficiency230. More generally, the Development Adviser, 
Stockdale, commented that colonial policy had reached the 
'parting of the ways' in Africa, with an urgent need for a 
clear policy for the future231. These sentiments were also 
endorsed by Gater, who agreed with Caine's suggestion that 
the answers given by Stanley in response to CEAC's questions 
on future development late in 1944 should now be reassessed: 
229 CO 852/1003/3, minute, 23 Apr 1946. 
230 Ibid., minute, 6 May 1946. 
231 Ibid., minute, 21 May 1946. 
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, 'Since 1944 a great deal has happened and it is becoming 
clear that we shall have to face more revolutionary methods 
if we are to achieve success in raising the standard of 
'2 living in colonial Territories32. Stockdale, Cohen and 
Caine met to discuss this review of development policy in 
July 1946. They agreed that the most pressing problem was to 
encourage local governments to consider for themselves such 
basic questions as the value of 'concentrated' development. 
Officials in London believed that local governments would be 
helped if they knew that the Colonial Secretary was prepared 
to listen to radical ideas on these subjects. 
As demonstrated by its stance over Nigerian 
development, the Colonial office remained committed to its 
policy on industrialisation. Encouraging the Office were 
fresh indications that industrialisation in the under- 
developed world was accepted by key government departments 
in a more liberal spirit than before the war. In May 1946, 
for example, the Board of Trade told the Cabinet Committee 
on External Economic Policy and Overseas Trade that such 
development need not ultimately be harmful to British 
industry as a whole, although it might threaten certain 
sectors. Overseas industrialisation offered opportunities to 
some British exporters: 'It must be remembered that if we 
were to refuse to export capital goods in such instances, 
our competitors among the industrial nations might step in 
and secure the orders-, 233. The Board's attitude was a 
pragmatic response to inevitable overseas industrialisation. 
232 Ibid., minute, 29 May 1946. 
233 CAB 134/165, E(46)30, 'Capital Goods Export Policy', 22 
May 1946. 
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However, the Board continued to oppose the promotion of new, 
'uneconomic' industries in thinly populated regions of the 
world, and urged the rest of Whitehall to take the same 
234 line. 
A more sober, if equally fatalistic, conclusion was 
drawn by the Cabinet Office Economic Section Committee in 
June 1946. Surveying the overseas economic situation, the 
Section warned that the combined effects of 
industrialisation and population growth in the prim ary- 
producing countries might reverse the pre-war trend for 
primary products to be cheaper than manufactures. The 
immediate, post-war 'hunger' for manufactured goods was 
judged temporary, though currently there was enough demand 
to absorb most of the exports which Britain could produce. 
Overseas industrialisation, however, was considered a more 
permanent problem. On the one hand, this promised to 
increase the demand for capital goods, raw materials and 
fuel from all sources. On the other hand, the demand for 
consumer goods, especially textiles, was threatened by local 
import substitution, though the total demand for 
manufactures seemed likely to expand. The growth of incomes 
and demand resulting from industrialisation was most likely 
to offset the harmful aspects of overseas development, by 
increasing total imports of manufactures, in countries with 
the lowest incomes, for example in Latin America and India. 
However, the net effect of overseas industrialisation would 
damage Britain's export trade. It would, at least, involve a 
sectoral change in the composition of British exports away 
from cheaper textiles and hardware towards engineering and 
234 Ibid.. 
180 
electrical products. The Economic Section drew some solace 
from the hope that this would assist Britain's balance of 
payments, because it involved a move away from the 
production of goods containing a high proportion by value of 
imported materials, and towards producing goods which owed 
2 much of their value to the skill of British labour35. 
The Colonial Office, for its part, continued to seek 
evidence of interest in industrialisation among colonial 
governments, despite the hitherto disappointing responses 
from West Africa. Between February 1945, when Stanley's 
circular despatch on manufacturing was issued and the end of 
1946, the West African governments gave little indication 
that they regarded industrialisation as a developmental 
priority. The Nigerian government appears not to have 
responded directly to the despatch, but its attitudes 
towards industrial development subsequently became clear 
during the extensive discussions between Lagos and London on 
cotton textile manufacturing. The response from the Gold 
Coast Government was hardly encouraging. The overall 
conclusion of the Government's Economic Development 
Committee, established in 1944, was that few goods could be 
manufactured economically in the territory236. 
London's growing dissatisfaction with the abilities of 
local governments can be seen in the Office's reaction to 
the draft ten year development plan submitted by the Gold 
Coast Government early in 1946. The plan was felt to be 
235 CAB 132/3, LP(46)149, 'Survey of the Overseas Economic 
Situation as it affects the United Kingdom', 17 June 1946. 
236 Shuckburgh (I), p. 300; CO 852/587/9, enclosure 1 to 
CEAC(Ind. )(45)211 Report of Industrial Development Sub- 
Committee, Gold Coast, May 1945. 
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biased too heavily towards welfare provision, neglecting the 
territory's overall development needs. In particular, little 
mention was made of industrial expansion. As one official 
commented: 
In a colony whose economy relies so largely 
upon one agricultural crop and on expendable 
mineral assets, it is essential that larger 
provision be made - with C. D. +W. assistance - for establishing and building up new and 
reliable sources of general revenue. 
The plan's 'less urgent' components should, it was felt, be 
adjusted, so as to permit greater attention to industrial 
2 and general economic growth37. 
During the review of development policy in 1946, 
however, it became clear that industrial development was, 
for the Colonial Office, an important, but increasingly 
relegated aspect of development as a whole. As the Office's 
report covering the years 1939 to 1947 put it, the main 
emphasis in development planning was necessarily on 
improving agriculture and communications, although 'due 
regard' was being paid to the promotion of new economic 
activity, including industry238. According to the report, 
agriculture was by far the most important activity in the 
colonies, and would continue to be their main source of 
239 wealth. 
In the official scale of development priorities, 
agricultural development was underscored by two, major 
considerations: the immediate postwar world food shortage, 
237 CO 96/806/2/31596/1946-47, 'A memorandum on the Gold 
Coast Ten Year Plan', (n. d., unattributed). 
238 Cmd. 7167, The Colonial Empire 1939-1947, July 1947, PP 
(1946-47), X, paras. 108-14. 
239 Ibid., paras. 318,323-4,348. 
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and, more persistent, the scarcity of goods, both consumer 
and capital, for export to the colonies. Metropolitan 
concern over the post-war world food shortage was especially 
acute by early 1946, leading Attlee to create a special 
Cabinet Committee to monitor world food supplies in February 
1946240. The most spectacular, and infamous, consequence of 
London's anxiety to promote food production was the ill- 
fated East African Groundnut Scheme, launched in November 
1946. Smaller scale projects were also begun to investigate 
West Africa's potential for groundnut production, aimed at 
improving the supply of fats. Despite this activity up to 
the end of 1946, the British Government's concern to 
stimulate colonial food production was not yet associated 
with any grand strategy to utilise colonial resources in 
order to reduce Britain's balance of payments problems241. 
In August 1946, Caine produced a draft circular 
despatch on agricultural productivity in Africa. Once again, 
the convergence in the thinking of Caine and Cohen is 
apparent. Cohen described the draft as one of the most 
'encouraging' documents he had seen for a long time. 
Although he recognised that industrialisation was an 
important issue in African economic development, he 
considered it of secondary importance to the need to improve 
agriculture. He therefore saw no advantage in asking 
colonial governments to examine the distinct problems posed 
by industrial development at the same time as addressing the 
24 
question of agricultural re-organisation2. Caine's 
240 Morgan (1980) II1 pp. 177-80. 
241 Hinds (1987), pp. 151-2; Cmd. 7167, The Colonial Empire 
1939-1947, July 1947, PP(1946-47) X, para. 324. 
242 CO 852/1003/3, minute, 24 Sept 1946. 
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memorandum was eventually despatched to the African 
Governments in February 1947. It stressed the 
vital importance of revolutionary changes in 
production, particularly agricultural 
production ... without such changes we shall 
not succeed in raisin 943 rapidly the standards 
of living of Africans 9 
Parallel to this growing metropolitan interest in 
promoting colonial primary production, a tendency not fully 
revealed until 1947, was the continuing problem of supplying 
the colonies with the imports they required for postwar 
reconstruction and development. The difficulty in supplying 
West Africa with consumer goods had been the basic motive 
for exploring the possibilities of limited industrialisation 
early in the war. But as peace drew near, it became apparent 
that these supply problems would continue. In December 1944, 
Stanley publicly admitted the shortage of textiles, 
especially cotton goods, in the colonies. Claiming that the 
colonies were receiving their fair share of available 
British supplies, Stanley conceded that the question of 
meeting future colonial demand was causing concern244. By 
early 1945, officials in London realised that the supply 
position was unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future, 
and that colonial governments needed guidance on this 
question245. The Colonial Office had been counting on an 
extended 'twilight' period before the collapse of Japan, to 
ease the transition in Britain from wartime to normal 
production, while the war itself had provided a convenient 
243 Ibid., despatch to African Governments, 'Agricultural 
Productivity in Africa', 22 Feb 1947. 
244 PD C, 406, col. 1351,14 Dec 1944. 
245 CO 852/558/8, minute by Caine, 28 Mar 1945; ibid., 
minutes by Gater and Stanley, 3 Apr 1945. 
184 
excuse for continuing difficulties in supplying colonial 
246 needs for imports. 
Stanley warned local governments in April 1945 that the 
supply position would not improve as soon as the war ended: 
rather it might worsen in the first year of peace, because 
of continuing shipping shortages. He added: 
One of the most striking things which emerges 
from any review of the situation is that the 
position is likely to be most acute with 
regard to supply of goods of most interest to 
the mass of colonial populations, ie wage 
labourers and small peasant producers'4'. 
The immediate concern was that the shortage of consumer 
goods would have inflationary effects in the colonies, a 
major preoccupation throughout the war. This would oblige 
local governments to dissipate any 'false' optimism, and to 
emphasise to their populations that further stringencies lay 
248 ahead. 
The Colonial Office was anxious to warn the Cabinet 
that the colonies could not endure further reductions in 
supplies, given the already critical position, and that any 
cuts should be borne by the more 'sophisticated and literate 
Dominions'249. The Office stressed the 'disastrous effect' 
which the deteriorating supply of goods might have. Cotton 
textiles were identified as the most important item in short 
supply. A cut in supplies, it was argued, might affect 
colonial primary production and encourage political 
discontent, which might in turn be aggravated by the 
246 Ibid., minute by Clauson, 7 Apr 1945. 
247 Ibid., circular telegram, 21 Apr 1945. 
248 Ibid.. 
249 Ibid., minutes by Bentham, 4 May 1945 and Rosa, 5 May 
1945. 
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demobilisation of colonial troops. Stanley was supported by 
the Minister of Food, eager to maintain and increase 
colonial food production250. 
In July, Stanley told the Cabinet Home Affairs 
Committee that the shortage of consumer goods in the 
colonies, particularly of textiles, was even worse than in 
Britain. Once again, he warned that the production of 
foodstuffs in the colonies would suffer unless more goods 
were made available. Inflation was already producing 
political unrest in parts of Africa, threatening lasting 
damage. He concluded by asking his colleagues to bear 
colonial needs in mind before acting to ease domestic 
shortages. Neither the President of the Board of Trade nor 
the Minister of Production foresaw any improvement in 
textiles supplies to the colonies 'for many months' to come, 
although they thought that other types of goods, especially 
semi-luxuries, might be made available251. However, when the 
Colonial Office subsequently unveiled details of the new 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, it was optimistically 
suggested that the increase in development funding which it 
provided coincided with a period when greater availability 
of materials and personnel could be expected252. In 
practice, such optimism proved ill-founded. A year later, 
the Board of Trade called for cuts in textile supplies to 
250 CAB 71/20, LP(45)100, 'Prospective General Supply 
Difficulties in the Colonial Empire', 10 May 1945; ibid., 
LP(45)105, memorandum by Minister of Food, 15 May 1945. 
251 CO 852/558/8, Cabinet Home Affairs Committee 2nd 
meeting, 20 July 1945, 'Supply difficulties in the Empire'. 
252 Cmd. 6713, Colonial Development and Welfare. Despatch 
dated 12th November, 1945 from the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies to Colonial Governments, PP(1945-46), xix, 35. 
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the colonies. This alarmed the Colonial Office, which 
challenged the Board's priorities. As Clauson put it: 
The future prospects of Lancashire's export 
trade are of course an important matter for 
this country, but not as important as our 
political prestige in the Colon 
213 
Empire + 
the food supplies of this country . 
The consumer goods position in West Africa became critically 
important as the post-war world food shortage impinged upon 
Britain. As during the war, it was recognised at a high 
level that such goods were vital in order to maintain 
colonial productivity. In February 1946, Attlee personally 
directed that a special effort be made to meet West Africa's 
requirements, especially of textiles. The Board of Trade, 
however, opposed the direction of consumer goods to food- 
producing areas254. 
What is striking about the persistence of colonial 
supply difficulties up to late 1946 is that the Colonial 
Office does not seem to have regarded these as a pretext for 
encouraging import-substituting local industry in West 
Africa. Certainly, the office tried to encourage industrial 
development as and when proposals arose, but there was 
apparently no discussion on the part colonial industry could 
play in easing local supply difficulties. 
This can at least in part be attributed to the shortage 
of capital goods for export to the colonies. This shortage 
affected not only basic items such as steel and cement, but 
virtually all the materials required for economic 
development, including agricultural machinery and tractors, 
253 CO 537/1414, minute, 11 Dec 1946. 
254 BT 11/3247, T. W. Davies (CO) to H. J. Habakkuk (BoT), 27 
Feb 1946; ibid., Habakkuk to Davies, 8 Mar 1946. 
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manufacturing plant and railway rolling stock255. Though the 
wartime controls on British exports were mostly lifted by 
early 1946, this brought little benefit to the colonies, 
since domestic and dollar-earning orders tended to take 
priority. Thus, a fundamental constraint faced any attempt 
to ease colonial consumer goods shortages by local 
production, for example of textiles. The problems 
confronting West Africa in securing textile machinery, for 
example, have already been described. Moreover, despite the 
apparent resignation of the Board of Trade to overseas 
industrialisation, it transpired that this did not 
necessarily apply to individual proposals for development, 
particularly in the colonies. The Board had adopted an 
apparently progressive and co-operative stance towards West 
African schemes for textile development, demonstrated by the 
relatively conflict-free discussions it held with the 
Colonial Office between 1943 and 1946. However, there is 
evidence that the Board remained susceptible to the Cotton 
Board's anxieties about future competition, amounting even 
to discreet collusion designed to restrict textile 
development overseas. Although the Cotton Board had also 
appeared constructive towards colonial textile development, 
this was less obvious in its stance on similar developments 
outside the colonial empire, over which Lancashire could 
expect to have little effective influence. This can be seen 
in the Board's concern about exports of textile machinery 
from Britain. In mid-1945, the Board of Trade proposed to 
simplify existing export controls by removing textile 
255 Cmd. 7167 The Colonial Empire (1939-1947), July 1947, 
paras. 314-315. 
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machinery from the list of controlled items. In deference to 
the Cotton Board's policy since wartime concentration, the 
Board of Trade proposed to retain export licensing for all 
textile machinery manufactured before 1 May 1941256. In 
January 1946, however, Streat voiced the Cotton Board's 
fears about exports of second-hand machinery. He told the 
Board of Trade that recent ad hoc decisions on these exports 
amounted to a disturbing trend. Streat feared that several 
countries, for example in the Middle East, favoured 
investment in cotton textiles production because of recent 
shortages which had given them a distorted impression of the 
true demand for these goods. Once established, he thought, 
such enterprises would demand tariff protection from their 
governments, harming British export prospects. Streat 
believed that the Board of Trade should severely limit 
export licences for textile machinery. The Board's response 
was a promise to allow the administrative machine 'to 
function very slowly for the next few months' in handling 
applications for licences, a suggestion which the Cotton 
Board accepted257. It is unclear from the records whether 
this decision had direct consequences for West African 
development, although it will be recalled that it was from 
the summer of 1945 onwards that the textile projects in 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast encountered particular difficulty 
in obtaining machinery from Britain. 
In the face of such obstruction, the Colonial Office 
appears not to have considered promoting local industry to 
256 BT 175/3, CB 3789a, Cotton Board 141st meeting, 19 June 
1945. 
257 Ibid., CB 4401a, Cotton Board 154th meeting, 15 Jan 
1946. 
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meet the colonial demand for consumer goods. Official 
discussions on industrialisation became sparse and 
incidental. Instead, to stem the threat of inflation, and, 
ultimately, political discontent, arising from shortages of 
goods, the Office sought to limit colonial purchasing power 
by encouraging effective taxation policies and through the 
state marketing of colonial produce. It was a fundamental of 
London's conscious attempts after 1945 to promote 'nation 
building', that governments should increase their revenues, 
as one step towards self-sufficiency and the elimination of 
metropolitan aid. Specifically, colonial governments were 
encouraged to introduce or extend income taxation, thereby 
reducing their past overdependence on revenue from import 
and export duties. Nevertheless, excise duties had risen 
during the war, and net receipts from them had increased as 
a result of the greater value of trade. These duties were 
also seen as having a counter-inflationary function, 
absorbing the gap between the selling price and the supply 
costs of consumer goods. The Colonial Office feared that 
local governments might be tempted to ease the taxation 
levels applied during the war. In view of the difficulty in 
satisfying the colonial demand for consumer goods, officials 
believed that taxation might, on the contrary, have to be 
increased258. In July 1946, Hall urged local governments to 
develop direct taxation, especially income tax, and to 
reduce indirect taxes259. Yet revenue from indirect taxation 
continued to be important to the local administrations. For 
258 CO 852/729/2, minute by Caine, 30 May 1946; ibid., 
minute by Dawe, 6 June 1946. 
259 Ibid., circular telegram, 19 July 1946. 
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example, the Nigerian government derived 43 per cent of its 
revenue from excise duties in 1946: by 1950 this figure had 
260 risen still further to 51 per cent. This partly explains 
the government's concern that local industrial development 
might affect revenue from trade, a fear often expressed 
during discussions on the UAC's textile scheme. 
Through the second element in its anti-inflationary 
strategy, the state marketing of agricultural produce, the 
Colonial Office aimed to shield producers from violent price 
fluctuations such as experienced before the war. The 
marketing authorities were to accumulate financial 
surpluses, funds which could later be drawn on to pay more 
to producers for their crops when world market prices fell. 
During the war, the authorities paid low prices, at least 
partly because of fears that unabsorbed local purchasing 
power at a time of import constraints would fuel inflation. 
While the official justification for the post-war marketing 
policy was that it would minimise fluctuations in producer 
incomes, the accumulation by the marketing authorities of 
ever larger reserves seems to have become an end in itself, 
driven partly by a desire to control inflation, and partly 
by the benefit derived by sterling as a world currency by 
the holding of these reserves in London. Consequently, the 
Colonial office was reluctant to see these funds used for 
developmental purposes, believing that they should be 
dedicated solely to an ill-defined shibboleth of 
'stabilisation'. During the Colonial Office's initial 
attempts at reconstruction planning in 1941, economic 
stabilisation through controlled produce marketing had 
260 Ekundare (1973), p. 233. 
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emerged as a potential rival to arguments for diversifying 
colonial economies, for example through industrialisation. 
Early in 1944, Lord Hailey suggested that marketing would be 
more important than almost any other problem of post-war 
economic policy. After 1945, the twin objectives of 
stabilisation and combatting inflation, through state 
produce marketing and improved taxation, increasingly 
eclipsed two of the key arguments for industrialisation 
current throughout wartime policy discussions in the 
Colonial Offic: the easing of structural economic 
instability arising from dependence on primary production, 
and the immediate danger of inflation due to import 
261 shortages. 
261 Meredith (1986), pp. 77-91; Co 990/1, CEAC 3rd minutes, 
15 Feb 1944. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DEFINING THE COLONIAL STATE'S ROLE 
IN POSTWAR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1943-1946 
The Colonial Office's clarification of its ideas on the 
relevance of industrialisation to colonial development in 
West Africa between 1943 and 1946 was protracted and 
uncertain. No less tortuous were its parallel attempts to 
address fundamental questions on the promotion of industrial 
development. At its simplest level, this could be 
interpreted as a problem of finding the necessary finance, 
but partly because of their perceptions of West African 
conditions, officials in London were soon givinq equal 
weight to the perceived need to inject entrepreneurial and 
managerial skills into the development process. Official 
assumptions about the availability of development capital 
were modified between 1943 and 1946. In several respects, 
official deliberations were hampered by the absence of clear 
indications on the availability of various forms of finance 
after the war. Thus, for example, it was unclear whether 
colonial governments would have free access to the London 
capital market, or to foreign sources, or even to the 
sterling balances which they accumulated in London 
throughout the war. More important, perhaps, in shaping 
official discussions was a growing sensitivity within the 
Colonial Office to the political implications of 
development, an uncomfortable awareness of the scope for 
charges of exploitation attaching to the colonial operations 
of European private enterprise. Because of this increasingly 
acknowledged political dimension, official discussions on 
promoting industry evolved into a debate on the need to 
control development, and hence on how far the colonial state 
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should intervene in the operations of private enterprise, 
and, where necessary, itself assume a more actively 
entrepreneurial role, supplementing private capital with new 
forms of public enterprise, politically acceptable to 
colonial opinion. 
Sources of development capital 
Early in the reconstruction debate, the Colonial Office 
seemed optimistic that development capital would be 
available to the colonies after the war. Officials 
encouraged two assumptions: first, that a number of colonies 
would have accumulated sizeable sterling balances which 
could be drawn on; and secondly, that colonial governments 
would be able to borrow on the London money marketsl. Yet, 
by spring 1944, the Office, while still promoting an 
optimistic picture, had altered the emphasis in its advice 
to colonial governments. The latter were now told that there 
would be three available sources of finance. First, there 
were surplus funds, for example from revenue, which the 
Colonial Office thought should be the 'first recourse' of 
colonies who possessed them. London suggested that many 
colonies would be in this attractive position after the war, 
and would therefore be able to fund a great deal of 
development without seeking loans or grants. Secondly, it 
was thought that because extended controls on access to the 
City were likely, local financial resources would probably 
assume an increasing importance. Finally, officials 
concluded that Colonial Development and Welfare (CD & W) 
1 CO 990/2, CEAC(43)5, 'Social and Economic Planning in the 
Colonial Empire', 25 Nov 1943. 
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funds were likely to remain the chief source of development 
capital for many colonies2. 
Britain's capacity to promote colonial development 
after the war remained uncertain long into the 
'reconstruction debate'. By the end of the war, Britain had 
lost around one quarter of her national wealth since 1939, 
and external liabilities had been accumulated totalling 
L3,355 million by June 1945. Of this, some L2,723 million 
was owed to the Sterling Area. By May 1945, Keynes was 
predicting that by the end of the war, Britain would have an 
overseas deficit of around L1,400 million per annum3. 
Despite these bleak prospects, the Colonial office 
persuaded the War Cabinet to extend the 1940 CD &W Act late 
in 1944, providing L120 million for development over a ten 
year period. Stanley told the Colonial Economic Advisory 
Committee (CEAC) in December 1944 that the aim of the new 
Bill was that at the end of the period provided for, the 
colonies ought to have increased their resources so as to be 
able to maintain a 'decent' standard of living4. However 
impressive the gesture, the practical impact of these funds, 
when spread thinly across the Colonial Empire, could only be 
limited. Officials concerned with negotiating the extension 
of aid did not, in fact, envisage this as being the sole 
source of development capital available to colonial 
governments. The latter were warned in November 1945 that 
the allocations made under the new Act would have to be 
2 CO 852/588 Pt. l, 'The Planning of Social and Economic 
Development in the Colonial Empire', Apr 1944. 
3 CAB 66/65, WP(45)301, 'Overseas financial policy in Stage 
III', 15 May 1945. 
4 Co 990/1, CEAC 9th minutes, 19 Dec 1944. 
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supplemented as far as possible from the governments' own 
resources, or by external borrowing5. 
What, then, of the resources of local governments? The 
war produced important changes in the financial 
circumstances of many governments, due in particular to the 
introduction of new forms of taxation which substantially 
increased government revenue. For example, the Nigerian 
Government-Is gross revenue grew from L6,113,000 to 
L13,200,000 during the war. This was partly due to an 
increase in revenue from indirect taxation, especially 
customs and excise, but also to the introduction and 
subsequent increase of the Company Tax. For the first time, 
the expatriate firms became subject to direct taxation 
within Nigeria. These measures had been introduced to 
counteract inflation and stimulate production. More 
importantly, they secured budget surpluses during the war, 
enabling the Nigerian government to ease some of the curbs 
on public expenditure required during the pre-war years of 
financial restraint. Government spending accordingly rose 
from L6,499,000 in 1939/40 to L10,693,00 in 1945/46, of 
which an increasing proportion was available for 
development6. 
The Gold Coast Government, in contrast, lagged behind 
Nigeria in modernising its taxation regime, not introducing 
an income tax until 1943, following an unexpected revenue 
deficit for the year 1942/43. Even then, income tax rates in 
the Gold Coast, regarded widely as a wealthy colony, were 
5 PP (1945-46), xix, 35, Cmd. 6713 Colonial Development and 
Welfare. Despatch dated 12th November, 1945 from the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to Colonial Governments. 
6 Pearce (1987), p. 282; Shuckburgh II, pp. 310-13. 
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lower than in Nigeria. The Government remained reluctant to 
increase personal taxation rates, since the burden would 
fall mainly on its own officials, and preferred instead to 
raise the rate of Company Tax. This attitude worried the 
Colonial Office, where doubts were raised about granting CD 
&W monies to a colony which imposed relatively light 
taxation7. 
An important potential source of development capital, 
which local governments were encouraged to expect access to, 
was the sterling balances which they accumulated in London 
throughout the war. These were credits to the British 
Government, enabling it to import raw materials and to pay 
for services from the Sterling Area: they formed a valuable 
part of the wartime Imperial economic system, helping to 
support it, and constituting 'involuntary and indefinite 
loans' to Britain from her sterling creditors, particularly 
those in the British Empire. These balances totalled nearly 
L3,700 million by the war's end. Of this, the share owed to 
British West Africa amounted to L76 million by November 
1944, a substantial figure when compared to the region's 
subsequent CD &W allocation of L30,400,000 for 1946-56. The 
growth of the West African balances was fuelled by the 
wartime bulk purchase scheme, and the decision to continue a 
system of state marketing after the war made it likely that 
the balances generated by the produce boards would continue 
to swell8. 
7 Shuckburgh II, pp. 315-18. 
8 Morgan (1980) I, p. 201; N. J. Westcott, 'Sterling and 
Empire: the British Imperial Economy, 1939-1951', Seminar 
Paper, ICS London, 1983, pp. 4,7,8. 
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The colonial sterling balances were, however, a 
delicate area in Anglo-American relations, being seen in the 
United States as giving British exporters an unfair 
advantage, since unless creditors could convert their 
holdings into 'hard' currency, they were limited to buying 
sterling goods. United States' pressure therefore grew for 
Britain to 'adjust' her sterling balances, by reducing them 
or writing them off, and a promise on Britain's part to 
discuss this was a condition of the post-war United States 
Loan Agreement. For various reasons, this was an 
unattractive proposition for Britain. Tampering with the 
balances would risk political confrontation with the 
creditors as well as the dishonouring of debts, which would 
undermine London's standing as a world financial centre and 
hence weaken sterling as an international currency9. 
Pressure on the sterling balances also arose within 
Britain. In April 1945, Keynes suggested that one means of 
easing Britain's financial difficulties in the immediate 
post-war period would be to write off or appropriate large 
amounts of the colonial balances. Naturally, the Colonial 
Office was alive to the political difficulties such action 
might create in the coloniesl0. Furthermore, the Office 
itself had different plans for West Africa's balances which 
belied the numerous references to them made during the war. 
Although the Colonial office told the West African 
governments on several occasions that they would have access 
to their balances after the war, there is evidence that 
officials resisted the idea of using these funds, especially 
9 Westcott (1983), pp. 6-7. 
10 Porter and Stockwell (1987), p. 45. 
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those derived from state marketing, for development 
purposes. The Office feared that the balances would be 
'frittered away' on development, whereas their value was 
increasingly seen to lie in securing an ill-defined price 
stability designed to cushion primary producers against 
fluctuations. For officials in London, therefore, the 
emphasis in policy towards West Africa's balances was on 
continued accumulation, rather than on spending. This was in 
turn justified by the need to avoid a post-war 'boom' 
similar to that which had followed the First World War, 
'with all its unhappy consequences', and to provide against 
future 'lean years'". By the end of 1946, the long-term 
fate of the colonial sterling balances remained uncertain. 
However, given US opposition, the Bank of England's 
insistence that 'adjustment' was unethical, and the Colonial 
Office's private conviction that the balances should be 
devoted, where possible, to price stabilisation, the 
prospects for their employment in development by colonial 
governments were not promising. 
If the future of the sterling balances remained 
uncertain between 1943 and 1946, the outlook for colonial 
borrowing was no more encouraging. During the 1930s, there 
had been a definite shift in British overseas investment 
towards the Empire. It became possible for the colonies to 
raise loans more cheaply in the City than elsewhere, thanks, 
in part, to the National Government's 'cheap money' 
policies. During the war, however, London imposed rigid 
control over sterling issues, and the colonies raised no new 
loans in this period. Instead, colonial governments were 
11 Meredith (1986), pp. 77-78,87-88. 
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encouraged to meet their borrowing requirements from local 
sources, in order to ease the strain on the City12. 
It is not clear whether the Colonial Office expected 
any major relaxation of these tight financial controls after 
the war. In its statements to colonial governments, as 
suggested above, the initial optimism of the Office late in 
1943 gave way by the following spring to a more guarded 
position. In June 1945, Caine asked the Treasury for 
guidance on future colonial access to the London money 
markets in order to supplement CD &W funds. The Treasury 
replied that the question was under consideration, but added 
that all overseas borrowers should initially seek local 
sources of capital, not only to relieve pressure on London, 
but also to reduce the likelihood of inflation arising from 
heavy expenditure at a time of scarcity of goods13. 
During the war, officials appear to have given little 
attention to the possible use of foreign, and particularly 
American, capital, although this suggestion was aired on 
several occasions during the war. During the Carlton Hotel 
discussions, arranged by MacDonald soon after the outbreak 
of war to encourage constructive thought on colonial policy, 
Sir Keith Hancock argued that foreign capital was essential 
to development. In Margery Perham's view, this implied a 
need to attract United States capital. For officials, this 
was a thorny subject, and Clauson dismissed the proposal as 
12 Westcott (1983), p. 2; PP (1946-47), x, 403, Cmd. 7167, The 
Colonial Empire (1939-1947), para. 401. 
13 CO 852/591/3, letter to Brittain (Treasury), 19 June 
1945; ibid., A. J. D. Winnifrith (Treasury) to J. B. Williams, 
21 July 1945. 
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'nonsense'. Traditionally, it had been British policy to 
deflect US interests from the colonies14. 
Yet the war transformed the relationship between 
Britain and the United States, the latter emerging as by far 
the more powerful partner in the wartime alliance. From late 
1942, the strength of the American military presence in 
Africa was increasingly felt, prompting concern in the 
Colonial Office about future US commercial ambitions. In 
particular, London feared that the United States would look 
to West Africa, a region with which she had had only modest 
trading links before the war, as a major post-war export 
market. This anxiety was fuelled by the ambiguous 
commitments to 'access on equal terms' to raw materials and 
markets given by Britain in the Atlantic Charter of August 
194115. 
Despite these official fears, interest in the potential 
role of American capital in development grew in Britain as 
the reconstruction debate accelerated. Paradoxically, 
perhaps, this interest was particularly marked among the 
broad 'left'. In its 1943 statement on colonial policy, for 
example, the Labour Party concluded that little development 
was feasible without 'the provision of capital on a 
considerable scale by loans'. Without a substantial 
injection of European or US capital, the 'vicious circle' of 
colonial poverty would remain unbroken16. 
14 W. Roger Louis, (1977), pp. 103-5. 
15 Hargreaves, (1988), pp. 55-6. 
16 The Labour Party, The Colonies: the Labour Party's Post- 
War Policy for the African and Pacific Colonies, (1943), 
pp-16-7. 
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The Colonial Office did not encourage speculation about 
the role of foreign capital, but in April 1944 the question 
was raised during discussions on industrial finance by CEAC, 
among whose more outspoken members Evan Durbin showed a 
particular interest in US investment. Caine countered, 
blandly, that there should be no discrimination against 
foreign enterprise interested in establishing factories in a 
colony17. His colleague Clauson was, characteristically, 
more forthright in open debate. He warned that borrowing 
from the United States would involve interest repayments, 
which might oblige colonies to forego goods currently 
imported in exchange for their exports. Specifically, he 
thought, there would be little point in borrowing foreign 
capital to finance industrial development, whose purpose was 
to raise living standards, if in consequence the range of 
available consumer goods was depleted because of loan 
repayment costs18. Whereas Durbin believed that US aid was 
the only long-term solution to development, and that foreign 
loans could be guaranteed with CD &W funds, Clauson argued 
that no country could afford to develop all the colonies to 
the desirable level, thus unwittingly repeating one of the 
central arguments for 'concentrated' industrial development 
already deployed by Durbin and Lewis19. Clauson further 
suggested that although there was no bias in the colonies 
17 CO 990/16, CEAC(Industry) 3rd minutes, 17 Apr 1944; CO 
990/17, CEAC(Industry)(44)5, 'Possible scope for 
industrialisation in the Colonies', 25 Apr 1944. 
18 Co 990/16, CEAC(Industry) 4th minutes, 15 May 1944. 
19 See above, ch. 2, pp. 136.8. 
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against foreign capital, this might emerge, a tendency he 
equated with the growth of 'national consciousness'20. 
A final query raised by CEAC was whether the British 
Government would consider approaching foreign governments, 
or any future international investment fund, for development 
capital, or whether exclusively private investment was 
envisaged21. Stanley replied that Britain would not be 
approaching foreign sources specifically for development 
loans, and that he expected foreign investment to be private 
in character. He believed that the colonial peoples would 
not favour development which 'bound' them to a foreign 
country, and he could not foresee money being lent without 
'strings' attached22. This position won the support of Lord 
Hailey, who thought it would be 'healthier' to encourage 
private (including local) enterprise, than to borrow heavily 
from abroad, so that industrial development would arise from 
a colony's own resources23. 
The Colonial Office's reluctance to discuss the role of 
foreign capital may also have stemmed from the diplomatic 
need to demonstrate the metropolitan government's intention 
to take a prominent role in development. This need was 
especially strong later in the war, when Anglo-American 
discussions on Britain's future status as a colonial power 
were under way24. It was, after all, chiefly on political 
grounds that Stanley was able to request an extension of CD 
20 Co 990/16, CEAC(Industry) 5th minutes, 15 June 1944. 
21 CO 852/588/2, memo. by CEAC to Stanley, 31 Oct 1944. 
22 CO 990/1, CEAC 9th minutes, 19 Dec 1944. 
23 Ibid.. 
24 See esp. Louis (1979). 
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&W provision, by emphasising the need to justify before 
international opinion Britain's fitness to remain a colonial 
power. These major policy considerations also explain in 
part the Colonial Office's anxiety in this period to retain 
control over the development debate, and to limit the 
interference of 'unofficial' enthusiasts, such as the 
radical wing of CEAC25. 
Against this unpromising background, the question of 
identifying fresh development capital for West Africa led 
officials in London to the inescapable conclusion that 
continued and increasing reliance would have to be placed on 
expatriate firms such as the UAC. Although to some 
officials, including Caine, this was an obvious conclusion, 
others, notably Cohen, became increasingly concerned to 
harness the financial resources and expertise which private 
enterprise could contribute within a framework which 
enhanced the power of the colonial state to control 
development. This in turn aroused official interest in the 
possibility of giving the state a more direct role in 
promoting development, and hence to an exploration of the 
merits of public enterprise. 
Public versus private enterprise 
In its discussions on the relationship between public 
and private enterprise, the Colonial office needed to 
reconcile, for public consumption, the experience of 
European commercial activity in the colonies with a shifting 
metropolitan intellectual climate. At the heart of these 
discussions lay a fundamental dilemma for officials: on the 
25 Porter and Stockwell (1987), p. 43. 
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one hand were the demands of a new, more responsive and 
interventionist colonial policy, shaped increasingly with an 
eye to international, especially American, sentiment, and on 
the other hand, the practical question of where the 
resources for an active programme of colonial development 
were to be found. Thus, Lord Hailey, in his capacity as 
'unofficial spokesman' for the Colonial Office, sought to 
defend the record of development under private auspices 
while conceding the patchy nature of its impact. In his 
view, the 'vitality' which private enterprise had 
contributed would in future have to be supplemented by state 
action to ensure an equal distribution of development across 
the community as a whole, a responsibility which he thought 
had already been recognised in the 1940 CD &W Act26. Hailey 
admitted that problems could arise in privately funded 
development, notably in the exploitation of cheap colonial 
labour. However, unless all aspects of economic development 
were to be provided for by the state, there was no 
alternative to the continued involvement of private 
enterprise: 
Our object must clearly be to secure the 
widest co-operation of external capital and 
enterprise, while safeguarding against its 
abuse, or against its acquisition of a 
privileged position which may hamper the 
natives of the country from occupying a due 
share in its economic development 4l. 
Hailey had identified two related questions which 
dominated the Colonial office's consideration of development 
throughout the reconstruction phase: the need to achieve the 
26 Lord Hailey, Britain and Her Dependencies, (1943), pp. 10- 
6. 
27 Ibid., pp. 18-9. 
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optimum balance between public and private enterprise, and 
hence the cultivation of a constructive partnership between 
the two; and the wider question of the extent to which 
development should be controlled by government. In July 
1943, Hailey suggested that the private sector had 'a 
limited sphere of action' in developing tropical areas, and 
that there was a wide field remaining in which government 
must henceforth take the lead. This might involve the 
promotion of secondary industries and the organisation of 
local marketing, areas 'which a previous generation would 
have regarded as lying beyond the normal range of government 
action'28. 
In his memorandum of August 1943, Caine, too, 
LAA 
recognised the need for acconodation with new ideas on the 
state's economic role. He denied that development was 
impossible without state planning: 'Nothing is more 
demonstrably untrue for the Colonial Empire, where 
tremendous developments have been produced by the planning 
of private enterprise'. However, Caine envisaged a future 
expansion of state economic regulation, and thought that 
this would have important implications for development 
financing. Whereas in the past, much development had been 
financed privately, future taxation policy and control of 
the capital markets were likely to diminish the speculative 
appeal of the colonies to external investors. Consequently, 
a much greater proportion of development finance would have 
to be provided by the state, and the state itself would 
28 Rhodes House Library, Oxford: MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 335 
Hailey Papers, speech to Royal Central Asian Society, 'The 
Colonies and the Atlantic Charter', 7 July 1943. 
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require new skills in 'economic prospecting'29. Coming from 
Caine, traditionally a defender of private enterprise, these 
comments are surprising. Moreover, they were at variance 
with the general framework for development which the 
Colonial office was projecting for public consumption. Only 
a month before, Stanley had delivered his major policy 
speech in the Commons, encapsulating the future thrust of 
colonial policy. He had acknowledged that the subject of 
private enterprise's role in post-war colonial development 
was 'fraught with great danger'. However, assuming that 
private capital had a role in the post-war metropolitan 
economy, which hardly seemed to be in question, then it 
would 'certainly' have a part to play in the colonies. 
Stanley offered practical reasons: 
As I see it, the financial resources of the 
Colonial Governments and the financial 
assistance which His Majesty's Government are 
to give under the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act, will be fully needed for basic 
developments and social advances, and I think 
we shall need and be glad of, the assistance 
of private capital30. 
He warned, however, that private enterprise would have 
to be under 'proper control', and that there would be no 
place for the entrepreneur seeking rapid returns: 'What I 
hope is to give a chance to the efficient producer with 
/ 
reasonable security to get a reasonable return31. Despite 
the caveat, reflecting, perhaps, Stanley's own political 
convictions as well as being a concession to metropolitan 
and international public opinion, the message remained that 
29 CO 852/588/2,16 Aug 1943. 
30 PD C, 391, cols. 66-8,13 July 1943. 
31 Ibid.. 
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the public funds available for development would be limited. 
Despite the advances made during the war, colonial 
government revenues were not expected to contribute 
substantially to development finance, and metropolitan 
Government assistance, from CD &W funds would be needed 
mainly for other forms of development, especially in the 
social sphere. By late 1943, therefore, it seemed clear to 
officials in London that most capital for industrial 
development would have to come from private sources32. 
The idea of achieving a constructive partnership 
between private enterprise and the state was central to 
Oliver Stanley's political outlook. His were ideas which had 
developed gradually throughout his political career, and to 
which he remained wedded until his premature death in 1950. 
Later in the war, he regarded the revised CD &W Bill which 
he introduced as being instrumental in securing the right 
balance between public and private enterprise: 
I believe we can do a great deal with it, 
particularly if we can associate with 
Government action the best kind of private 
enterprise and private investment33. 
Given these official assumptions about the continuing 
importance of private enterprise, the attitudes of potential 
sources of development capital acquire particular 
significance. In the West African context, the only likely 
sources of substantial capital investment were the large 
expatriate firms, and much would depend, therefore, on 
whether their experience of wartime economic conditions had 
32 CO 482/2, draft memo. by Carstairs, 'The Control of 
Secondary Industries in the Colonies, with special reference 
to East and West Africa', 21 Nov 1943. 
33 CO 588/12, letter to A. H. S. Hinchcliffe (President, 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce), 19 Feb 1945. 
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eroded their customary indifference to business 
diversification, and on whether they could be induced to 
participate in development on terms acceptable to local 
opinion. 
By the onset of reconstruction planning in 1943, signs 
were emerging of a change in attitudes towards industrial 
development among the European firms in West Africa. There 
were a number of indications that some of the larger 
expatriate companies had warmed to the idea of participating 
in industrialisation, in contrast to their pre-war 
attitudes. In particular, attempts were made by the larger 
firms to improve their relations with local governments, and 
to demonstrate a co-operative attitude towards official 
34 development strategies. This was especially true of the 
UAC, whose poor relationship with the West African 
Governments was discussed in chapter one. The Company also 
supported the establishment of the West African Institute, 
one of whose functions was to undertake research into 
industrial development, and its Gold Coast Manager sat on 
the Council of Achimota College, the Institute's parent 
body35. 
The second largest European concern in West Africa, 
J. Holt and Co., showed a similar interest in diversifying 
its operations into manufacturing. Early in 1943, the 
Colonial Office received a copy of a memorandum by the 
Company which declared that industrial development was 
urgently needed, both to satisfy the local elite 
34 See also Bowden (1980), p. 218. 
35 CO 554/130/33685/1943, note by H. B. Lawrence, 'The 
Institute of West African Arts, Industries and Social 
Science', 10 June 1943. 
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expectations and to provide work for demobilised troops. The 
company believed that most firms operating in West Africa 
shared the view that such development was inevitable. Since 
local industrialisation would impinge on the firm's 
traditional commercial activities, Holt's stressed the need 
to plan ahead to meet changing conditions. The Company hoped 
that industrialisation would ultimately promote a new form 
of trade based on capital goods exports to the colonies. In 
turn, Holt's sought guidance from government on the role 
envisaged for the European firms36. While the Colonial 
Office thought that the Holt's memorandum raised 'some 
interesting points', officials were reluctant to comment 
until Whitehall's attitude to colonial industrialisation had 
been clarified37. Nevertheless, they were gratified that the 
firms appeared to be in a 'co-operative mood', and were 
looking to government to take the initiative in 
development38. 
Besides these expressions of a desire to co-operate in 
the promotion of colonial industry, the firms had provided 
concrete evidence of their interest. The UAC, for example, 
had stepped up its production of soap in Nigeria in response 
to the wartime expansion of the local market, its sales 
rising from 4,400 tons in 1937 to 10,643 tons in 194639. As 
has been seen, the Company also put forward proposals for a 
timber processing mill at Sapele, and was considering plans 
36 Bowden (1980), pp. 218-219; CO 852/480/11, Meyerowitz to 
Williams, enclosing memo. from J. Holt and Co., 3 May 1943. 
37 CO 852/480/11, minute by O. G. R. Williams, 4 May 1943. 
38 CO 852/480/11, note of meeting in CO, 12 Nov 1943. 
39 Fieldhouse (1986), p. 10. 
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for cotton textiles production in Nigeria40. Later, when the 
UAC was elaborating its textile proposals, the Company 
stressed that apart from the purely commercial aspect, it 
was motivated by a desire to help implement government 
policy on industrial development4l. 
The war had fundamentally extended the colonial state's 
control over private enterprise. For example, the 
introduction of more sophisticated taxation policies, 
encouraged by London in the interests of controlling 
inflation, had wider long-term implications for the 
relationship of colonial governments and the European firms. 
Thus Nigeria imposed a Company Tax for the first time during 
the war. As Pearce has commented: 
If the war increased the profitability of 
expatriate firms in Nigeria, at least 
colonial policy ensured hat the country 
would share in the profits4 . 
It was probably the strengthened position of the 
colonial state in wartime which encouraged a more compliant 
and conciliatory position among the European firms. An 
example of this attitude came with the offer by the UAC, 
made in 1942, to sell its rights to mineral royalties in 
Nigeria to the colonial government. In 1942, these rights 
brought the Company payments totalling L155,000, a sum 
swollen by increased wartime mineral production at 
artificially high prices. The Colonial Office tried to 
persuade the Treasury to buy these royalties on the Nigerian 
Government's behalf, in order to stem the flow of mining 
40 See above, p, iss-& 
41 CO 852/574/7, note of meeting in CO with representatives 
of Cotton Board, BOT and UAC, 8 Mar 1945. 
42 Pearce (1987), p. 282. 
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profits back to shareholders in Britain, arguing that this 
gesture would improve the international image of Britain's 
colonial policy. The Treasury refused, but early in 1945 
negotiations between the Colonial Office and the UAC began. 
Although these were inconclusive during the reconstruction 
period, they suggest that the UAC wanted to improve its 
standing with the colonial authorities43. 
The war also had important repercussions on traditional 
patterns of European commercial activity in West Africa, 
affecting the outlook and behaviour of large firms such as 
the UAC. Particularly important was the introduction of 
state-controlled produce marketing in the region. Under 
these arrangements, the existing trading firms had become 
the state's principal agents, continuing to buy produce but 
selling it to a single, official buyer, the Produce 
Marketing Board, which also fixed the prices to be paid. On 
the one hand, the firms benefitted from the scheme, which 
they themselves had been willing to help establish. It was, 
in effect, an official endorsement of the private 'pooling' 
arrangements which had existed among the firms before the 
war. In return for their co-operation, the firms received 
preferential treatment from the colonial authorities in the 
issuing of import licences, and were able to influence 
policy so as to exclude newcomers to West African trade, 
both African and 'Syrian'44. Yet, although the new marketing 
43 Shuckburgh I, pp. 279-81; R. Robinson, 'Andrew Cohen and 
the Transfer of Power in Tropical Africa, 1940-1951', in 
W. H. Morris-Jones and Georges Fischer (eds), Decolonization 
and After: the British and French Experience, 1980, p. 58; CO 
583/271/30572/1944, note of meeting in CO to discuss 
Nigerian preliminary development plan, 6 Nov 1944. 
44 Hopkins (1973), pp. 259-64. 
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policy strengthened the position of the firms, it also 
brought their activities more directly under the control of 
the state than ever before45. Hence, when official interest 
in continuing state produce marketing grew stronger during 
1944, the firms became alarmed. Through their central body, 
the Association of West African Merchants, they proposed 
their own scheme, accepting the need for price 
stabilisation, but arguing that the state Board should 
guarantee a minimum price, above which free competition 
would be permitted. 
Although some in the Colonial Office welcomed this 
proposal as a means of circumventing a possible 
confrontation with business interests both in Britain and 
the United States, the West African governments opposed the 
scheme, fearing the local opposition which it might produce. 
Above all, official concern about the local political 
repercussions of the firms' activities crystallised the 
decision taken in the first half of 1944 to continue state 
marketing after the war, expressed in the White Paper of 
October 1944 announcing the establishment of local cocoa 
marketing boards46. Against the combined interests of the 
Colonial Office, the colonial governments and the 
metropolitan Treasury, each of which had its own reasons for 
preferring state marketing, the opposition of the firms was 
ineffective. Nevertheless, the firms were not entirely 
without influence over the scheme's implementation: for 
example, a place on the Gold Coast cocoa board was reserved 
45 Pearce (1987), p. 284. 
46 Meredith (1986), pp. 85-6. 
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for a representative of AWAM, the nucleus of the pre-war 
cartel47. 
At the end of August 1943, the Colonial Office told the 
West African governments that a broad planning framework was 
envisaged leaving 'a wide field' for private initiative, 
under the 'general direction and supervision' of the state. 
The governments were asked how far economic regulation was 
considered necessary in the interests of the community, 
whether adequate basic services for development existed, and 
if these were not already provided by the state, whether 
steps were needed to encourage private enterprise to provide 
them. The governments were also asked to review their powers 
to promote development, and existing safeguards against the 
exploitation of local populations. The Colonial Office 
assumed that considerable government economic controls would 
continue in the immediate post-war period, and that a 'much 
greater degree of Government control than existed before the 
'48 war will remain as a permanency. 
The Office's ideas on the scope for government 
participation in development were elabor, 
prepared for the CEAC in November 1943. 
jointly by Caine and Clauson, assumed 
controlled planning would not continue 
that government's role would be to 
development plans, giving ample scope to 
The state's function would therefore 
necessary framework for development. 
47 Meredith (1988), pp. 286,295-296. 
ated in a memorandum 
This paper, written 
that wholly state- 
after the war, but 
produce 'outline' 
private initiative. 
be to ensure the 
While the paper 
48 CO 554/132/33718/1/1943, memo. for West African 
Governments, 'Post-War Planning for West Africa', (n. d. ). 
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acknowledged a widened proper sphere of state action, it 
maintained that colonial governments should concentrate on 
providing basic services, and leave the planning of 
production as such largely to private enterprise, which was 
described as having a vital role in colonial development49. 
However, when the CEAC discussed the memorandum several 
Committee members rejected the implication of a modest state 
role in production. Henderson, for example, argued the need 
for colonial governments to plan social services in 
conjunction with their economic planning, on which improved 
welfare provision depended. From the left, Durbin believed 
that the memorandum implied that government's role was to 
create conditions in which private, and therefore foreign 
enterprise, could flourish, whereas he stressed the 
potential for government participation in development50. 
The planning memorandum was accordingly revised before 
being circulated to the colonial governments in spring 1944. 
It now emphasised that the state's role in economic planning 
should not be minimised. Nevertheless, the paper advocated 
'outline' planning by government, leaving private enterprise 
to take the 'bulk' of decisions on development. The 
essential point was that officials envisaged a partnership 
in development between private enterprise and state planning 
and control51. Here, Caine's influence can be detected. He 
had already complained that the Colonial Office's 
49 CO 990/2, CEAC(43)5, 'Social and Economic Planning in the 
Colonial Empire', 25 Nov 1943. 
50 Morgan (1980) I, p. 186; CO 990/1, CEAC 2nd minutes, 9 Dec 
1943. 
51 CO 852/588 Pt. l, 'The Planning of Social and Economic 
Development in the Colonial Empire', Apr 1944. 
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discussions on industrial development generally neglected 
instances of development successfully launched without state 
assistance, for example in Hong Kong before the war52. He 
warned against overreliance on government to stimulate 
development, at the cost of minimising the scope for private 
initiative: 
The part which private enterprise can play in 
the future as in the past is also vital to 
active development in the colonies, both 
economic and social. Wherever possible, 
Government activity should aim at the 
stimulation rather than the restriction of 
private initiative, subject to the controls 
essential to the protection of public 
interests53. 
On the other hand, government was expected to be active 
in promoting development where private enterprise showed no 
interest. Generally, the Colonial Office felt that direct 
government operation was most appropriate in circumstances 
which, for technical reasons, demanded monopolistic control, 
for example in order to achieve economies of scale through 
large-scale production. Since the award of monopoly 
privileges to commercial firms was a sensitive area, 
officials concluded that monopolies should be reserved to 
government operation. Similarly, it was felt that in 
granting incentives to firms to promote consumer goods 
industries, governments should be careful that the consumer 
did not suffer, as would be the case if prices rose because 
of high tariff protection54. Caine suggested that if private 
enterprise could not be attracted to certain industrial 
52 CO 852/482/3, minute by Caine, 30 Oct 1943. 
53 CO 852/588 Pt. l, 'The Planning of Social and Economic 
Development in the Colonial Empire', Apr 1944. 
54 Ibid.. 
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projects, government should offer assistance in one of three 
ways: by providing capital on easy terms, by participating 
in the formation of a company to undertake the development, 
or by taking on the work itself55. 
Among CEAC's members, Durbin particularly challenged 
Caine's suggestion that the state might step in to promote 
development unattractive to private enterprise: in his view, 
governments should consider participating in every case of 
development, not only unprofitable ventures56. Yet even in 
mid-1944, a lingering scepticism within the Colonial Office 
towards the benefits of public enterprise was evident, 
echoing a former orthodoxy now increasingly seen by 
officials as inappropriate. For example, Clauson argued that 
finance was a barrier to government investment in industry, 
since the necessary public borrowing, and hence the 
accumulation of debts, was risky and undesirable. In 
fairness, such views represented not simply a stubborn 
official attachment to laissez faire ideas, but arose from 
painful inter-war experience, when a number of colonial 
governments had over-extended themselves by borrowing 
heavily during the brief 'boom' after 1918, only to find 
themselves encumbered with severe debt burdens during the 
Depression57. 
In its report on manufacturing industry58, CEAC 
stressed the importance of governments promoting genuinely 
55 CO 990/17, CEAC(Industry)(44)5, 'Possible scope for 
industrialisation in the Colonies', 25 May 1944. 
56 CO 990/16, CEAC(Industry) 5th minutes, 15 June 1944. 
57 Ibid.. 
58 See above, ch. 2, pp. NO - 2. 
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economic industries. However, the Committee did not mean 
that only proven industries should be promoted, but called 
for a policy of 'enterprise and bold experimentation' by 
government in order to overcome basic problems such as the 
lack of local managerial expertise. The report incorporated 
the arguments of both Durbin and Caine on the role of 
government. As Durbin had suggested, the report urged 
government not to restrict itself to participation in 
ventures whose lack of profit-making potential made them 
unattractive to private enterprise. It endorsed Caine's 
suggestion that government involvement could take three 
possible forms: the provision of capital, participation in 
forming companies, for example by taking up shares, and 
direct government operation of enterprises59. 
CEAC did not explore the question of the administrative 
machinery required by a more active government role in 
promoting industrial development, other than to recommend 
the creation of Departments of Industry in all the larger 
territories, responsible for 'discovering, investigating and 
promoting desirable industrial development'. The Committee 
recognised, however, that much would depend upon the 
expansion of government personnel, including the recruitment 
of staff with qualifications not previously expected of 
colonial administrators. 
Subject to unspecified 'appropriate safeguards', CEAC 
welcomed the participation of established British companies 
in promoting industrial development60. CEAC's more radical 
59 CO 852/578/5, CEAC(44)32, 'The Development of 
Manufacturing Industries', 29 Aug 1944. 
60 Ibid.. 
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members were dissatisfied with this conclusion. The Agenda 
Sub-Committee's controversial planning memorandum argued 
that industrial development could not be left to private 
enterprise. It was wrong, the Sub-Committee argued, to 
compare colonial conditions with those in mature economies, 
where industrialisation had occured largely without state 
assistance, such as Britain and the United States, since 
these had enjoyed traditions of entrepreneurship and 
commercial skill considered unavailable in the colonies. The 
Sub-Committee concluded that if government did not 
participate in planning development, little or none would 
61 occur. 
However conciliatory the European firms might have 
appeared by 1943, and however much officials in London might 
have recognised that only these firms possessed the capital 
and expertise necessary to promote industrialisation in West 
Africa, the problem remained that the firms were profoundly 
unpopular among key sections of the colonial population. 
Moreover, African distrust of firms such as the UAC had 
increasingly come to be shared by colonial administrators in 
West Africa, as demonstrated by the hostility frequently 
voiced by Governor Bourdillon of Nigeria. Bourdillon 
estimated in June 1943 that of the discontent among 
Nigeria's population, '99%' was due to economic causes, 
including the favoured position which the European trading 
firms were believed to enjoy62. 
61 CO 852/588/2, CEAC(44)38, Agenda Sub-Committee Third 
Report, 'Memorandum on Planning', 14 Sept 1944. 
62 CO 583/263/30560/1943, note of meeting in CO on Nigerian 
development, 22 June 1943. 
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The control of development: industrial licensing 
As the Colonial Office's awareness of this state of 
affairs sharpened during 1943, discussions turned to the 
question of bringing the activities of expatriate enterprise 
under effective government control. This extended debate was 
triggered, however, by a separate problem in West Africa, 
raised by the Resident Minister, Swinton, and involving the 
need to restrain economic penetration of the region by non- 
European expatriate capital, collectively termed the 
'Syrian' problem. In his policy memorandum of February 1943, 
Swinton cited the urgent need to curtail the activity of 
Syrian traders in West Africa as his reason for proposing 
that all future industrial development in the region should 
be subject to a system of government licencing63. It is 
clear that Swinton was, in turn, prompted to make this 
suggestion by the repeatedly voiced fears of the European 
firms at the possibility of Syrian competition. Swinton 
believed that it was the small Syrian trading community, 
rather than the European firms, which had squeezed African 
entrepreneurs out of business. While he admitted that the 
number of Syrians involved was still small, he was alarmed 
that its rate of growth had been rising since the 1920s. The 
local consequences, argued Swinton, were that European and 
African traders had become uneasy, and that the Syrians had 
introduced 'debased commercial standards', seen in the 
flourishing black market. Syrians were also unpopular 
because they were believed to remit their profits home. The 
problem was so acute, felt Swinton, that only government 
63 CO 852/509/15, WAWC(CM)4, 'Economic Policy in West 
African Colonies', 24 Feb 1943. 
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control could deal with it, hence his advocacy of a system 
by which all industrial enterprises would have to be 
licensed64. 
The European firms, anxious to protect their dominant 
position, apparently endorsed Swinton's views. Their wish to 
restrict potential commercial rivals, which required 
government action, may account for the conciliatory posture 
assumed by the firms and increasingly evident during 1943. 
In return for protection against Syrian competition, the 
firms seemed prepared to co-operate in the evolving 
development strategy. 
Swinton's sympathies clearly lay with the large 
European firms, with whom he believed the colonial 
governments should establish a close working relationship. 
The firms, he argued, being large, were easier to deal with 
and to control65. He made no secret of his suspicion of 
government-financed or managed industrial development, 
although he was interested in encouraging Native 
Administrations to take a financial stake in 'sound' local 
industries66. Although he paid lip-service to the importance 
of encouraging African enterprise, using this as a pretext 
for licensing, it seems likely that Swinton saw expatriate 
interests as the obvious source of finance, expertise and 
enterprise67. He dismissed critics of British business: 
64 Ibid.; CO 852/482/2, draft memo. by Carstairs, 'The 
Control of Secondary Industries in the Colonies, with 
special reference to East and West Africa', 21 Nov 1943. 
65 Kent (1985), pp. 340-341. 
66 Co 990/1, CEAC 2nd minutes, 9 Dec 1943. 
67 CO 852/509/15, WAWC(CM)4, memo. by Resident Minister, 24 
Feb 1943. 
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One school of thought has proposed that 
industries requiring substantial capital, 
plant and expert management should be 
exclusively African, and that they should be 
financed by Government. It desires to exclude 
all outside capita. I believe this to be 
thoroughly unsound . 
Significantly, Swinton assumed that wartime government 
economic controls would not continue in peacetime, when 
policy should aim to allow 'full play for freedom and 
initiative'. To this extent, he may have regarded licensing 
as a temporary expedient, unnecessary once the immediate 
threat of Syrian competition had been removed69. Swinton had 
raised a controversial question, and in the Colonial Office, 
major differences of opinion soon emerged on the extent to 
which government controls should be used to limit foreign 
enterprise in West Africa in favour of locally-promoted 
development. 
The incident which prompted Swinton to address London 
on licensing arose in the Gold Coast. Here, the West African 
Institute had established a pilot brick-making plant, in 
line with its policy of encouraging African craft 
industries. The plant could not, however, produce bricks in 
quantities large enough to meet the immediate wartime 
demand, and consequently Governor Burns gave permission for 
a Syrian company to establish a brick factory and authorised 
it to import the necessary machinery. 
Stanley defended Burns' action, rejecting the argument 
that the local government should promote exclusively 'local' 
68 CO 852/482/2, WAWC(CM)30, 'Licensing of Industries in 
West Africa', 9 Dec 1943. 
69 Co 852/509/15, WAWC(CM)4,24 Feb 1943. 
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development, and underlining his preference for a mixed 
development strategy: 
Whatever may be post-war policy with regard to encouraging the development of secondary industries it seems improbable that it will take the form of limiting development to any 
single undertaking or institution, even of 
governmental character, with the consequence 
of drastic restriction or prohibition of 
competitive enterp5ýses irrespective of their 
economic soundness . 
Even if compatible with the metropolitan Government's future 
international obligations, such a policy might be criticised 
as a means of stifling the development of industries which 
might compete with British manufacturers7l. 
Swinton was disturbed by Burns' response, believing it 
to conflict with all existing ideas on the development of 
secondary industries. Nor was he convinced by the argument 
that the Syrian proposal in this case could safely be 
sanctioned as it was unlikely to remain in business after 
the war. In his view, Burns had failed to apply basic 
criteria of desirability, notably whether the firm could be 
relied upon to follow the Government's own social and 
economic policy guidelines72. 
Swinton's views on controlling industrial development 
drew sharp criticism from the Colonial Office. Caine was 
particularly hostile, regarding Swinton's ideas as dangerous 
and arguing that it was 'fundamentally the wrong approach' 
to suggest that industries could only be established with 
government approval. He did not dispute that government 
might have to assume an active role in development by giving 
70 CO 96/775/1/31401/1941, letter to Burns, 2 June 1943. 
71 Ibid.. 
72 Ibid., letter to R. E. Robinson, 19 Aug 1943. 
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special assistance to certain projects, but he opposed any 
system which required government's prior approval of 
development, believing that in practice, this would 
restrict, not stimulate, development. Caine cited colonies 
such as Hong Kong and Palestine, which had achieved some 
industrialisation through private enterprise unhindered by 
government policy. He also detected a serious underlying 
political consideration: 
I think, moreover, that any system of 
licensing in normal times would arouse the 
keenest suspicions that it was being used 
deliberately to stifle Colonial industrial 
development in o5cer to prevent competition 
with U. R. exports . 
Significantly, Caine argued that while economic controls 
might be inevitable in wartime, it would be a 'grave 
mistake' to contemplate any permanent extension of such 
controls over private initiative, and that they had, 
historically, operated in a negative way74. 
Implicit in Caine's position were fundamental doubts 
about the capacity of colonial governments to undertake 
wide-scale control of economic development, including 
industrial development. These misgivings formed the central 
thrust of his memorandum of August 1943, dealing in broad 
terms with development policy, in which Caine had argued 
that little progress in development could be expected from 
the existing machinery of colonial administration75. It was 
natural, then, that he would resist any further extensions 
73 Ibid., minute, 25 Aug 1943. 
74 Ibid.. 
75 CO 852/588/2,16 Aug 1943. 
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in the responsibilities of colonial governments, whose 
inadequacies he sought to indicate to his colleagues. 
Caine's views drew sympathy from Dawe, who was equally 
critical of Swinton's proposals both on economic and 
political grounds: 
if, in the post-war period, we start 
attempting to control private enterprise by a 
system of Government licensing, we shall get 
into a real mess. On the one side we shall 
have the U. A. C. pressing us to use the system 
in one direction, while we shall be exposed 
to clamgjr from other interests to use it in 
another . 
Dawe's comments suggest that the Colonial Office was anxious 
to avoid too close an association of the colonial 
authorities with specific interest groups, particularly the 
European firms. However, while senior officials endorsed 
Caine's views on industrial licensing, they were apparently 
unsure how best to respond to Swinton, concealing their 
misgivings during the Resident Minister's visit to London in 
summer 1943, and preferring to leave the question open for 
the time being77. Consequently, Stanley's formal response to 
Swinton simply commented that the Syrian brick scheme was 
already well under way and that it was too late to reassess 
the position78. 
Swinton's concern to establish clear government 
controls over industrial development appears to have been 
shared by the West African colonial governments, although, 
as will be suggested, their motives were different. In 
October 1943, The Civil Members' Committee of the West 
76 CO 96/775/1/31401/1941, minute, 27 Aug 1943. 
77 Ibid., minutes by Dawe, 27 Aug 1943, and Gater, 28 Aug 
1943. 
78 Ibid., letter, 28 Aug 1943. 
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African Council agreed that a system of industrial licensing 
was 'essential'. The Committee favoured general legislation 
giving local governments 'absolute discretion' to grant or 
withhold licences, applicable to existing industries79. 
Swinton was therefore encouraged to request information from 
Stanley on licensing systems operating in other colonies80. 
Pressure on the Colonial Office for a statement on 
industrial licensing was simultaneously emerging from other 
parts of the Colonial Empire. When the East African 
Governors' Conference requested guidance on the subject in 
September 1943, Stanley decided to refer the entire question 
to the newly-established CEAC81. 
As with tariff policy, discussions on licensing were 
y 
overshadowed by the continuing negotiations in Washington on 
the post-war economic order. As already noted, United States 
opinion favoured freer postwar trading arrangements, and the 
International Commercial Union then under consideration was 
intended to cut tariffs and to lift import and export 
prohibitions, a regime in which the USA was keen to secure 
British co-operation. This wider policy background created 
difficulties for the Colonial Office, which needed to decide 
how a system of industrial licensing, inherently 
restrictive, would fit into a liberalised world trading 
system. The issue, was whether colonial industrialisation 
should be encouraged under conditions of free competition, 
or whether local governments should retain control over 
79 CO 852/480/11, extract from WAWC(CM)29,4th meeting, 28 
Oct 1943. 
80 Ibid., telegram, 9 Nov 1943. 
81 CO 852/480/11, Clauson to Lockhart, 16 Nov 1943. 
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development so as to curb over-production and the emergence 
of uneconomic enterprises82. As Clauson admitted, there were 
attractions in such a system of control. The uneconomic 
competition and consequent failure of enterprises which 
might arise from unrestricted industrial development could 
damage the reputation of the colonial territories as a 
location for investment. Furthermore, licensing could be 
employed to ensure African participation in industrial 
development, by stipulating that a proportion of the capital 
invested in a project should be held by government, for 
eventual transfer to African investors. More generally, 
licensing was thought to be a means of controlling the rate 
of industrial development, and hence its impact on colonial 
societies, enabling urbanisation to be controlled through 
the careful location of new industries, and conditions of 
employment to be established. 




In other words, licensing 
industrial development, 
social and political 
Despite licensing's apparent attractions, Caine 
remained unconvinced. He feared that such a system would 
favour 'vested interests' in West Africa, particularly the 
European firms. Moreover, he believed that licensing was an 
inherently restrictive strategy, at odds with the Colonial 
Office's traditional policy of encouraging private 
enterprise84. Here were echoes of Caine's earlier misgivings 
at the possibly restrictive consequences of state-controlled 
82 Ibid.. 
83 Ibid.. 
84 CO 852/480/11, note of meeting in CO, 12 Nov 1943. 
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produce marketing in West Africa, which he regarded as 
benefitting firms such as the UAC at the expense of 
newcomers, such as 'Syrian' traders85. 
The Colonial Office asked both Swinton in West Africa 
and Lockhart in East Africa not to introduce licensing 
legislation until the whole question had been considered 
further in London86. However, officials soon concluded that 
there was no appropriate precedent for licensing which could 
serve as a model for future legislation, as Swinton had 
hoped87. More fundamental official misgivings emerged in a 
letter from Clauson to Lockhart of the East African 
Governors' Conference. Clauson explained that the Office was 
undecided on licensing, but, referring to the pre-war 
dislocation of international trade, aggravated by a 
widespread mood of protectionism, he suggested that 
agreement was emerging that post-war prosperity depended 
upon removing obstacles to trade, a process requiring 
concessions on all sides. Consequently, those who advocated 
industrial licensing, potentially a barrier to trade, would 
have to present a convincing case that it would generate 
more development than it hindered88. 
Hitherto, officials in London had concentrated on the 
economic aspect of industrial licensing, but by November 
1943, the West African Department of the Colonial office was 
growing restless, arguing that the question had to be seen 
85 See above, p. 53. 
86 CO 852/480/11, note of meeting in CO, 12 Nov 1943. 
87 CO 852/480/11, minute by R. E. Robinson, 16 Nov 1943; 
ibid., telegram from Stanley to Swinton, 19 Nov 1943. 
88 Ibid., Clauson to Lockhart, 16 Nov 1943. 
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in its wider, political, context. As early as April 1943, in 
discussions arising from the Syrian brick-making incident, 
the head of the West African Department, O. G. R. William, 
emphasised the political and social dimensions to the 
problem of government control over private enterprise, which 
he thought ought not be subordinated to purely economic 
considerations89. Given that during 1943, Williams and his 
colleagues were edging uncertainly towards a framework of 
long-term political objectives in colonial policy, their 
sensitivity to the political ramifications of economic 
policies under discussion elsewhere in the Office is 
understandable. After July 1943 and Stanley's watershed 
speech to the Commons, London's stated goal was self- 
government for the West African territories90. Though this 
goal was imprecisely defined, those officials in London most 
responsible for it were anxious to achieve a fusion of 
economic and political objectives. If the West African 
peoples were to be prepared for ultimate self-government, 
part of their 'training' must include greater involvement in 
local economic activities, and an opportunity for African 
economic self-management: 
It is widely felt that such developments will 
be in an important degree stultified if in 
the industrial sphere the African is denied a 
measure of responsible participation whether 
through ownership or management which does 
not in some degree correspond to his 
political and administrative attainments; or 
at any rate if political and industrial 
89 CO 96/775/1/31401/1941, minute, 29 Apr 1943. 
90 On the Office's wartime deliberations on constitutional 
development, see Pearce (1982), chs. II and III passim; Lee 
and Petter (1982), pp. 193-99; J. Flint, 'Planned 
decolonization and its failure in British Africa', African 
Affairs, 82 (1983), pp. 389-411; and Porter and Stockwell 
(1987), pp. 32-8. 
229 
policy do not at least tend in the same direction. 
or, more succinctly, 
To use what are perhaps catch-phrases, 
economic democracy is an essential 
concomitant of political democracy91. 
From the West African Department's point of view, 
therefore, the principal policy concern was to secure the 
position of Africans in the region. Particularly important, 
it was felt, was the growing educated class, whose numbers 
were expected to be swollen by demobilisation. This group 
was likely to want to participate in economic, as well as in 
political life, and to seek a share in the ownership and 
control of industries. Economic policy, in other words, had 
to complement the broad objectives of political development, 
and this would be impossible if Africans were given a 
subordinate role in industrial development: 
It is politically most important that the 
African should be enabled to show what he can 
do in the creation and management of 
secondary industries 92. 
Officials in the West African Department recognised three 
barriers to such development: the lack of local capital, the 
shortage of technical and managerial expertise and the 
presence of non-African competitors93. Officials recognised 
the unpopularity of the European firms, regarded as being of 
the 'greatest political and economic consequence', 
particularly since policy-makers to private enterprise to 
provide the major initiative in industrial development, and 
91 CO 852/482/2, draft memo. by Carstairs, 'The Control of 
Secondary Industries in the Colonies, with special reference 
to East and West Africa', 21 Nov 1943. 
92 CO 852/480/11, note of meeting in CO, 12 Nov 1943. 
93 CO 852/482/2, draft memo. by Carstairs, 21 Nov 1943. 
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only non-African enterprise seemed to possess the necessary 
resources94. As Carstairs observed, 
The European firms themselves, and in 
particular the United Africa Company, have 
however much odium to live down... There is a 
suspicion of the United Africa Company in 
West Africa which is so strong and so 
widespre as almost to constitute a mass 
neurosis 
All these considerations, especially the presence of the 
European firms, convinced the Department of the need for 
machinery in West Africa to control the development of 
industry: 
It is to my mind essential that - if it is 
humanly possible - industrialization should 
not be allowed to develop in W. Africa in ways 
that are likely to prejudice our policy of 
encouraging + training the West Africans for 
ultimate self-government, however remote that 
goal may be at present. This seems to imply 
inevitably some form of regulation of the 
development of industrialization for hick 
Government must bear the responsibility9ý. 
While there was little argument within the Colonial Office 
on this problem, opinions differed on its significance for 
policy on licensing. The divide separated those, for example 
in the West African Department, who saw a government- 
controlled licensing system as the best means of securing 
wider opportunities for African entrepreneurs in the face of 
European and Syrian competition, a concern grounded 
ultimately in political considerations, and those, like 
Caine, who sought to emphasise the economic difficulties 
posed by government regulation. Caine was worried at the 
direction which official discussions seemed to be taking: 
94 Ibid.. 
95 Ibid.. 
96 CO 852/482/2, minute by O. G. R. Williams, 27 Nov 1943. 
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I myself am quite unconvinced of the urgency 
of the enactment of any licensing 
legislation, either in East or West Africa, because it seems to me that, in any event in 
war-time, Government can in practice control 
any substantial industrial development 
through its powers of control over the import 
of machinery and other war-time regulatory 
powers. 
What was needed, he believed was more discussion and thought 
on how to promote, not control, development97. 
Meanwhile, Swinton grew impatient for a response from 
London, especially after the Syrian brick-makers incident at 
Accra98. He argued that government should promote planned 
industrial development, which was possible only if it could 
control development through a licensing system, for which he 
volunteered a detailed justification. He believed that 
licensing would ensure that government could approve those 
European firms which wanted to develop industries, and 
satisfy itself that these firms acted as partners in overall 
development plans. Similarly, governments would be able to 
control the location of new industries, relating them to 
local primary production, and to control the scale of 
development, protecting village industries where this was 
desirable on social grounds. 
Swinton denied that a policy of government control need 
be restrictive; rather, he thought, its purpose was to 
encourage development. He had originally envisaged licensing 
as applying only to large-scale industry, but believed that 
in West Africa the Syrians were attempting to 'muscle in' on 
village industries, threatening the plans of colonial 
97 Ibid., minute by Caine, 25 Nov 1943. 
98 CO 852/480/11, telegram from Sandford to Robinson, 23 Nov 
1943. 
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administrators for African social development99. He 
concluded stressing that the Civil Members, Committee agreed 
with him, that West Africa required a general system of 
licensing, which would not require differentiation between 
large- and small-scale industries, and would permit 
'undesirable' industries to be excluded. The advantage of a 
general system, he thought, would be its flexibility, and 
the information which it would provide to those responsible 
for planning on the course of industrialisation100. 
Swinton's arguments for licensing were apparently 
different from those used by advocates of such a policy 
within the Colonial Office. For Swinton, the key point was 
to deal with the alleged 'Syrian' problem, and here he was 
supported by the European firms, anxious to suppress any 
possible competition in West Africa. It was almost as an 
after-thought that Swinton argued that licensing would 
assist in promoting African enterprise. Given Swinton's 
strong views on the need for a constructive partnership 
between government and the European firms, it seems that he 
saw an African contribution to development as a remote 
possibility. 
For the West African Department, the position was 
entirely different. Here, the chief argument for licensing 
was the problem surrounding the European firms: 
The violent and universal suspicion against 
these firms which at present exists creates 
an atmosphere in which industrial development 
is hamstrung and paralysed. Our object must 
be to break down this suspicion and that can 
only be done by showing that the Governments 
99 CO 852/482/2, WAWC(CM)30, 
West Africa', 9 Dec 1943. 
'Licensing of Industries in 
100 Ibid.. 
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are the masters. This can only be achieved if 
the Governments are able to exercise control 
and licensing eems the simplest and most 
effective meansj01. 
In other words, officials in London believed that it had 
become politically necessary for local governments to 
demonstrate to the populations of West Africa their ability 
to control the region's economic development. While Swinton 
appeared insensitive to the political dimensions of 
development, these formed the touchstone of the West African 
Department's outlook. 
Whereas Caine felt that the European firms welcomed the 
licensing proposal precisely because it would benefit them, 
Andrew Cohen doubted that licensing would favour, because so 
many colonial officials in West Africa shared the local 
population's anti-firm sentiments102. Cohen, who throughout 
the reconstruction debate championed a greatly enhanced 
developmental role for the state, saw the basic problem in 
West Africa as being the strained relationships between the 
colonial governments, the local populations and the European 
firms. He shared the West African Department's view that a 
system of licensing was necessary to demonstrate that it was 
the colonial authorities, and not the firms, which 
controlled the region's economic life. He conceded, however, 
that licensing was an essentially negative device, which 
government would have to supplement with positive measures 
to assist development103. 
101 Ibid., minute by Cohen, 31 Dec 1943; ibid., minute by 
O. G. R. Williams, 4 Jan 1944. 
102 CO 852/482/2, minute, 31 Dec 1943. 
103 Co 990/16, CEAC(Industry), 1st minutes, 2 Mar 1944. 
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When the CEAC eventually discussed licensing, its 
conclusions resembled Caine's Closely. The Committee was 
unhappy at the prospect of restrictive legislation, and 
uneasy about the way such controls would be implemented. 
CEAC's principal objection, like Caine's, was that a 
licensing system would in practice obstruct industrial 
development. Where licensing was considered desirable, 
however, the Committee believed that it should apply only to 
certain scheduled industries agreed by the Colonial 
Secretary. 
There were four cases which CEAC thought might warrant 
licensing: first, where a potentially economic industry 
required initial protection; secondly, where without some 
control, excess productive capacity was likely to develop; 
thirdly, where locally-owned industries had to be shielded 
in the wider interests of the territory; and finally, in 
order to control the location of industry. The Committee saw 
the purpose of licensing as being to ensure for the local 
population the maximum return from their labour and 
resources. Appreciating the issue's importance, the CEAC 
recommended that the power to grant a licence should rest in 
an 'impartial' authority, and that disappointed applicants 
should have the right of appeal. Furthermore, it was felt 
that licences should be granted for a fixed, but renewable, 
period, and should be revocable at any time104. CEAC's final 
verdict was therefore a rejection of Swinton's call for a 
general system of licensing105 
104 CO 852/578/5, CEAC(44)21 (Revised), 'Industrial 
Licensing', 31 Mar 1944. 
105 CO 852/574/5, Saving from Stanley to Swinton, 13 Apr 
1944. 
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Swinton was dismayed by the Committees conclusions. He 
recognised, however, that since the question of licensing 
was not related directly to his ministerial remit to co- 
ordinate the war effort in West Africa, the final decision 
must rest with Stanley. He added: 
I must, however, make it plain that I could 
have no part in a plan which, while 
purporting to accept the principle of 
licensing, was hedged round with so many 
conditions and restricons that I honestly 
felt it would not work 
'W 
To reinforce his case, Swinton claimed that licensing was 
desirable in the interests of the African population, a view 
he said his staff at Achimota shared. Furthermore, the 
problem remained that those responsible for planning found 
it difficult to ascertain what industries were being started 
in West Africa. As an alternative to licensing, Swinton 
therefore proposed a scheme of industrial registration. The 
information which this would provide, he argued, was 
essential to effective taxation and labour policies, and to 
planning necessary basic services. Furthermore, Swinton 
believed that this would help in tackling the Syrian 
problem, by revealing this group's activities in West 
107 Africa . 
The West African Civil Members' Committee shared 
Swinton's view that there would be little point in pursuing 
a licensing scheme on the lines advocated by CEAC, owing to 
the lack of necessary information, favouring instead a 
system of industrial registration108. Accordingly, the 
106 Ibid., Swinton to Stanley, 17 May 1944. 
107 Ibid.. 
108 Ibid., WAWC(CM) 6th meeting, 6/7 July 1944. 
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colonial governments of West Africa set about the problem of 
defining an 'industry' for these purposes109. 
Swinton discussed the entire question further with 
Stanley in London in August 1944. Stanley, who now disclosed 
misgivings over CEAC's recommendations, said that he would 
agree to a system of registration, though this would not 
fulfil the same functions as licensing. Stanley subsequently 
arranged for CEAC to reconsider the question with Noel Hall, 
Swinton's Development Adviser110. The outcome was an 
agreement that the authorities in West Africa should work 
out their scheme for industrial registration"'. 
Vehicles for growth: development corporations 
However, the momentum behind the official debate on 
licensing/registration seems to have dissipated by summer 
1944, by when attention focussed increasingly on promoting, 
rather than simply controlling, development, and 
specifically on the possible role of development 
corporations. For the remainder of the 'reconstruction' 
period, references to licensing are sparse. Early in 1946, 
the Governors of Kenya and Uganda showed enthusiasm for such 
a system, believing that it was essential to orderly 
industrial development112. In West Africa, however, interest 
apparently lapsed. Early in 1946, when the Nigerian 
Government's doubts about factory development were being 
109 CO 554/139/33718/1/1944, note of discussion between 
Stanley and Swinton, 2 Aug 1944. 
110 Ibid.. 
111 CO 852/574/5, CEAC 6th minutes, 29 Aug 1944. 
112 CO 852/586/11, CEAC(45)72, Third statement on action 
taken on Committee's Reports, 11 Jan 1946. 
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discussed in the Colonial Office113, it was suggested that 
the territory might need a licensing system in order to 
avoid the unwelcome side-effects of industrialisation114. 
Caine, however, maintained his opposition, arguing that in 
view of recent evidence of the Nigerian government's 
hostility to industrialisation, it would be a mistake to 
make the government responsible for controlling 
development115. A new counter-argument posed by Caine was 
that the United States might insist on participating in any 
licensing system in Nigeria, an opportunity for interference 
in colonial policy which it can only be assumed would have 
been unwelcome to officials and politicians alike in London. 
By the time that officials in London had sealed the 
fate of Swinton's licensing proposals, they had already 
begun to examine closely the measures and machinery 
necessary to promote industrialisation actively. The idea of 
devising machinery to facilitate a partnership between 
private enterprise and the state was not new, having been a 
recurring theme in earlier, more nebulous discussions on 
colonial development. An important breakthrough came with 
Caine's memorandum of August 1943. In this, he discussed the 
possibility of establishing a body which, while commercial 
in form, would not be constrained to operate in a purely 
commercial way, that is, a company acting as the agent of 
government. Caine saw many attractions in a body enjoying 
the 'comparative freedom of a commercial concern'. In 
particular, it might undertake the 'economic prospecting' 
113 See above, ch2, pp. I'+2 - ti . 
114 CO 852/574/10, minute by Monson, 31 Jan 1946. 
115 Ibid., minute, 6 Feb 1946. 
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increasingly seen as essential to successful development in 
a relatively informal way made possible by its quasi- 
commercial character116. 
W. A. Lewis, even before entering the Colonial Office, 
had speculated on the value of government-controlled 
corporations, which could work with local and external 
interests in the larger colonies to promote industrial 
schemes which private enterprise might be unwilling to 
undertake alone. An alternative suggested by Lewis was the 
formation of a single, centralised corporation, based in 
London117. Similarly, Andrew Cohen complained that official 
discussions on promoting industrial development tended to 
minimise government's role. At the height of the Office's 
discussions on industrial licensing, Cohen suggested the 
formation, with government finance, of a large development 
company, which could co-operate with private enterprise in 
118 specific projects 
At least initially, the West African governments were 
interested in promoting industry through new forms of 
organisation, at this stage often still termed 'development 
i 
companies. These were mentioned, for example, in the Gold 
Coast outline development plan of July 1944, by which time 
the Nigerian government was also understood to be 
considering similar machinery119. Sustained discussion began 
in August 1944, shortly after the Nigerian government 
116 CO 852/588/2,16 Aug 1943. 
117 CO 990/2, CEAC(44)15, memo. by Lewis, 'The Development 
of Secondary Industry in the Colonial Empire', n. d.. 
118 CO 852/482/2, minute, 23 Nov 1943. 
119 CO 96/781/2/31475/1944, minute by Carstairs, 11 Oct 
1944. 
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suggested the creation of an Industrial Development 
Corporation. This proposal was discussed when Swinton was in 
England during summer 1944. Early in August Noel Hall 
explained that both the Nigerian and Gold Coast Governments 
were considering the possible role of development 
corporations in promoting industrial development. At this 
stage, explained Hall, their projected role was still 
modest, involving the provision of managerial assistance to 
subsidiary firms; they would not necessarily be prominent in 
financing development. The principal advantage of machinery 
of this sort was the control it would give colonial 
governments over development. 
Swinton, who assumed that successful development would 
depend on the European firms rather than on the 
entrepreneurial skills of the colonial state, feared that a 
development corporation might find itself financing 
'unsound' schemes. Stanley, however, argued that in West 
Africa, government was the only agency which could provide 
facilities for small industrial developments, and rejected 
as impracticable Swinton's suggestion that local co- 
operatives or the Native Administrations were suitable 
vehicles for such intervention. 
These discussions raised a deeper problem: how could 
existing private enterprise in West Africa be integrated 
into the proposed machinery? Politically, it was desirable 
to ensure government control if the European firms were 
involved in any development corporation120. It fell to Cohen 
to produce a paper on development corporations in West 
Africa. Assuming that government policy was to encourage 
120 CO 852/578/8, note of discussion in CO, 2 Aug 1944. 
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private enterprise to participate fully in development, 
Cohen noted that only the large European firms had the 
necessary financial resources and expertise, and that rapid 
post-war development largely depended on them. However, the 
'intense political suspicion' in West Africa towards the 
firms, shared by Africans and colonial administrators, 
threatened to handicap progress: 
This suspicion has created a form of economic 
paralysis which has been serious enough in 
the past, but is likely to be even more 
serious in the future when the need for 
development will be so much greater. It must 
be the aim of economic no] icy to put an end 
to this state of affairs '2f. 
As with industrial licensing, Cohen highlighted the 
political dimension to the promotion of development. The 
problem hitherto, argued Cohen, was that governments had 
lacked the machinery they needed to take a guiding and 
controlling role in economic development. Inevitably, this 
had fuelled African fears that big business, and not 
government, controlled the colonial economies. In turn, this 
had created tensions between government and business, 
hindering the co-operation between them which development 
required. Cohen concluded that local governments needed 
machinery with which they could formulate general economic 
policies, and control private enterprise in the public 
interest. However, this machinery should not stifle private 
initiative, but should demonstrate to African opinion that 
government was the 'controlling partner'. 
One solution, thought Cohen, was the development 
corporation, at least half of whose finance should come from 
121 Ibid., 'Development Corporations in West Africa', Aug 
1944. 
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local governments, either from their own revenues or 
reserves, or from CD &W funds. Commercial banks, but not 
the European firms, should also be encouraged to invest. 
While he expected local legislatures to decide the broad 
operating policy of the corporations, Cohen believed the 
latter should be run on commercial lines. He did not foresee 
the corporations undertaking projects themselves, but saw 
them operating through subsidiary companies, perhaps in 
partnership with the European firms. However, the 
corporations would keep overall control through the capital 
structure of their subsidiaries, and through the appointment 
of directors. Cohen emphasised the importance of flexibility 
in this mechanism, explaining that the degree of involvement 
by the corporations would vary from case to case. He 
believed that the development corporation met the two basic 
objectives revealed by recent official discussions: control 
over development, where necessary, and promotional 
machinery, especially where external finance and managerial 
skills were needed. Echoing earlier arguments over 
industrial licensing, Cohen claimed that development 
corporations would not be restrictive, but would facilitate 
government co-operation in development. A final problem he 
identified was that the corporations would require highly 
qualified and experienced staff, and that to complement 
these, local governments would need adequate economic 
departments with appropriately qualified staff. Here, Cohen 
believed that governments' wartime experience should be 
. 
1 drawn upon22 
122 Ibid.. 
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Although the development corporation was proposed as a 
solution both to the problems of encouraging and of 
controlling development, it was unclear in summer 1944 that 
co-operation in this sort of machinery would appeal to the 
European firms, who stood to lose their freedom to direct 
their own activities as they saw fit123. The Colonial Office 
discussed whether attempts should be made to establish a 
closer, more co-operative relationship with the European 
firms. It was clear to officials that private capital's role 
in development was going to be vital. The European firms, 
the major source of private capital in West Africa, were 
understood to have accumulated large sterling balances 
during the war which would require investment opportunities. 
Because the Office sought to draw upon the firms' capital 
and expertise, and because it was thought, from the previous 
discussions on licensing, that the firms were waiting for 
government to take the lead, it seemed necessary to 
establish good contacts with them, especially with their 
headquarters in London. As one official commented: 
If nothing is done to secure the good will 
and co-operation of the firms, I am afraid we 
shall be guilty of driving British capital 124 out of the Empire. 
Cohen was optimistic that if government seized the 
initiative, the firms would co-operate in a way which left 
the state in overall control of development, which was 
politically essential125. Caine, too, favoured discussions 
123 Ibid., minute by Carstairs, 21 Aug 1944. 
124 CO 852/588/10, memo. by F. J. Pedler, 'Planning of 
Development in the Colonies. Consultation with Business 
Houses', 10 Aug 1944. 
125 Ibid., minute, 11 Aug 1944. 
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with the firms, not only so that the Colonial Offices own 
planning would be better informed, but also to avoid giving 
the impression that the firms were being excluded from 
development. Not for the first time, Caine warned that post- 
war conditions, possibly including high rates of taxation, 
were not going to make the encouragement of private 
enterprise any easier. He feared a possible tendency to 
leave the initiative in development entirely to government: 
I am more and more persuaded that it would be 
disastrous to get into a frame of mind in 
which everything had to be done by 
Government, however attractive that may 
appear 12tip certain schools of political thought . 
In September 1944, Stanley reminded the African 
Governors of the importance of private, as well as public, 
enterprise in development, and suggested that the private 
component might often be the largest, adding 
The greatest success must be expected to come 
when the use of Imperial or Colonial money as 
pump priming induces a substantial private 
investment. 
For this reason, local governments had to understand the 
firms' objectives, and obtain the firms' good-will and co- 
operation. Stanley explained that he was encouraging 
informal contacts between the firms' head offices and the 
Colonial Office, to improve the relationship between the 
firms on the one hand and the colonial governments and 
127 populations on the other. 
It is unclear whether these approaches were made. No 
record survives of the presumably numerous informal contacts 
between officials and commercial employees. That these were 
126 Ibid., minute, 14 Aug 1944. 
127 Ibid., despatch to African Governors, 29 Sept 1944. 
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an important part of the relationship between the Colonial 
office and the firms is suggested by the apparent redundancy 
of the Office's Business Adviser, Sir Clifford Figg, who was 
appointed in September 1939, but was not apparently involved 
S 
in discussions on this seniive question. His post was 
128 allowed to lapse in September 1945. 
The idea of improving the machinery for investment and 
development was strengthened by events in Britain during 
1944. In October 1944, the Cabinet Reconstruction Committee 
approved the Board of Trade's proposal to establish two 
finance corporations to help fill gaps in the domestic 
arrangements for financing industry, gaps perceived as early 
as 1931 by the Macmillan Committee. The first corporation, 
to be financed jointly by the Bank of England and the 
clearing banks, was to supply investment capital to small 
businesses. The second, to be funded by the City and by 
insurance companies, would supply finance for industrial 
reorganisation. Together, the corporations would have assets 
of L30 to L40 millions, to be increased through borrowing to 
between L110 and L165 millions. Interestingly, in the 
context of discussions on raising finance for colonial 
development, neither of the two new domestic corporations 
129 was to receive state capital. 
The Colonial Office's discussions on possible forms of 
new development were not limited to officials, but included 
contributions, sometimes unsolicited, from members of CEAC, 
to which the office had not yet referred the question of 
development machinery. Among the proposals made by the 
128 Shuckburgh I, p. 21. 
129 CAB 87/9, R(44)174,19 Oct 1944. 
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Committee's more radical members was one that a commission 
of industrial experts be sent to investigate possibilities 
in the colonies and to produce development plans. While this 
proposal was for an executive body, a problematic suggestion 
in view of the delicate relationship between local 
governments and London, evident from earlier official 
discussions on the creation of a Development Commission for 
West Africa, there was nevertheless sympathy in the Colonial 
Office for the idea of expert investigation of the colonies' 
industrial potential as a prelude to development 
130 planning. 
A subsequent proposal, made by the increasingly 
dissident members of CEAC's Agenda Sub-Committee, was for 
industrial experts, recruited in Britain, to be sent to the 
colonies as an investigative commission. Having assessed an 
area's potential, this body could become a permanent agency, 
with executive powers to provide development 
infrastructures, select appropriate industries for 
encouragement, negotiate with industry to initiate projects, 
and, if necessary, arrange for their operation under 
government control. The Agenda Sub-Committee stressed that 
this work was unsuitable for civil servants or for 
economists without practical experience. It criticised the 
existing local machinery, which usually consisted of 
departmental representatives of the colonial governments, 
who, thought the Sub-Committee, could not plan boldly enough 
to achieve rapid development, because the necessary skills 
l3 l. were beyond their experience 
130 CO 852/578/8, minute by Carstairs, 21 Aug 1944. 
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When, in October 1944, CEAC sought guidance on key 
development issues, it asked for Stanley's views on the 
creation of 'new instruments for both planning and 
execution' in industrial development, including public 
corporations, possibly with executive powers independent of 
colonial governments132. Stanley replied that he favoured 
new instruments, such as departments of commerce and 
industry, and development corporations acting on a semi- 
commercial basis with government finance. He warned, 
however, that any executive powers enjoyed by these 
corporations would have to be determined by local 
governments, on London's advice133. 
Development corporations were discussed in October 1944 
by senior officials in the Colonial Office and the Nigerian 
Development Adviser, F. E. V. Smith. Smith saw the development 
corporation as the 'commercially executive corollary' of the 
Department of Commerce and Industry which his government 
proposed to create, but which intended to be responsible for 
promoting industry. He envisaged the corporation as a 
statutory body, part-financed by CD &W money, the remaining 
capital coming from the commercial sector. Like Cohen, Smith 
saw the corporation operating through subsidiaries in which 
it had a majority shareholding or voting control. it would 
finance desirable industries otherwise unattractive to 
private investors. Its ultimate aim would be to transfer 
these industries to the producers themselves. The 
corporation would investigate potential industries, and 
131 CO 852/588/2, CEAC(44)38, Agenda Sub-Committee Third 
Report, 'Memorandum on Planning', 14 Sept 1944. 
132 Ibid.. 
133 Co 990/1, CEAC 9th minutes, 19 Dec 1944. 
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encourage their commercial development, while retaining 
control to prevent any 'exploitation' of the local 
population134. Nevertheless, the government's strategy was 
essentially facilitative, and there was no intention to 
supplant private capital. 
When the Nigerian government's preliminary development 
plan was discussed in London in November 1944, Stanley 
supported its proposal to create a development 
corporation135. He particularly favoured the establishment 
of state corporations, believing there was 'very 
considerable suspicion of the outside capitalist and a very 
strong desire to see that development is definitely 
Nigerian'136. 
The Gold Coast government's Economic Adviser, 
Richardson, was similarly interested in development 
corporations. He acknowledged the need for a 'central 
nucleus body' to help promote industries, by supplying 
finance and expertise. However, he believed that the 
corporation's working capital should come from commercial 
sources, to avoid any local suspicion of government 
interference137. 
Interest in the potential for development corporations 
in West Africa and elsewhere was not confined to officials 
in London and at the periphery. For example, in October 
134 CO 852/578/8, note of meeting in CO, 24 Oct 1944; CO 
583/271/30572/1944, note on 'Nigeria Development Plan', Nov 
1944. 
135 CO 583/271/30572/1944, note of meeting in CO, 6 Nov 
1944. 
136 CO 852/578/11, letter to Goodenough, 15 Feb 1945. 
137 CO 852/578/8, note of discussion between Carstairs and 
Richardson, 6 Dec 1944. 
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1943, Sir Raymond Streat, Chairman of the Cotton Board, 
suggested to representatives of the Colonial Office and the 
Board of Trade that an investment corporation, financed by 
Lancashire and London, might be created to participate in 
officially approved schemes of development, especially 
projects involving cotton textiles industries. This 
corporation would be composed of large firms which were 
potential investors. Its aim would be to achieve co- 
ordinated action among interested Lancashire firms138. 
Having had no response after a year, Streat raised the 
subject at a meeting with Board of Trade officials. He 
regretted the lack of progress with his suggestion, and 
believed an investment corporation would enable Lancashire 
to participate in textile development schemes such as that 
currently being made by the UAC in Nigeria139. Streat 
persisted, although he understood that his plan raised 
questions of high policy, and risked hostility from sections 
140 of the Lancashire cotton industry. 
The Colonial Office had remained non-commital towards 
Streat's ideas. Eventually, in March 1945, the Office 
explained its concern about possible suspicion in the 
colonies that the true purpose of Streat's investment 
corporation was to stifle local textile development, and to 
ensure that any development would benefit British capital 
138 CO 852/482/4, note of discussion in CO with 
representatives of Cotton Board and Board of Trade, 14 Oct 
1943; Streat had mentioned the idea during an informal 
discussion with Stanley on 28 July 1943, see Dupree (1987), 
V01-III pp. 138-41. 
139 CO 852/574/6, note of meeting in CO, 26 Oct 1944. 
140 CO 852/578/7, Helmore (Board of Trade) to Caine, 29 Jan 
1945. 
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rather than the local populations. Caine thought this 
suspicion might be allayed if the corporation had a broad 
range of financial backers, rather than being associated 
with a particular industry. It was considered important to 
allow the formal initiative, for example in any approach to 
Lancashire, to come from the colonies themselves. Hence the 
Colonial Office's preference for an informal relationship 
with Lancashire interests. In any case, the development of 
colonial cotton industries would involve consultation with 
the Board of Trade, and hence, indirectly, with the British 
cotton industry141. 
If the Colonial Office hesitated over proposals from 
Lancashire, it was more receptive to a scheme for a 
development corporation put forward by Barclays Bank 
(Dominions, Colonial and Overseas) Ltd.. In November 1944, 
Sir William Goodenough, Chairman of the Bank and a member of 
CEAC, told Caine that he perceived scope for an industrial 
development corporation in Nigeria. Aware of the discussions 
on the subject within the Colonial Office, Goodenough was 
anxious to clarify the boundary between the public and 
private spheres of interest. In his view, the state's 
141 CO 852/578/7, minute by Caine, 12 March 1945; ibid., 
J. R. Willis (BoT) to Carstairs, 16 March 1945; after an 
earlier interview, Streat confided to his diary his mounting 
frustration at official responses to his proposals: 
'I said altruism was a fine thing and also purity of 
motive: but surely in a practical world we should keep our 
feet on the ground. Were we to be so discreet as to abandon 
export trade first and then any direct interest in the 
economic activities of the colonies? The Yankees would slip 
in and do the job whilst their politicians and journalists 
kept up a barrage of condemnation against Britain's alleged 
imperialism. We had, in fact, quite a hot debate. Conclusion 
- all concerned to think things over' [in Dupree (1987), 
entry for 8 Mar 1945, p. 252]. 
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function in development should be limited to providing 
services. Goodenough also questioned whether a development 
corporation could work through subsidiaries, fearing that 
this might involve the corporation in unanticipated 
activities and even controversy, for example over the timing 
of the transfer of subsidiary companies to private 
enterprise. He thought it important to maintain the 
principle that equity interest should normally be provided 
by private sources, since if subsidiary companies held the 
equity, 
then it seems to me that this would be 
tantamount to setting up the economic 
machinery of a totalitarian state, which I 
venture to suggest is a highly debatable 
issue. 
Moreover, Goodenough feared that a powerful government- 
controlled corporation might encourage unrealistic 
expectations, although he believed that a corporation could 
do much in the exploratory and research fields. One problem 
he foresaw was that future Treasury retrenchment might 
embarrass a mainly publicly-operated corporation. Goodenough 
advocated the maximum use of private capital in development, 
arguing that a government corporation should seek to create 
14 conditions to attract it2. 
Barclays' own plans for a corporation became clearer in 
January 1945. The Bank, whose assets expanded substantially 
during the war, was dissatisfied with the existing financial 
organisation in the colonies, particularly West Africa, 
which it judged especially weak in providing the long-term 
finance necessary for 
proposed to establish 
development. Barclays therefore 
a development corporation with 
142 CO 852/578/8, letter to Caine, 30 Nov 1944. 
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authorised capital of L5 million which the Bank would 
provide. The bulk of the corporation's business was expected 
to be colonial, but this would not preclude involvement in 
the Bank's most important regions of operation, South Africa 
and Egypt. The corporation's staff would initially be 
recruited internally, although local representatives could 
also be included. Barclays expected development to be 
gradual, and claimed to expect no profits for 'several 
years', but rather initial losses143. 
The Colonial office responsed warmly to Barclays' 
scheme condidering it a useful supplement to the machinery 
already under discussion. The Treasury, while sympathetic, 
queried whether such a venture should be operated by a 
single bank. Caine, however, argued that no other bank had 
shown a similar interest, and that attempts to persuade 
other banks to participate might delay the entire 
project144. Sir George Gater added his endorsement of the 
scheme to Caine's, and Stanley's reaction was also 
encouraging. He saw room for both private and public 
enterprise, and thought that their respective spheres of 
activity would emerge naturally. However, he felt that 
Barclays' corporation should co-operate with any government 
corporation, in order to avoid duplicated effort and 
competition, and hoped that Barclays would recognise the 
need to secure local participation. He also suggested that 
Barclays' corporation might be less active in territories 
145 with their own government corporations. 
143 CO 852/578/11, minute by Caine, 16 Jan 1945. 
144 Ibid.. 
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Goodenough's reply satisfied Stanley that Barclay's 
organisation would accord with the Colonial Office's 
objectives. It would welcome liaison with a public 
corporation, work within the officially-defined framework of 
development and accept the Office's guidance. Goodenough 
explained that he saw private and public enterprise as 
distinct but complementary, and recognised the political 
aspect of development and the need both to co-operate with 
colonial governments and to encourage local 
participation146. 
In Caine's view, Barclays' thinking was close to the 
Colonial Office's. When the Bank of England suggested that 
other banks should be involved in the scheme, and that 
Barclays might be trying to gain an advantage over their 
competitors, Caine defended Barclays, arguing that it would 
be wrong to 'stifle an enterprise merely because it may 
result in the enterprising firm doing better than the 
unenterprising-47. 
By March 1945, the Treasury had approved the project 
understanding that the new corporation would consult both it 
and the Colonial Office on policy matters, and that its 
beneficiaries would not be confined to Barclays' existing 
clientele, a condition readily accepted by the Bank. The 
desire for close liaison stemmed from the Treasury's concern 
about the absorption of the colonial sterling balances, and 
about the control of overseas issues generally. In response 
145 Ibid., minute by Gater, 30 Jan 1945; Stanley to 
Goodenough, 15 Feb 1945. 
146 Ibid., letter to Stanley, 19 Feb 1945; minute by 
Stanley, 20 Mar 1945. 
147 Ibid., minute, 22 Feb 1945. 
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to the Bank of England's continuing misgivings that other 
banks with colonial interests were not to participate, 
Barclays explained that because of their 'substantial' 
surplus in reserves, they were well placed to engage in 
development through a subsidiary, which, once established, 
could borrow from other sources. The corporation would be 
empowered to engage in all kinds of business, and to make 
medium- or long-term loans. Its operations would be run from 
London, an arrangement believed to be a more economical use 
of skilled personnel. Barclays also assured the Bank that it 
would provide for local participation in the corporation, 
possibly including other local banks in the territory 
concerned148. These assurances satisfied the Bank, and by 
late August 1945, Barclays could tell the Colonial Office 
that they were ready to proceed. Barclays' had received the 
Treasury's rather sombre approval: 'Go ahead but you must 
realise that the responsibility is on you and is not shared 
by any Government Department'. Gater echoed this warning, 
but Goodenough hoped for continuing co-operation with the 
149 Colonial Office. 
The direction of development: central versus local control 
While the details of Barclays' scheme were being 
clarified, the Colonial office was addressing the broad 
issues raised by the establishment of development 
corporations, and re-examining its own position. The Office 
had postponed a decision on the earlier Cotton Board plan, 
148 Ibid., minute by Caine, 13 Mar 1945; memo. by Barclays 
Bank (DC & 0) Ltd. for Bank of England, 'Colonial 
Development Finance', 24 Apr 1945. 
149 Ibid., minute by Monson, 1 June 1945. 
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pending both CEAC's discussions on industrial development 
and the Office's own consideration of the proposals already 
mooted. By early 1945, there was a growing awareness that 
official views on the subject of development corporations 
needed sharper definition. Caine's initial interest in the 
Cotton Board's scheme had given way to doubts. Much had 
happened since Streat's original suggestion late in 1943, 
including the Barclays' proposal. Moreover, the Colonial 
Office was determined to give any new development machinery 
the 'strongest possible' local flavour, and to avoid any 
appearance that it would be controlled by British financial 
interests. Hence the Cotton Board's proposal, dependent on 
joint investment by Lancashire and the City, seemed less 
attractive, as the motives for creating Streat's investment 
corporation were open to misinterpretation. Instead, the 
Colonial Office had become interested in locally organised 
corporations in individual colonies, controlled by 
government, and playing a substantial, though not 
necessarily exclusive role in development150. 
During the second reading of the CD &W Bill in 
February 1945, Stanley mentioned the possible role of 
development corporations, run by local governments, in 
providing capital and managerial expertise for development. 
He also suggested an alternative, in which governments could 
collaborate with external investors to initiate new 
enterprises, eventually transferring full responsibility for 
them to private enterprise1510 Stanley, whose Lancashire 
150 CO 852/578/7, minute by Caine, 5 Feb 1945; ibid., Caine 
to Helmore, 15 Feb 1945. 
151 PD C, 407, cols. 2092-2188,7 Feb 1945. 
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connections were strong, had been anxious not to discourage 
the Cotton Board's initiative, but for wider, policy reasons 
he did not want the Colonial Office to become embroiled in 
it. The key point, arising from the local political 
implications of development, was that the Off ice wanted to 
secure the co-operation of British capital and managerial 
skill, but in a form which would not stifle the growth of 
local capital and entrepreneurship, the importance of which 
had already emerged during the lengthy official discussions 
on industrial licensing. This sharpening official concern to 
give new development machinery a genuinely local character 
seemed to demand an emphasis on promoting local development 
15 corporations, rather than bodies organised in Britain2. 
Hence, in his circular despatch on manufacturing industry of 
February 1945, Stanley advocated corporations, operating 
commercially but with government capital, as the executive 
organs of the proposed local departments of industry, to 
assist in the investigation and promotion of new 
153 industries. 
Early in 1945, the Colonial office still preferred not 
to refer the development corporations proposal to CEAC, 
partly to allow time for local governments' attitudes to be 
studied, and partly to enable the Committee to gain 
experience154. The Colonial Office's internal discussions 
were taken a stage further with a memorandum written by 
152 CO 852/578/7, minute by Caine, 15 Feb 1945. 
153 CO 852/578/6, circular despatch, 'The Development of 
Manufacturing Industries', 27 Feb 1945. 
154 CO 852/587/9 minute by Caine, 9 Mar 1945; minute by 
Clauson, 26 Mar 1945; Caine to Sir Harold Howitt, 28 Mar 
1945; Howitt to Caine, 6 Apr 1945. 
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Carstairs which analysed the general factors affecting the 
nature and rate of industrial development, and the potential 
contribution of development corporations. Carstairs 
concluded that development corporations could be useful in 
reviewing matters such as raw material supplies, markets, 
capital, labour and expertise, and the relationship between 
them, from the single standpoint of industrial development. 
A major obstacle to development identified by 
Carstairs, and one not previously obvious in official 
discussions, was the inadequacy of local financial 
machinery, especially for providing fixed or working 
capital. Carstairs thought it probable that only government 
initiative and participation could overcome the absence of a 
developed system of local issuing houses. The existing 
inadequacies could be met, he suggested, either by 
government credits, or by a system of government guarantees 
for bank loans. In either case, machinery would be needed to 
examine applications for help. 
Besides the question of finance, Carstairs addressed 
the equally important problem of harnessing the expertise 
required to bring together capital resources and 'sound' 
industrial projects, a question inseparable from the need 
for entrepreneurship, judged by most officials to be absent 
in the colonies. Carstairs concluded that government would 
have to act at least as a 'catalyst', and sometimes carry 
through whole operations by providing capital and 
technicians and by initiating projects. He also concluded 
that many of these needs could be met by establishing an 
industrial development organisation able to perform four 
main tasks. First, it could survey the industrial potential 
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of a given area, investigating questions such as raw 
material and labour supplies. Secondly, it could arrange to 
fill gaps detected in the factors of production, for example 
by providing skilled personnel, or by training personnel. 
Thirdly, the corporation could supply the missing 
entrepreneurial element by assuming a managerial role in 
selected projects, prior to their transfer to local 
managers. Finally, it could arrange for the supply of 
capital. Carstairs did not intend his proposed corporation 
to have a monopoly over industrial development in an area: 
rather, it could encourage further private development, 
eventually becoming an information source rather than an 
active agent155. 
Carstairs advocated locally organised and controlled 
development corporations. This model, attractive to the 
Colonial office on political grounds, assumed that local 
governments would themselves take the initiative. Certainly, 
late in 1944, it had seemed as though the governments of 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast were interested in creating 
industrial development corporations. Yet by mid-1945, the 
Colonial office had made little progress in inducing the 
governments to explore the subject deeply. Little more, for 
example, had been heard from Nigeria about the development 
corporation mooted in the Government's development plan of 
October 1944. This suggests that Carstairs' views were 
personal, developed, perhaps, independently of the doubts 
beginning to preoccupy his 'Geographical' department 
colleagues. While the Colonial office was considering 
155 CO 852/587/9 CEAC(Industry)(45)22, enclosure 1, memo. 
by C. Y. Carstairs, 'Development Corporations', (n. d. ). 
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Barclays' scheme, the Nigerian government indicated its 
interest in the proposal and its belief that the new 
corporation might be a useful source of development funding. 
Officials in London, however, saw no reason why Barclays' 
scheme should delay the Nigerian government's consideration 
of a corporation of its own156. 
As already suggested, the Nigerian government's 
interest in industrialisation began to wane late in 1944, 
with Governor Richards stating that large-scale industrial 
development was not envisaged. Early in 1945, the government 
was busy shaping its policy on fostering a peasant textile 
industry, the plans for which were announced in April. As 
described in chapter II, the Nigerian government was, by 
spring 1945, placing ever more difficult constraints on 
factory development, affecting particularly the UAC's 
textile scheme, apparently because of official fears at the 
threat of rapid urbanisation157. Given these reservations 
about industrialisation, it is not surprising that the 
Nigerian government apparently lost interest in forming an 
industrial development corporation. 
Nor was the situation in the Gold Coast very 
encouraging. Replying to Stanley's despatch on industrial 
development of February 1945, the Gold Coast government 
dismissed the idea of forming an industrial development 
corporation, though it had formed an Industrial Development 
Board to assist promising local industries158. It 
has 
156 CO 852/578/11, Smith (Nigeria) to Caine, 23 Mar 1945; 
ibid., Caine to Smith, 29 Mar 1945. 
157 See above (Ch. II), P"66 
158 CO 847/36/2, summary of replies to circular despatch of 
27 Feb 1945, (n. d. ). 
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already been noted that the Industrial Development Sub- 
Committee of the Gold Coast Economic Development Committee 
concluded in May 1945 that the scope for developing 
secondary industry in the territory with state assistance 
were limited159. Although the Sub-Committee identified some 
instances of development, such as textiles and furniture- 
making, which it thought merited government assistance, the 
overall conclusion was that 'none of these projects needs 
anything like an Industrial Development Corporation'. 
However, it was felt that a government agency of some sort 
was required to help initiate and consolidate such 
industries before their eventual transfer to private 
enterprise. No existing government department appeared 
competent to do this, and it was considered that 
the projects should not be put in hand unless 
they are seriously undertaken and not left as 
a part-time side-line of some enthusiastic 
individual, 
probably an oblique reference to Meyerowitz of the West 
African Institute, whose vagaries had begun to irritate 
officials. Instead of a development corporation, the Sub- 
Committee favoured an Industrial Development Board, 
operating under commercial, rather than government, 
principles of accounting160. 
An even more fundamental question raised by proposals 
to establish development corporations was whether local 
governments were capable of devising novel forms of 
development machinery. Officials in London already harboured 
159 See above (Ch. II) ,P 163" 
160 CO 554/139/33718/1/1944, minute by Creasy, 7 Sept 1944; 
CO 852/587/9, enclosure 1 to CEAC(Industry)(45)21, 'Report 
of Industrial Development Sub-Committee, Gold Coast', May 
1945. 
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serious doubts about the ability of local governments to 
play a dynamic role in promoting development. Evidence from 
the periphery to justify these doubts reached the colonial 
Office at an accelerating rate after 1943, undermining what 
remained of the traditional orthodoxy, still apparent in 
Carstairs' memorandum, that the initiative in development 
should be left with the colonial governments. A paradox 
consequently arose: on political grounds, it was desirable 
to foster development with an obviously 'local' flavour, 
minimising the danger of allegations that the colonial 
economies were being 'exploited' by Britain; however, an 
equally pressing concern to accelerate development led 
officials to consider unprecedentedly centralist solutions, 
eventually expressed in the plan for a single development 
corporation based in London. 
Unease in the Colonial office at the capabilities of 
the West African governments resurfaced following the 
despatch of Stanley's memorandum on West African planning in 
August 1943. Governor Burns replied that he proposed to 
establish a central planning committee for the Gold Coast, 
over which he would preside, to consider and co-ordinate 
development plans161. The reply from Governor Richards of 
Nigeria was less encouraging. While a Development Branch had 
been established in the Secretariat in May 1943, together 
with a central Advisory Committee on Economic Development 
and Social Welfare which had drawn up a programme including 
industrial development, Nigeria complained of an acute 
shortage of staff to engage in development planning. The so- 
called 'Development Branch' in fact consisted of one 
161 Co 554/132/33718/1/1943. 
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officer. In Richards' view, these staff shortages were a 
major constraint on the territory's reconstruction 
l6 2. 
planning 
In London, Cohen considered Richards' despatch 'a 
depressing document'. He felt that the Gold Coast 
government, despite similar staffing problems, had made 
'considerable' progress with post-war planning (what he 
meant by this, and what he based his judgement on are 
unclear), but hoped that the position in West Africa might 
improve with the appointment of a Development Adviser to 
Swinton. Meanwhile, he thought that the Colonial Office 
should continue to discuss ways of strengthening Nigeria's 
development machinery163. Similarly, when Caine reviewed 
Nigeria's initial attempt to draw up a development 
programme, he condemned it as 
simply a collection of scraps, and shows no 
sign of any attempt to review the whole field 
of what is neede 6 
for active and reasonably 
quick development . 
Resuming the theme implicit in his arguments against 
industrial licensing, Caine questioned the wisdom of 
expecting colonial governments to suggest industries 
suitable for development. In his view, a traditional problem 
had been a reluctance among local governments to experiment 
with industrial development, grounded in pessimism about its 
prospects. This convinced him that machinery was needed to 
165 determine which industries should be encouraged. 
162 CO 583/271/30572/1944, despatch to Stanley, 7 Jan 1944. 
163 Ibid., minute, 27 Jan 1944. 
164 Ibid., minute, 28 Jan 1944. 
165 Co 990/16, CEAC(Industry) 4th minutes, 15 May 1944. 
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Strong criticism of the West African governments also 
came from Swinton. His experiences in the region made him 
sceptical of the capacity of colonial administrators to make 
an effective contribution to economic policy and management. 
He told Stanley 
the more I see of the colonial service, the 
more I am impressed by the number of misfits, 
or at any rate of men who l st carry on because they are in the groove 
Swinton subsequently warned Stanley that he doubted the 
ability of the Gold Coast government in particular to 
undertake any new enterprise affecting the war effort. He 
was especially critical of the government's 'deplorable' 
167 record in cocoa production and other key sectors. 
During 1944, however, the West African governments had 
begun to establish their own machinery for development 
planning, with an eye less to Swinton Is war effort than to 
postwar production and the demands of demobilisation. Under 
the direction of F. E. V. Smith, Nigeria produced a 
comprehensive development plan by the end of the year. In 
the Gold Coast, Professor Richardson was appointed Economic 
Adviser to the Government, and an Economic Development 
168 Committee was established to consider post-war planning. 
Nigeria's preliminary development plan, submitted in October 
1944, seemed 'inherently sound' to Noel Hall, being 
calculated to encourage development by both local and 
external capital and enterprise. In particular, Hall hoped 
that the Colonial office would agree to the proposal to 
166 Kent (1985), p. 336. 
167 CAB 104/257, telegram to Stanley, 14 June 1944; J. A. 
Cross, Lord Swinton, (Oxford, 1982), p. 241. 
168 Kent (1985), p. 343; Shuckburgh I, p. 300. 
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create a Development Commission or Board in Nigeria to plan 
and execute the development programme, providing 'drive' and 
checking the tendency towards 'departmentalism' and 
resistance to outside expertise 
169, Hall had already told 
the Office that he thought a Development Committee in each 
colony should be responsible for ensuring that industrial 
development opportunities were taken up in all phases of its 
170 development programme. 
Although Stanley considered the general outline of the 
Nigerian plan 'excellent', for political reasons he was less 
keen on the proposed Development Commission, whose 
centralising tendency he thought might conflict with 
Nigeria's new constitutional proposals for greater regional 
autonomy. Another problem was the likelihood of calls for 
African 'unofficial' representation on the Commission, 
regarded as impracticable because there was 'no African in 
Nigeria capable of viewing the interests of Nigeria as a 
whole'171. 
The Colonial Office's continuing anxiety about local 
governments' grasp of development planning is also evident 
in London's reaction to the Gold Coast's outline plan, 
produced in July 1944. Governor Burns was thought not to 
have consulted Noel Hall before having the plan drafted, and 
was even thought to be sceptical towards the entire notion 
of planning. In one official's view, Burns was 
169 CO 583/271/30572/1944, telegram to Stanley, 30 Sept 
1944; ibid., 'Nigeria Preliminary Development Plan', 20 Oct 
1944. 
170 CO 554/139/33718/1/1944, letter to Creasy, 7 June 1944. 
171 CO 583/271/30572/1944, note of meeting in CO1 25 Oct 
1944; see also Pearce (1982), pp. 80-83. 
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'temperamentally unwilling to consider anything which takes 
a long time'. If this observation is accurate, it may 
account for the distinct lack of interest in 
industrialisation which became evident in the Gold Coast 
government's attitudes early in 1945. Burns's apparently 
cavalier attitude towards planning was considered 
particularly worrying, coming from the richest territory in 
West Africa: 'If investment cannot be made remunerative here 
then all our Empire is just a hopeless slum'172. 
Nevertheless, the progress made by Nigeria and the Gold 
Coast in appointing their own development staffs in 1944 was 
given by officials in London as one reason for not 
appointing a successor to Noel Hall as Development Adviser 
for West Africa early in 1945173. However, it is possible 
that the Colonial Office was already satisfied that rapid 
development would not automatically follow improvements in 
the region's administrative machinery (even if personnel 
shortages permitted this), although London had not, as yet, 
translated this interpretation into a frankly centralist 
strategy. Not until summer 1945 did clearer indications 
emerge that a change in the direction of policy was 
imminent, and even then much remained unresolved. 
A final example of the weakness of local machinery was 
the fate of the West African Institute. Established in April 
1943 with a CD &W grant of L127,000, this body was hailed 
as a means of investigating potential industries and 
providing new employment opportunities. Initial progress in 
172 Co 96/781/2/31475/1944, minute by F. J. Pedler, 29 Sept 
1944. 
173 PD C, 409, cols. 1403-4,28 March 1945. 
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fields such as textile production and ceramics, stimulated 
by the wartime impetus to import-substitution, had been 
encouraging174. Towards the end of 1944, attention focussed 
on the future relationship between the Institute's 
activities and action by government to promote development 
in West Africa. In Noel Hall's view, the Institute did not 
see its role as including the establishment of 'pilot' 
industries of a kind which could eventually be hived off, 
and instead had reached a more modest interpretation of its 
function, namely the testing of methods and materials, 
training and experimentation175. Henceforth, it was decided, 
the Institute should apply itself to 
economic, sociological and technological 
experimentation and enquiry rather than to 
day to day supervision of quasi-commercial 
units and the management of a relatively 
large labour force. 
This, it was hoped, would make the Institute's staff more 
mobile and available to give specialist advice throughout 
West Africa176. By mid-1945, problems with the Institute 
were more obvious. It was felt in London that the Institute 
had 'never really got going', chiefly because of its 
staffing problems. This had been aggravated by the 
'contempt' in which Nigeria's Development Adviser reportedly 
held the Institute. Furthermore, Nigeria's own experimental 
peasant textile industry depended heavily on specialist 
advice from the Institute's textile officer, and Burns 
174 CO 554/130/33685/1943, ACEC (Advisory Committee on 
Education in the Colonies) 120th minutes, 14 Jan 1943; 
Shuckburgh I, pp. 33,300-301. 
175 CO 554/136/33685/1945, letter to O. G. R. Williams, 20 Dec 
1944. 
176 Ibid., CRC 154, 'West African Institute of Industries, 
Art and Social Science', 16 Feb 1945. 
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resented the devotion of the Institute's resources to 
projects benefitting a single territory rather than West 
Africa as a whole. Burns concluded that the Institute could 
not function on a regional basis and told the Colonial 
Office that he proposed to call for its abolition and 
refounding as a purely Gold Coast concern177. By autumn 
1945, the Colonial Office had judged that the Institute was 
'moribund'178. 
This mounting evidence of local shortcomings, together 
with the failure of the Gold Coast and Nigerian governments 
to produce blueprints for development corporations, 
coincided with acknowledgement within the Colonial Office 
that its own thinking on corporations was imprecise. 
Moreover, the change of government in Britain in July 1945 
obliged the office to submit the Barclays scheme for fresh 
ministerial approval179. In August 1945, Monson, who had 
taken over responsibility for the broad question of 
industrial development from Carstairs, suggested that 
development corporations should be re-examined by the 
Office, particularly since interest in them had been re- 
awakened following a reference by Stanley during a recent 
Commons speech180. Caine interjected that development 
corporations were of wider interest in relation to 
development as a whole, not only to industrialisation181. 
177 Ibid., 'Establishment of Institute', 4 June 1945; CO 
852/574/9, note of meeting in CO1 26 June 1945. 
178 CO 554/136/33685/1945, note of discussion on future of 
West African Institute, 30 Oct 1945. 
179 CO 852/578/11, minute by Gater, 29 Aug 1945. 
180 CO 852/578/9, minute, 14 Aug 1945. 
181 CO 852/578/9, minute, 16 Aug 1945. 
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This was an early indication that the uses envisaged for 
colonial public enterprise, and even the direction of 
development policy itself, were entering a new period of 
fluidity, at least in the mind of the key responsible 
official. 
The extent to which official thinking was shifting in 
the summer of 1945 is demonstrated by a memorandum on 
Industrial Development corporations written by Rosa in 
August, in answer to Monson's directive, and by the response 
it evoked from the Colonial Office. Unlike Carstairs, who 
had discussed the possible role of local development 
corporations, Rosa advocated a single, large corporation, 
centrally organised in London. Like Carstairs, Rosa noted 
two basic problems in development: the provision of capital 
and the provision of enterprise in operating individual 
schemes. He believed both could be tackled through a 
development corporation. Of the two problems, Rosa 
considered the provision of experienced personnel to be the 
most difficult. He proposed a 'pool' of expertise in London, 
available for deployment as required, from which 'management 
squads' could be formed to organise schemes in the colonies, 
operating them until they could be transferred to local 
personnel. A major aim would be to train local personnel to 
take responsibility for projects as soon as possible, 
releasing the squads for work elsewhere, in a gradual and 
staged withdrawal. Thus, the squads would themselves acquire 
valuable experience in development. A practical advantage of 
Rosa's scheme was that staff could be hired for a limited 
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period, rather than on a possibly less attractive career 
18 basis2. 
In Rosa's opinion, all these considerations suggested 
that a central corporation was preferable to a number of 
local corporations. A single body, based in London, would 
have direct access to a 'wealth of talent and expertise', 
whereas it would be difficult to find enough qualified 
people to staff a number of separate corporations. 
Similarly, local corporations, without access to expert 
advice, could not assess or initiate development schemes in 
the same way as could one large corporation. However, Rosa 
believed that his corporation should work through local 
subsidiaries, able to examine proposals from a local 
perspective. The central corporation could then assess the 
commercial soundness of schemes, taking into account broad 
questions like the existence of export markets and the 
prospects of competition with industries in other colonies. 
Rosa felt that the corporation would need financial 
flexibility, and substantial capital of its own, plus wide 
borrowing powers. The impracticability of raising capital in 
London for individual projects seemed to Rosa another 
argument for a single corporation. From an investment point 
of view, a large corporation would also enjoy scope for 
risk-spreading, both geographically and among a variety of 
projects, to an extent impossible for local corporations. 
This would promote overall stability in its operations, and 
enable it eventually to outweigh failures with successes. 
Possibly in deference to official sensitivity to the 
182 CO 852/578/9, minute, 18 Aug 1945; ibid., 'Industrial 
Development Corporations'. 
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political implications of development, Rosa suggested that 
the corporation's local subsidiaries could attract local 
capital, fulfilling the goal of securing local 
participation. Moreover, Rosa considered this the only way 
18 to promote local enterprise under local operation3. 
Meanwhile, a decision was still awaited on Barclays' 
scheme, which was under ministerial review. As seen earlier, 
officials in the Colonial Office generally welcomed the 
plan, and Sir George Gater accordingly recommended ministers 
to approve it184. At this stage, the Labour Government's new 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Creech Jones, intervened. 
Creech Jones had strong views on the benefits of public 
enterprise in colonial development. He had championed 
colonial rights in Parliament since his election in 1935, 
and was instrumental in founding the Fabian Colonial Bureau 
with the economist and journalist Rita Hinden. Creech Jones 
had been closely involved in drafting the Labour Party's 
1943 statement on colonial policy, a document which had 
impressed officials in the Colonial office, including Caine, 
with its 'realism' and moderation, and its implicit 
assumption of a continuing role for private enterprise in 
the colonies, even if under stricter government regulation 
than envisaged by the Colonial Office185. Creech Jones 
nevertheless sought to extend government intervention in, 
183 Ibid.. 
184 CO 852/578/11, minute, 11 Sept 1945. 
185 Labour Party, The Colonies; Bowden (1980), pp. 202-3; Lee 
and Petter (1982), pp. 159-60; P. S. Gupta, Imperialism and 
the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964, (1975), pp. 275-84; 
D. Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945- 
1961, (Oxford, 1971), Ch. IV passim. 
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and control of, the colonial economies, and soon made his 
views plain to officials. In 1944, Creech Jones wrote: 
It ought no longer to be the function of 
colonial governments to hold the ring for 
alien interests to exploit and develop what 
natural wealth there may be; to see the 
surplus wealth drained overseas for the 
enjoyment of anyone outside the people who 
produce it or whose natural resources it is; 
to remain indifferent to the claims of health 
and education and social advance; to concede 
little to the people in the way of 
consultation and collaboration or of 
political representation and 
responsibility186. 
He noted with approval the wartime growth of government 
control over the colonial economies, regarding this as the 
basis for sound future development. He was critical of the 
record of private enterprise which, he argued, 'can only 
operate where it is profitable, but then its motive is its 
profit and not the well-being of the Colonial people'. 
Although he was more concerned with the immediate problems 
posed by mining development, Creech Jones also called for 
industrial development, especially raw materials processing, 
to be under public control, believing that this constituted 
an essential element in any planned economy187. An index of 
Creech Jones' commitment to public ownership came when 
Attlee's Cabinet was divided over steel nationalisation. 
Creech Jones, Dalton tells us, was firmly within the pro- 
nationalisation lobby, possibly influenced by Bevin, who had 
a regard for Creech Jones not universally shared by his 
colleagues, and whose Parliamentary Private Secretary at the 
Ministry of Labour Creech Jones had been during the war188. 
186 R. Hinden (ed), Fabian Colonial Essays, (1945), p. 12. 
187 Ibid., pp. 16-7. 
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Like his colleagues in the Fabian Colonial Bureau, who 
welcomed the development corporation as a means of escaping 
the 'vicious circle' of colonial poverty, Creech Jones was 
interested in the potential of this new type of 
organisation, but felt that the Colonial Office had been 
precipitate in approving Barclays' scheme before considering 
the subject further, and thought that the Office should 
await the colonial governments' own plans for corporations 
before sanctioning Barclays' project. 
Although he acknowledged a role for private capital in 
development, Creech Jones doubted that colonial problems 
could best be solved by private corporations. He questioned 
whether they would possess the experience necessary to 
pursue comprehensive development, and, citing the past 
reluctance of private enterprise to take risks in the 
colonies, asked whether this had changed. Moreover, he was 
concerned that there would be local suspicion that private 
corporations would represent exploitation by outside 
interests. He called for 'safeguards', obliging Barclays' 
corporation to employ local personnel and to operate within 
the development framework established by local governments. 
Furthermore, he urged that its work should complement that 
of any government corporation which might be formed189. 
Creech Jones' misgivings about Barclays' scheme were 
not, apparently, shared by his officials. It was felt that 
initiatives such as Barclays' need not conflict with 
government measures to establish development corporations. 
188 H. Dalton, High Tide and After. Memoirs 1945-1960, 
(1962), p. 136. 
189 Ibid., minute, 18 Sept 1945; Empire, Vol. 8, no. 3, (Sept- 
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Caine, particularly, stressed the breadth of the development 
task, and doubted whether a single organisation could 
undertake all the necessary work: 
I believe myself that the greatest need in 
development of this kind is to get the 
maximum of enterprise, and that is likely to 
be best achieved by leaving the field as open 
as possible and refraining from prohibitions 
while providing a Government organisation 
capable of taking up projects which, for one 
reason or another, had not attracted the 
attention of private concerns -9ý. 
Creech Jones, however, was not satisfied, and at his request 
Barclays were reminded of the need for their corporation to 
co-operate closely with the colonial governments191. The 
Colonial Office also told Barclays of the need for the new 
corporation to conform to any overall investment plan 
formulated by the metropolitan Government, and for 
consultation between the corporation and any future 
government body of this type192. Barclays' replied that one 
means of fostering good relations with the colonial 
governments would be for its corporation to begin by 
assisting schemes favoured by the governments, but which 
lacked finance193. 
The Barclays Overseas Development Corporation was 
finally approved by the Treasury's Capital Issues Committee 
in November 1945194. Confusion soon arose over the boundary 
190 CO 852/578/11, minute, 25 Sept 1945; ibid., minute by 
Gater, 25 Sept 1945. 
191 Ibid., minutes by Creech Jones, 26 Sept 1945, Gater, 13 
Oct 1945 and 15 Oct 1945, and Creech Jones, 16 Oct 1945. 
192 Ibid., Gater to Goodenough, 16 Oct 1945. 
193 Ibid. note of interview with Goodenough and Crossley , (Barclays) in CO, 25 Oct 1945. 
194 Ibid., Goodenough to Gater, 26 Nov 1945. 
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between projects suitable for government and private 
finance. Rosa, for example, believed that Barclays hoped 
government would limit itself to undertaking uneconomic 
enterprises195. Barclays sought to clarify the point, but 
Caine explained that no precise demarcation was yet 
possible, although it was 'widely agreed' that the two 
spheres of activity were likely to be distinct. In his view, 
colonial governments would not seek the Corporation's help, 
which any enterprises were unlikely to need. However, the 
groundwork of development, such as basic research, 
undertaken by government, would complement and aid private 
enterprise196. In February 1946, a representative from 
Barclays was invited to attend CEAC's discussion. Barclays 
recognised the valuable work which a government corporation 
could do in basic research and surveying, but the Bank was 
unenthusiastic about the corporation engaging in industrial 
enterprise. Caine, however, thought that fundamental 
research would be too great a burden for a government 
corporation197. Barclays argued that they did not fear 
competition from a government corporation, but that they 
were unhappy about it engaging in commercial enterprises, 
possibly in competition with private firms198. 
When informing the colonial governments about the 
registration of Barclays' Corporation, the Colonial office 
also described the organisation's functions and its 
195 Ibid., minute, 17 Dec 1945. 
196 Ibid., minute, 16 Jan 1946. 
197 CO 852/587/10, CEAC(Finance) 9th minutes, CEAC(Industry) 
11th minutes, (joint session), 12 Feb 1946. 
198 Ibid., Crossley to Stockdale, 13 Feb 1946. 
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intention to co-operate closely with both the governments 
and the Office. It was suggested that the Corporation could 
provide an additional source of funding for 'remunerative' 
development, though it did not envisage lending capital to 
governments. Local governments were requested to consult the 
Office before approaching the Corporation for assistance199. 
Creech Jones' intervention in September 1945 encouraged 
the resumption of the Colonial Office's own consideration of 
the value of government development corporations 200. By now, 
the discussion papers drawn up by Carstairs and Rosa, 
respectively presenting the case for local and central 
corporations, had been supplemented by material gathered on 
similar bodies, such as those in Puerto Rico and South 
Africa. By November 1945, the Colonial Office at last felt 
ready to refer the subject to CEAC. In his paper, Rosa 
suggested that his proposed corporation should be financed 
through private, rather than public capital. However, the 
secretary of CEAC advised against putting 'so politically 
controversial' an issue before the Committee, especially 
since the main question was whether there should be a 
single, central corporation, or separate corporations in 
individual colonies. Reference to Barclays ODC was also 
omitted at this stage, although information on it was 
circulated to CEAC at Goodenough's request early in December 
1945201. Consequently, CEAC was asked only to examine the 
199 CO 852/578/12, circular telegram, 27 Apr 1946. 
200 CO 852/578/9, minute by Carstairs, 26 Oct 1945. 
201 Ibid., minute by W. A. Morris, 12 Nov 1945; CO 852/587/9, 





government-sponsored central or local 
the influence of Creech Jones in 
accelerating discussions can be seen. In December 1945, 
during talks on the measures needed to strengthen the 
machinery available for development, Creech Jones called for 
more positive policies from the Colonial Office, voicing 
concern that in the past, the initiative had tended to come 
from external interests. Caine responded by suggesting that 
an executive organisation was needed, able to accelerate 
development, including industrialisation203. 
When referring the subject to CEAC, the Colonial Office 
explained to Sir William Goodenough, still a Committee 
member, that this did not mean there were official plans for 
a government organisation similar to Barclays'. The approach 
to CEAC was described simply as a resumption of discussions 
on promoting industrial development. This suggests a 
continuing desire among officials, especially Caine, to 
204 maintain good relations with private enterprise. 
CEAC's Industry Sub-Committee eventually discussed 
development corporations in February 1946. The Committee had 
been asked to advise on whether government should create a 
corporation to assist industrial development. Welcoming the 
proposal, the Committee opted for a central corporation 
working through local bodies, the course advocated by Caine 
and Rosa as the most effective means of providing technical 
202 Co 852/587/9, CEAC(Industry)(45)22, 'Industrial 
Development corporations', 16 Nov 1945. 
203 CO 852/591/7, minute by J. B. Williams, 14 Dec 1945. 
204 CO 852/578/9, minute by W. A. Morris and letter from 
Caine to Goodenough, 19 Nov 1945. 
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expertise. However, the Committee left open the question 
whether these local bodies should be organised on a 
territorial or on a regional basis. Similarly, no agreement 
was reached on whether the corporation should be funded 
publicly or privately. The Committee recommended, however, 
that a government corporation should not embark on projects 
compet `ing directly with existing commercial enterprises. 
This point was underscored by Rosa, who believed the whole 
purpose of the new machinery was to encourage industries not 
yet established205. 
Official discussions continued on the proposed 
corporation's financial structure. Here, the key issue was 
whether the corporation should be self-supporting. 
Carstairs, whose role in the wider debate was declining, 
feared that if the new machinery were expected to be self- 
supporting, this would defeat its purpose, since if the 
corporation were too conscious of the financial aspect of 
its operations, it might restrict itself to 'safe' schemes, 
from which the private investor would therefore be excluded. 
Carstairs, supported by the economist Professor Lionel 
Robbins, a member of CEAC, thought that the corporation 
should be free to engage in 'developmental and exploratory 
expenditure', which, though possibly unprofitable to the 
corporation, would benefit the territory as a whole by 
clearing the path for subsequent investors206. 
However, as Rosa stressed, one argument in favour of a 
centrally-organised corporation was precisely that it could 
205 CO 852/587/10, CEAC(Finance) 9th minutes, CEAC(Industry) 
11th minutes, (joint session), 12 Feb 1946. 
206 Ibid.; CO 852/578/10, minute, 11 Mar 1946. 
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spread its risks widely, and therefore be self-supporting 
overall. It was therefore important, not to overburden the 
corporation with too wide a range of functions, some of 
which, like basic research, ought to be undertaken directly 
by government. Equally, the corporation should not be 
obliged to finance uneconomic schemes simply because they 
were judged valuable on other grounds. In his opinion, if an 
industry were desirable in the public interest, then, again, 
it should be subsidised directly by government. Rosa 
concluded that patience would be needed to allow the 
corporation to achieve solvency and a wide scope of 
activities. It was because he believed that private 
enterprise would expect quick results that he was 
increasingly convinced that the corporation should be 
operated by government207. 
By late March 1946, CEAC had made little progress with 
its discussions on the form and functions of the proposed 
corporation. A draft report was therefore compiled for the 
Committee by its secretary at the suggestion of the Colonial 
Office's Development Adviser, Sir Frank Stockdale, CEAC's ex 
officio Chairman208. CEAC's still incomplete conclusions 
were accordingly summarised in June, but as the Committee's 
own life neared its end during summer 1946, officials 
decided to postpone action on the report until it could be 
put before CEAC's successor body, the Colonial Economic 
Development Council (CEDC)209. There were, however, 
207 CO 852/578/10, minute, 15 Mar 1946. 
208 Ibid., minutes by Sweaney, 23 Mar 1946, and Rosa, 5 Apr 
1946. 
209 CO 852/587/10, minute by Stockdale, 25 June 1946; ibid., 
minute by J. B. Williams, 3 July 1946. 
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additional motives for avoiding further reference to CEAC. 
The subject had important political aspects, relating not 
only to the 'central' versus 'local' debate on the 
organisation's form, but also to whether it should be 
undertaken on a public or private basis. As Caine commented, 
the subject was 
so very much tied up with controversial 
economic and political doctrines that it is 
quite likely that the new economic and 
development council may take a different view 
on many points from those so far expressed by 
the Sub-Committee of the present Advisory 
Committee. It would therefore be better to 
defer further examination until tig0 character 
of the new Council is established 
Caine's lack of enthusiasm for public enterprise has already 
been noted in his views on industrial licensing and in his 
spirited defence of Barclays' initiative. It is possible 
that by blocking further discussions by CEAC, he sought to 
prevent advocates of state operation gaining unchallenged 
control over the debate on the form the development 
corporation should take. 
The lull in the Colonial Office's deliberations on 
development corporations seems to have been decisively 
broken by Creech Jones, who replaced George Hall as 
Secretary of State early in October 1946. Shortly 
afterwards, Creech Jones told the Commons that he had 
recognised for some time the need to give colonial 
governments more guidance on industrial development, and 
that the whole question was 'under consideration' in the 
Colonial Office. Admitting that a 'considerable degree' of 
public enterprise was 'essential' in colonial development, 
210 Co 852/587/10, minute, 5 July 1946. 
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he saw no reason why public and private action should not be 
211 complementary. 
Balancing his enthusiasm for public enterprise was 
Creech Jones' interest in improving the machinery of 
colonial government. Shortly after becoming Colonial 
Secretary, he met his senior officials and advisers and 
asked whether the Colonial Office's approach to development 
was sufficiently imaginative and comprehensive. He was 
concerned that the recent scheme to cultivate groundnuts in 
East Africa had been produced not by the Office, but by a 
private company212. He sought officials' views on how to 
achieve the co-operation of local populations in 
development. Creech Jones questioned whether the existing 
Colonial Service was qualified for its new responsibilities, 
for example in the fields of finance, economics and 
industry. Specifically, he wanted to know how the Colonial 
Office itself could do more to stimulate development. The 
problem seemed to be, as one official observed, how to 
provide 'instructive direction' from London while 
213 simultaneously fostering local initiative. 
Presumably in response to the impetus provided by 
Creech Jones, Caine suggested that the views of the newly- 
formed CEDC on the promotion of industrial development 
should soon be sought214. Creech Jones was particularly keen 
to have Stanley's February 1945 circular despatch on 
manufacturing industry reviewed and, if necessary, 
211 PD C, 427, cols. 393-4,23 Oct 1946. 
212 See Morgan (1980) II1 pp. 226-319. 
213 CO 852/588/3, note of meeting in CO, 29 Nov 1946. 
214 CO 852/587/10, minute, 23 Oct 1946. 
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revised215. Accordingly, the CEDC was asked to discuss the 
despatch, and to give its views on the establishment of an 
Industrial Development Corporation, its form and 
structure216. The Council had before it the incomplete 
conclusions of CEAC's Industry and Finance Sub-Committees, 
drafted during summer 1946 in anticipation of the CEDC's 
creation. These favoured a central corporation, based in 
London, with local branches in the colonies, and funded 
publicly. The functions envisaged for the corporation would 
be to promote industrial development, for example by 
providing information on opportunities, assessing 
applications for assistance, and arranging for the provision 
of capital and managerial and technical expertise. The 
corporation was also expected to undertake projects itself 
if necessary. The report had recommended that the 
corporation should work closely with any private development 
corporation established, and that its long-term strategy 
should be to withdraw its personnel and sell its stake in 
the projects it had assisted either to colonial governments 
217 
or local bodies, or to private investors. 
In December 1946, the CEDC endorsed CEAC's views as the 
basis for future action, and proposed to give the question 
detailed consideration at a later date218. When discussions 
were resumed early in 1947, however, the environment for 
215 Ibid., minute by Gater, 30 Oct 1946; CO 852/592/3, 
minute by J. B. Williams, 26 Nov 1946. 
216 CO 852/587/10, CEDC(46)12, 'Note on Industrial 
Development', (n. d. ). 
217 Ibid., CEDC(46)12 Appendix III, 'CEAC(Finance and 
Industry) Joint Report on Colonial Industrial Development 
Corporation', 15 Nov 1946. 
218 CO 999/1, CEDC 9th minutes, 16 Dec 1946. 
281 
debate was changing radically. The luxury of speculation, so 
characteristic of the entire 'reconstruction' period, was 
soon dispelled in the harsher climate of the 'annus 
horrendus', when all aspects of metropolitan government 
policy, including colonial development, were increasingly 
affected by the immediate need to support the domestic 
economy. In these circumstances, many of the objectives 
identified by the Colonial Office between 1943 and 1946 had 
to be reassessed, and some sacrificed. 
282 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE METROPOLITAN CRISIS AND CONSTRAINTS ON 
COLONIAL INDUSTRIALISATION 1947-1948 
Development policy and the crisis of 1947 
The first eighteen months of the Labour Government s 
life provide little evidence of any systematic ministerial 
exploration of possible colonial solutions to Britain's 
financial difficulties . The majority of the Cabinet trusted 
to multilateral trade and export growth to secure full 
employment and recoveryl. The failure of the convertibility 
operation in August 1947 finally crushed these hopes. The 
government's problems, however, had been growing since early 
1947. The winter brought a crippling fuel crisis and 
serious disruption of industrial production; the American 
loan was rapidly depleted; exports grew less quickly than 
anticipated, and concern mounted at the level of food 
imports from the dollar area. Against this background, 
ministerial attention fixed upon colonial resources and on a 
colonial role in metropolitan recovery2. 
Attlee's government effectively succumbed, like none 
before it, to the myth of colonial wealth as a solution to 
metropolitan problems. After 1947, the Cabinet equated 
colonial development with a drive to maximise colonial 
commodity production as rapidly as possible. The principal 
advocate of this strategy was the Foreign Secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, although his views resemble Attlee's. Bevin was 
convinced that colonial raw materials production could 
1 Cairncross (1985), pp. 21-2; Gupta (1983), pp. 105-6. 
2 Gupta (1983), p. 106; Cairncross (1985), pp. 21-2; R. Hyam, 
`Africa and the Labour Government, 1945-51', JICH, 16,3 
(1988), pp. 148-9; A. E. Hinds, `Sterling and Imperial Policy, 
1945-1951', JICH 15,2 (1987), pp. 151,155. 
283 
contribute significantly to Britain's balance of payments3. 
He demonstrated a near obsessive faith in Africa's 
potential, particularly its mineral wealth. In July 1947, he 
urged every effort to accelerate colonial production of 
commodities in demand in the United States. Where labour was 
a factor limiting expansion, Bevin was even prepared to 
consider importing workers from Italy4. His interest in 
colonial development derived from concern to reduce 
Britain's financial dependence on the United States, whose 
continued assistance he felt could not be assumed. Moreover, 
he was pessimistic about the prospects for recovery based on 
Britain's former export trade in manufactures, given the 
wartime stimulus to overseas industrialisation5. 
Similar motives for promoting colonial development 
informed a paper by Herbert Morrison which argued that 
Britain's economic recovery was being 'strangled' by 
shortages of raw materials, food and fuel, and that without 
, an 
'ample flow' of commodities, economic planning would be 
nullified and crises would recur6. 
Such attitudes, nascent and largely unco-ordinated 
earlier in the year, were given prominence by the crisis of 
August 1947 and the resulting suspension of sterling 
3 CO 537/3047, letter to Attlee, 13 Sept 1947; ibid., letter 
to Attlee, 16 Sept 1947; Gupta (1983), pp. 101,106; Hinds 
(1987), p. 153; Hyam (1988), p. 149. 
4 CO 537/3047, letter to Attlee, 13 Sept 1947; ibid., Attlee 
to Bevin, 16 Sept 1947; CAB 130/19, GEN. 179/5th meeting, 28 
July 1947; Hinds (1987), pp. 155-6. 
5 CAB 130/19, GEN. 179/5th meeting, 28 July 1947; ibid., 
GEN. 179/14th meeting, 20 Aug 1947; CO 537/3047, letter to 
Attlee, 16 Sept 1947; Gupta (1983), p. 106. 
6 CAB 124/1079, 'Planning for Expansion', 31 May 1947 (final 
version CP(47)169). 
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convertibility. Immediately, efforts began to incorporate 
the colonies in an overall strategy to achieve recovery7. 
The colonies were asked to continue currency accumulation in 
London, to strengthen the Sterling Area's position. They 
were requested not only to limit their dollar and other hard 
currency expenditure, but also to curb sterling imports, 
thereby releasing goods for export to dollar markets, now 
considered critically important to Britain. The colonies 
were invited to help directly by increasing their production 
of goods which Britain currently bought with dollars, or of 
dollar-earning goods8. From London's point of view, 
increased commodity exports were the major contribution 
which the colonies could make to recovery. London described 
the crisis as an unprecedented opportunity for the colonies 
to develop their production and trade along lines which 
would bring advantages both to them and to Britain9. 
On Bevin's prompting, the Colonial Office was asked to 
report urgently on prospects for increased colonial exports 
to the United Statesl0. Bevin called for investigations into 
what raw materials had been scarce in the United States at 
the outbreak of the Second World War, with assessments of 
how far these shortages could be met by colonial exports1l. 
The Office's initial response was hardly encouraging. 
Officials concluded that the only important commodity of 
which increased supplies could rapidly be made available was 
7 Co 852/870/2, circular telegram, 6 Aug 1947. 
8 Ibid., T 236/693, circular telegram, 20 Aug 1947. 
9 Ibid.. 
10 CAB 130/19, GEN. 179/15th meeting, 21 Aug 1947. 
11 Ibid., GEN. 179/14th meeting, 20 Aug 1947. 
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rubber, though others might be expanded if Britain's own 
imports were cut. Longer-term possibilities included exports 
of minerals such as tin and lead, though here development 
was being hampered by shortages of capital equipment, a 
complaint which became all too familiar over succeeding 
months12. 
Symbolic of the government's new commitment to colonial 
development was the creation in 1948 of the Colonial 
Development Corporation (CDC), an example of the brief vogue 
for applying technocratic and dynamic methods to achieve 
rapid and efficient colonial development. The idea of 
promoting development through state action was not, as 
already suggested, contributed directly by the incoming 
Labour government. Nevertheless, Attlee and his colleagues 
endorsed it warmly13_ 
As described in chapter III, the Colonial Office's 
plans for a development corporation, supported by local 
subsidiaries, envisaged a body capable of bringing capital 
and expertise to a variety of development schemes, embracing 
both agriculture and industry. The proposal was advanced by 
the Colonial Office in March 1947. Creech Jones told Attlee 
that the intention was to 
promote in every possible way increased 
Colonial production on an economic and self- 
supporting basis with an eye to the 
production of foodstuffs, raw materials and 
manufactures where supply to the UK or sales 
would assist overseas our balance of 14 payments . 
12 CAB 128, CM(47)74, minute 2,25 Aug 1947. 
13 PREM 8/457, Creech Jones to Attlee, 26 Mar 1947; 
ibid., 
Attlee to Creech Jones, 26 Mar 1947; CO 537/2002, Creech 
Jones to Dalton, 28 Apr 1948. 
14 CO 537/2002, letter to Attlee, 26 Mar 1947. 
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The plan was swiftly approved by Cabinet. In June 1947 
ministers agreed to create not only the CDC, but also an 
Overseas Food Corporation, responsible to the Ministry of 
Food, to co-ordinate the strategy to boost food production 
and hence to increase supplies to metropolitan consumers15. 
Two factors probably explain the speed with which these 
proposals were adopted. The first was the imminent 
exhaustion of the American loan; the second was a growing 
conviction in Whitehall that Britain derived little 
immediate benefit from the sums already allocated to 
Colonial Development and Welfare expenditure16. 
The need to implement the development corporation plan 
rapidly influenced the Colonial office's choice of the 
new organisation's form. A single, centralised body was 
preferred to smaller, local bodies, because the latter would 
take longer to establish, and would deploy scarce expertise 
less efficiently17. The choice of a centralised form 
probably reflected also the Colonial Office's continuing 
doubts about the capacity of local governments to act 
dynamically in development. However, while the Office sought 
greater central control over the corporation, it did not 
envisage surrendering its overall direction to other 
branches of the metropolitan government. 
The Overseas Resources Development Bill, which created 
the CDC, gave it borrowing powers of up to L100 million. The 
15 CAB 128, CM 53(47)5,10 June 1947; Gupta (1983), pp. 106- 
7; PREM 8/457, Portal to Attlee, 10 Apr 1947; CAB 129 
CP(47)175, 'The Development of Colonial Resources'. 
16 Bodleian Library MS Attlee dep. 48 (Attlee Papers) 
fols. 116-119, Portal to Attlee, 17 Dec 1946. 
17 CO 852/867/1, CEDC(47)7, note by Chairman on formation of 
a Colonial Development Corporation, (n. d. ). 
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Bill, which also created the Overseas Food Corporation, was 
enacted in February 1948. The CDC's function was to promote 
schemes either to earn dollars through exports to the United 
States, or to save dollars by producing raw materials for 
Britain, thereby continuing the colonies' wartime economic 
contribution to Britain's balance of payments18. The 
Corporation was expected to judge proposed development 
schemes according to their value to the Sterling Area in 
earning or saving dollars. Initially, the Corporation's 
activities were expected to be biased towards short-term 
projects requiring a minimum investment of capital goods19. 
The unprecedented enthusiasm for colonial development 
shown by ministers after summer 1947 exposed fundamental 
weaknesses in Whitehall's co-ordinating machinery. 
Symptomatic of other departments' growing interest, and of 
mounting demands after summer 1947 for development to be 
integrated into domestic economic planning and given a clear 
place in Britain's general investment programme, was the 
creation, late in 1947, of an inter-departmental Colonial 
Development Working Party, which presented its final report 
in October 1948. This comprised representatives of the 
Central Economic Planning Staff, the Colonial Office, the 
Board of Trade and the Ministries of Supply and of Food, and 
was chaired by Sir Edwin Plowden, the government's Chief 
Planning Officer. Its function was to examine colonial 
requirements of capital equipment in relation to the 
competing needs of metropolitan investment and export, and 
18 Ibid.; CO 537/2002, Creech Jones to Attlee, 26 Mar 1947. 
19 CO 852/875/1, 'The Colonial Development Corporation. 
Method of Operation', 5 Dec 1947. 
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to advise on development programmes in the light of 
available resources20. 
Official enthusiasm for development after 1947 
inevitably encouraged unrealisable expectations. Development 
fever was pervasive and infectious. An extreme example was 
the report by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field 
Marshal Montgomery, following his African tour late in 1947. 
Montgomery, betraying a comprehensive ignorance of the 
political, economic and social realities of post-war Africa, 
saw 'immense possibilities' in development, and 'almost 
unlimited quantities' of vital raw materials, which could 
all be tapped to maintain British living standards. Voicing 
a criticism of the Colonial Office which became increasingly 
common in Britain during 1947-48, Montgomery attacked what 
he felt was the current unco-ordinated approach to 
development, and called for a dynamic 'grand design', with 
the ruthless elimination of obstacles, human or otherwise21. 
Montgomery's report drew a predictably defensive 
response from the office, which considered the CIGS's 
suggestions simplistic and impracticable, as well as 
contrary to the momentum towards political devolution in 
Africa: the political aspect of development could not be 
ignored if local good-will, essential to success in 
development, were to be maintained. This had long been a 
M 
co monplace within the Colonial office: increasingly, other 
n 
20 Morgan (1980) II, p. 18; the Central Economic Planning 
Staff had been established in March 1947, as an inter- 
departmental, but non-executive 'think-tank', and was also 
chaired by Sir Edwin Plowden; see Aldcroft (1986), p. 242; 
Cairncross (1985), p. 53. 
21 T220/17, 'Tour in Africa in November-December 1947' by 
Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, 19 Dec 
1947. 
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branches of Whitehall had to be convinced of its 
importance22. 
Another example of the exaggerated expectations aroused 
in this period was the proposal by Sir Henry Tizard, 
Chairman of the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy and of 
the Defence Research Policy Committee, for a study of the 
implications of a large-scale dispersal of population and 
industry from Britain throughout the Commonwealth23. Tizard, 
prompted by Attlee's strategic review of 1946, explained 
that no-one could envisage an adequate defence of Britain 
from nuclear war, and called for a study of the feasibility 
of redistributing the population, especially in Africa and 
Australia24. 
The Colonial Office reacted coolly. Officials believed 
that mass British emigration to Africa would conflict with 
their entire African policy. They were particularly 
concerned about the possible political implications, for in 
West Africa the proposal was inconceivable, requiring as it 
would a reversal of firmly established immigration policies, 
and even in East Africa, with its existing settler 
population, an accelerated influx of Europeans threatened to 
exacerbate communal difficulties25. 
Early in 1948, London grew increasingly anxious to 
accelerate progress with development. Even now, ministers 
22 Ibid., Watson (CO) to Fogarty (Treasury), 6 Jan 1948; CAB 
130/31, GEN. 210 ist meeting, 9 Jan 1948. 
23 CO 537/2667, letter to Minister of Defence, 25 Nov 1947. 
24 Ibid.. 
25 CO 537/2667, minutes by Cohen, 2 Dec 1947, and Lloyd, 3 
Dec 1947; ibid., Creech Jones to Attlee, 17 Dec 1947, and 
Rees-Williams to Attlee, 20 Feb 1948. 
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were anticipating the expiry of Marshall Aid. The key point 
seemed to be that Aid sufficient to restore Britain's 
economic independence could not be assumed. It was therefore 
essential to give colonial development high priority if 
satisfactory results were to be achieved before US aid came 
to an end26. 
Moreover, ministers felt that previous development 
planning had been insufficiently integrated with domestic 
economic policy. For example, no effort had been made to 
determine what proportion of metropolitan resources colonial 
development required, and understanding grew that improved 
arrangements were needed to ensure that the colonies 
received their fair share of available supplies27. 
During 1948, the Colonial Office became subject to much 
direct and oblique criticism over its handling of 
development. Early in the year, Attlee personally sought 
reassurances from Creech Jones that the Office was organised 
to fulfil its responsibilities28. Progress with development 
was reviewed critically in the report of the Select 
Committee on Estimates of June 1948. This found particular 
fault with the Colonial office and its development 
machinery, calling for stronger co-ordination and 
centralised planning29. Similarly, even late in 1948, 
ministers remained unconvinced of the office's capacity to 
26 CAB 130/31, GEN. 210 ist meeting, 9 Jan 1948. 
27 Ibid.; CO 537/3030, Creech Jones to Attlee, 5 Feb 1948; 
Hinds (1987), p. 159. 
28 CO 537/3030, letter to Creech Jones, 29 Jan 1948; ibid., 
Creech Jones to Attlee, 31 Jan 1948. 
29 H. C. 181, Fifth Report from the Select Committee on 
Estimates. Session 1947-48. Colonial Development, 30 June 
1948. 
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oversee development policy. They considered this 
particularly important given the new degree of direct 
government participation in the colonial economies, which 
required from the Office an ability to maintain general 
control over development. Ironically, in view of their past 
indifference to colonial interests, ministers now argued 
that the colonial economies could not be integrated with the 
metropolitan economy effectively unless the Colonial Office 
was able to present their case when supplies were allocated 
and priorities determined30. 
It took time for the Colonial Office's critics to 
appreciate the limits to centralised control of development, 
a problem aggravated by insensitivity in Whitehall to its 
political dimension. During the Supply Debate in July 1948, 
Rees-Williams tried to convey the complexities of the 
colonial relationship. 
We have to recognise the fact that the 
Colonial Office are very often not in a 
position to insist upon many things. We can 
suggest to many of the Colonial Governments, 
advise them and help them, but in many 
instances they have the final word and if 
they do not take our help and advicS4 there 
is very little further that we can do . 
Since adopting a predominantly 'welfarist' development 
outlook before 1939, the Colonial office had consistently 
argued that development should be planned by local agencies, 
with London providing resources and guidance where 
necessary. This principle had been enshrined in the 1940 CD 
&W Act, although, after 1943, the office became 
increasingly frustrated and alarmed at the apparent 
30 CAB 134/216, EPC(48)35th meeting, 9 Nov 1948. 
31 PD C, 454, col. 611,22 July 1948. 
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inability of local governments to absorb the importance of 
planning. Moreover, given London's vaunted commitment to 
progressive colonial devolution, and the need for local co- 
operation in development, it was impossible, politically, to 
impose development plans from Britain. Only repeated 
explanations of these constraints by the Colonial Office 
convinced ministers, by late 1948, that development was a 
complex and delicate process. 
Metropolitan insensitivity to colonial political 
realities was irritating and potentially embarassing to the 
Colonial Office. More serious, however, was the virtually 
exclusive emphasis placed by Whitehall, especially in the 
two years immediately after summer 1947, on expanding 
colonial primary production, a bias in development at odds 
with the Office's more catholic interpretation of the term. 
This bias in favour of primary production was explicitly 
stated by Sir Stafford Cripps when addressing the African 
Governors' Conference in November 1947. Cripps called for 
the tempo of African economic development to be increased 
'out of all recognition', arguing that 'the whole future of 
the sterling group and its ability to survive depends in my 
view upon a quick and extensive development of its African 
resources 13 2 
The Colonial office knew that the key to improved 
colonial living standards was agricultural efficiency, but 
continued to see an important role for economic 
diversification through industrial development. This was 
demonstrated, for example, in Creech Jones's despatch to 
African Governors of February 1947 which called for a 
32 CO 852/1000/3, address by Cripps, 12 Nov 1947. 
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'revolution' in African productivity. According to the 
despatch, while it was clear that 'for many years to come', 
agriculture would inevitably be of predominant importance in 
African economic development, it was clear, too, that 
the kind of standards aimed at today are impossible of attainment on a purely 
agricultural basis, and that in the course of 
years there must be a very substantial 
development of secondary industry q markedly higher standards are to be achieved . 
It became evident during 1947 and 1948 that officials had 
not lost their wartime interest in industrialisation. 
Furthermore, the Colonial Office could not ignore the 
growing enthusiasm for industrial development, especially in 
the African territories, where it was increasingly regarded 
by emerging political elites as essential to future growth, 
and symbolic of economic 'maturity'34. Therefore for the 
Colonial Office to be seen to be obstructing industrial 
development would be to risk creating political capital for 
nationalist (or 'proto-nationalist') leaders. 
However, there remained fundamental obstacles to the 
promotion of colonial industrialisation. The major immediate 
problem was the shortage of equipment and other essential 
supplies. Aggravating this, though not then seen as a major 
limiting factor, was the scarcity of development capital. A 
third, and arguably critical barrier, the precise effects of 
which are difficult to measure, was the resurgence of 
antipathy, even hostility, in Whitehall towards colonial 
industrialisation. 
construc a coherent 
The Office's wartime efforts to 
policy on industrialisation were 
33 CO 847/36/2, despatch to African Governors, 22 Feb 1947. 
34 See, e. g., CO 537/3226, report by Rees-Williams, 'West 
African Tour - 1948', 27 Sept 1948. 
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threatened after 1947 by the weight of opinion in Whitehall 
which regarded such development as at best irrelevant under 
current conditions, or worse, as inherently damaging to 
British interests. 
The supply problem 
The dominant obstacle to development in the period 
1947-48 was Britain's inability to supply the colonies with 
the exports they required. Starved of imports during the 
war, the colonies now found their needs ranking third after 
those of Britain and the dollar markets. Goods not required 
for metropolitan reconstruction were exported, where 
possible, to 'hard' currency areas in preference to 'soft' 
sterling markets35. Until August 1947, London tried to 
dictate colonial import policy only in general terms, with 
no attempts at detailed controls. With the onset of the 
convertibility crisis, however, local governments were asked 
to estimate their imports during 1948 from the Western 
Hemisphere. These rough estimates were subsequently imposed 
as 'ceilings' on colonial dollar imports, controlled in 
London by a Colonial Dollar Drain Committee, comprising 
representatives of the Colonial Office, the Treasury, the 
Board of Trade and the Bank of England36. 
In August 1947, the colonies were instructed to limit 
their imports to 'minimum essentials', especially imports 
from hard currency sources37. Subsequently, more stringent 
35 Westcott (1983), p. 8. 
36 CO 852/889/3, memo. by Gorell Barnes, 'Economic Planning 
in the Colonies', 3 Aug 1948. 
37 T236/693, circular telegram, 6 Aug 1947. 
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measures were taken with the reimposition of wartime import 
controls. Colonial governments were instructed to refuse 
import licences for goods which would not generate 
substantial increases in dollar-earning or saving 
production38. 
Despite its growing concern to accelerate development, 
Whitehall was slow to establish machinery to discover 
precisely which goods the colonies required. As already 
noted, the Colonial Development Working Party was formed 
late in 1947 to remedy this. As pressure grew in Whitehall 
after summer 1947 for the integration of development in 
domestic economic planning, the Colonial Office's response 
was the proposal to create the Working Party, intended to be 
a body of recognised authority to examine the allocation of 
supplies to the colonies and a means of co-ordinating 
development. Above all, the Colonial office sought a way of 
educating Whitehall in the unappreciated problems of 
development39. However, there were early indications of 
future divisions of opinion within Whitehall. Whereas the 
Colonial office saw the CDWP as a means to secure increased 
supplies for the colonies, others in the metropolitan 
government, notably Sir Edward Bridges, the Treasury 
Permanent Secretary, were keen to limit colonial imports 
still further40. 
38 T236/688, circular telegram, 'Import licensing policy', 5 
Sept 1947. 
39 CO 852/871/1, minute by Caine, 10 Nov 1947; ibid., minute 
by Rees-Williams, 11 Nov 1947; ibid., Creech Jones to 
Cripps, 22 Nov 1947; ibid., minute by Caine, 24 Nov 1947; CO 
852/831/1, minute by T. W. Davies, 11 Nov 1947. 
40 CO 852/831/1, minute by T. W. Davies, 11 Nov 1947. 
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In the event, it was not until January 1948 that 
attempts were made to gauge the colonies' likely needs of 
basic capital imports such as steel and cement. The 
accumulation of information on colonial investment plans 
began with a pilot study of Nigeria's requirements for 
capital goods in the period 1948-5041. Whether colonial 
needs, once known, could be satisfied, was another matter. 
When Creech Jones sought Attlee's authorisation to announce 
that Britain would do everything possible to promote 
development, not only financially but also with supplies, 
Attlee responded guardedly that the CDWP might be asked what 
promises could reasonably be made, though he doubted that 
the assurances Creech Jones requested could safely be 
given42. 
Yet the supply problem's pressing nature soon became 
clear. Early analyses of achievements in postwar development 
were disturbing. For example, the Colonial Development 
Working Party's draft report, produced in April 1948, 
estimated that colonial exports of many foodstuffs and raw 
materials during 1946 were below 1936 levels, chiefly due to 
the running down of capital equipment during the war and the 
scarcity of supplies since 1945. The CDWP subsequently 
concluded that the major impediment to development was the 
continuing supply problem. Accordingly, the Working Party 
concluded that priority in the near future should be given 
41 T229/220, Strath (CEPS) to Plowden, 22 Jan 1948; CO 
852/875/1, telegram from Beresford-Stooke (Nigeria) to 
Caine, 24 Jan 1948; CO 852/871/1, circular telegram, 27 Jan 
1948. 
42 CO 537/3030, Creech Jones to Attlee, 31 Jan 1948; ibid., 
Attlee to Creech Jones, 15 Feb 1948; ibid., Attlee to Rees- 
Williams, 27 Feb 1948. 
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to concentrating on short-term development possibilities, 
and on restoring and improving existing capital equipment, 
such as railways, and to avoid the allure of large, new 
schemes which, while firing the imagination, could not 
become productive quickly. 43. In effect, this was a call to 
patch up colonial infrastructures severely stretched by the 
war, and which, more importantly, were geared almost 
entirely to the production and evacuation of raw materials. 
It was, therefore, an implicit call for a bias in 
development which would benefit Britain rapidly, and ignored 
the Colonial Office's commitment to economic 
diversification. Not until summer 1948 did the Colonial 
Office finally win Whitehall's recognition that colonial 
import needs should receive the same treatment in the 
allocation of British goods as did those of countries with 
which Britain had bilateral trading agreements. Although the 
Office considered this a major breakthrough, it realised 
that constant pressure would be necessary for this principle 
to have any substance44. 
In this period, shortages of consumer goods were as 
critical as the scarcity of capital equipment. Wartime 
experience had demonstrated to officials both in Africa and 
in London that colonial productivity required an adequate 
supply of items such as cotton textiles. It was ironic, 
then, that calls for increased colonial production were made 
when the colonies were being urged to curb their imports. 
The shortage of goods, coinciding with rising peasant 
43 CO 852/868/3, CEDC(48)2, CDWP draft Interim Report, 12 
Apr 1948. 
44 CO 852/889/3, telegram from Poynton to Rees-Williams, 18 
Aug 1948; ibid., Poynton to Rees-Williams, 20 Aug 1948. 
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producer incomes, threatened not only an inflationary 
spiral, but also political discontent. As early as August 
1947, the Nigerian Governor warned London of the political 
risks which might accompany the reintroduction of import 
control45. His fears were borne out in February 1948 when 
serious rioting erupted in the Gold Coast. Since the war, 
the Colonial office had feared the possible effects, both on 
colonial productivity and on local political opinion, which 
the shortage of consumer goods might have, warning the 
Cabinet of the problem's political aspect as early as May 
1945. These warnings were repeated in September 1947 when 
ministers were told that if the colonies were to make a 
major contribution to the solution of Britain's economic 
difficulties, special attention would have to be paid to 
their needs for consumer goods, especially textiles46. The 
commission of inquiry into the Gold Coast disturbances 
subsequently identified as the principal cause not the 
'communist' conspiracy suspected by some colonial 
administrators, but simple economic discontent, particularly 
at the scarcity and price of basic consumer goods47. 
The British Government's response was that although 
some shortages persisted, the Gold Coast's total imports in 
1947 were approximately seventy per cent higher in value 
than in 1946, which would alleviate the inflationary 
45 T236/688, telegram to Creech Jones, 26 Aug 1947. 
46 CAB 71/20, 'Prospective general supply difficulties in 
the Colonial Empire', 10 May 1945; CO 537/1414, minute by 
T. W. Davies, 11 Dec 1946; CO 537/2007, CM(47)75th 
conclusions, 9 Sept 1947. 
47 Col. no. 231, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into 
Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948,8 June 1948; see also 
Hargreaves (1988), pp. 114-5. 
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pressure, although it was recognised that this would be 
offset partially by any increase in the prices paid to the 
territory's cocoa producers48. Paradoxically, in its drive 
to boost exports to the dollar area, the British Government 
jeopardised its colonial development strategy by restricting 
exports of incentive goods to the colonies, and by thus 
indirectly encouraging local unrest. This was ironic, too, 
given traditional demands from sections of British industry, 
particularly Lancashire cotton, for the colonies to be 
developed as British markets. In March 1948, the President 
of the Board of Trade explained that the volume of cotton 
goods exports in 1947 was approximately 32% of the 1937 
level, and admitted that Lancashire had been slow to recover 
from the effects of concentration and other wartime 
measures49. Nevertheless the Board of Trade believed that 
West Africa fared relatively well in terms of supplies of 
cotton goods precisely because it was such an attractive 
market to Lancashire. Exports of cotton textiles to the Gold 
Coast in the first seven months of 1948 were 20 million 
square yards, compared to nine million square yards in the 
same period in 1947, and 12 million in 1938, and this trend 
seemed likely to continue. However, the Board concluded that 
a substantial increase in exports to British West Africa 
could be achieved only at the expense of other 'equally 
desirable' markets, such as British East Africa50. 
Unfortunately, it was precisely these cotton goods, along 
48 Col. no. 232, Statement by His Majesty's Government on the 
Rebort of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the 
Gold Coast, 1948,8 June 1948. 
49 PD C, 448, col. 1398,11 Mar 1948. 
50 BT 11/4089, minute by Reardon, 27 Aug 1948. 
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with items such as kerosene and bicycles, for which there 
seemed to be an 'almost inexhaustible' market, for example 
in West Africa, fuelled not only by rising producer prices, 
but also by the inducements paid to peasant farmers to cut 
out cocoa trees affected by swollen shoot disease5l. 
After his visit to West Africa in 1948, Gorell Barnes, 
newly appointed Assistant Under-Secretary in the Colonial 
Office's Economic Division, stressed the importance of 
increasing consumer goods supplies to the region, especially 
in view of the larger cash payments which were to be made to 
its cocoa producers. He warned of trouble, particularly in 
the Gold Coast, if steps were not taken to improve the 
supply situation, if necessary by relaxing restrictions on 
imports from hard currency areas, a move he thought 
justifiable because ultimately the stability of major 
dollar-earning territories was at stake. His colleagues, 
however, doubted that the Treasury would accept a 
liberalisation on these lines52. Arguably more interesting 
are the Board of Trade's longer-term goals in colonial 
markets, revealed in reaction to Gorell Barnes's views. The 
Board felt unable to help implement Gorell Barnes's proposal 
that counter-inflationary supplies should be deemed 
'essential'53. Moreover, privately, Board of Trade officials 
doubted Britain's ability to meet West Africa's needs for 
consumer goods so long as local tastes remained 
51 CO 537/3226, report by Rees-Williams, 'West African Tour 
- 1948', 27 Sept 1948. 
52 CO 852/801, telegram from Gorell Barnes to Creech Jones, 
20 July 1948; CO 852/874/7, CDWP(48)9th meeting, 27 July 
1948; Morgan (1980) II1 p. 15. 
53 CO 852/801, letter from Harris (BoT) to Gorell Barnes, 29 
July 1948, cited in Morgan (1980) II1 p. 15. 
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conservative. For example, British manufacturers would be 
unable to supply cotton textiles in sufficient quantities, 
and London would have to agree to the release of dollars to 
permit purchases of goods from the United States. However, 
the Board saw this as an opportunity to stimulate new demand 
in colonial markets for other kinds of British goods, such 
as watches, rayon goods, radios, footwear and cameras. As 
one official observed: 
There is, of course, a tremendous job of 
export promotion involved, but the 
opportunities are great, and if missed are 
unlikely to recur54. 
There was a further practical consideration, as the same 
official continued: 
... I feel that the opportunity of increasing 
our exports to a very desirable long term 
market, is a great one. Moreover, it is only 
if we can provide West Africa with the goods 
she needs, that we can expect to use the 
dollars she earns to pay for our own 
imports55. 
These supply problems revealed tensions and conflicting 
interests within Whitehall. For instance, the Treasury 
remained adamant that strict colonial import control was 
essential to maintain the sterling balances as a support for 
the pound56. The Board of Trade, however, feared that 
continuing import controls would deprive certain British 
exporters of valuable colonial markets. It had been the 
Board's policy since 1945 to try to maintain at least a 
'trickle' of exports to as many markets as possible, hence 
its concern in December 1947 when the colonies were 
54 BT 11/4089, minute by Dyson, 3 Aug 1948. 
55 Ibid.. 
56 Morgan (1980) II1 pp. 53-63. 
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instructed to reduce their imports from Britain57. In 
September 1947, Cripps presented the Treasury's new 'export 
plan', a deliberate attempt to direct Britain's exports 
towards 'hard' markets so as to improve the balance of 
payments position. By December 1947, the Treasury and the 
Board of Trade had graded overseas markets according to 
desirability, and this criterion shaped the direction of 
exports during 1948. Nevertheless, the Board, anxious to 
safeguard long-term trading interests, was concerned that 
this policy might damage traditional markets58. 
A similar divergence of views surrounded the question 
of conserving dollars. Whereas the unifyinq theme in 
Whitehall's policy after August 1947 was the need to reduce 
dollar expenditure, the Board of Trade considered that it 
was politically impossible for Britain to continue to 'cream 
off' the West African producers' return. Following the 
increase in price paid to cocoa producers in the season 
beginning in autumn 1948, the Board foresaw that the gap 
between the Gold Coast's exports and imports would worsen, 
and believed that unless British exports to the territory 
were increased, absorbing the new local purchasing power, 
pressure against the Gold Coast's dollar ceiling on imports 
would become difficult to resist59. 
In the Colonial office, the supply problem encouraged 
fundamental doubts about the entire strategy of maximising 
exports to the dollar area. One danger, it was felt, was 
57 CO 537/3095, CD(47)7, Dollar Drain Committee. Colonial 
Empire. Progress Report by the Treasury, 10 Dec 1947. 
58 Miller (1986), pp. 317-38. 
59 BT 11/4089, minute by Harris, 5 Aug 1948. 
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that unless more consumer goods were diverted to the 
colonies, the colonies might seek to spend more dollars on 
these goods than could be earned by direct British exports 
to dollar markets60. The only way to give the British 
economy long-term security, it was argued, was to divert 
more exports to the colonies, so that their wealth and 
dollar-earning capacity could be expanded, a course which 
would require Whitehall to consider colonial needs far more 
seriously than hitherto6l. 
Development finance 
Just as the post-war years witnessed a sharp reduction 
in Britain's capacity to meet the colonies' material needs, 
so too the period saw the Colonial Empire being effectively 
starved of development finance. Although unprecedentedly 
large amounts of grant aid had been promised under the 1945 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, the supply of 
investment capital shrank. Colonies were discouraged from 
borrowing on the London money markets on the grounds that 
domestic reconstruction took precedence over colonial 
needs62. In August 1948, Creech Jones raised this problem 
with the Treasury, fearing that restrictions on the 
colonies' freedom to borrow might be seen as exploitative. 
In its report, the Colonial Development Working Party 
subsequently concluded that development loans of up to L60 
million over the following three to four years were 
60 CO 537/3146, CDWP(48)5th meeting, 8 Apr 1948. 
61 CO 852/889/3, memo. by Gorell Barnes, 'Economic Planning 
in the Colonies', 3 Aug 1948. 
62 Morgan (1980) II1 pp. 46-52. 
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acceptable, a recommendation later endorsed in principle by 
the Treasury. The relatively small figure was excused on the 
grounds that loans were only one of the available sources of 
funding63. 
Equally problematic were the colonial sterling balances 
held in London. It was noted in the previous chapter that 
the question of the colonies' right to draw on these 
reserves for development purposes created divisions in 
Whitehall, with the Treasury advocating the conversion of 
part of the balances into CD &W allocations and interest- 
free loans, while the Colonial office, vigorously opposed to 
cancellation, acquiescing in the loan-conversion proposal, 
and favouring measures to prevent their liquidation. In 
effect, the consolidation of the Sterling Area after 1947, 
and London's commitment to maintaining the sterling balances 
at a high level, meant that the colonies were lending to 
Britain at a low interest rate64. 
Even the vaunted CD &W provision proved to be a 
disappointment. In total, the allocation of L120 million for 
development appeared impressive, but, when distributed among 
a combined population of over sixty millions, and over a 
period of ten years, its true significance was modest. Even 
these sums were not fully expended. By 19 51, only about L40 
million had actually been spent, representing approximately 
one sixth of the net colonial contribution to sterling in 
the form of loans by colonial governments to London and the 
63 CAB 134/65, Report of the Colonial Development Working 
Party (Revised), 11 Oct 1948. 
64 Morgan (1980) II1 pp. 53-62; Porter and Stockwell (1987), 
p. 48; Hinds (1987), p. 154; Bowden (1980), p. 231; Fieldhouse 
(1984), p. 96. 
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sterling balances amassed by the state marketing boards 
which purchased colonial produce under monopolistic 
conditions, generally on terms advantageous to the British 
consumer. Moreover, the CD &W grants taken up were targeted 
heavily towards reinforcing existing patterns of production. 
Economic diversification figured in approved development 
schemes only to a marginal extent. For example, in the 
financial year 1946-47, whereas L2.2 million were spent on 
agricultural schemes, only L3,943 were spent on industrial 
development65. 
At the height of post-crisis metropolitan enthusiasm 
for colonial development, there had been some discussion 
among officials in London of the possible value of borrowing 
dollars to achieve a faster rate of progress, for example 
enabling colonies to buy agricultural machinery in the 
United States. Through informal contacts with American 
officials, Whitehall learned of a growing interest in 
African opportunities among private US investors66. The 
Colonial office responded publicly that foreign private 
investment in the colonies was welcome if it complemented 
existing development plans and observed local welfare and 
labour regulations67. Privately, however, officials were 
uneasy at the prospect of foreign control over individual 
development projects. Nor could they afford to ignore the 
political ramifications of foreign investment in the 
colonies, or the sensitive question of the repatriation of 
65 D. R. Fieldhouse, review of Morgan (1980) Volume II, 
English Historical Review, Apr 1982, pp. 386-94. 
66 CO 852/875/1, Trefgarne to CO1 12 Jan 1948; ibid., 
CDWP(48)5,12 Jan 1948; CO 852/877/1, Makins (FO) to Caine, 
15 Aug 1947. 
67 Morgan (1980) II1 p. 100. 
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profits made in the colonies68. Creech Jones in particular 
was reluctant to see American private capital gaining a 
dominant position in individual colonies69. Similarly, the 
Colonial Office was cool towards investment either by the 
United States Government or by the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. International Bank loans 
were considered too expensive for most colonies, but more 
important was official concern that 'strings' might 
accompany these loans, for example giving the Bank the right 
70 to observe how its money was spent. Borrowing directly 
from the US Government was thought to carry the risk that 
loans towards colonial development might be deducted from 
Britain's allocation of Marshall Aid, and would almost 
certainly involve an unacceptable degree of interference7l. 
The Colonial Office was not unanimous on this question. 
Caine, often at variance with his colleagues in the past, 
warned 
I have very little doubt myself that if we 
decide not to enlist American aid the 
absolute limitations of our own resources 
available for capital development will result 
in the practical progress made being very 
much smaller than he vast majority of people 
are now expecting? . 
The Colonial Development Working Party eventually concluded 
that the whole subject of attracting private US capital was 
68 CO 852/877/1, Caine to Makins, 18 Aug 1947. 
69 CO 537/3030, draft note, 'Economic Development in the 
Colonies', Feb 1948. 
70 CO 852/877/1, Rowe-Dutton (Treasury) to Caine, 18 Sept 
1947; ibid., minutes by Eastwood and Ivor Thomas, 18 Sept 
1947. 
71 CO 852/875/1, CDWP(48)20, memo. by CO, 'Investment of 
foreign capital in the Colonies', 9 Mar 1948. 
72 CO 852/877/1, minute by Caine, 6 Nov 1947. 
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fraught with difficulties. Moreover, IBRD loans could only 
be used for purchases outside Britain and the colonies, and, 
since those goods which Britain could not supply seemed 
equally scarce in the United States, there seemed to be no 
advantage in borrowing dollars for this purpose. The 
conclusion was that, in the short term at least, most 
external investment in the colonies would have to come from 
Britain73. 
Earlier discussions in Whitehall had, however, revealed 
more fundamental objections to foreign penetration of the 
colonial economies. The CDWP's interim report had, for 
example, hoped that any temporary advantage gained from an 
earlier availability of foreign goods obtained through loans 
would not deprive Britain of long-term colonial markets 
necessary to pay for Britain's future imports of colonial 
produce74. Similarly, when the Economic Planning Board met 
to consider the CDWP's draft interim report, Sir Archibald 
Rowlands, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Supply, 
argued that it would be a 'profound mistake' to encourage 
foreign capital into the colonies, given Britain's need to 
re-create its overseas investment fund and rebuild its 
'lost' Empire, adding that 'trade had in the past always 
followed the flag'. Moreover, since little investment seemed 
practicable in the foreseeable future, he believed that 
Britain should concentrate on 'making do' in the colonies 
until its own economic position permitted it to resume 
overseas investment75. His colleagues on the Board agreed 
73 CAB 134/65, Report of the CDWP (Revised), 11 Oct 1948. 
74 CO 852/868/3, CEDC(48)2 CDWP draft Interim Report, 12 Apr 
1948. 
308 
that since the colonial territories would 
markets for British capital goods and a 
investment income, British capital should be 
colonies to the maximum extent possible 
economic conditions, thereby endorsing the 
recommendations76. 
Whitehall and colonial industrialisation 
be required as 
Ls a source of 
invested in the 
under existing 
CDWP's interim 
Interwoven among the more immediate problems of a 
shortage of supplies and development finance as obstacles to 
colonial diversification after 1947 was an increasingly 
prominent, though privately expressed, antipathy within 
Whitehall to colonial industrialisation. This was in marked 
contrast to the apparent wartime thaw in metropolitan 
official attitudes, which had encouraged the Colonial Office 
to adopt a relatively robust position on the subject in its 
dealings with other government departments. The hardening 
climate of opinion in Whitehall after 1947, fostering an 
entrenchment of pre-war beliefs in the complementarity of 
the metropolitan and colonial economies (themselves 
strengthened by the rise in world commodity prices, which 
heightened the attraction of colonial produce bought at 
fixed prices,, often on long-term contracts) offered little 
scope for the development of the Colonial office's wartime 
views on the value of limited industrialisation, and the 
75 CO 537/3146, EPB(48)6th meeting, 15 Apr 1948. The EPB was 
a purely advisory body, comprising the Chief Planning 
Officer, the Permanent Under-Secretaries of several 
government departments and representatives of the CEPS, the 
employers' organisations and the TUC. 
76 Ibid.. 
77 Porter and Stockwell (1987), pp. 48-9. 
309 
Office found itself outnumbered and outflanked in the 
Whitehall hierarchy, lacking political weight, poorly placed 
to withstand concerted governmental pressure to gear 
development unambiguously towards primary export production, 
or to confront a Treasury fast regaining control over 
economic policy after the temporary eclipse of its influence 
during the war78. 
An early example of the resurgence of opposition to 
colonial industrialisation surfaced during the preparation 
of the overseas Resources Development Bill in 1947. The 
Ministry of Food, anxious to press ahead with legislation 
embodying the East African Groundnut Scheme, complained that 
a joint Bill, creating both the Overseas Food Corporation 
and the Colonial Development Corporation, might cause 
delays, since the CDC was to be empowered to promote 
secondary industries, a question still considered 
controversial79. 
The growing potential for conflict between the policy 
goals of the Colonial Office and those of other sections of 
Whitehall is illustrated by the Office's reaction to draft 
guidelines on colonial investment priorities, prepared by 
the Central Economic Planning Staff in 1948 at the Colonial 
Development Working Party's request, and which enjoyed the 
Treasury's approval80. To the Office, the suggested 
priorities seemed 'almost incredible', since they attached 
78 On the Treasury's changing fortunes, see Lee (1980), 
pp. 102-3, and Cairncross (1985), pp. 50-6. 
79 CO 537/2003, note of meeting at Ministry of Food, 30 May 
1947. 
80 CO 852/876/1, Grant (Treasury) to Croome (CEPS), 9 Aug 
1948. 
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little importance to what would benefit the colonies, 
concentrating instead on how their resources could benefit 
Britain, especially in producing dollar-earning/saving raw 
materials and food. Moreover, the CEPS had suggested that 
colonial industrialisation should, in terms of development 
priorities, 'come third by a considerable margin', and that 
any such proposals should be considered in terms of their 
possible effects on British export interests. Similarly, the 
Treasury argued that colonial labour should be deployed in 
directly productive activities, and that the minimum 
possible effort should be deflected from food and raw 
materials production81. The Colonial Office judged such 
attitudes 'deplorable', lending weight to accusations that 
development policy was essentially exploitative. 82 
During 1948, the CEPS even attempted to justify 
proposals to curb colonial welfare expenditure, arguing that 
social development could proceed only at a rate warranted by 
the level of local economic development, otherwise the 
colonies might incur expenditure commitments beyond their 
means, and so require British financial assistance, 
inevitably delaying their progress towards self- 
government83. This was, implicitly, an attempt to return to 
the discredited pre-war doctrine of colonial financial self- 
sufficiency, theoretically abandoned with the passage of the 
1940 CD &W Act. Colonial office protests, however, secured 
81 T236/696, Rowe-Dutton (Treasury) to Caine, 5 Feb 1948. 
82 CO 852/876/1, R. E. Robinson to Gorell Barnes, 9 Aug 1948; 
ibid., minute by Gorell Barnes, 10 Aug 1948; ibid., note of 
meeting held in CEPS on 'Principles of Colonial Investment', 
11 Aug 1948. 
83 CO 852/875/3, CDWP(48)50, memo. by CEPS, 'Principles for 
the Guidance of Colonial Investment', 14 Sept 1948. 
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a revision of the CEPS's guidelines, giving greater 
prominence to colonial interests. For instance, the Office 
argued that if serious political consequences were to be 
avoided, future development would have to balance economic 
and social objectives, and called for greater emphasis on 
diversification, though it acknowledged that industrial 
development should not be an end in itself, when primary 
production was probably, in most cases, more profitable for 
the colonies themselves. The Office also considered that it 
would be impossible to justify cuts in colonial welfare 
expenditure at a time when so much progress was being made 
in this field in Britain84. 
The Colonial office's qualified success in resisting 
the more extreme demands of the CEPS was probably due in no 
small measure to the recent, startling, experience of 
disturbances in the Gold Coast. While the impact of the 
Accra Riots on London's plans for the Colony's 
constitutional development remains a matter for debate, the 
incident seems to have made London more sensitive to the 
political implications of colonial economic policy, leading 
to a perceptible softening of the development strategy. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental conclusion reached by the 
CEPS was that it was necessary to devote the greatest 
possible part of available capital resources to highly 
remunerative projects, which was recognised as implying a 
'bias' in development towards deriving the maximum 
contribution from colonial resources to the Sterling Area's 
balance of payments. In deference to the Colonial office, 
the revised version of the CEPS's paper stated that this 
84 CO 852/876/1, note of meeting with CEPS, 11 Aug 1948. 
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basic objective should be pursued as far as was consistent 
with progress towards other goals, including the raising of 
colonial standards of consumption and the promotion of those 
economic activities, whether primary or secondary, in which 
individual territories were best equipped to engage85. 
These adjustments were reinforced in the CDWP's final 
report. Stressing the need to secure the mutual advantage of 
Britain and the colonies, the CDWP argued that both would 
benefit from the early achievement of a balance of external 
payments by the Sterling Area. The Report endorsed the 
CEPS's contention that colonial development in turn depended 
on metropolitan recovery: 
Unless the sterling area as a whole succeeds 
in restoring the balance of its external 
payments at a high level, the United Kingdom 
itself will be unable to provide the overseas 
capital investment upon which the Colonial 
territories must rely if their economic 
development is to be accelerated. 
It was, therefore, nece4ary for the colonies, in their own 
interests, to make the maximum contribution to Sterling Area 
recovery86. 
However, the CDWP accepted the Colonial office's view 
that investment should not concentrate on highly profitable 
projects since 'even from the purely economic point of view 
this would be self-frustrating'. More importantly, the 
political consequences would be 'most serious'. Development, 
it was agreed, must be balanced, and must include provision 
for social expenditure. However, the Working Party accepted 
85 CO 852/875/3, CDWP(48)50, memo. by CEPS, 'Principles for 
the Guidance of Colonial Investment', 14 Sept 1948. 
86 CAB 134/65, Report of the CDWP (Revised), 11 Oct 1948. 
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the CEPS Is argument that capital investment had to be 
related to each territory's capacity: 
The goal of self-government in the Colonies 
will be reached more slowly if the burden of 
maintenance charges for roads, air and 
seaports, hospitals and schools is so inflated that it cannot be met without 
external financial assistance wherever 
economic difficulties are encountered. 
On the bias in future development, moreover, the CDWP 
offered little hope that much progress would be made with 
industrialisation: 
The main increase in Colonial production 
within the next few years must, in our view, 
come from the expansion and improvement of 
existing apiculture and existing mining 
enterprises 
The CDWP also suggested general principles to guide colonial 
production of commodities. First, it was thought preferable 
to expand production of items which were problematic for 
scarcity reasons rather than for currency reasons alone, 
since a commodity now in world short supply 
is likely to have a more assured market than 
one which is readily available if purchasers 
have the requisite currency. 
Secondly, the commodities produced should be marketable at a 
competitive price on the world market in the long term. Both 
these points echoed the Colonial office's continuing 
concern, despite the prevailing buoyant market, about the 
problems of commodity disposal, a concern rooted in pre-war 
experiences". Nevertheless, in the same month that the CDWP 
produced its report, Creech Jones warned the Cabinet of the 
fears expressed by delegates at the recent Africa Conference 
about the long-term implications of current colonial 
87 Ibid.. 
88 Ibid.; CO 852/878/1, EPB(48)13th meeting, 21 Oct 1948. 
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production. In particular, they were concerned that 1 when 
the immediate demand for increased production of certain 
dollar-earning and dollar-saving commodities becomes less 
acute, the local industries would be left to their fate 
without protection and without adequate markets89. 
When the CDWP's final report was discussed by the 
Colonial Economic Development Council in October 1948, W. A. 
Lewis detected two basic problems with the existing approach 
to colonial development: insufficient attention was being 
paid either to peasant agriculture or to the development of 
secondary industries. Lewis was still championing the thesis 
he had put forward during the CEAC's wartime discussions on 
industrial development, that in many colonies, effective 
agricultural development required a parallel and 
complementary drive towards industrialisation. Lewis 
criticised Hinden for failing to recognise this in her 
pamphlet Common Sense and Colonial Development, which he had 
read in draft: 
The whole discussion is in terms of either 
or, as if it were not a historical fact that 
agricultural and industi al development have 
always gone hand in hand 
90- 
Responding to Lewis, the Council agreed that the 
importance of agricultural investment should be emphasised. 
On industrial development, the view was taken that it was 
premature to assess the adequacy of plans in this field 
until the CDC was fully operational, as the corporation was 
known to be considering a number of proposals. Furthermore, 
89 CAB 129/30 CP(48)237, 'The African Conference. Memorandum 
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies', 12 Oct 1948; 
see also Gupta (1983), p. 109. 
90 CO 852/868/5, CEDC(48)5th minutes, 19 Oct 1948; FCB 32/4, 
f23, Lewis to Hinden, 2 Dec 1948. 
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several colonial governments had established local 
corporations to stimulate secondary industry, and their 
progress should be awaited9l. 
The CDWP's report was subsequently discussed and 
endorsed by both the Economic Planning Board and the high- 
level Cabinet Economic Policy Committee, a small, select 
body chaired by Attlee, responsible for both home and 
overseas economic policy92. A criticism of the report made 
by the Board, and later echoed by both Cripps and Creech 
Jones, was that inadequate emphasis had been given to 
agricultural development. Sir Graham Cunningham, a member 
both of the Board and of the CEDC, and a former senior 
official in the Ministry of Supply, for example, argued that 
the development plans submitted by colonial governments 
suggested that the main problem was not to raise local 
living standards, but to prevent them from falling, for 
instance as a result of soil erosion. In his view, the 
colonies were basically agricultural, and secondary 
industries could not be developed for a number of years93. 
The Colonial Office and industrial development 
Against such comprehensive metropolitan indifference, 
or even hostility, to colonial industrialisation, the 
Colonial office had few opportunities to defend the policy 
goals which it had established during the 'reconstruction 
planning' period. The Office became notably silent on 
91 CO 852/868/5, CEDC(48)5th minutes, 19 Oct 1948. 
92 G. D. N. Worswick and P. H. Ady (eds), The British Economy, 
1945-50, (Oxford, 1952), p. 348; Cairncross (1985), p. 51. 
93 CO 852/878/1, EPB(48)13th meeting, 21 Oct 1948; CAB 
134/219, EPC(48)92,1 Nov 1948. 
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industrialisation after 1947, provoking a rebuke from Oliver 
Stanley in the Commons when the annual report on the 
Colonial Empire was debated in July 1947. Even privately, 
there were few discussions in the Office on this 
controversial subject, in distinct contrast to the period 
1945-46, when, for example, officials had been vigorous in 
defending proposals to develop textile industries in 
Nigeria94. Similarly, although industrialisation was 
considered by officials in preparation for the African 
Governors' Conference of November 1947, at which a new 
course in colonial policy was to be revealed and explained 
to the assembled administrators, the Colonial Office 
produced no discussion paper on the subject specifically for 
the Conference, although numerous memoranda were prepared on 
other economic matters; instead, officials simply 
resurrected the circular despatch which Stanley had issued 
in February 1947. Significantly, the Conference noted but 
did not discuss this95. 
The consumer goods shortage in this period did not, 
apparently, encourage the Colonial Office to consider 
systematically the value of local import-substituting 
manufacture, as it had to some extent during the war. Soon 
after import controls were imposed following the 
covertibility fiasco, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, 
Ivor Thomas approached Cripps with a proposal that 
in 
addition to producing dollar earning or saving commodities, 
the colonies might produce for themselves some of the goods 
94 See above, pp. 81-2. 
95 Co 852/860/2, Record of the proceedings of the Conference 
of African Governors (8-21 November 1947), Nov 1947. 
317 
they needed, thus reducing imports, especially from the 
dollar area96. This idea was not, apparently, developed, 
probably due to discouraging wartime experiences combined 
with the cool response of other government departments. 
The most important consequence of the scarcity of 
consumer goods was the threat of inflation, with its 
attendant risks of political discontent. However, the 
Colonial office's response was not an effort to expand 
supplies, either through exports from Britain or through 
local production, but rather encouragements to restrict the 
local money supply, for example through revised taxation 
policies. In West Africa, a key device was state produce 
marketing, seen by the Colonial office as 'the most 
effective' means of countering the effects of large 
increases in producer incomes97. The Office continued to 
attach importance to accumulation by the state marketing 
boards of ever greater funds which could be drawn upon to 
stabilise producer incomes. Moreover, the wartime practice 
of paying producers prices lower than those current on the 
world market continued, even after locally-organised 
marketing boards assumed control after 194798. 
During 1948, the Colonial office showed signs of a 
renewed interest in industrialisation, due, chiefly, to a 
growing awareness of local enthusiasm for development in 
this direction. The events in the Gold Coast in spring 1948 
appear to have shaken officials out of their lethargy, and 
96 Co 537/3027, Thomas to Cripps, 17 Sept 1947. 
97 CO 852/1041/2, memo. by Research Section, Economic 
General Dept., CO, 'Survey of inflationary and deflationary 
tendencies in the Colonies', 21 July 1949. 
98 Meredith (1986), pp. 77-91. 
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discussions on industrial development became more frequent 
thereafter. When Thomas's successor, Rees-Williams, visited 
West Africa in summer 1948, he discovered a widespread local 
demand for industrialisation. He found the local population 
- he was no more specific - 'desperately' keen on economic 
development, by which was meant industrial development. He 
concluded that West Africans were even more interested in 
economic questions than in political matters. However, he 
considered much of this thinking was muddled. For example, 
he found that 'Every territory wants to be self-sufficient 
in everything, which is absurd'. But while he believed the 
region would continue to have an agriculturally based 
economy, he saw room for diversification through processing, 
light engineering and the production of consumer goods. 
Rees-Williams noted the start made by local development 
corporations, but drew attention to the continuing scarcity 
of African entrepreneurs and managers: 
The African looks for safe jobs where he can 
wear a white collar. His mendicant outlook 
blames government for all his shortcomings 
and believes that it has all the means to 
provide him with an up-to-date economy with 
no trouble or work on his part99. 
One of the major conclusions reached by Rees-Williams in his 
report on his trip was that a far greater effort was needed 
to promote industrial development, for example through the 
provision of finance and training100_ This interpretation 
was generally approved at a meeting called by Creech Jones 
in the Colonial Office early in October 1948. However, it 
was not thought that any specific action on 
99 CO 537/3226, 'West African Tour - 1948', 27 Sept 1948. 
100 Ibid.. 
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industrialisation was required from the Offices Economic 
Division at this stage101. 
In its sporadic discussions on industrial development 
after 1947, the Colonial Office felt obliged to concentrate 
on what seemed feasible, and, given the immense constraints 
on development, to establish clear priorities so that scarce 
resources were used as effectively as possible. In this 
context, effectiveness was measured according to the benefit 
to be derived by Britain as much as by the colonies 
themselves. As Rees-William put it: 
It is obviously essential that there should 
be the maximum amount of development in the 
shortest possible time, otherwise the 
Government's plan of economic development and 
the integration of the Colonies with Western 
Europe and the Commonwealth will fail. If it 
fails, I cannot personally see how we can get 
out of our difficulties, and if M2 go down, 
the Colonies will go down with us. 
To prevent the dissipation of materials and resources, Rees- 
Williams called on the Colonial Office to prepare a list of 
priority projects. This list, produced by the Economic 
Intelligence and Planning Department, was completed by 
September 1948, and reproduced, unaltered, in November and 
December. The activities judged to have priority involved 
mainly the production of food and raw materials such as 
cotton, tobacco, hard fibres and tin, together with 
experiments in new agricultural techniques, hydro- 
electricity schemes, communications and education. A 
separate list, dealing specifically with West Africa, said 
little about industrial potential, apart from a reference to 
101 CO 537/3561, minute by Poynton, 7 Oct 1948. 
102 CO 852/888/4, minute, 27 May 1948. 
320 
installing palm-oil mills and the possibility of 
establishing a plywood factory, also in Nigerial03. 
The colonial governments and industrialisation 
Despite the apparent hesitancy, even ambivalence, in 
its own attitudes in the face of multiple constraints, the 
Colonial Office's fundamental faith in industrial 
development explains its dismay that this area was 
conspicuously neglected in a number of the development 
schemes submitted by local governments. In its desire to 
promote modernisation, the Office had to overcome the 
conservatism of local officials, who were thought to regard 
London's missives as products of the latest change in 
fashion in Whitehall104. An index of the colonial 
governments' grasp of the new urgency informing development 
policy was the disappointing response to Creech Jones's 
despatch of February 1947 which called for substantial 
increases in productivity. By July, only one government 
(Zanzibar's) had replied105. Within the Office, fears 
persisted that local governments gave inadequate priority to 
economic, as opposed to social, development in their 
planning. This theme arose when the Committee on the 
Conference of African Governors, created at the beginning of 
1947 to prepare the Agenda for the African Governors' 
Conference of November 1947, discussed means of securing 
more efficient economic organisation in the colonial 
103 Ibid., 'Priority Development Projects October 1948', 24 
Sept 1948. 
104 CO 537/3226, 'West African Tour - 1948', 27 Sept 1948. 
105 CO 852/1003/4, circular despatch, 13 July 1947. 
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territories. Caine, chairing the Committee, noted that the 
development programmes so far submitted by African 
governments were generally deficient on the economic side of 
development, a problem he had been warning of since 1943106. 
The Gold Coast Development Plan, submitted in December 1946, 
was a case in point. The Plan was criticised for being 
'unduly conservative' in its financial provision, in view of 
the territory's healthy excess of revenue over 
expenditure107. As Cohen observed: 
In the Gold Coast we have greater 
opportunities for development than perhaps 
anywhere else in Africa. We have good 
relations between the Government and the 
people, plenty of money and great economic 
resources. But little hard thinking seems to 
have been devoted to the problem of 
developing the natural resources of the 
Territory . 
Moreover, the Office's Development Adviser, Sir Frank 
Stockdale, noted the Plan's neglect of industrial 
development, which he thought 'certainly a matter which 
requires careful consideration'109. Officials believed that 
the industrial potential of the Gold Coast should be 
reviewed, together with the government's policy on 
encouraging industry110. 
Governor Burns was subsequently asked by the Colonial 
Office to review the Plan, especially its economic 
106 CO 847/36/2, CCAG 2nd meeting, 11 Feb 1947. 
107 CO 96/806/3/31596/1948, note by A. P. Rogers, 25 June 
1948. 
108 CO 96/806/2/31596/1946-47, minute, 27 Feb 1947. 
109 Ibid., minute, 8 Feb 1948. 
110 Ibid., 'Comments on Gold Coast Draft Ten Year Plan' 
(unsigned, n. d. ). 
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componentslll. This proved to be a slow process, however, 
and as late as November 1948, the Gold Coast Government was 
reported to be beginning to prepare a new ten year 
development plan112. It is notable in this context that one 
of the economic causes of the Accra Riots identified by the 
Watson Commission of Enquiry was a local sentiment that the 
Gold Coast government had not formulated any plans for the 
future of industry and agriculture, and that it was 
uninterested in any development apart from production for 
113 export. 
Fresh evidence that the government was unenthusiastic 
about industrial development emerged during Rees-Williams' 
trip to West Africa in summer 1948. During his talks with 
Gold Coast officials, the question of consumer goods 
shortages inevitably arose, an issue of special importance 
in view of the forthcoming increase in cocoa prices and the 
spur to inflation likely to result. Rees-Williams suggested 
that the only answer was an increased flow of consumer 
goods, and promised that every effort would be made to 
export them to the Gold Coast. However, he also asked local 
officials whether factories could not be established in the 
territory to manufacture consumer goods, adding that the CDC 
would be very interested in this sort of development114. The 
response of local officials was significantly lukewarm. The 
Secretary for Commerce and Industries explained that the 
111 Ibid., Lloyd to Burns (Accra), 3 Mar 1947. 
112 CO 537/3227, 'CO Internal Report', Nov 1948. 
113 Col. no. 231, Re port of the Commission of Enquiry into 
Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948,8 June 1948. 
114 CO 852/801/1, minutes of meeting held by Rees-Williams 
in Accra, 22 Aug 1948. 
323 
Gold Coast had few raw materials other than agricultural 
produce, and that for industries based on anything else, the 
raw materials would have to be imported. When told by the 
Secretary for Rural Development that the question of 
industrialisation had not yet been thoroughly examined, 
Rees-William replied that it was of the first importance, 
and must be considered carefully. The promotion of industry 
had already been recommended by the Watson Commission115. 
Officials in Accra were no more encouraging about the 
Industrial Development Corporation which the Gold Coast had 
recently created. The Corporation was expected to 
concentrate on minor projects, such as the manufacture of 
starch from tapioca and cassava. Rees-Williams asked whether 
the Corporation planned to establish and manage any 
industries itself, but was told that the intention was to 
foster private enterprise rather than to engage directly in 
production. As a result of this disappointing exchange, it 
was decided that the possibility of establishing factories 
for consumer goods should be considered116. 
The apparent apathy of local officials was particularly 
worrying for the Colonial office because of the importance 
increasingly attached to the colonial state as the engine of 
development. It also appeared paradoxical, given that 
contemporary studies suggested that in the colonies as a 
whole, the state controlled about half the current 
investmentl17. In Rees-William is opinion, the West African 
115 Col. no. 231, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into 
Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948,8 June 1948. 
116 CO 852/801/1, minutes of meeting held by Rees-Williams 
in Accra, 22 Aug 1948. 
117 CAB 134/65, Report of the CDWP (Revised), 11 Oct 1948. 
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territories were confronting the problems of the modern 
world with little of the machinery or outlook of the modern 
state: 
Some of the senior officials seem to regard 
modern planning as just the most recent fad. First it was indirect rule, then social 
welfare, later m! rp education and now economic development 8 41 
The attitudes and capacities of local administrators were, 
it seemed, a key obstacle to implementing the more 
interventionist development policies identified by 
Colonial Office as necessary. 
The Role of Private Enterprise 
the 
If the West African local governments showed little 
ability to take an initiatory role in development, what 
prospects were there for private enterprise to take the 
lead? The British government's attitudes towards the role of 
private enterprise in development were summarised by Rees- 
Williams in July 1948: 
I personally do not believe that private 
enterprise was ever able to do the job of 
developing the Colonial Empire, and we do not 
believe that private enterprise would be able 
to do the 
l9b. 
That is the whole bedrock of 
our policy . 
Since early 1947, awareness had grown in London that without 
substantial private enterprise in the colonies, governments 
would increasingly have to take the place of the private 
investor, examining available resources, deciding what form 
development should take, and providing the capital and 
118 CO 537/3226, 'West African Tour - 1948', 27 Sept 1948. 
119 PD(C) 454, col. 611,22 July 1948. 
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organisation required120. It was, unsurprisingly, at the 
same time that the Colonial Office's discussions on 
development corporations were resumed. 
Yet the expatriate firms operating in west Africa were 
not indifferent to development in this period. As in the 
latter years of the war, they continued to show an interest 
in diversification into industrial projects. For example, 
among the schemes submitted to the CDC by Nigeria in the 
first half of 1948 were two such proposals. The first was a 
scheme to establish a machine-spinning industry to process 
locally-produced and ginned cotton. This, it was hoped, 
would encourage the peasant hand-weaving industry by 
providing increased supplies of better quality yarn. While 
the Nigerian government did not intend to participate in the 
scheme, the United Africa Company and other firms were said 
121 to be interested. 
The second scheme was a proposal to establish a factory 
to make produce bags out of locally grown fibres. This would 
save expenditure on imported jute sacks and ensure a supply 
of bags for Nigeria's own export crops. Again, the 
government did not intend to participate beyond ensuring an 
adequate supply of suitable fibres, but the UAC was said to 
be considering taking part in the scheme122. 
Although there was continuing evidence, therefore, that 
expatriate enterprise was interested in local industrial 
development, the critical impediment remained that local 
120 CO 847/36/2, CCAG 2nd meeting, 11 Feb 1947. 
121 CO 537/3031, 'Schemes submitted by Nigeria to the 
CDC', 
9 June 1948. 
122 Ibid.. 
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attitudes to firms like the UAC were hostile. Recognition of 
this problem in London was not confined to the Colonial 
Office. In its report on colonial development, the Select 
Committee on Estimates warned that private enterprise could 
not participate fully in development as long as the belief 
existed among the colonial peoples that outside firms 
exploited them unfairly123. The Committee took the problem 
of African hostility to the firms seriously. One of its 
members, Sir Ralph Glyn, subsequently wrote to Sir Thomas 
Lloyd on the subject. He noted the 'immense' contribution 
which the UAC had made to Nigerian development, but added 
that the very fact that the Company was so powerful and 
virtually monopolistic constituted a deterrent to the 
emergence of smaller private enterprise. 
I think all of us on the Committee felt that 
this was a most unfortunate position, and 
that anything that could be done to attract 
capital investment in the country by concerns 
other than the United Africa Company wf-. d be 
greatly to the benefit of the Africans . 
The Watson Commission found that among local grievances 
in the Gold Coast about consumer goods was the 
'monopolistic' position of the importing firms, and the 
consequent restriction of African enterprise125. Similarly, 
Rees-Williams commented on local attitudes towards the 
European firms following his visit to West Africa, regarding 
the question as being of the 'highest' political importance: 
123 H. C. 181, Fifth Report of the Select Committee on 
Estimates. Session 1947-48. Colonial Development, 30 July 
1948. 
124 Co 852/855/4, letter, 12 Sept 1948. 
125 Col. no. 231, Report of the Commission of Enquiry 
into 
Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948,8 June 1948. 
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Everywhere I met hostility towards the big import houses, especially U. A. C., among Europeans as much as among Africans. 
In his view, it was on its treatment of the firms more than 
anything else that the Labour Government would be judged126. 
Officials in London found that their freedom of action 
was restricted by the hostility which Rees-Williams 
described. For example, in July 1948, at an 
interdepartmental meeting held to discuss the supply of 
consumer goods to West Africa, the suggestion was made that 
the problem should be discussed with the expatriate firms 
trading in the region. These talks were not arranged, 
however, because Governor Creasy of the Gold Coast feared 
that they might reinforce local suspicions of collusion 
1 between colonial officials and the firms27. 
Late in 1948, active consideration was being given by 
the Labour Party, through its Sub-Committee on Industries 
for Nationalisation, to the case for taking the UAC into 
public ownership. This case did not rest on allegations that 
the Company made excessive profits. Since the UAC published 
no accounts, its profit levels were unknown, but the Sub- 
Committee accepted, as the Nowell Commission had in 1937, 
that they were not unduly high. Moreover, nationalisation 
was not regarded as an appropriate solution to the question 
of profits, as other controls existed or could be applied if 
128 necessary. 
126 CO 537/3226, 'West African Tour - 1948', 27 Sept 1948. 
127 Morgan (1980) II1 p. 15. 
128 Rhodes House Library, MSS Brit. Emp. s332, Creech Jones 
Papers, ACJ 45/1, ff13-14, Labour Party Sub-Committee on 
Industries for Nationalisation, 'The United Africa Company', 
Oct 1948. 
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More important, in the Sub-Committee's view, were the 
restrictive effects on development arising from the 
Company's activities. The UAC, whose primary interest was 
trade, was alleged to have deliberately stifled industrial 
development in West Africa. Although the Company might point 
to the industrial enterprises which it had established and 
operated in the area, and claim an interest in any similar 
profitable schemes, this was not felt to evade the basic 
problem that the Company's need to make a profit meant that 
it would have to set the profits accruing from local 
manufacturing against the loss of profits from trade129. 
Furthermore, the Company was suspected of opposing new 
developments outside its control, and of hostility to 
African enterprise. 
What West Africa needs is a great trading 
organisation that will help to develop local 
enterprise by offering contracts, advice, and 
assistance; instead, it gets a great 
organisation which, by its very nature, must 
have, and has had, just the opposite effect. 
This led the Sub-Committee to what it considered to be the 
strongest element in the case for nationalisation: the fact 
that the Company's organisation could then be used to 
promote economic development, in which industrialisation 
would be prominent. The UAC structure was seen as the ideal 
foundation for a consumer co-operative system in West 
Africa, a system which would have little chance of 
establishing itself in competition with the Company. 
Reinforcing these arguments was the political case for 
nationalisation: 
The U. A. C. is thoroughly detested in West 
Africa, not so much because of its profits 
129 Ibid.. 
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(though exaggerated notions are held on this 
subject) but rather because, in the economic 
sphere, it is widely believed to have 
sabotaged the development of native 
enterprise and of secondary industries, and in the political sphere, it has obviously 
wielded great power in the past, and had 
excessive influence upon Governors and upon Secretaries of State. 
While it was no longer thought that the political charge was 
applicable, because the hostility of local administrators to 
the UAC was so marked, Britain could no longer afford, 
politically, to maintain an institution so resented by local 
African leaders, to whom 
the U. A. C. is the instrument and the symbol 
of British economic imperialism, and they 
will never have full confidence in the 
British government as long as they continue 
to see the co any's tentacles everywhere 
that they turn l3ý 
Late 1948, however, was an unpropitious time for discussions 
on nationalising the Company, given the Labour government's 
shift towards 'consolidation' instead of further extensions 
of public ownership. Nevertheless, in light of Rees- 
William Is report, and possibly in response to pressure from 
Labour's colonial specialists, Creech Jones called for a 
detailed study of the organisation of West African trade, 
with particular reference to the position of the big trading 
. companies131 
The Colonial Development Corporation 
Continuing doubts about the adequacy of local 
development machinery, combined with the problems arising 
from the activities of private enterprise, account for the 
130 Ibid.. 
131 CO 537/3561, minute by Poynton, 7 Oct 1948. 
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importance attached by the Colonial Office to the creation 
of the Colonial Development Corporation, and for official 
disappointment with the latter's initial role. 
The Corporation, intended to be commercial and self - 
supporting, enjoyed a high degree of operational 
independence, and wide discretion in judging the commercial 
soundness of schemes proposed to it132. A rift snnn 
developed between the Colonial Office and the Corporation's 
chairman, Lord Trefgarne, who was determined to preserve his 
freedom of action, and who took as scriptural the injunction 
to bind the CDC's activities to strictly commercial 
principles. Advocates of this commercial role, and of the 
CDC's bias towards projects of direct benefit to Britain, 
justified their position by claiming that the immediate 
developmental needs of the colonies had already been met by 
successive CD &W Acts. The Colonial Office was even obliged 
to resist, successfully, Treasury attempts to use CD &W 
l3 funds to finance the new Corporation3. 
Ironically, the CDC, designed as a vehicle for 
development acceptable to colonial opinion, itself became a 
target for colonial criticism, especially in West Africa, to 
the Colonial Office's dismay. The creation of the 
Corporation did nothing to reduce intense local suspicion of 
anything which could be interpreted as exploitation by 
outside capital, whether its source was private or public 
investment. The CDC soon came to be regarded as a vehicle 
for exploitation, not development. A key problem was the 
132 CO 852/875/1, 'The Colonial Development Corporation. 
Method of Operation', 5 Dec 1947. 
133 CO 537/2002, note of informal discussion at Treasury, 14 
May 1947. 
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Corporation's commercial character, which precluded 
involvement in urgently required, though not immediately 
profitable, development projects. The influential Pan- 
Africanist, George Padmore, described the CDC as: 
a system of State Capitalism, 
behalf of the Labour Governmen- 
executives working for a 
Corporation rather than for 
This const . rtes a new form 
Imperialism 40 
operated on 




It had been recognised at an early stage in preparing the 
Overseas Resources Development Bill that the Corporation 
might be exposed to charges of exploitation. Consequently, 
particular stress was placed on the mutual benefits to be 
derived from development. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged 
that the entire question would have to be handled carefully 
when plans for the CDC were made public135. Bevin, 
especially, was concerned at the international political 
implications which might arise if Britain's colonial policy 
appeared to be exploitative. As he told Attlee: 
We must be careful that our plans for the 
development of our Colonial Dependencies 
cannot in any way be represented as springing 
solely from our own selfish interests. It is 
above all important that in their 
presentation there is no possible suggestion 
of exploitation of the colonial populations. 
In either case we may find ourselves exposed 
to bitter criticism in the United Nations and 
be obliged to defend ourselves against quite 
baseless charges. We know from experience 
that the possibilities of misrl p; esentation 
in this field are almost endless 40 
The Colonial Office's sensitivity to the scope for 
allegations of exploitation is illustrated by its attitude 
134 Quoted in Empire, November 1948. 
135 Co 999/1, CEDC 13th minutes, 10 Mar 1947. 
136 PREM 8/456, letter, 4 Oct 1947. 
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towards the proposed activities of the CDC's sister 
organisation, the Overseas Food Corporation, responsible to 
the Ministry of Food. The Office was afraid of reactions in 
the colonies to a large new body whose primary function was 
to obtain food for the British consumer. Ivor Thomas warned 
Attlee: 
There is in many parts of the Colonial 
Empire, particularly in West Africa, a deep- 
rooted suspicion of all large-scale 
enterprises from overseas, a suspicion which 
may not have been altogether unjustified in 
the past. A Labour Government should not run 
any danger of appearing to introduce a new 
and more lptent 
form of capitalist 
exploitation 0 
In this instance, the Colonial Office successfully 
established the principle that the OFC should not operate in 
the colonies except at the express invitation of the 
13 Colonial Secretary8. 
In mid-1948, the whole question of the CDC's role was 
reviewed by Andrew Cohen, a key figure in the evolution of 
the Colonial Office's thinking on development corporations. 
In Cohen's view, the CDC's participation in West African 
projects highlighted the suspicion felt by local political 
elites towards external capital139. The elites did not 
always distinguish between state enterprise, which re- 
invested profits locally, and private enterprise, whose aim 
was primarily to extract a profit. The result was a tendency 
to impose conditions on the CDC's prospective operations 
which discouraged it from entering West Africa. The 
137 Ibid., 'Definition of functions of Colonial Development 
Corporation and Overseas Food Corporation', 1 Oct 1947. 
138 Ibid.. 
139 CO 537/3033, minute, 17 June 1948. 
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Corporation's lack of enthusiasm for the region was 
reinforced by uncertainty over future political 
developments, especially in the Gold Coast. The CDC, in 
Cohen's view, had to be reassured. Economically, both 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast were comparatively poor in 
natural resources necessary for heavy industry to develop, 
but both had great agricultural and other possibilities. 
Unless all available resources were applied to these 
territories, which together constituted half the population 
of the colonial empire, there would be a major gap in the 
policy of developing colonial economic resources fully. 
Furthermore, noted Cohen, the tendency in West Africa was 
going to be towards rapid political advance, , more rapid, 
indeed, than the capabilities of the people would justify on 
merits', and it would be impossible to decelerate the rate 
of advance to a pace preferable to local authorities if they 
enjoyed 'complete discretion'. Therefore, it was essential 
for economic development to keep in step with political 
development. The problem hitherto had been that it had not 
kept pace. In Cohen's opinion, this made it all the more 
necessary to devise suitable mechanisms for public or semi- 
public investment. 
I have been pressing for a Development 
Corporation for West Africa ever since 1943 
and now that we have it (and in the light of 
developments since 1943 both political and 
economic) I can think of nothing more 
important to West Africa, or indeed to Africa 
as a whole, than the devising of proper 
machinery to enable14Ö e Corporation to 
operate in West Africa . 
Moreover, Cohen did not think that political uncertainties 
or 'theoretical political objections' should prevent the CDC 
140 Ibid.. 
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from entering West Africa, and indulged in a rare piece of 
speculation on the economic implications of decolonisation: 
Political development towards self-government 
will go forward whatever happens and it seems to me that the future of the British 
relationship with West Africa demands that as the West African Territories get greater 
political freedom they should be more closely linked to the United Kingdom econP cally both for their own advantage and ours 
West Africa, Cohen argued, was 'desperately' short of 
economic services, technical skill and the apparatus of 
economic development, and could not progress without outside 
investment, a point which he believed Africans would come to 
recognise once they acquired an increasingly important role 
in the direction of economic policy. 
Provided, therefore, that we play our cards 
properly, I believe that there is a very real 
future for United Kingdom investment in west 
Africa. 
However, the problems would be greater if the medium chosen 
for investment by Britain was private, monopolistic capital. 
This, thought Cohen, was a further argument for persuading 
the CDC to enter the region. There remained the problem of 
devising appropriate machinery. Reviving the original 
intention when the CDC was being planned, Cohen suggested 
the creation of a subsidiary, local corporation, providing 
for local participation and local directors142. The growing 
importance of associating 'representative local opinion' 
with the CDC's work was underlined in the fifth report of 
the Select Committee on Estimates, published soon after 




By summer 1948, relations between the Colonial Office 
and the CDC were already strained. Officials found the 
attitude of the CDC's Chairman, Lord Trefgarne, particularly 
disturbing. Trefgarne had promised to inform the Office of 
the CDC's intentions, but had made the unacceptable 
condition that this information should not be passed on to 
local governments, and in practice, adequate information had 
not been forthcoming. The Colonial Office warned Trefgarne 
that without details of the schemes being proposed, the 
CDC's requests for funds could not be considered. As Caine 
observed of Trefgarne: 
In effect, he is asking that the Corporation 
be treated as an authority with greater 
independence of Government control and 
superviT an than any private concern in the 
country 
When Colonial Office and CDC representatives met in July 
1948, Trefgarne announced that the CDC had decided to set up 
five regional corporations, one to be based in West Africa. 
This, he explained, was the first step in creating the 
Corporation's overseas organisation and would not 
necessarily be permanent. Trefgarne suggested that the West 
African corporation might be based in Lagos. Caine pointed 
out the disadvantage of trying to operate new enterprises in 
the Gold Coast from a base in Nigeria, but Trefgarne replied 
that conditions in the Gold Coast 'did not seem at all 
favourable', and that he doubted whether the Corporation 
would have any substantial undertakings there. It was agreed 
that care would be needed when the announcement of the new 
143 H. C. 181, Fifth Report from the Select Committee on 
Estimates. Session 1947-48. Colonial Development, 30 June 
1948. 
144 CO 537/3031, minute, 26 June 1948. 
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body was made, and that it would be helpful if its form 
could be agreed with the Governor of the Gold Coast, Sir 
145 Gerald Creasy. 
Trefgarne had already attracted criticism during a 
speech at Liverpool in June. Referring to political problems 
in the colonies, he had warned that the CDC would not invest 
in territories where there was 'a political obsession 
against the good faith of the United Kingdom', and suggested 
that allegations of exploitation stemmed from communist 
agitation. The Fabian Colonial Bureau reacted strongly to 
Trefgarne's comments, deploring the implication that 
political 'strings' might be attached to British investment, 
and arguing that claims that colonial discontent was the 
work of communists was 'calculated to drive the colonial 
peoples into the arms of Communism, and to magnify whatever 
sense of grievance they already have'146. The Colonial 
Office was particularly concerned when the press 
announcement of the creation of the CDC (West Africa) Ltd. 
omitted any reference to participation in the Gold Coast147. 
Cohen was led to re-emphasise his belief that 
any impression that we are seeking to squeeze 
the Gold Coast out of C. D. C. assistance 
because of alleged anti-British tendencies 
there can only have a most deplorable effect 
on the relations between the Gold Coast and 
this country and that the effect will not, of 
course, be purely political but will also 
. 
148 
extend into all economic activities 
145 CO 537/3033, note of second monthly meeting with CDC, 12 
July 1948. 
146 FCB 51/2, ff17-18, Hinden to Creech Jones, 6 July 1948. 
147 CO 537/3033, minute by Gorell Barnes, 9 Aug 1948. 
148 Ibid., minute, 9 Aug 1948. 
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Cohen considered a change of policy by the CDC essential, 
together with moves to make good the damage already done149. 
Officials were subsequently mollified by Trefgarne's 
proposal to reply, if asked, that in accordance with the 
wishes of the Governor of the Gold Coast, a separate 
organisation would be established to deal with any large 
undertaking in the Gold Coast150. The importance of 
stressing to the CDC that even more than finance, Africans 
required managerial and technical training towards 
industrial development was one of the major recommendations 
made by Rees-Williams on the basis of what he had seen in 
West Africa in summer 1948. In his view, it was necessary to 
convince the CDC that it was the Africans' 'great hope', and 
that there was no need for the Corporation to fear operating 
151 in the Gold Coast. 
Proposals for industrial development 
During 1948, developments at the local level obliged 
the Colonial office to turn its attention from the general 
principles of industrial policy to specifics. An appropriate 
example was the case of textile development in West Africa. 
As during the war, the possibilities of developing textile 
industries in the region received continuing attention. When 
the Colonial Office reviewed development opportunities early 
in 1948, Stockdale singled out this sector's potential, 
149 Ibid.. 
150 Ibid., minute by Gorell Barnes, 12 Aug 1948. 
151 CO 537/3226, 'West African Tour - 1948', 27 Sept 1948. 
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based on locally-grown cotton152. It was subsequently 
acknowledged that a proposal to establish a cotton textiles 
factory in Nigeria 'some years ago' (presumably a reference 
to the Haighton's scheme discussed earlier) had collapsed 
because the government refused to guarantee that the 
factory's products would not be subject to an excise duty 
equivalent to the import duty levied on cotton piece- 
goods153. 
In November 1948, W. A. Lewis put forward a proposal 
which, he said, gave the British government an opportunity 
to implement its often-stated desire to assist colonial 
industrialisation, and to demonstrate that it did not 
intend to maintain the colonies as sources of cheap raw 
materials. Prompted by the serious colonial shortage of 
textiles, and by reports that peasants were in consequence 
refusing to grow more, Lewis suggested that some of the 
textile machinery made idle by the current labour shortage 
in Lancashire could be obtained cheaply and used to develop 
colonial textile industries. His argument was that much of 
this machinery would never again be used in Lancashire, 
partly because of the labour shortage, and partly because 
British cotton manufacturers were anxious to re-equip with 
modern plant. Anticipating the likely reaction that this 
would endanger British interests, Lewis claimed that 
Lancashire was resigned to losing much of the colonial 
market for cotton goods once Indian, Chinese and Japanese 
production regained momentum. Furthermore, he argued, the 
152 T220/26, CDWP(48)7, 'Possible development projects 
in 
the British Colonies', 14 Jan 1948. 
153 CO 852/875/2, CDWP(48)28, note by CO, 'Control of 
capital investment in the Colonies', 3 May 1948. 
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future of Lancashire lay with producing quality goods, and 
if colonial cotton industries developed, mass-producing 
countries rather than Britain would feel the impact most154. 
Lewis believed that local cotton industries would not 
only stimulate agricultural production, but would also 
provide work in colonies where unemployment was a problem, 
for example in the West Indies, and improve these economies 
by diversifying them and creating new opportunities for 
talent. Moreover, he judged this a rare instance where 
surplus British plant existed and could be delivered 
immediately, and argued that colonial demand for textiles 
was such that local manufacturing would be bound to pay its 
way, at least in the short term. Although some expertise 
would have to be supplied, Lewis explained that this would 
be true of all development. He suggested that the CDC might 
take the initiative in starting industries, possibly in 
partnership with an experienced private entrepreneur, 
withdrawing after an initial period. He advocated 
establishing fully integrated manufacturing, incorporating 
weaving, knitting and finishing. Weaving and knitting were 
relatively simple processes, and the CDC could quickly pass 
on its interests in them, once local enterprise was 
proficient. Spinning, however, was a large-scale operation, 
responsibility for which would, Lewis thought, 
have to 
remain longer with the Corporation155. 
The Colonial office's response was to circulate among 
the CEDC a memorandum describing two colonial 
textile 
154 CO 852/896/1, CEDC(48)32 Annex A, 'Colonial 
Textile 
Industries. Suggestion by Professor Lewis', 8 Nov 1948. 
155 Ibid.. 
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projects under consideration, both in Nigeria. The first was 
the scheme, previously referred to, submitted by the 
Nigerian government to the CDC to establish a mechanised 
spinning industry to process locally produced and ginned 
cotton. A site for a spinning mill had been chosen at 
Onitsha, on the Niger. It was proposed that the mill should 
consist of 8,600 spindles, to be increased by 1949 to 17,500 
spindles, and would require one million pounds of cotton per 
annum initially, rising to two million pounds. The Nigerian 
government estimated that the necessary plant and equipment 
would cost L215,000156 
The second scheme was a plan being contemplated by the 
Commonwealth Investment Trust Ltd. to build a spinning mill 
with a capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 spindles. The intention 
was to form a subsidiary company with capital of L250,000, 
in which the Nigerian government had agreed in principle to 
participate up to a limit of L150,000. This company would 
include representatives of the government and local 
'unofficials'. The government had also suggested that the 
CDC might invest in the Trust's subsidiary company, leaving 
the company in control, and was also keen to enable Nigerian 
investors to subscribe to the subsidiary's capital. 
Negotiations, explained the Colonial Office, were being 
conducted by the CDC and the Commonwealth Trust. However, 
the Trust's managing director had revised the costs of the 
scheme dramatically, estimating that the spinning machinery 
alone for a factory of 20,000 spindles would cost about 
L300,000, and that the equipment for a 600 loom factory 
156 Ibid., CEDC(48)32 Annex B, note by CO, 'Colonial Textile 
Industries', 8 Nov 1948. 
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would cost around L100,000. When additional costs, such as 
power and housing, were taken into account, it was judged 
that a scheme on the scale contemplated would cost between 
L750,000 and one million pounds157. In reply to Lewis's 
proposal to use redundant plant from Lancashire, the 
Colonial Office claimed that this had been considered, but 
that although a great deal of surplus machinery existed, not 
all of it was suitable for use in the colonies. However, it 
was conceded that in some cases the advantage in price and 
early supply might outweigh the disadvantage of not 
158 obtaining modern equipment. 
Furthermore, because colonial industries would have to 
compete in the world market, it was argued that they should 
be equipped with the most modern machinery available. It was 
therefore felt that colonial industries would be 
disadvantaged if equipped with machinery which, although 
adequate at present, was soon liable to become obsolete 
quickly and would have to be replaced with new plant. The 
Colonial Office's conclusion perpetuated the arguments which 
had dominated the debate on industrialisation since the late 
1930s: 
To establish industries in the Colonies which 
are not likely for one reason or another to 
be able to compete successfully, as soon as 
they have been properly established, is 
liable to do more harm than good in the long 
výoping secondary run to the cause of de 
industries in the Colonies 
When it discussed the Colonial Office's paper in 





seizing opportunities for textile development, and suggested 
that the Cotton Board's views should be sought160. The 
Board's subsequent discussions demonstrated that 
Lancashire's traditional hostility to overseas textile 
industrialisation had not abated. Sir Raymond Streat 
considered that in the existing 'unsettled' state of the 
world, it would be undesirable to promote such development. 
The Board sought to persuade the Colonial Office of the need 
for prior consultation before any steps were taken to 
stimulate the development of colonial textile industries. 
Particularly interesting was the Board's dismissal of 
Lewis's belief that Lancashire saw its future in exporting 
high quality textiles: the colonies, it seems, were still 
regarded as valuable outlets for cheaper lines. The Board 
emphasised that where such development was proposed in order 
to raise colonial living standards, it should proceed along 
lines least damaging to Britain's export trade161. These 
attitudes suggested little progression in Lancashire's 
thinking since the war: indeed, they were evidence of a 
considerable regression since the mid-war years when Streat 
had appeared to be seeking a constructive means for 
Lancashire to adjust to changing world conditions. More 
disturbing, perhaps, was the Colonial office's brief 
response to the Board, disclaiming any intention of pursuing 
the general question of cotton textile development at that 
stage162. The records are reticent in explaining the 
160 Ibid., CEDC(48)6th meeting, 15 Nov 1948; ibid., 
CEDC(48)7th meeting, 20 Dec 1948. 
161 BT 175/5, CB 7330a, CB(1948)17th meeting, 14 Dec 1948. 
162 Ibid., CB 7420a, CB(48)21st meeting, 4 Feb 1949. 
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Colonial Office's attitude. However, two factors may be 
relevant. First, given the continuing physical constraints 
on industrial development, together with recent confirmation 
that the subject was still controversial, it was easier for 
the office to deal with proposals to establish manufacturing 
industry as they arose, rather than to risk generating 
consolidated opposition from Whitehall and from British 
exporters by airing the question in terms of general policy. 
Secondly, the supply of textiles to West Africa improved 
significantly during 1948. Thus, total cotton piece goods 
imports into Nigeria rose from 104,852,000 square yards in 
1947 to 124,969,000 square yards in 1948, chiefly due to a 
massive recovery in supplies from Germany and Japan. 
Similarly, in the Gold Coast, cotton piece goods imports 
rose from 42,651,000 square yards in 1947 to 62,324,000 
square yards in 1948163. It was precisely the resurgence of 
German and Japanese competition in textile exports which 
reinforced the Cotton Board's resistance to the 
encouragement of local colonial industries which might erode 
Britain's market share still further. With the relative 
easing of the supply problem during 1948, one pressing 
incentive for the Colonial office to explore the scope for 
local manufacturing in West Africa had been removed. 
By late 1948, opinions outside the Colonial office on 
what was achievable in development were noticeably more 
sober than they had been eighteen months earlier. This was 
reflected in the Colonial Development Working Party's broad 
conclusions, which seemed to vindicate the Colonial office 
163 Statistical Abstract of the British Commonwealth No. 71, 
(1951). 
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by acknowledging the need to promote a wider view of 
development. One lesson learned from the CDWP's efforts was 
that any attempt to introduce major schemes for rapid 
economic development might seriously disrupt the colonial 
164 economies. This view, as already noted, was accepted by 
the high-ranking Cabinet Economic Policy Committee, which 
endorsed the Working Party's three main conclusions: first, 
that development plans needed to maintain a proper balance 
between economic development and social welfare; secondly, 
that the rate of development would be severely limited by 
shortages of plant and materials in Britain, and by problems 
of adjustment created by large-scale economic development in 
'primitive' communities; and finally, that while resources 
were scarce, they were best applied to restoring and 
improving existing capital and equipment rather than 
initiating new development schemes165. A new sense of 
realism had supplanted the reckless optimism shown in some 
quarters in mid-1947. Patiently, the Colonial Office had 
explained why the approach to development favoured by 
Montgomery, the Select Committee on Estimates and others was 
impracticable. 
In addition to the greater realism evident in London 
late in 1948, there was growing government recognition of 
the scope for allegations that its actions in the colonies 
were exploitative. This encouraged a fresh official emphasis 
on the advantages which both Britain and the colonies could 
derive from development. The acknowledged bias in 
development towards schemes for quick, dollar-earning 
164 CO 852/878/1, EPB(48)13th meeting, 21 Oct 1948. 
165 CAB 134/216, EPC(48)35th meeting, 9 Nov 1948. 
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production acquired a new justification at the hands of the 
Treasury and the CEPS: a 'temporary' bias in development was 
claimed to be necessary to improve Britain's balance of 
payments, restoring the metropolitan economy to a condition 
in which it would be able to devote more resources to 
colonial development166. 
Several Cabinet ministers understood the scope for 
charges of exploitation. Bevin was especially sensitive on 
this point, and was keen to avoid criticism of British 
colonial policy in the United Nations, notably from the 
Soviet Union. The CDC, for instance, appeared to be a prime 
candidate for criticism. The Bill to create the Corporation 
was deliberately combined with legislation to form the 
Overseas Food Corporation, because it was thought that the 
latter, designed to serve British interests, might attract 
adverse comment in the colonies and in the United 
Nations167. This sensitivity surfaced again early in 1948, 
when ministers expressed general support for the rapid 
development of African resources in order to reinforce 
Britain's political and economic position. This prompted the 
Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook, to remind Attlee of the 
potential difficulties of defending such a policy, which 
could easily be interpreted as 'Imperialism', adding that it 
was important for a Labour government to be able to justify 
its actions and not alienate its supporters or 'enlightened' 
168 public opinion 
166 CAB 134/65, Report of the CDWP (Revised), 11 Oct 1948. 
167 E. g., PREM 8/456, Bevin to Attlee, 4 Oct 1947. 
168 CAB 21/1690, minute by Norman Brook, 14 Jan 1948. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE THREADS OF POLICY RESUMED, 1949-1951 
The metropolitan economic background 
The improvement in Britain's balance of payments 
apparent at the end of 1948 proved to be temporary, and in 
1949 a fresh sterling crisis developed, culminating in 
September in the devaluation of the pound. During 1948, the 
Sterling Area's exports rose rapidly, while import controls 
continued. Although this eradicated the overall balance of 
payments deficit, the Sterling Area's dollar deficit 
persisted. 'Marshall Aid', operative from mid-1948, covered 
this deficit until April 1949, but thereafter, Sterling Area 
exports to the United States declined both in volume and 
price. Throughout the first half of 1949, US imports fell, 
largely because the immediate post-war demand released by 
the abolition of wartime controls was diminishing. 
Consequently, between April and June 1949, Britain's deficit 
with the dollar area grew from $330 million to $632 million. 
By June, the prospect again loomed of sterling collapsing, 
with the exhaustion within a year of Britain's gold and 
dollar reserves. In July, Herbert Morrison warned his 
colleagues that exhaustion was imminent1. In these 
circumstances, London saw no alternative to devaluing the 
pound by 30.5 per cent in September 1949. This not only 
ended speculation against the pound but also led to an 
expansion of Sterling Area exports, and, ultimately, to the 
virtual elimination of the Area's dollar trade deficit2. 
1 Cairncross (1985), pp. 22,165-211; Morgan (1980) II, P-29; 
Morgan (1984), pp. 379-88. 
2 Hinds (1987), p. 164. 
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Following devaluation, Britain's overseas trade figures 
and balance of payments improved. By 1950, stability was 
achieved, with the first postwar surplus, and an acceptable 
trade deficit with the dollar area. As exports to the 
Western Hemisphere grew, Britain's reserves continued to 
rise until 19513. During this period, aggregate colonial 
dollar earnings grew, reaching an annual rate of $560 
million in the second half of 1950, compared to 
approximately $200 million in 1948-494. The period ended 
with a new balance of payments crisis in 1951, the product 
of rearmament, spurred by the Korean War, and of the 
increased import prices which the war encouraged. These 
price increases, fuelled by United States strategic 
stockpiling, drew Britain's dollar balance out of a L308 
million credit in 1950 into a deficit of L561 million in the 
second quarter of 19515. The developing US recession led to 
a reduction in imports from the Sterling Area. The colonial 
dollar export surplus, which had reached a monthly level of 
between $15 million and $20 million in April and May 1949, 
was wiped out, threatening a major cut in colonial export 
incomes6. 
As in 1947, so again in 1949 Whitehall examined the 
part the colonial empire could play in easing Britain's 
dollar problems. One working party charged with supplying 
information to the Economic Cooperation Administration 
3 Cairncross (1985), pp. 22,66. 
4 Cmd. 8243, The Colonial Territories (1950-51), (May 1951). 
5 Cairncross (1985), pp. 21,212-33; Pollard (1983), p. 240; 
Morgan (1984), pp. 456-60. 
6 CAB 134/64, CD(49)9, 'Dollar situation and the colonies', 
1 July 1949. 
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proposed an examination of the scope for stimulating 
colonial dollar exports7. The Colonial Office was unlikely 
to welcome any crude policy of boosting colonial dollar 
exports. Experience over the previous two years convinced 
officials that despite the crisis of 1947, colonial 
production had not been put on a purely dollar-earning 
basis, because the metropolitan Government had seen the 
colonies primarily as a source of supply for Britain, either 
of dollar-saving commodities, or of commodities which it 
could not otherwise acquire. An important consequence of 
this had been that the colonial price structure had been 
influenced by that in Britain. It seemed unlikely, 
therefore, that any substantial increase in production for 
export to the USA could occur unless the colonies accepted 
US, rather than UK, prices. This, however, was problematic 
so long as colonies were expected, because of the dollar 
shortage, to buy from the UK at relatively high prices. As 
one official observed, the CEPS was, by mid-1949, concluding 
that the solution might lie not in forcing the colonies to 
sell at lower prices to the USA than in Britain, but for the 
latter to 'draw in its buying horns', not only from the 
dollar area, but from the Sterling Area too. 
Accepting the apparent logic of this conclusion, the 
Colonial office nevertheless feared that it would nullify 
most of the assumptions governing colonial production policy 
over the previous two to three years, especially that 
Britain would remain a stable, long-term market for colonial 
7 CO 852/1039/6, CCD Working party on submission of 
information to ECA, 2nd meeting, 4 July 1949. 
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produce. This would represent a volte face in Britain's 
moral commitments to the colonial economies8. 
Nor was the Colonial Office convinced that a renewed 
'dollar drive' was practicable in the colonial context. 
officials saw little scope for centralised action, since, 
ultimately, the problem was one of selling more colonial 
commodities in dollar markets9. Any attempt to give 
'absolute' priority to dollar exports, as the Cabinet 
Committee on Exports appeared to favour, would raise another 
fundamental problem. As Creech Jones told Cripps in October 
1949, if exports otherwise intended for the colonies were 
diverted to the dollar area, the risk would be that 
relatively small, if immediate, returns would be achieved 
compared to the potentially much greater dollar return 
possible if the same exports went to the colonies. Moreover, 
the success of Britain's continuing attempts to curb 
colonial dollar expenditure would depend largely on the home 
economy's ability and willingness to replace colonial dollar 
imports with its own goods. As Creech Jones asked, in terms 
echoing the Colonial Office's pre-war and wartime concern to 
achieve market stabilisation: 
Is it wise to withhold these exports from 
what is almost certain to be a permanent 
dollar-saving market for a more precarious 
expansion in direct dollar earnings(? ). 
In addition, there might be political repercussions if the 
recent improvements in the colonial supply situation were 
not maintainedl0. 
8 Ibid., minutes by Emanuel and Gorell Barnes, 11 July 1949. 
9 Ibid., minute by Poynton, 28 Sept 1949. 
10 T 229/144, letter to Cripps, 3 Oct 1949. 
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The supply problem 
Despite Creech Jones's reference to recent 
improvements, the supply problem continued to overshadow 
development policy. It was one of the subjects most 
frequently discussed by the cabinet Committee on Colonial 
Development, created late in 1948 at the suggestion of the 
Colonial Development Working Party, and charged with 
reviewing development plans, and progress with them, in 
relation to the government's wider economic policy". When 
London took stock of the situation up to May 1949, it was 
admitted that the overall achievement in development fell 
short of original hopes, mainly due to shortages of 
materials and personnel, and that some colonial governments 
might need to consider whether their initial goals had been 
realistic given these continuing constraints12. 
Early in 1949, the Colonial Office decided to convene a 
conference of colonial supply officers in London to discuss 
import programming plans and the need for continued 
restraint, and to examine the relative desirability of 
different countries as sources of supply-3. Whitehall feared 
that a conference, through which details of the dollar 
ceilings on each colony's imports would for the first time 
become generally known among the colonial governments, might 
encourage combined opposition to the system of import 
controls14. 
11 CAB 134/65, Report of the CDWP, 11 Oct 1948. 
12 CO 852/1041/1, CEDC(49)19, memo. on review of colonial 
development plans, 12 May 1949. 
13 Morgan (1980) II1 pp. 23-4. 
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Meanwhile, problems had arisen, over price 
differentials in colonial imports. The dollar ceilings 
imposed on colonial imports during 1948 meant that goods 
from 'hard' currency sources were generally excluded, even 
when cheaper than 'soft' currency equivalents. The Colonial 
Office, fearing political complications, noted that while 
Britain imposed fixed prices for colonial produce, it did 
not reciprocate with fixed prices for sterling exports to 
the colonies. The question was referred to the Committee on 
Colonial Development in March 1949. The Colonial office did 
not envisage colonial governments being authorised to buy 
'hard' goods wherever prices of 'soft' imports were higher 
by a given percentage: instead, officials favoured asking 
colonial administrations to report instances where, under 
existing instructions, they would have to buy soft imports 
at unjustifiably high prices compared to similar hard 
currency items, and believed that London should be prepared 
to adjust colonial dollar ceilings accordingly15. 
The Colonial Office considered the existing 
instructions on import licensing, issued in September 1947, 
too restrictive, for example in forbidding licences for 
imports unlikely to yield 'substantial' earnings or savings 
of dollars. Officials wanted dollar imports required for 
development to be permitted, regardless of whether the 
development would promote dollar earning or saving (though 
in keeping with the Colonial Development Working Party s 
guidelines), provided the supplies were unavailable from 
soft sources, or only at substantially higher prices and 
14 CAB 134/64, CCD 2nd meeting, 25 Jan 1949. 
15 CAB 134/65, CD(49)10, 'Price differentials in colonial 
imports', 30 Mar 1949. 
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after long delays16. The Office wanted to establish a level 
of price difference beyond which the colonies should not be 
pressed to buy from Britain. The CCD believed that if the 
full political value were to be derived from any concessions 
made, these should be publicised and any special 
arrangements applied to the whole colonial empire'7. 
Whitehall recognised the need to forestall any 
suspicions that Britain was protecting her colonial markets 
through import controls. Consequently, the CCD stressed that 
colonies should regard all soft currency sources, not only 
Britain, as the alternative to dollar supplies. Moreover, 
the Committee considered that the work of British export 
promotion in the colonies should be undertaken through 
separate channels, such as the Board of Trade commissioners, 
who, it was felt, should be ready to seize the opportunities 
at hand18. 
The period 1949-51 saw continuing evidence that 
colonial markets were highly prized, at least by certain 
sectors of British manufacturing industry, for example, 
Lancashire cotton. Although Lancashire's fortunes had 
improved following the war, with demand exceeding the 
industry's capacity to meet, fears of competition in 
overseas markets from the German and Japanese textile 
industries soon re-emerged. Moreover, US exports remained 
much greater in volume than they had been before the war. 
Thus, although total world exports of cotton goods had 
reached some 89 per cent of their pre-1939 level, Britain's 
16 Ibid., CD(49)16,11 Apr 1949. 
17 CAB 134/64, CD(49)5th meeting, 12 Apr 1949. 
18 Ibid.. 
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share of this had declined from 27 per cent to 15 per 
cent19. At the Colonial Supplies Conference in June 1949, 
Sir Raymond Streat told delegates that the colonies were 
'most important' to Lancashire's future, offering the most 
'assured' markets, given their rising populations and the 
improved living standards expected to result from 
development. According to the Cotton Board's estimate, total 
world exports in 1952 would be 15 per cent below their pre- 
war level; however, total colonial imports would be some 16 
per cent above the pre-war figure. Before the war, 
Lancashire had enjoyed about one third of this trade, and 
hoped to secure at least half of it in the future. Whereas 
before the war, 15 per cent of Britain's cotton exports had 
gone to the colonies, by 1949 40 per cent of all orders on 
hand were for these territories. Nevertheless, the recent 
decline in colonial orders alarmed Lancashire, and Streat 
emphasised that the metropolitan cotton industry would 
'never' be able to compete in prices with Japan. If the 
colonies were to choose their imports according to price, he 
explained, Lancashire would be finished20. 
The Nigerian representative at the conference spoke of 
feelings in West Africa that Lancashire had missed a 
'tremendous opportunity' to expand its post-war trade. Since 
1947, when the system of allocating supplies was abolished, 
imports from Britain had declined: of 125 million square 
yards of cloth imported into Nigeria, for example, only 35 
million square yards were from Britain. This, it was 
19 N. R. Buxton and D. H. Aldcroft (eds), British industry 
between the wars, (1979), p. 44. 
20 CO 852/834/3, Colonial Supplies Conference, minutes, 10 
June 1949. 
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claimed, was resented by the local population, who allegedly 
disliked Japanese goods, and without measures to restore 
trade with Britain, the problem might have political 
consequences21. 
In September 1949, Streat warned the Cotton Board that 
it was 'vitally' important for Lancashire to increase 
supplies to colonial markets, arguing that as other markets 
became less penetrable, colonial markets would acquire a 
growing value. Unless Lancashire increased its supplies to 
colonial markets, it would lack a stake in them large enough 
to warrant colonial authorities acting to protect British 
interests, risking a loss of colonial trade and further 
contraction at home22. 
Although in May 1949, the CCD was informed of the 'very 
satisfactory' colonial gold and dollar surplus of $260 
million, some $50 million higher than the 1948 figure, the 
overall sterling area position soon eclipsed this hopeful 
indicator. At the end of May, the CCD was told that the 
(Cabinet) Economic Policy Committee had endorsed the 
suggestion by the official Committee on Economic Development 
that all dollar expenditure, except Britain's own dollar 
imports, should be reviewed with the goal of further 
economies. The Colonial office, with one eye on price 
differentials, considered that the entire field of dollar 
21 Ibid.; see also Dupree (1987), Vol. II p. 503. 
22 BT 175/5, CB 7860a, CB 35th meeting, 6 Sept 1949. Fears 
for Lancashire's future persisted. In July 1950, the 
President of the Board of Trade reminded the Economic Policy 
Committee of the need to act to deal with Japanese 
competition in colonial markets, arguing that agreements on 
this reached between Japan and the Sterling Area 
late in 
1948 were no longer adequate [See CAB 134/226, EPC(50)82, 
'Colonial textile requirements from Japan 1950/51', 25 July 
1950]. 
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saving should be examined, and that any cuts should not fall 
solely on the colonies, dependent as they were on dollar 
imports if soft supplies were unavailable23. With the 
Treasury urging every effort to ensure that dollar 
expenditure in 1949-50 was the 'absolute minimum', the 
Colonial office argued that colonial spending had already 
been reduced to essentials, and that any further attempts to 
switch from dollar to soft sources would accentuate the 
price differential problem, and warned that an 'excessively 
stringent' attitude on London's part might create political 
difficulties in the colonies, undermining the entire purpose 
of the exercise24. 
The CCD accepted that a cut in colonial dollar 
expenditure would be defensible only if a similar amount 
were deducted from the estimates of colonial dollar 
receipts, themselves based on optimistic assessments. Even 
the CEPS, previously insensitive to colonial needs, conceded 
that there was little prospect of cuts being made without 
lowering colonial living standards, especially since food 
imports represented around forty per cent of total colonial 
imports25. 
In July 1949, the CCD was told that the colonial dollar 
balance of payments surplus, hitherto between $15 and $20 
million per month, had virtually disappeared, owing largely 
to the United States' recession and its effects on US 
purchases of colonial commodities. This threatened not only 
to reduce colonial earnings from dollar exports, but also to 




increase expenditure by the Independent sterling area to 
take advantage of currently falling American prices. 
According to the Treasury's estimate, the probable gap 
between earnings and expenditure would require a cut of some 
25 per cent in the sterling area's total imports. The 
Colonial office, accepting that the colonies had to 
contribute to dollar economy, doubted how far this could be 
done by arbitrary cuts in imports. Nevertheless, the CCD 
concluded that colonial governments should be asked to 
undertake no further dollar commitments unless 'absolutely 
essential' until further notice, and that in view of falling 
prices and the increased availability of supplies from 
Britain, every effort should be made to economise on current 
dollar ceilings26. The Colonial office requested local 
governments to suspend dollar import licences, except where 
'grave effects' would result, and asked for estimates of how 
far dollar imports in 1949 could be cut. The office hoped, 
and encouraged colonial governments to believe, that it 
would be possible by mid-August to remove the standstill on 
dollar import licensing. Nevertheless, the CCD recommended 
that the colonies be warned that further reductions in their 
dollar expenditure would be necessary in the first half of 
1950 if the overall sterling area target of a 25 per cent 
cut were to be achieved27. 
Any hope of an easing of controls was dashed, however, 
by the progressive deterioration of Britain's dollar balance 
during summer 1949, leading to devaluation28. This step was 
26 CAB 134/64, CD(49)9, 'Dollar situation in the colonies', 
1 July 1949. 
27 Morgan (1980) II, p. 29. 
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extended automatically to colonial governments, and the 
Colonial Office sought to avoid any impression that the 
likely consequences for the colonies had been ignored. The 
principal effect of devaluation was to reduce the real 
external purchasing power of the sterling area. However, as 
the Colonial Office pointed out, the repercussions were 
likely to vary considerably between Britain, with its vast 
industrial and agricultural output, and the colonial 
economies, which lacked this protective cushion. For 
example, colonies which imported virtually all their 
manufactured goods and exported a limited range of crops or 
other raw materials were likely to be markedly affected by 
devaluation. Similarly, the consequences were likely to be 
far greater for colonies where average incomes were low, if 
not at subsistence level, than for Britain, with its 
relatively high incomes. Furthermore, Britain was in a 
stronger administrative position to alleviate the impact of 
devaluation than were many colonies. Since the sterling cost 
of all imports from the United States increased, the 
immediate consequence would be a rise in the colonial cost 
of living, especially in colonies heavily dependent on 
dollar imports, such as the West Indies. More generally, 
much would depend on devaluation's effects on sterling and 
other soft currency prices, together with Britain's ability 
to supply colonial needs29. This last point concerned the 
Colonial office particularly, since Britain supplied by far 
the greater proportion of colonial non-dollar imports. It 
seemed likely that Britain's exporters, encouraged by the 
28 see above, p. 347. 
29 CAB 134/65, CD(49)39, 'Alteration in the sterling-dollar 
exchange rates. Implications for the colonies', 22 Oct 1949. 
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Board of Trade, would try to increase their exports to the 
dollar area, if necessary at the expense of other markets. 
This led the Colonial Office to warn the CCD that any 
deliberate policy of directing exports away from the 
colonies would not only create political difficulties, since 
the colonies would then be obliged to buy essential items 
from now relatively expensive dollar suppliers, but it would 
also require administrative controls in the colonies to 
ensure that supplies from the sterling area were not 
obtained by indirect means, and the Colonial Office doubted 
whether such controls could be imposed. 
The general supply problem raised the issue of 
Whitehall's attitude to colonial policy and to colonial 
needs. Early in 1949, the Colonial office complained to the 
CCD that some British manufacturers were refusing to accept 
colonial orders, allegedly on instructions from government 
departments to reserve their output for the domestic market. 
This, argued the Colonial Office, could not be reconciled 
with the notion that the colonies should be treated as 
integral parts of the British economy30. The Board of Trade 
and the Ministry of Supply replied that this affected only a 
small range of items, including (ironically) agricultural 
machinery, and that it was impracticable to consult the 
Colonial office over every case. In their view, the colonies 
generally received fair, even favourable, treatment31. In 
March 1949, the CCD established that colonial orders should 
receive equal treatment to home orders32. Creech Jones 
30 CAB 134/64, CCD 2nd meeting, 25 Jan 1949. 
31 Ibid.. 
32 Ibid., CCD 3rd meeting, 28 Mar 1949. 
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subsequently raised this problem with Cripps, arguing that 
while the views of other Whitehall departments on colonial 
affairs were improving, they still fell short of what was 
desirable. He believed that a directive from Cripps, or from 
the appropriate Cabinet committee, that colonial orders 
should receive equal treatment to those within Britain, 
would help. Cripps, however, countered that time was needed 
to allow the new procedure to take effect33. 
When the CCD's Sub-Committee on Import Programmes 
reported in April 1949, it proposed dollar ceilings for the 
colonies as a whole totalling $202.8 million, $45 million 
less than the colonial governments had requested. Although 
the report urged that colonial governments should be 
reminded of the need for continuing dollar economy, it 
conceded that overall expenditure had fallen from $436 
million in 1947 to $380 million in 194834. Furthermore, the 
Sub-Committee recognised that the colonies needed Britain's 
help in limiting their dollar expenditure. It was understood 
that much of the reduction in colonial dollar spending since 
1947 had been due to revived supplies of Japanese and German 
cotton textiles, often cheaper than imports from Britain. To 
complicate matters further, some US cotton textiles were now 
cheaper than Japanese goods35. 
The supply problem demonstrates the paradoxical 
character of metropolitan economic policy towards the 
colonies in this period. At a time when British government 
directives sacrificed colonial needs to Britain's immediate 
33 CO 537/5194, letter to Creech Jones, 5 Apr 1949. 
34 CAB 134/65, CD(49)14, '1949 Dollar Ceilings', 8 Apr 1949. 
35 Ibid.. 
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balance of payments requirements, longer-term official 
concerns persisted at a submerged level. In April 1949, for 
example, prompted by alarm at the rapid recovery of Japanese 
and German exports,, the CCD urged the UK production 
departments to remind British exporters of the need to 
maximise current opportunities to entrench themselves in 
colonial markets, by striving to meet colonial requirements 
at competitive prices36. Whitehall understood the danger of 
Britain being seen to be using import controls to protect 
its colonial markets,, but an anxiety over the future of 
long-term markets remained a recurring theme in its 
discussions. 
The supply problem also revealed contradictions in 
metropolitan policy. For instance, not long before the 
danger to British exporters from Japanese and German 
competition was attracting comment in Whitehall, the CCD 
noted with apparent satisfaction that the colonies in 
general were making the most of these , soft,, sources of 
supply, enabling them to reduce their consumption of dollar 
imports, the question which remained of overriding immediate 
concern37. 
When the Colonial Supplies Conference opened in London 
on 8 June 1949, earlier fears at the prospect of convening a 
gathering of potentially restless colonial administrators 
proved largely groundless. Little hostility was expressed to 
the colonies-' membership of the sterling area,, or to the 
Treasury's broad strategy, although concern surfaced that 
Britain had limited its own dollar spending less strictly 
36 Ibid.. 
37 CAB 134/66, CD(50) 1st meeting, 13 Jan 1949. 
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than the colonies were being urged to d038. More 
contentious however, was the issue of price dif f erentials 
in colonial imports. This problem had been accentuated by 
the US recession, which had depressed American export 
prices, increasing their competitive edge over sterling and 
other soft supplies. Furthermore, the deteriorating sterling 
balance of payments position, also a product of the US 
recession, created obstacles to effective action on price 
differentials. Optimistically, the Colonial Office hoped 
that the recession might ease the problem, since colonial 
dollar allocations would go further as dollar prices fell, 
though it recognised that continuing dollar economy was 
necessary39. 
The Colonial Office proposed writing to local 
governments after the Colonial Supplies Conference, 
explaining that the price differential question was likely 
to worsen if the US recession continued, and that the office 
had suggested a modest relaxation of dollar ceilings. 
However, the conference delegates feared that any relaxation 
would encourage a 'flood' of applications, making it 
impossible to restrict additional hard currency licensing to 
the level envisaged by Whitehall. Since then, however, the 
dollar situation had made it even less possible for Britain 
to contemplate any adjustment which might expand hard 
currency spending. But because falling dollar prices would 
mean that existing dollar ceilings would go further than 
38 Morgan (1980) II1 pp. 25-6. 
39 CAB 134/65, CD(49)27, 'P'rice differentials', 29 June 
1949. 
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expected when set,, the Office hoped that revised 
arrangements might not be necessary after al, 40. 
As Britain's dollar position worsened in July 1949, 
local governments were asked to stop issuing import licences 
for dollar goods, and told not to expect increased dollar 
ceilingsj, to resolve the price differential problem or for 
any other reason. The Colonial Office sugared this pill by 
suggesting that the developing world recession, with the 
emergence of a buyers-* market, would increase the 
availability of non-dollar goods4l. Perhaps unrealistically, 
Creech Jones later told the colonial governments that he 
hoped to be able, by mid-August 1949, to withdraw the 
standstill on dollar import licences42. Circum tances 
prevented this, however, and at the end of August the 
original instruction was confirmed43. A contributory factor 
was the fact that discussions were then in progress in the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation over the 
distribution of Marshall Aid. As Creech Jones explained, any 
suggestion that curbs on dollar import licensing were to be 
relaxed might 'most seriously, affect the allocation of aid, 
and thus the total amount of dollars available to the Area 
as a whole44. 
The colonies had responded to the 4 July telegram by 
volunteering cuts in their dollar import ceilings totalling 
$15 million, leaving the overall ceiling for 1949 at $215 
40 Ibid.. 
41 CO 852/1039/6, circular telegram, 4 July 1949. 
42 Ibid., circular telegram, 18 July 1949. 
43 Ibid., circular telegram, 26 Aug 1949. 
44 Ibid.. 
363 
million. When special provision was made for purchases of 
petroleum products and when known overspending during the 
year, especially by Malaya, was taken into account, a total 
projected expenditure of $250 million was calculated. Yet in 
the first half of 1949 alone, colonial dollar imports had 
totalled around $150 million, and it seemed unlikely that 
spending could be kept within the target set45. 
Following devaluation in September 1949, fresh calls 
were made for the 1950 colonial ceilings to be reduced. The 
CCD's Sub-Committee on Imports, which actually set these 
ceilings, decided that in view of the improving supply 
position, the 1950 target should be fixed at $169 million, 
compared to the figure of $196 million set before 
devaluation46. Yet the main CCD believed there was little 
scope for further cuts in the dollar ceilings, acknowledging 
that pressure might arise for increases in some cases47. 
There were striking disparities in the distribution of 
dollar ceilings among the colonies. For instance, of the 
total ceilings proposed for 1950,50'per cent was allocated 
to the West Indies, 24 per cent to Malaya, but only 8.5 per 
cent to West Africa48. Even allowing for the special 
circumstances of the West Indies, heavily dependent on 
neighbouring dollar suppliers for essential imports, and for 
the post-war reconstruction needs of Malaya, it is ironic 
45 CAB 134/65, CD(49)36, 'Colonial dollar imports - 
July, 1949 to December, 1950', 20 Sept 1949. 
46 CAB 134/66, CD(50)3, '1950 Dollar Ceilings', 11 Jan 1950; 
(this figure did not include expenditure proposed by the CDC 




that West Africa,, a major dollar-earning region of the 
colonial empire, was given access to So little of what it 
earned, underlining the inequitable character of the 
controls operated from London. 
A paper produced in June 1950 for the CCD demonstrated 
the effects of these controls on colonial dollar expenditure 
since 1947. In 1947 the colonies as a whole had imported 
$390 million worth of goods, a figure reduced to $355 
million in 1948. It was estimated that the 1949 figure would 
be $248 million, with a forecast for 1950 of $206 million. 
In West Africa's case, the target for 1950 represented a cut 
of 45 per cent since 1947, from $42 million to $23 
million49. The Colonial Office now felt confident that local 
governments understood the objectives of dollar limitation, 
and considered that detailed programming of their dollar 
imports for 1951 was unnecessary50. 
The continuing supply problem was reflected in the 
colonies by swelling cost of living indices, which were 
estimated to have increased by at least 100 per cent between 
1939 and the end of 1948. This increase was attributed 
chiefly to the increased prices being paid for colonial 
exports. The response of colonial governments was to try to 
counteract the resulting inflationary tendency through 
taxation and budgetary policies,, but above all through 
produce marketing arrangements. It was recognised that the 
supply position had been improving steadily. For instance,, 
since inflationary pressures had become noticeable late 
in 
49 CAB 134/66, CD(50)26, 'Colonial dollar imports', 2 June 
1950. 
50 Ibid. , CD(50)29,, 
'Import programmes anti ao11at ceilings 
1951', 30 June 1950. 
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1947, supplies appeared to have increased at a faster rate 
than incomes, creating a relatively stable relationship 
between the supply of goods and the money supply. A key 
indicator of this was the fact that colonial cotton piece- 
goods imports were higher in volume in 1948 than in any year 
since 1937. With the emergence of a buyers' market by mid- 
1949, and the halt in the increase in export prices from the 
main supplying countries, officials in London confidently 
expected an easing of colonial inflationary pressure5l. 
However, the Colonial Office realised that increased 
supplies of consumer goods would be needed as local incomes 
rose. officials considered that one means of combatting 
inflationary tendencies might be to increase the volume of 
local goods production for the domestic market52. Although 
the idea was not apparently developed, the fact that such a 
suggestion could be aired helps to illustrate the renewed 
importance increasingly attached to industrialisation by the 
Colonial Office. 
By late 1950, the Colonial office was becoming 
concerned at the possible effects of the rapidly 
accelerating metropolitan rearmament programme on the 
colonial supply position. The office had already raised with 
the Cabinet Economic Steering Committee the likely 
economies of rearma 
ent for the colonial es 
1 
generally. Officials were particularly worried by increased 
colonial earnings from raw materials exports resulting from 
price rises, fuelled by high world demand; nearly all 
51 CO 852/1041/2, 'Survey of inflationary and deflationary 
tendencies in the colonies', 21 July 1949. 
52 Ibid.. 
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colonial exports had increased in price in the previous 
year , but this development had not been matched by a 
corresponding rise in colonial imports. Evidence f or this 
was the growth of the colonial sterling balances (of which 
West Africa's share was 30 per cent by the end of 1950) from 
L670 million in December 1949 to L850 million a year 
later53. The Colonial Office feared that combined with the 
effects of rearmament, especially the danger of fresh 
shortages of capital goods, the consequences of this 
situation in the colonies would be inflationary, stimulating 
the accumulation of unspent balances, a potential source of 
embarrassment, implying that colonies could not draw on 
their own resources for development. It was also feared that 
this would retard economic development, and, more 
importantly, increase the risk of local ROlitical 
discontent. The impact of events in the Gold Coast in 1948 
on the official mind in London had evidently been deep and 
long-lasting. The Colonial office warned the Cabinet 
Economic Steering Committee that f iscal measures taken by 
colonial governments could have only a limited effect in 
curbing local spending power54. The Committee, however, was 
unmoved: accepting that an unlimited growth Of the sterling 
balances was -undesirable, ', it considered that these might 
provide the colonies with 'a most valuable cushion, against 
any future difficulties. Ironically, the Colonial office was 
now being obliged to digest the official rationale for 
53 Cmd. 8243, (May 1951). 
54 CAB 134/263, ES(50)30, 'Economic implications of 
rearmament to the colonial territories', 23 Dec 1950; CAB 
134/264, ES(51)1st meeting 11 Jan 1951. 
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continued accumulation which it had promoted since the 
latter years of the war55. 
Rearmament had further implications for the colonial 
supply position. The switch to soft currency sources, 
evident in 1950,, continued in the 1951 dollar expenditure 
programmes, but it seemed increasingly likely that the 
colonies would have to be allowed greater latitude in their 
dollar spending, not only because rearmament was liable to 
affect dollar goods prices in 1951, but also because it was 
improbable that goods scarce in Britain as a result of the 
rearmament programme would be any less scarce in the United 
States. Aggravating this was the threat of inflation as raw 
material prices rose. Accordingly,, the CCD&*s Sub-Committee 
on Imports concluded that its parent committee should 
realise that the colonial dollar ceilings being proposed for 
1951 might be inadequate56. 
During summer 1951, the Colonial office was reminded of 
the political delicacy of the supply question. To accompany 
his estimate of the imports the Gold Coast would need for 
development in the period 1951-1960, over and above its 
normal requirements, Governor Arden-Clarke warned of the 
serious political consequences which might follow if the 
capital resources necessary for development were not 
forthcoming. This danger appeared greater following the 
elections recently held under the Gold Coast's new 
constitution, which brought to power a party calling for 
55 Ibid.. 
56 CAB 134/67, CD(51)5, 'Colonial dollar expenditure', 2 Feb 
1951; Cmd. 8243, May 1951. 
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rapid, large-scale economic and social development. As the 
Colonial Office put it to the CCD: 
If the present harmonious relations between 
the new African Ministers and their official 
colleagues in the Gold Coast Executive 
Council are to be maintained, and the 
pressure of the more extreme nationalist 
elements for full and immediate self- 
government is to be neutralised, it is 
imperative that every possible effort should be made to enable the Gold Coast development 
programme to be implemented to the fullest 
possible extent. Failure in this respect will inevitably lead to a breakdown in the working 
of the constitution with serious consequences 
for the whole future of His Maj est 's 
Government's relations with the Gold Coast'7. 
The Colonial Office emphasised that as development 
programmes gathered momentum, colonial supply needs would 
grow, a problem not unique to the Gold Coast, and that 
special action to help that territory would in itself raise 
problems, especially if, as a result, other colonies were 
deprived. The Office lacked information on the demand which 
other colonies' development programmes would create; 
moreover, many colonial administrations were reluctant to 
predict their needs beyond a twelve-month period, and found 
it even more difficult to gauge the likely requirements of 
the local private sector. 
The CCD considered it unlikely that the world 
availability of capital goods would increase over the next 
few years, and warned that supplies might even decline. 
Because of Britain's rearmament programme and raw materials 
shortages, it was also unlikely that Britain would be able 
to maintain the current level of engineering exports, and 
the same appeared true of the United States. The Committee 
57 CAB 134/67, CD(51)12, 
development', 1 Aug 1951. 
'Supplies for colonial 
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accepted that,, except possibly for a brief period during 
1949-50,, many colonies had effectively been investing in 
Britain since 1939, and that if this situation continued,, 
there might be -*very seriousf Political difficulties, and 
the success of the experiment in 'controlled transition to 
self-government' might depend largely on whether the 
colonial governments then in office could demonstrate 
achievements in economic development. The Committee 
conceded, moreover, that colonial needs were not excessive, 
in that the African territories-' development plans could 
apparently be implemented up to 1956 provided the 1950 level 
of expenditure,, at 1950 prices, were maintained58. 
Nevertheless, the CCD concluded that nothing like the ten- 
year commitment to a given level of supplies, requested by 
Arden-Clarke, was possible, suggesting instead that the 
colonies could attempt to plan for the three-year period 
covered by the present rearmament programme59. 
Development finance 
If the supply position continued to present 
difficulties in the path of broad-based colonial economic 
development, constraints on the provision of development 
finance also persisted. The relative easing of Britain's own 
difficulties in 1949-50 encouraged some reflection among 
officials in London on progress made since the end of the 
war. A firm conviction remained, however, that finance was 
not the major limiting factor on development. Even with the 
temporary improvement in Britain's financial position by 
58 Ibid., CD(51)2nd meeting, 15 Aug 1951. 
59 Ibid.. 
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1949, the prospects were not hopeful for any substantial, 
immediate increase in British investment in the colonies. 
Creech Jones, having informed the colonial governments of 
his earlier appeal to Cripps for a relaxation of loan 
policy, went on to explain, on the basis of the CDWP's final 
report, that it seemed unlikely that there would be scope 
for any 'appreciable' increase in the rate of colonial 
investment from British sources over 'the next few years'60. 
It became clear after devaluation in September 1949 
that the provisional loan ceiling of L60 million accepted by 
the CDWP was unlikely to be increased, although it appeared 
to the Colonial Office that this figure would, in practice, 
6 suffice for most colonial governments until March 19521. 
Attention shifted from possible metropolitan sources of 
funding to local, colonial resources, and, once again, to 
foreign investment. Local resources were still depressingly 
limited. It appeared to the Colonial Office that the 
majority of banks operating in the colonies, such as the 
Bank of British West Africa, were willing to finance small 
industries, though generally only against adequate security. 
However, the Office saw little evidence of interest in this 
kind of development among banks based in Britain, with the 
exception of Barclays'. The fundamental problem was that 
while 'sound' commercial undertakings, regardless of size, 
could normally attract loans through commercial channels, 
difficulties arose when the would-be borrower was 
inexperienced62. Yet it was precisely the local entrepreneur 
60 Morgan (1980) II1 pp. 50-1; 
despatch, 24 Jan 1949. 
61 Morgan (1980) II1 p. 51. 
CO 852/878/1, circular 
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whom officials, both in London, and especially at the 
periphery, were most concerned to encourage, and as the 
momentum towards political devolution developed, so did the 
perceived pressure to provide development with a secure 
indigenous base. 
It was in these circumstances that officials looked 
again, after prolonged distractions, at Barclays Overseas 
Development Corporation, whose creation in 1946 had done so 
much to inform the Colonial Office's thinking on development 
corporations generally. Little had been heard of the 
Corporation since its formation63. In 1947, the Corporation 
proposed that it should allocate a small part of its 
resources for use as a 'revolving fund' to finance small 
development schemes proposed by West Africans. It was 
suggested that the distribution of this fund should be 
delegated, in each West African territory, to a local 
representative of the Corporation and a representative of 
the local government who together would be empowered to make 
advances of up to L1,000. The Gold Coast government welcomed 
this proposal, and agreed to co-operate with the 
Corporation, through its own Industrial Development 
Corporation. The Nigerian Government, however, agreed to the 
proposal only on condition that it should not itself incur 
any financial liability, a proviso which Barclays 
understandably found unacceptable. Therefore although, early 
in 1950, the Colonial Office understood the scheme to be 
62 CO 852/1325/2, 'Sources of financial assistance available 
to small industrial and agricultural enterprises 
in the 
colonies', 8 May 1950. 
63 See above, ch. 3, pp. 253-4. 
372 
operating in the Gold Coast,, there seemed in practice to 
have been little demand for its services64. 
In June 1950, Griffiths advised the colonial 
governments to give priority to important development 
projects, especially where these would strengthen the 
governments' future reserves. Simultaneously, he revived the 
possibility of colonial borrowing from the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now made more 
attractive by being only about half a per cent more 
expensive than London loans. Nevertheless, the basic 
obstacle remained that IBRD loans could not be used to make 
purchases in sterling or colonial currencies. At a time when 
continuing calls were being made for dollar restraint, this 
stipulation eroded the usefulness to colonial governments of 
IBRD funds65. Griffiths had only been induced to remind the 
colonies of this possible resource by the prevailing 
uncertainty over the availability of metropolitan loan 
finance. This fear was confirmed very soon by the Treasury's 
announcement that some 'postponement' of colonial borrowing 
in London was inevitable66. 
The Colonial Office reviewed the position towards the 
end of 1951, informing the CCD that the total amount 
involved in issues and approved by the Capital Issues 
Committee in respect of colonial enterprises during 1951 had 
been approximately L8.5 million. But, as the Office pointed 
out,, this figure did not represent British private 
investment in the colonies. Since April that year, a number 
64 
.; ý 
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65 Morgan (1980) II1 p-52- 
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of applications to the CIC had concerned the capitalisation 
of reserves, rather than the raising of additional capital. 
The Colonial Office saw this as a demonstration that very 
little fresh capital was in fact being raised by private 
enterprise in Britain for colonial investment67. 
The question of foreign, and s] 
investment in the colonies became 
President Truman's inaugural address 
January 1949, in which he outlined 




to Congress on 20 
his 'Fourth Point', 
world. As Truman put 
We must embark on a bold new program for 
making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available 
for the improver; qnt and growth of 
underdeveloped areasoo. 
The Fourth Point, a product, like the earlier Marshall Plan, 
of a deepening Cold War,, was presented as a wholly new 
approach to development: 
The old imperialism - exploitation for 
foreign profit - has no place in our plans. 
What we envisage is a programme of 
development based 019 the concepts of 
democratic fair-dealing . 
The British ambassador in Washington saw in the Fourth Point 
great opportunities f or Anglo-American relations,, provided 
Britain responded quickly and favourably. He thought it 
clear that Truman had in mind assistance primarily to Latin 
America and the Far East, especially China, and cautioned 
67 CAB 134/67, CD(51)16, 'Applications to the Capital Issues 
Committee in respect of colonial enterprises during 1951', 1 
Nov 1951. 
68 Morgan (1980) 11, p-102. 
69 CAB 134/65, CD(49)7, 'President Truman, 's "Fourth Point" 
(Annex A)', 14 Mar 1949. 
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against any attempt by Britain to 'grab the proceeds, for 
Africa70. As the ambassador hopedr Ernest Bevin's reaction 
to the Fourth Point was enthusiastic7l. 
The Colonial Office's reactions to Point Four, conveyed 
to the CCD in March 1949, were that Us private investment in 
the colonies was seen as beneficial both to the colony 
concerned and to the sterling area provided it earned or 
saved dollarsr and complied with exchange regulations and 
local welfare and other legislation. However, officials 
believed that while some of their prominent US counterparts 
were interested in promoting US private investment in 
overseas territories, investors themselves were nervous. 
Anticipating calls that London should actively encourage 
foreign investment by indicating appropriate spheres of 
development, the Colonial Office outlined some of the 
accompanying difficulties. Not only would the balance of 
payments implications have to be considered,, but Britain 
could hardly contemplate easing financial and 'social' 
restrictions on colonial investment since this would be 
incompatible with the declared policy of 'protecting&* the 
interests of colonial populations. If anything, officials 
felt, pressure was likely to develop in favour of more 
stringent restrictions, for example through immigration 
controls and guarantees of provision for the training of 
local personnel. Furthermore, the possible repercussions of 
US investment on the interests of British,, Dominion and 
other foreign investors had to be considered. Finally, the 
condition of local governments themselves, particularly 
70 Ibid.. 
71 CAB 134/65, CD(49)7; Bullock (1983), p. 681. 
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their lack of expertise in economic planning, was thought to 
be a constraint on expanded investment: officials considered 
that there was a limit to the extent to which colonial 
development could be accelerated without risking local 
administrative collapse. Given these problems, the Colonial 
office questioned the political practicability of 
stimulating US investment,, in view of the possible 
allegations of exploitation72. 
On the Fourth Point proper, that is, direct US 
Government involvement,, the Colonial Office was equally 
cautious. The acknowledged deficiencies of colonial 
administrations might,, it was feared, encourage proposals 
for US control over development projects, which neither 
Westminster nor local governments were likely to accept. 
Even less attractive, in the Colonial Office's view, was the 
possibility of the United States opting for international 
control of development, a prospect which revived officials, 
wartime fears concerning the internationalisation of 
colonial rule. A final counter-argument was that US aid to 
the developing world might involve a reduction in provision 
to the European Recovery Programme, and hence impinge upon 
metropolitan interests73. The Colonial Office's objections 
to US investment were therefore broadly the same as those 
raised in 194874. 
Creech Jones had already told the colonial governments, 
in February 1949,, that London was drafting guidelines on 
colonial investment for the benefit of foreign governments 
72 CAB 134/65, CD(49)7. 
73 Ibid.. 
74 See pp. 306-9. 
376 
and investors, and solicited local administrators,, views. 
The accompanying note pointed out that many foreign concerns 
were already operating in the colonies, and that the 
creation of the CDC and OFC was not intended to preclude 
further foreign investment. The draft note advised 
interested investors to become familiar with local 
legislation and regulations, and reminded them of existing 
controls, for example over marketing, and explained that 
foreign exchange was available for the remittance of 
dividends and interest,, but not for the repatriation of 
capital invested for less than ten years75. 
For the colonial governments,, the fundamental problem 
was to reconcile foreign investment with limitations on 
foreign competition with local populations both in 
* 76 employment and enterprise . This impinged on other 
sensitive areas of policy, such as controls on immigration 
into the colonies, particularly West Africa. For instance, 
Nigeria, 's policy was to exclude any potential competitors 
with local entrepreneurs 
77. In the Gold Coast, however, 
policy was unresolved; in 1949, proposals were under 
discussion to control immigration on economic grounds,, 
but 
these were regarded as 'non-discriminatory, ' 
in that they 
distinguished between the population of the Gold Coast and 
all others, British or foreign78. 
75 Morgan (1980) 111 p. 102. 
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In the discussions prompted by the Fourth point, it 
became obvious that the Colonial Office was unenthusiastic 
about private US investment. While the maximum possible US 
investment in the sterling area was desirable on balance of 
payments grounds, the existing controls on investment, 
together with investors' expectations of large returns where 
their risks were high, had tended to counteract this. 
Moreover, officials recognised that any preferential 
treatment to such investors would not only be unfair to 
other investors, but might result in a net loss to the 
sterling area if it involved a relaxation of exchange 
controls and import licensing. Officials concluded that the 
US should be told that private investment, on conventional 
terms, would contribute little to colonial development, and 
that aid without the 'strings' which might attach to the 
Fourth Point was preferable, as this would prepare the way 
for `orthodox' private investment79. 
The Colonial Office's reservations were incorporated in 
a CCD report produced in April 1949, and subsequently 
endorsed by the Colonial Economic Development Council. The 
Committee concluded that because of the political, social 
and balance of payments considerations outlined by the 
Colonial office, existing controls on foreign colonial 
investment could not be lifted80. Furthermore, the Committee 
believed that measures to attract US capital might involve 
risks. An interesting contraindication to private investment 
was now introduced: private investment depended on adequate 
79 Ibid.. 
80 CAB 134/65, CD(49)15, 'Colonial implications of President 
Truman-*s "Fourth Point"-*,, 9 April 1949; CO 852/1040/4, CEDC 
2nd meeting, 23 May 1949. 
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basic services in the colonies, now identified as the main 
factor impeding development. Whereas in the past, private 
investment had provided these services to the 'minimum 
degree essentiallr social,, labour and other standards were 
now higher, and adequate provision by private enterprise was 
no longer thought practicable. Increasingly, private 
investment could flourish only following the development of 
basic services by the state, and it was considered that this 
area might offer an outlet for US assistance, though not in 
the form of commercial loans81. 
Yet the Colonial Office's underlying disquiet was 
revealed by its reactions to a draft report, 'Investment 
opportunities in British Africa', prepared by the US Chamber 
of Commerce. This was described by one official as a 'poor' 
document, unlikely to encourage American firms to invest in 
Africa, though he added, significantly, 
As we ourselves are not enthusiastically 
attempting to encourage American prive 
investment this is perhaps all to the good . 
This view was not, however, shared universally within the 
British government. In June 1949, the Lord President of the 
Council, Herbert Morrison, suggested to Attlee that the 
possibility of attracting US investment for colonial 
development purposes should be considered83. In the 
following month, Creech Jones put a memorandum on foreign 
81 CAB 134/65, CD(49)151 9 April 1949; Whitehall's 
discussions on Point Four also produced a significant, and 
rare, indication of a continuing metropolitan concern to 
protect colonial markets. In March 1949, the CCD was advised 
that US technical assistance in development was preferable 
to supplies, because the latter might compete with British 
exports (CAB 134/64, CD(49)3rd meeting, 28 Mar 1949]. 
82 CO 537/5192, minute by Emanuel, 14 Apr 1949. 
83 Morgan (1980)11, p. 104. 
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investment to the Cabinet Economic Policy Committee. This 
was the same, in essentials, as the note circulated to the 
colonies in February, and explained that foreign investment 
was welcome provided that it was in harmony with the 
colonies, ' own plans, and was devoted to productive, long- 
term purposes of benefit to the colonies and to the sterling 
area, and provided that investors conformed to local 
regulations governing commercial undertakings84. 
When Cabinet discussed the question, Treasury concern 
surfaced over any alteration in exchange control policy to 
facilitate US investment, a concern shared by the Colonial 
Office. The Cabinet decided to postpone any public statement 
until the Anglo-American financial discussions, due in 
September, were completed85. It is clear, however, that the 
Treasury foresaw no sizeable influx of foreign private 
investment, given the disincentive of inadequate basic 
services86. 
A major consequence of the Washington talks was a new 
emphasis on the importance of encouraging foreign, 
especially dollar, investment in the colonies. The Colonial 
Office therefore proposed an inter-departmental examination 
of policy on foreign private investment, and the CCD agreed 
that the CEPS and the Treasury should consider the question 
urgently87. Accordingly, an inter-departmental committee, 
84 CAB 134/222, EPC(49)74, 'Investment of foreign capital in 
the colonies', 5 July 1949. 
85 CAB 128/16, CM 51(49)1,29 July 1949. 
86 Morgan (1980) 111 p. 104; CO 852/840/2, supplementary 
record of 14th meeting with CDC, 17 Sept 1949. 
87 CAB 134/64, CD(49)12th meeting, 22 Sept 1949. 
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formed in October,, reported in January 195088. it 
recommended that the existing selective policy on us 
investment in the sterling area should continue, based on 
the criteria of dollar earning or saving, or increased 
productivity, bearing balance of payments considerations in 
mind. It also recommended that this policy should be made 
89 public 
Having Lead the draft statement of policy requested in 
the committee's report, Dugdale, sensitive to the danger of 
a hostile response from the Labour left and the Tory right, 
commented: 
The more I look at it,, the less need can I 
see for the House of Commons to have to 
listen to a glorified company prospectus 
asking people to invest in "British Colonial 
Empire Limited". 
In his view, statements such as these might be 
counterproductive90. 
In response to Dugdale's request for an alternative to 
a Commons statement, Gaitskell, the Minister of Economic 
Affairs, suggested that the Colonial Office and Treasury 
statements could be incorporated in a letter from Britain's 
ambassador in Washington to the United States' Secretary of 
State , and that this letter could be given whatever 
publicity was necessary in North America9l. 
88 Morgan (1980) 11, p. 104; the committee, chaired by the 
Treasury, included representatives from the Foreign office, 
the Colonial Off ice,, the Board of Trade,, the Commonwealth 
Relations office, the CEPS and the Bank of England. 
89 Morgan (1980) II1 p. 105. 
90 Ibid., p. 106. 
91 Ibid.. 
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Eventually,, however,, a Commons statement was made in 
the form of a written answer by Cook, the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary. This explained that while current policy, 
in general, was to welcome US investment in the colonies, it 
was necessary to remember the dollar liability arising from 
the remittance of dividends or profits,, together with the 
ultimate liability for the repatriation of capital. 
Therefore, as long as the dollar problem persisted,, policy 
would have to remain selective, and any project would have 
to promise a net saving or earning of dollars , or be so 
beneficial economically to the colony concerned as to 
justify any loss of dollars involved92. 
Local government machinery and attitudes 
This was the unpromising background against which 
colonial governments sought to formulate their own policies 
on industrial development. There was, in this period, a 
growing sense of urgency among local officials of the need 
to present a constructive attitude towards 
industrial isation a need sharpened by rapid developments at 
the political level, especially in West Africa. This was one 
aspect of a broader evolution in policy, even more 
noticeable in the Colonial Office. At least as far as West 
Africa was concerned, officials were increasingly obliged to 
review, even reverse, traditional priorities in colonial 
policy, in which economic and social development had been 
seen as a necessary, and probably lengthy process, designed 
to provide constitutional advance with secure foundations. 
After 1948, particularly after the rapid sequence of events 
92 PD C, 476,221-2,28 June 1950. 
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following the Accra Riots, the need to maintain local 
political goodwill became the touchstone of development 
policy, expressed in an official anxiety to promote economic 
development so as to retain the co-operation of local 
political elites. Among the emerging political forces in 
west Af rica, economic development,, and industrial isation, 
were potent slogans to which colonial authorities felt 
obliged to respond. The manifesto of the Convention Peoples' 
party, produced for the general election of February 1951, 
stated that industrialisation was one of the Party0s 
principal objectives as a means of raising living standards., 
adding: 
Imperialism is incompatible with industrialisation of a colonial country. It is only under self-government that this 
country c" be industrialised in the way that it should - 
As already suggested, a recurring theme in the 
development policy debate had been doubts over the capacity 
of colonial governments to tackle new responsibilities and 
functions. Such doubts persisted into the later 1940s. For 
example, in 1949, W. Arthur Lewis wrote: 
most colonial administrations have not yet 
begun even to recognise the nature of their 
most important economic problems,, let9flone 
to make provision for dealing with them . 
Yet it was towards the end of the period covered in this 
study that the idea of state-led development gained fresh 
impetus,, particularly after the influx of new ministerial 
blood af ter the February 1950 general election in Britain. 
The re-examination of the role of public enterprise by the 
93 CO 537/7233. 
94 W. A. Lewis, Colonial Development, Manchester 1949, quoted 
in Lee (1967), p. 112. 
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Colonial Office was associated especially with Dugdale, but 
was apparently also encouraged by Creech Jones's successor, 
James Griffiths. The discussions initiated by ministers in 
the Colonial Office embraced a wide range of development 
issues, the most prominent being mining and industrial 
development. In this, there is a sense of the enthusiasm of 
Creech Jones, clear from 1945 onwards, but truncated, inter 
alia, by the crisis of 1947 and its aftermath, being 
rediscovered during 1950. Dugdale,, who had been advocating 
planned industrial development in the colonies since the 
early 1930s, expressed a concern still prevalent among 
ministers, and shared by some senior officials, that 
colonial development should take place 
in an orderly manner, and that it should not 
be the old scrambles of 9e arly capitalist development in this country . 
Citing the Nigerian example, Dugdale suggested that colonial 
governments be encouraged to promote industrial development 
through local development boards, to include representatives 
of the local population, rather than by direct government 
action. Generally, however, he thought that assisted schemes 
should remain under the permanent management of these 
boards,, and not be transf erred after an initial stage to 
private ownership. He was keen, too, to protect such schemes 
from unfair competitioni, for example from expatriate firms, 
if necessary by legislation96. 
When officials in London examined the steps taken by 
colonial governments since the war to promote development, 
95 PD(C)O, 4771,1490, r 12 July 1950; 
P. S. Gupta, Imperialism 
and the British Labour Movement, (1975), p. 243. 
96 CO 852/1325/2, minute, 6 July 1950. 
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the pattern which emerged was uneven. The Gold Coast 
government, for example, had established an Industrial 
Development Corporation in 1947,, to initiate and operate 
industrial undertakings, and to 'facilitate, promote, guide 
and assist' the financing of new projects. It had capital 
resources of L100,000, increased in 1950 to L350,000. 
Although fully operational since 1949,, progress had 
initially been slow, but by mid-1951, some L190,000 had been 
taken up97. The Corporation's activities represented almost 
entirely the Gold Coast government's contribution to 
industrial development. The government was the Corporation's 
sole share-holder, and was to receive any dividends payable. 
The IDC assisted printing, soap-making , timber and weaving 
enterprises,, and to a number of craf t industries such as 
carving and furniture -making,, chief ly by marketing produce 
centrally. The responsible minister in the Gold Coast did 
not,, however, believe that the Corporation had developed as 
originally intended. Specifically, he felt the new machinery 
was concerned too much with providing finance, to the 
neglect of the investigative and technical aspects of 
development,, largely due to staf f shortages, a persistent 
problem to which no resolution appeared likely in mid- 
195198. 
More fundamentally,, the government considered that an 
obstacle to industrial development had been the recent high 
world price of cocoa,, which had discouraged local 
97 Ibid. 'Sources of financial assistance available to , 
small ind ustrial and agricultural enterprises in the 
colonies' 8 May 1950; CO 96/830/31695/1951, minute by , Unsworth, 7 Feb 1951; CO 852/1325/4, Arden-Clarke to 
Griffiths, 17 May 1951. 
98 Ibid.. 
385 
diversification. The government also doubted whether it 
would be economical to develop industries for which both 
power and raw materials would have to be imported. Looking 
ahead, however, it was thought that the scope for 
industrialisation would be extended once the Volta River 
hydro-electric project was developed99- 
The Nigerian government,, in contrast, appeared to be 
more positive about industrialisation. Early in 1949, 
Governor Macpherson reassured Creech Jones that it was his 
administration's 'declared policy, to encourage new 
industrial enterprises beneficial to the territory in 
spheres not already fully exploitedloo. Similarly, the 
government claimed that its policy was to provide fall 
possible opportunities' for Nigerian businessmen to play an 
increasing role in the country's commerce, and to develop 
secondary industries on the widest possible scale by methods 
ensuring the maximum participation by Nigerians'01. By May 
1950, the Nigerian Director of Commerce and IndUstry 
believed that local pressure for industrial development was 
'extremely strong', that the available machinery for dealing 
with these problems was 'quite inadequate', and, in 
particular, that local governments lacked the expertise 
102 necessary for more rapid progress The Nigerian 
government's Department of Commerce and Industries was 
intended chiefly to establish new industries and to recruit 
99 Ibid.. 
100 CO 537/5193, telegram to Creech Jones, 25 Mar 1949. 
101 CO 583/311/30699/1950, telegram to Griffiths, 21 Apr 
1950. 
102 CO 852/1323/5, minute by Emanuel, 22 May 1950. 
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qualified expatriate staff. It was not expected to manage 
enterprises permanently: rather,, once financially -*sound, ', 
they were to be transferred to African control. Following 
pressure from the Nigerian Finance Committee, the Department 
was expanded and given the function of breaking #*new ground 
so that others can follow, 103. 
The Nigerian government had not been idle since 1945. 
Having established a Local Development Board in 1946 to 
provide loan capital to promote a wide range of development 
schemes, the government decided in 1948 to accelerate 
development, and encourage small schemes, including 
industrial projects such as brick and tile-making, soap 
production, spinning and weaving104. In keeping with the 
trend towards political decentralisation in the territory, 
it was also decided to regionalise the development board 
machinery. This was an issue investigated by Rees-Williams 
during his trip to West Africa in 1948, his conclusion being 
that the existing central Board had promoted very few 
schemes105. In the Colonial Office's view, the original body 
had been on 'too high a level-*,, and too inaccessible to 
local entrepreneurs106. In 1949, Development 
Boards were established for Nigeria's Northern, Western and 
Eastern territories,, with a total budget of L100,000 per 
annum,, while the Colony Development Board had a limit of 
103 CO 852/1325/2, minute by Vile, 6 Apr 1950. 
104 CO 583/295/30676/1949, note on Regional Development 
Boards, 7 Sept 1949. 
105 CO 852/840/2, minutes of 14th meeting with CDC (12 Sept 
1949), 17 Sept 1949. 
106 CO 583/295/30676/1949, minutes of 14th meeting with CDC, 
12 Sept 1949. 
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L50,000. The purpose of these boards was not directly to 
engage in enterprises, but only to provide finance'07. The 
funding of the boards by the territoryls existing marketing 
boards was itself significant, representing an important 
break with the previous tendency to reserve funds derived 
from state marketing for the purpose of price 
stabilisation'08. 
The Nigerian government's continuing interest in 
industrial development can be seen in its encouragement of a 
local textile industry, partly in response to growing 
enthusiasm among local entrepreneurs. Government assistance 
was provided to two local companies which decided in 1949 to 
erect textile mills, in Lagos and Kano respectively. These 
small units were to be capable of rapid growth on the 
weaving side, and were initially expected to produce up to 
one and a half million yards of cloth per year. The Kano 
mill was to be operated by the Kano Citizen Trading Company, 
0 partly financed by a loan of L35,000 from the Northern 
Regional Development Board, with the Department of Commerce 
and Industries providing technical assistance. Reconditioned 
British looms were bought for the scheme, made available by 
the re-equipment of the metropolitan industry'09. The mill 
at Lagos was a purely private development,, about half the 
size of the Kano unit, but also receiving assistance from 
the Department of Commerce and Industries. Both the Nigerian 
107 Ibid. , note on Regional Development 
Boards, 7 Sept 1949. 
108 A. E. Hinds, 'British imperial policy and the development 
of the Nigerian economy, 1939-19511, unpublished Ph. D. 
thesis, Dalhousie University, (1985), p. 263. 
109 Ekundare (1973), pp. 302-303; Kilby (1969), pp. 112,312- 
315. 
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government and the private investors soon realised, however, 
that if a local textile industry were to expand, it would 
require the participation of an overseas textile firm in 
order to obtain adequate capital and expertise"O. In the 
government's view, a fundamental problem remained: 
There are no Nigerians at present competent 
to run textile mills or to undertake the 
training of operatives and none possess the 
banking, legal and accounting knowledge which 
is essential for the uccessful establishment 
and running of a mill? ]Ll. 
In 1949 . the governments own textile development scheme 
was revised to include powered weaving. The government, 
still enthusiastic, foresaw the development of a substantial 
local mechanised industry, and established research and 
training centres. It was hoped that mechanically produced 
cloth could compete with imported goods. Handweavers were 
expected to retain their market position and, as the supply 
of yarn improved, were thought likely to face lower costs. 
It was recognised,, however,, that a much larger market was 
open to powered weavers, and that handloom weaving would 
therefore have to take second place. By September 1949, of 
the eight textile training centres envisaged in the 
development plan, six were in operation, the training they 
provided was thought to result in better quality weaving and 
a higher output, and it was considered necessary to extend 
training to the skills required in textile mills112. 
Official optimism was shaken when, midway through the 
territory's ten-year development plan,, a review of 
110 Ekundare (1973), p-303. 
111 CO 583/311/30699/1950, 'Proposals for the expansion of 
the Department of Commerce and Industries', Sept 1949. 
112 Ibid.. 
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government sponsored handloom weaving revealed that the 
effects of training were only temporary, and that when the 
weavers returned home,, they resumed their former, 
inefficient practices, a problem which indicated a need for 
greater government supervision of the scheme113. 
Nevertheless, early in 1950 the Governor of Nigeria told the 
Colonial Office that the training centres, work was 
stimulating interest in textile production as a village 
114 industry throughout the country 
The Colonial Development Corgoration 
Given the importance,, recognised by both the Colonial 
office and the colonial governments, of attracting external 
enterprise to promote development, the role of the Colonial 
Development Corporation in this period is of particular 
interest. Though its initial interest seemed to be in 
schemes to accelerate raw material and agricultural 
development, the Corporation gradually began to explore 
industrial proposals. An early problem,, however,, was that 
the CDC preferred larger industrial schemes, geared towards 
an export market, rather than small units designed to meet 
local needs; these, it was felt, were the concern of local 
e 115. theoretically enterprise Although the Corporation was 
empowered to finance small industries, without itself 
becoming involved in their control, in practice it was 
inclined only to deal in large projects, securing the right 
to participate in their management. Thus, up to the end of 
a 113 Kilby (1969), pp. 311-312. 
114 CO 583/311/30699/1950, telegram, 21 Apr 1950. 
115 CO 852/840/2, note of meeting with CDC, 11 Apr 1949. 
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1949,, capital sanction had been sought f or only one scheme 
involving less than L100,, 000116, 
one of the most important West African industrial 
projects in which the CDC became involved was a textile 
manufacturing scheme at Onitsha, Nigeria. The plan was to 
produce sacks, and to establish a cotton-spinning plant. The 
scheme won the Nigerian government-'s warm support, being 
seen as -*an important step in industrial isation,,, and one 
which would operate in the interests of the local 
population117. Initial investigations were made into the 
possibility of manufacturing some twenty million sacks per 
year from imported jute,, enough to meet all West Africa's 
needs'18. 
The Corporation's cotton-spinning plan began with 
exploratory discussions on co-operation with a British firm, 
Calico Printers'19. Under the proposals which subsequently 
emerged,, the CDC would undertake the initial work of 
establishing a small spinning factory; once the stages of 
weaving and finishing had been reached,, the British firm 
would become involved120. Significantly,, relations between 
the Corporation and the Nigerian government seemed to have 
improved121. The local government was so keen to see the 
116 CO 852/1325/2j, tsources of financial assistance 
available to small industrial and agricultural enterprises 
in the colonies', 8 May 1949. 
117 CO 583/307/30498/l/1950, Macpherson to Griffiths, 21 Aug 
1950. 
118 CO 583/295/30676/1949, minute by Eastwood, 15 Aug 1949. 
119 Ibid.. 
120 CO 852/842/2, Quarterly report on schemes under active 
consideration No. 6, (September-November 1949), Jan 1950. 
121 CO 583/295/30676/1949, minute by Eastwood, 15 Aug 1949. 
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Onitsha project started that it offered to collaborate with 
the CDC if Calico Printers proved to be unwillingl22. 
Yet by late 1949, the CDC was having second thoughts 
about the scheme,, following investigations by an independent 
specialist. The plan was now thought 'too ambitious,, 
precisely because it depended on jute imported from India or 
Pakistan. Instead,, the Corporation chose to consider a 
smaller project, based on locally grown fibres123. In August 
19501 Trefgarne, the CDCIs chairman, told the colonial 
Office that the Corporation proposed to build and operate 
the combined sack factory and cotton-spinning plant in co- 
operation with the local marketing boards. This development, 
it was hoped, would provide the boards with the sacks they 
needed, as well as replacing all the cotton yarns currently 
imported. In addition, the scheme was expected to promote 
local production of jute and raw cotton124. The scheme 
secured Treasury approval, and in the Colonial Office, 
125 Griffiths was enthusiastic 
once again, however,, difficulties arose. By mid-1951,, 
it was apparent that the project would require considerably 
more finance than originally envisaged. The CDC therefore 
opted to reassess the scheme and the likely profitability of 
both jute and cotton mills126. Fundamental problems were 
122 CO 852/842/2, Quarterly report ... No. 6, Jan 1950. 
123 Ibid.; CO 583/307/30498/l/1950, supplementary record of 
meeting with CDC, 7 Feb 1950. 
124 Ibid.,, letter to Griffiths, 9 Aug 1950. 
125 Ibid, Mackay (Treasury) to Willis (CO), 25 AUg 1950; 
Griffiths to Trefgarne, 31 Aug 1950. 
126 CO 583/307/30498/l/1951, letter from Winterbotham 
(CDC), 
5 June 1951. 
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subsequently revealed. In the CDC's view, the cotton- 
spinning scheme was 'a washout', because no market could be 
found for the grey yarn it was to produce, contrary to the 
Nigerian government's advice. The proposed sack factory, 
too, had reached an impasse, since the Nigerian government 
refused to promote local fibre production, on which the plan 
depended, until there was a mill to process the produce. The 
CDC,, for its part,, refused to erect a mill until it was 
assured of suf f icient supplies of raw material ,a caution 
born of the Corporation's concern at the apparent apathy of 
the local population towards fibre production. While 
sympathising with the CDC, the Colonial Office was 
disappointed, having been very interested when the project 
127 was first proposed 
The review of industrial policy 
It was while the CDC was investigating West Af rica, s 
industrial potential that metropolitan policy on colonial 
industrialisation again began to exercise the official mind 
in London. An apparently innocuous request from the West 
Indian governments f or guidance re-opened the entire 
question, prompting an extended debate within the Colonial 
Office,, the first on the subject since the heady days of 
128 
wartime reconstruction planning Early in 1950, 
following a visit by Gorell Barnes to the West Indies, 
industrial POlicY was raised and the Colonial office decided 
that a memorandum should be drafted, discussing legislation 
127 Ibid.,, minute by Willis, 3 Aug 1951. 
0 128 CO 852/1323/5, 'The promotion of "secondary" industry 
in 
the colonies', 22 May 1950. 
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either enacted or under consideration in the colonies 
designed to encourage industrial developmente While the 
memorandum was primarily intended for internal use, it was 
felt that it might form an appropriate, if belated, sequel 
to Stanley's despatch of 27 February 1945129. At this stage, 
official caution on the subject was evident. For instance, 
when Christopher Eastwood suggested that the development of 
secondary industries might be mentioned in the Office's 
annual report, Gorell Barnes advised against this, since no 
policy on the subject had yet been accepted by Cabinet130. 
If, yet again, it was a local, colonial enquiry which 
provided the proximate stimulus to discussion in London, the 
Colonial Office nevertheless had several additional reasons 
for reviewing its industrial policy. In some territories,, 
notably the Gold Coast,, the development of hydro-electric 
power seemed likely to stimulate, or at least facilitate, 
industrialisation; following the Anglo-American talks in 
Washington in September 1949,, an increase in US external 
investment appeared possible; additional development capital 
was now available from the CDC; and,, finally, the basic 
services on which industrial development would depend were 
being strengthened by progress, albeit limited,, under the 
colonies' ten-year development plans, and as development 
gathered pace,, so the possibilities for industrial isation 
131 were expected to grow 
129 Ibid.,, note of meeting in Colonial Office, 17 Feb 1950; 
CO 852/1324/4, minute by Adie, 21 Mar 1950. 
130 Ibid. (both references). 
131 CO 852/1323/5, 'The promotion of "secondary" industry 
in 
the colonies', 22 May 1950. 
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The Colonial Office's Economic General Department 
subsequently consulted the Geographical Departments on the 
legislation enacted by individual territories to encourage 
industrial development. In Nigerials case, the only 
substantial measure had been the Local Development Board 
Ordinance of 1946, and the Gold Coast could offer only its 
Industrial Development Ordinance of 1947. Significantly, a 
number of the responses revealed a continuing imprecision 
over the meaning of 'industry'. Even in 1950, the term was 
being used to describe any economic activity not directly 
related to agriculture, and was clearly not synonymous with 
132 manufacturing More interesting, however, was the 
developing analysis of industrial policy within the colonial 
Office early in 1950. This discussion involved a review of 
the first principles of policy, something noticeably absent 
in the previous five years. Since 1945, Gorell Barnes 
observed,, the Office had been proceeding under the 'tacit' 
assumption first that the state's role should be limited to 
the provision of inducements to industrial development such 
as short-term tax concessions, and secondly that the primary 
object should be to establish industries geared to the use 
of local raw materials to produce manufactured goods for 
local consumption. Beyond this, officials were hesitant. For 
example , the operation of f actories , 
in their early stages, 
by government , or the construction of 
f actories by 
government for sale or lease to industrialists at subsidised 
rates, topics discussed by the Colonial Economic Advisory 
Committee after 1943, had not been pursued since by 
132 CO 852/1324/4, minutes by Adie, 21 Mar, Vile, 23 Mar, 
and Hanrott, 30 Mar 1950. 
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officials. However,, the traditional '*taboo" on industries 
based on imported raw materials appeared by 1950 to be less 
entrenched133. Nevertheless, colonial industrialisation had 
apparently lost little of its controversial flavour. Gorell 
Barnes saw little point in calling on the Board of Trade for 
assistance, "since their attitude towards Colonial 
industrialisation is not very helpful, to Put it mildly'134. 
In April 1950, Griffiths, Dugdale and senior officials 
met to discuss industrial policy. This appears to have been 
the first such discussion at so high a level since the 
financial crisis of summer 1947. It was agreed that 
Stanley, 's 1945 despatch should be examined in the light of 
experience, with a view to its re-issue135. This ministerial 
intervention was part of a generalised Istocktaking' 
operation, associated particularly with Dugdale, who was 
similarly interested in reviving the question of mining 
development under state auspices, an issue largely neglected 
since Creech Jones's Memorandun on Colonial Mining Policy of 
October 1946. However, the re-opening of discussions on 
industrial development stemmed from the Colonial Office's 
belief that local governments were eager to receive more 
136 guidance from Britain 
In May 1950, Emanuel produced a detailed memorandum on 
'The Promotion of "Secondary" Industry in the Colonies". In 
view of growing local pressure for industrial development, 
and of the inadequacy of local development machinery, 
133 CO 852/1323/5, minute, 20 Apr 1950. 
134 Ibid.. 
135 Ibid.,, minute by Roberts, 24 Apr 1950. 
0 136 Ibid.,, minute, 22 May 1950. 
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Emanuel argued that a means was needed to keep developments 
under review. The key problem,, judging from the Colonial 
office's earlier experiences, was to secure ministerial 
approval, since only this could guarantee the kind of inter- 
departmental co-operation necessary for the successful 
implementation of policy137. As Emanuel indicated, it 
remained unclear how far Stanley's despatch of 1945 had 
influenced subsequent development. It had been issued before 
the full scope of the revised CD &W Act was known,, and 
although since then progress had been made in establishing 
local departments of commerce and industry, local 
development corporations and the CDC, and in passing 
legislation to encourage industry, still not enough appeared 
to have been done to diversify the colonial economies or to 
absorb surplus populations dependent on agriculture. In 
Emanuel's view, the problem by 1950 was how to accelerate 
138 development 
officials recognised that industrialisation was not 
necessarily synonymous either with economic diversification 
or with economic progress139. While the predominance of 
monocrop agriculture was thought to create an uncertain 
framework for developmentr industrial isation was not the 
only available remedy, other possibilities 
being the 
development of diversified agriculture and of mineral and 
forestry resources. In terms resonant Of 
the colonial 
Office's traditional concerns, Emanuel 
insisted that 
137 Ibid.. 
138 Ibid... The promotion of "secondary" 
industry in the 
colonies', 22 May 1950. 
139 Ibid.; ibid., minute by Rogers, 30 May 
1950. 
397 
industrial development could be justified only if the 
resulting industries could survive in the long-term without 
140 special assistance from other economic sectors 
He was similarly cautious in his attitude towards 
state-assisted industrialisation, which, he noted, was often 
justified, pace Lewis, on the grounds that agricultural 
improvements would create surplus agrarian populations, 
which industrial development could absorb productively. 
Emanuel considered this claim to be economically sound only 
if the 'marginal productivity' of industrial workers 
exceeded that of agricultural workers141. While he believed 
that Britain would inevitably be the chief source of capital 
and enterprise for such development,, Emanuel also warned 
that however much external assistance were provided, the 
scope for industrial development was limited unless local 
conditions were favourable. 
The conclusion he drew was that a clear demarcation was 
needed between the local and central fields of 
responsibility, though one permitting the 'fullest 
collaboration' between London and the colonial governments. 
In the past the Colonial office had not integrated economic 
development sufficiently into its overall thinking on 
development,, and consultation with local governments had 
been spasmodic. Moreover, no machinery had evolved through 
which accumulated experience could be transmitted to the 
colonies. On the basis of the scanty information received 
in 
the Colonial office, it appeared that most local development 
plans excluded industrialisation except where 
this was 
a 140 Ibid.,, -*The promotion of "secondary" 
industry 
141 Ibid. . 398 
associated with providing basic services. Industries 
therefore emerged from no systematic plan, a consequence of 
the limited support given in Stanley's despatch to 
government participation, and the continuing belief that 
industry was primarily a field for private enterprise142. 
Yet, private enterprise seemed unlikely to enter into 
detailed exploration of colonial industrial potential unless 
key areas of government policy were clarified, requiring the 
dissemination of information on local possibilities, the 
provision of an adequate legislative framework, finance, 
143 government organisation and active sponsorship 
Emanuel pointed out that before an industry could be 
established,, numerous basic problems about the scope f or 
development had to be addressed, involving, for example, raw 
materials, the labour supply and markets, after which local 
factors had to be assessed to determine the potential for 
development in specif ic locations. However,, many of these 
questions could not be resolved solely through local 
investigation, and it was this which Emanuel saw as a key 
flaw in existing planning machinery. His proposed solution 
was the appointment of an expert advisory committee with two 
broad functions: f irst, to investigate and report on local 
conditions relevant to manufacturing industries which could 
be established, including those based on imported materials, 
possibly producing for wider markets; and secondly, to make 
recommendations, periodically, on industries meriting 
detailed local investigation. Emanuel envisaged the 





governments through the Colonial Office. He also proposed 
the formation of a small inter-departmental committee, 
composed of of f icials and chaired. by the Colonial Of f ice, to 
examine existing industrial legislation, and any licences 
and concessions which had resulted from it144. 
Emanuel saw the CDC as the chief prospective source of 
non-colonial goverrment. f inance for industrial development, 
and believed that the role of the Corporation should be 
discussed once the new machinery he suggested had been 
established. Regarding local government machinery, he noted 
that despite the encouragement given in Stanley's despatch, 
f ew colonial governments had created departments of commerce 
and industry,, and that in some cases where there was scope 
for industrial development, no single government department 
was responsible for co-ordinating the government's role. 
This,, he felt,, called for a systematic study of local 
development machinery by the Colonial Office145. Finally, he 
suggested that colonial governments should consider 
attracting what he called industrial 'tourists', and 
146 
generally publicising local development opportunities 
'Reactions to Emanuel-Is paper within the Colonial Office 
were mixed. H. T. Bourdillon hoped that his colleagues might 
be approaching, 'for the first time', a systematic policy on 
secondary industry, though he reiterated Emanuells basic 
point that the essential aim of development was economic 





147 industries as such It was the centralising thrust in 
Emanuel-*s initiative which officials considered most 
problematic, involving the risk of local political hostility 
to detailed planning of development by London. Specifically, 
doubts were voiced about the value of an advisory committee 
which might be unwieldly in size and too broad-ranging to be 
effective; a further drawback was that any industrial 
consultants engaged would probably have to be paid. more 
importantly, however, the Board of Trade might be unwilling 
to participate if colonial industrial isation posed any 
threat to metropolitan exporters, and on this the CEPS 
seemed likely to support the Board. Hence officials feared 
that a committee might retard,, not encourage, development.. 
and political friction was bound to develop if it seemed to 
colonial opinion that such a body was acting as a brake on 
development. As Andrew Cohen observed, 'considerable 
political embarrassment might result if a conflict of 
interests emerged between Britain and any particular 
colony'148. Rather than the advisory committee proposed by 
Emanuel.. Cohen suggested the creation of an informal body of 
experts, to be consulted on an ad hoc basis, but available 
to assist colonial governments as well as to advise the 
149 Colonial Secretary 
Equally controversial was the assumption,, implicit in 
Emanuel-'s paper, that if any colony were able to develop a 
secondary industry it should be encouraged to do so,, and 
147 Ibid.,, minute by H. T. Bourdillon, 30 May 1950. 
148 Ibid., minutes by Rogers, 30 May, Mayle, 6 June, 
Gorsuch, 9 June and Cohen, 10 June 1950. 
149 Ibid., minute, 10 June 1950. 
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that the Colonial office should assist such development. In 
particular, Emanuel-Is willingness to embrace the thorny 
issue of encouraging industries based on imported raw 
materials drew a cautious response. Experience led officials 
to doubt whether British industry would view favourably the 
encouragement of competitive production in the colonies, 
150 especially when based on imported raw materials 
Nevertheless, any effective review of policy could not 
evade such difficult questions, as demonstrated by the 
Colonial office's parallel concern to discover how far 
existing colonial tariffs protected British manufactures 
from colonial competition, and the extent to which colonial 
tariffs had been amended in recent years to permit the 
safeguarding of colonial manufactures from British, Dominion 
and foreign competition. Similarly, the Colonial office 
wanted to know how far colonial tariffs were imposed on raw 
materials for industry, and whether the office itself was 
normally consulted by colonial governments when tariffs were 
151 
amended for protective purposes 
At this stage, in mid-19501 the general review of 
industrial policy received ministerial encouragement from 
both Dugdale and Griffiths. Following discussions with the 
Nigerian Director of Commerce and Industry,, Dugdale had 
become particularly impressed with the work the Nigerian 
Government was undertaking to promote small 
industries, and 
proposed informing all colonial governments of 
the efforts 
being made by this and other administrations152. 
similarly, 
150 Ibid.,, minute by Gorsuch, 9 June 1950. 
151 CO 852/1325/1, minute by Adie, 14 June 1950. 
152 CO 852/1325/2, minute, 6 July 1950. 
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in July 1950, Griffiths took the Opportunity provided by the 
supply debate on the colonial estimates to restate the broad 
objectives of colonial economic development: 
On the economic side, our aim is to seek to build.. in every one of the Territories, a 
stable economy by developing its agriculture, 
mineral or industrial resources, by improving 
methods of production, by safeguarding the 
natural wealth of the country and instilling 
"good husbandry" in all economic activities, 
and,, most important,, by diversifying these 
activities so that development is not lop- 
sided, and cor 
, 
j%j uently, dependent on a few 
basic products 1ý 
This represented no radical departure from the principles 
familiar from the lips of Griffiths's predecessors, 
especially Stanley and Creech Jones. The Colonial Office 
still regarded Stanley's memorandum of 1945 as the 'standard 
text-* on industrial development,, and was,, understandably, 
reluctant at that stage to issue any general 
a 154 , Ipronunciamentot on the subject . Nevertheless, Griffiths 
appears to have injected a degree of dynamism into the 
official discussions, making plain his commitment to 
155 
progress with diversification and industrialisation 
By July 1950, therefore, two strands were feeding into 
the Colonial Office-s review of industrial policy. First,, 
there was a growing sense that local needs had to be 
responded to,, prompting the official discussions which led 
to Emanuells appraisal. Secondly,, there was Dugdale-'s 
enthusiasm, reinforced by Griffiths's apparent interest. 
With characteristic caution, the Colonial Office preferred 
to delay further action until Griffiths had had an 
153. PD(Clf 477,1369,12 July 1950. 
154 CO 852/1324/4,, Emanuel to Carstairs, 14 July 1950. 
155 CO 852/1323/5, note of meeting, 30 Aug 1950. 
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opportunity to consider the proposals already at hand, after 
which the colonial governments could be given a 
comprehensive account of the policy review156. 
Late in August 1950,, Grif f iths and his senior of f icials 
discussed Emanuel, 's proposals. Griffiths was enthusiastic 
and, unlike some officials, favoured the creation of a 
committee in London to oversee industrial policy. 
Furthermore,, he called for consultations with the CDC and 
the Federation of British Industries, followed by the 
preparation of a despatch informing local governments of the 
proposals under consideration and seeking their co- 
operation. Griffiths stressed the importance of promoting 
diversification and industrialisation as a matter of long- 
term policy. Consequently, it was agreed that the Board of 
Trade,, the Treasury and the Ministry of Supply should be 
157 approached to discuss the establishment of a committee 
As the policy review took shape, officials were 
reminded of the continuing interest which the Board of Trade 
was likely to show in the subject. The Board had, for 
example, recently decided to publish in its journal more 
information on colonial industries, and especially on 
industrial legislation. When asked by the Nigerian 
government in mid-1949 for guidance on industrial 
development,, the Board seemed reluctant to help: a year 
later, Lagos had heard nothing 158. As one official noted 
in discussions with officials of the Board I 
have learnt that they are becoming 
156 Ibid., minute by Gorell Barnes, 28 July 1950. 
157 Ibid., note of meeting, 30 Aug 1950. 
158 CO 852/1325/2, Cox (Nigeria) to Gorell, Barnes, 28 June 
1950. 
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increasingly perturbed about what they assert is the growth of uneconomic industries in the Colonies. 
While this was seen as a 'natural' stance for the Board, the 
colonial Office could not be confident that the industrial 
projects being supported by colonial governments were 
economic, even in the long term. It was therefore essential, 
if the policy set out by Stanley in 1945 were to be 
successfully defended against criticism from Whitehall, that 
there should be adequate machinery to keep development under 
159 constant review 
The Colonial office realised that the question of 
protection would have to be handled carefully when other 
departments were approached, and sought to pre-empt the 
160 it was latters' likely unease . It explained that 
necessary to stimulate colonial industrialisation, and to 
ensure that development took place on 'sound lines', so that 
the 'industries which are set up have a good chance of 
maintaining themselves in the long run on a genuine economic 
basis, i. e. without undue artificial protection'161. The 
Ministry of supply's response was guarded. Like the Board of 
Trade, the Ministry thought it preferable to learn more 
about what the colonies themselves saw as suitable 
development opportunities. The Colonial office therefore 
decided to proceed alone with a small internal committee, 
chaired by Gorell Barnes, to examine local legislation 
designed to encourage industryl though the office's aim was 
still to pursue inter-departmental consideration of the 
159 CO 852/1323/5, minute by Emanuel, 22 May 1950. 
160 CO 852/1325/2, minute by Gorell Barnes, 28 July 1950. 
161 CO 852/1323/5, letter from Poynton, 4 Sept 1950. 
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subject162. The Board of Trade and the the Ministry of 
Supply subsequently relented, and agreed that a body such as 
the Colonial Office proposed would be desirable, and should 
contain representatives of metropolitan interests such as 
the FBI, ensuring the maximum possible co-operation from 
British industry163. Meanwhile, the Colonial Of f ice, s own 
committee decided that the first step was to obtain 
164 information from the colonial governments 
A difficulty with Stanley's 1945 despatch was that it 
gave no guidance on detailed problems involved in granting 
legislated concessions designed to encourage industrial 
development,, for example on the granting of monopolies, 
import restrictions and subsidies, which were left to the 
discretion of local governments. Unsurprisingly, in the view 
of officials, few territories had introduced any legislation 
at all,, while others had taken steps in a 'partial and 
piecemeal' fashion, on 'quite disparate lines'. It was 
agreed that present practice was unsatisfactory because 
information and experience were not pooled effectively nor 
disseminated among the colonies, a problem aggravated by the 
fact that some colonies with industrial potential lacked 
adequate government machinery to draft appropriate incentive 
165 legislation 
162 CO 852/1325/3, EOD No. 127, 'Office committee on 
encouragement of industry legislation', 9 Oct 1950; ibid., 
OCLI(50)3,, 'Legislation in the colonies to encourage the 
development of secondary industries', Oct 1950. 
163 CO 852/1323/5, Rowlands (Ministry of Supply) to Poynton, 
20 Sept 1950; ibid.,, Woods (BoT) to Poynton,, 20 Oct 1950; 
ibid., note of meeting in CO, 26 Oct 1950. 
164 CO 852/1325/1,, OCLI Ist meeting, (23 Oct 1950), 2 Nov 
1950; CO 852/1325/3, circular despatch, 'Industrial 
development in the colonies', 10 Nov 1950. 
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Early in 1951, the Colonial Office's own committee 
decided that the CDC should be asked its opinions on the 
desirability of protection for any colonial industries in 
which it might participate166. The CDC replied that import 
duties were of little help in encouraging existing 
industries, which seemed to contradict the widespread 
consensus that import duties were the most flexible method 
of protection where the main danger of competition came from 
imports. Equally,, the Corporation believed that exclusive 
manufacturing licences, while protecting the capitalist 
against competition within a colony, did not offer any 
inducement to new undertakings which required heavy capital 
and whose future profits were uncertain. In contrast, the 
Colonial Office's Economic General Department believed that 
where the main risk of competition was internal, an 
exclusive licence would offer a degree of encouragement 
167 because it established a monopoly 
The Colonial Office decided that Poynton should discuss 
British industrial co-operation with Sir Norman Kipping of 
168 the FBI . officials were heartened by Kipping's reaction. 
The Federation appeared to be sympathetic, and anxious that 
Britain should take opportunities for -*sound' industrial 
development in the colonies, rather than, through fear of 
its impact on imports from Britain, allow other countries, 
such as the United States,, to take the lead. However,, the 
0 
165 Ibid. OCLI(50)2, r -*The promotion of 
"secondary" 
manufacturing industry in the colonies', Oct 1950. 
166 CO 852/1325/5, OCLI(51) 3rd meeting, 8 Jan 1951. 
167 Ibid.,, comments on CDC memo. , 'Encouragement of capital 
investment in the colonies by legislative action,, 24 Jan 
1951,1, Mar 1951. 
168 CO 852/1323/5, note of meeting, 26 Oct 1950. 
407 
FBI advocated market research to gauge local demand f or 
consumer goods,, enabling the Colonial Of f ice and local 
govermnents to approach British industry with specific 
169 proposals 
The Federation suggested that the British Export Trade 
Research Organisation (BETRO) could examine the colonial 
consumer market and the practicability of establishing local 
manufacturing capacity170. BETRO in turn proposed a pilot 
survey of Nigeria to investigate the territory's market 
potential for locally based industry geared to local 
consumer needs, possible export markets and local resources. 
Its purpose was to identify and attract investors and 
171 manufacturers 
The possibility that the motives of the FBI and BETRO 
were not wholly altruistic was not lost on the Colonial 
Office. Gorell Barnes was concerned that the attitudes of 
0 
each body seemed to stem from a desire o pursue consumer 
research in the colonies for the benefit of British 
exporters, and warned that BETRO's proposal could be 
interpreted as an attempt to promote British exports, 
possibly by restricting local industrialisation. He 
questioned the value of market research in West Africa, 
where habits of consumption were relatively well developed, 
and believed the UAC could provide better information, more 
172 
quickly,, than BETRO 
169 Ibid., minutes by Poynton,, 8 Dec 1950 and 
Emanuel, 13 
Dec 1950. 
0 170 CO 852/1323/6, Griffiths to Macpherson, 2 Mar 
1951. 
171 Ibid.; ibid., f Macpherson 
to Griffiths,, 13 Mar 1951; 
ibid., Roberts to Director General, BETRO, 17 Mar 
1951. 
172 Ibid., minute, 24 Feb 1951. 
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The Governor of Nigeria, however, welcomed the proposal 
for a pilot survey and promised his full assistance173. A 
divergence of views soon emerged between what the Nigerian 
Government and BETRO considered to be industries appropriate 
for encouragement. The government, it transpired, envisaged 
mainly raw materials processing, including pioneer palm-oil 
mills, textiles and sackmaking. BETRO,, however,, seemed more 
interested in light industries requiring high levels of 
technical skill. Nevertheless,, the goverrunent told London 
that it would 
welcome any sound ideas which are likely to 
enable us to broaden the basis of production, 
and to induce the investment of foreign 
capital 1411 
this country f or productive 
purposes 0 
In June 1951 the FBI's Overseas Trade Policy Committee 
produced a report in response to the Colonial Office, 's 
request for advice and assistance on colonial 
industrialisation175. The Committee felt that ' political 
stability' was a major cons ideration for industrialists 
contemplating investment in the colonies, and that the 
perceived risk would be greatly increased by any prospects 
of ? premature' movements towards self-government. 
Specifically, the Committee thought it unlikely that British 
interests would consider investing in colonial industries 
without guarantees that prof its made could be remitted to 
Britain to a 'reasonable' extent, and over an extended 
period, since new enterprises might not be profitable for 
173 Ibid.,, Macpherson to Griffiths, 13 Mar 1951. 
174 Ibid.,, Macpherson to Poynton, 9 Apr 1951. 
175 CO 852/1325/6, 'Industrial legislation in the colonies 
affecting the establishment of secondary industries', 14 
June 1951. 
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several years. Moreover, problems could arise if the 
management of affairs passed out of British hands, and 
therefore the rights of investors would have to be 
176 safeguarded adequately 
The Gold Coast government was interested in BETRO's 
work in Nigeria,, and thought a similar study in the Gold 
Coast would be worthwhile177. The Colonial Office, however, 
was already having second thoughts. Its view was that some 
systematic machinery was required to discover suitable 
industries and to encourage foreign entrepreneurs to 
consider development in the colonies,, but that the entire 
problem was complex, and no single or easy solution seemed 
178 to exist 
Rearmament and industrial policy 
Early in 1951, the Colonial Office attempted to use the 
opportunity provided by the domestic rearmament programme to 
encourage further inter-departmental consideration of 
colonial industrial isation. In a paper f or the CCD,, the 
Office suggested that the strains which rearmament was 
likely to put on manpower resources in Britain required 
00 examination of the help the colonies might provide in 
manufacturing military equipment or essential non-military 
goods which might be displaced in British production. The 
Office explained that some -advanced" territories were 
beginning to industrialise in order to improve local living 
176 Ibid.. 
177 CO 852/1333/7, letter from Tours (Minister of Finance, 
Gold Coast), 25 June 1951; ibid.,, Emanuel to Tours,, 27 July 
1951; ibid., Tours to Emanuel,, 13 Aug 1951. 
178 Ibid., letter from Emanuel,, 27 July 1951. 
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standards or to create employment f or their growing 
populations, and that they could use existing factories with 
under-employed capacity,, or new plants drawing on surplus 
local manpower. Although the Office admitted that little 
surplus machine capacity probably existed,, it was thought 
that some existing production, for example in East and West 
Africa, could be transferred to more 'important' work, and 
that although much of the available labour was industrially 
unskilled,, a InucleusF of skilled and semi-skilled labour 
179 existed among local ex-servicemen 
The Colonial Off ice argued that the increasingly 
specialised division of labour in modern industrial 
production created opportunities for semi-skilled workers, 
and those requiring relatively little instruction, citing 
the example of the female workforce in Britain during the 
last war. Of f icials admitted that it would be expensive to 
ship heavy raw materials to overseas factories and to 
transport back finished goods, but argued that the dispersal 
of industrial effort need not be limited to heavy metal 
products, but could include simple plastic mouldings such as 
used in motor vehicles and wireless equipment. Some raw 
materials might, they added, be available locally anyway. 
The Office did not favour the establishment of "shadow, ' 
factories in the colonies, such as Lord Swinton had 
suggested during the war, whose labour force could be 
transferred to Britain if circilm tances, such as shipping 
a shortages, made it impossible to operate colonial factories 
in wartime. Officials pointed out that this would not only 
179 CAB 134/67, CD(51)4, 'The use of colonial industrial and 
manpower capacity in the United Kingdom rearmament 
programme', 25 Jan 1951. 
411 
be an expensive way of training labour, but would also not 
be in the long-term interests of the colonies180. The 
Colonial Office stressed the political advantages of its 
proposals, arguing that colonial participation in rearmament 
would demonstrate the British Government's desire to 
181 associate the colonial peoples in a common effort 
The CCD agreed that the Colonial Office's proposal 
should be considered by a working party,, chaired by the 
CEPSy comprising representatives of eight interested 
departments182. Late in March 1951,, the working party met 
for the first time. It agreed with a suggestion from the 
CEPS that its work should be limited initially to discussing 
the problem of linking metropolitan needs to known colonial 
capacity, and to exploring how Britain's needs could be met 
by adapting existiDg colonial capacity. In this way, the 
working party avoided more speculative enquiries into the 
scope for colonial industrialisation from scratch. The 
Colonial Office's representative,, Emanuel,, emphasised his 
department's concern to dispel fears in the colonies that 
their economies were being developed solely for raw material 
production, predictably rehearsing the political, as well as 
the economic aspect to the question. He also suggested that 
the possible use of small-scale workshop capacity in Nigeria 
and the Gold Coast might be examined. The working party 
agreed to ask the Colonial office to compile a questionnaire 
180 Ibid. . 
181 Ibid. . 
182 Ibid., CD(51) ist meeting, 6 Feb 1951; the departments 
were the Treasury,, the Colonial Off ice,, the Ministry of 
Defence, the Admiralty, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of 
Supply, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of 
Labour. 
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to be sent to the colonial governments, emphasising that the 
help which the UK supply departments could accept was 
183 limited 
The Colonial Office found the experiment of sounding 
out other goverment departments f or their reactions to 
colonial industrialisation disheartening. One official 
described the 'bleak atmosphere' of the working party's 
discussions. Although the Office was committed to industrial 
development, other departments clearly thought differently: 
The policy in all other Departments seems to 
be the maintenance of full employment in the 
United Kingdom and it was made clear at the 
Working Party meetings that Colonies were 
expected to take second place in the 
competition for raw materials. 
The same official continued: 
If that attitude is to be accepted, and quite 
frankly I doubt whether any Government at the 
present time could get away with a policy 
designed to share employment opportunities 
between the United Kingdom and the Colonies, 
then we must consider to what extent we can 
continue to encourage Colonial Governments to 
spend their time, and in some cases money, on 
efforts to persuade investor f84 to set up 
industries in their territories 
IMEN 
. %v---inf orcing this pessimistic assessment was the supply 
situation. It was particularly unfortunate that the kinds of 
material currently in shortest supply, such as non-ferrous 
metals and light alloys, were precisely those needed in the 
type of light engineering industries which the Colonial 
Office had in mind for the colonies. 
If the U. S. A. and U. K. are going to 
monopolise all available supplies of these 
materials up to the point where their 
industrial potentials are fully occupied, the 
183 T 229/263,, minutes of working party meeting (30 Mar 
1950), 3 Apr 1951 
184 CO 852/1323/6, minute by Willis, 8 May 1951. 
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outlook for the Colonies, even at their present level of industrialisation, is poor. The idea of spreading industrialisation in the Colonies in these circum tances is largely academic. 
This posed the problem for the Colonial Office whether or 
not the colonies should be warned of the -*futility-* in 
existing circum tances of fostering industries dependent on 
185 scarce materials 
While there was sympathy in the Colonial Office with 
Willis's views, it was also thought that the rate of 
industrial development to date had not depended on British 
Government policy, but on basic conditions in the colonies. 
In other words, whether or not the metropolitan government 
were united on policy,, ef forts apparently were continuing 
locally to develop suitable industries, many of them based 
186 on locally available materials 
Nevertheless, further disturbing evidence of the 
govermnent's attitudes to colonial industrial isation emerged 
in August 1951. Asked in the Commons about the possibility 
of manufacturing munitions in the West Indies, Strachey, the 
Secretary of State f or War, stressed the importance of the 
colonies concentrating on primary production, and appeared 
to discount the role of industrialisation in colonial 
development187. The Colonial Office was understandably 
anxious to establish whether Strachey had been airing 
0 personal views, or whether he was expressing opinions held 
generally by his Cabinet colleagues. If the latter were the 
185 Ibid. . 
186 Ibid. , minutes 
by Emanuel,, 22 May 1951 and Gorell 
Barnes, 23 May 1951. 
187 PD(C)-491j, 1645,2 Aug 1951. 
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case,, as the already despondent Willis observed, 'then we in 
the C. O. are working under a misapprehension and the quicker 
we realise it the better'. He continued: 
I have felt for some time and I have said as 
much on occasion, that we are fighting a lone battle in this matter of industrialisation in 
the Colonies. Other Departments,, and the F. B. I. f or that matter,, seem to m to be 
paying only lip-service to our pollcy? 88. 
The particular delicacy of this question was reflected in 
Griffiths's subsequent admonitory letter to Strachey. 
Reminding Strachey that it was the government's policy to 
encourage colonial industrialisation, Griffiths added, 
colonial communities are aware of this and,, 
in the present state of political 
consciousness, any suggestion that the 
development and diversification of their 
economy by industrial development should be 
held back in favour of continued 
concentration upon primary production for the 
benefit of the United Kingdom, would be 
liable ý%9 serious misunderstanding and 
criticism 0 
These discouraging indicators were confirmed when the inter- 
departmental committee reported that it did not believe an 
0 investigation into a colonial contribution to rearmament 
would serve any useful purpose. Having examined the items 
which might be required from the colonial empire, the 
working party concluded that these were not of a broad 
enough range to merit asking the colonial governments to 
make a general survey of their local resources. It also 
concluded that the most that could be done would be to 
ensure that the supply departments in Britain were aware of 
the possibility of using colonial capacity where the 
188 CO 852/1323/6, minute, 8 Aug 1951. 
189 Ibid., Griffiths to Strachey, 21 Aug 1951. 
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opportunity arose'90. 
190 CAB 134/67, CD(51) 2nd meeting, 15 Aug 1951. 
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CONCLUSION 
Between 1939 and 1951,, the Colonial off ice evolved a 
policy on the industrialisation of the colonies which 
remained broadly consistent throughout the period. This 
policy, growing from tentative beginnings, owed its 
development above all to the experience of the inter-war 
Depression and of the impact of the Second World War on the 
colonial economies. Together, these convinced the Colonial 
office of the need to promote diversification of the 
colonial economies. The Colonial Office had little 
a experience in dealing with such questions, and for much of 
the period examined, lacked clear guidelines on the 
implications of metropolitan government economic policy for 
its own deliberations. Once formulated, the Office's goals 
remained vulnerable to a spectrum of fluctuating 
circum tances and deep-rooted obstacles. 
While increasingly recognising a need for local 
industrial growth, the Colonial Office saw this as only one 
element in a broad strategy of economic development designed 
to prepare the colonies for eventual self-government. The 
more immediately relevant problem of promoting greater 
agricultural productivity remained. Similarly, officials 
spent much time considering a strand of policy potentially a 
rival to industrial development, namely the stabilisation of 
predominantly agricultural colonial economies through 
controlled primary produce marketing. Arguably, the two 
strands of policy were not mutually exclusive, but could be 
seen to be complementary. Yet the special conditions of 
wartime need and postwar dislocation gave stabilisation a 
wider appeal than industrial development: whereas the 
former 
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offered an attractive supplementary role in indirectly 
supporting sterling,, the latter could be interpreted as 
endangering metropolitan interests, either directly, by 
encroaching on colonial export markets, or indirectly, by 
distracting colonial efforts from primary production 
temporarily lucrative to the British economy. 
Like other departments in Whitehall, especially the 
Board of Trade, the Colonial Office consistently sought to 
promote 'sound' and 'economic' industrial development, 
though its motives were different. The office displayed a 
realism elsewhere eclipsed by an unfocussed metropolitan 
enthusiasm for freconstructionto This realism was the 
product of disappointing experiences of colonial development 
following the brief post-1918 'boom',, the consequences of 
the Depression, and protracted negotiations with the 
Treasury in the later 1930s to secure CD &W funding. 
Moreover, the office displayed a continuing sensitivity to 
external criticism, of which it was exposed to an unusually 
broad range, and, for most of this period, a fear of 
encouraging unrealistic expectations of what was achievable 
in colonial developmento 
The successful implementation of the Colonial office's 
development policies, united in their common respect for the 
new icon, planning', required a reappraisal of the 
machinery of colonial administration, both in London and in 
the colonies. The inadequacies revealed in this extended 
analysis were not satisfactorily resolved during this 
period, but they exposed and emphasised the delicate 
relationship between the colonial office and the colonial 
governments. Barely had the office grasped the nettle of a 
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greater central initiative in development than local 
circumstances in West Africa seemed to dictate an emphasis 
on an authentically local contribution, avoiding any 
impression that London's role was to direct, rather than to 
guide. Moreover, the critical steps towards shaping 
industrial policy were taken by the office in response to 
promptings from West Africa, especially during the war. 
Despite its transient enthusiasm for an enhanced role in 
promoting development,, therefore,, on a fundamental issue 
such as industrialisation, the office found itself still 
reacting to local initiatives and developments. These the 
office never learned to anticipate. By the end of the period 
examined, new political demands were being articulated 
within the colonies, especially in West Africa, which 
largely made redundant the timespan available for 
development assumed during the 'reconstruction, debate. 
Consequently, the development formulae produced by this 
debate had, hastilyr to be revised, with a reversal, in West 
Africa's case, of the former orthodoxy that painstaking 
economic development must precede self-rule. 
similarly, during these years, the Colonial office 
achieved only limited success in addressing what 
it 
perceived to be fundamental problems of promoting colonial 
industrialisation, namely the provision of capital, 
expertise and entrepreneurship. These broad questions were 
of extreme delicacy in the West African context. 
A 
continuing reliance on expatriate capital as 
the engine of 
development was considered by officials, especially those 
with Geographical' responsibilities, to 
be unwise given the 
extent of local hostility towards 
large foreign firms: a 
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political dimension was insinuated into the arena of 
development which the Colonial Office dared not ignore. 
The ensuing discussions on extending the legitimate 
boundaries of state economic intervention raised fundamental 
questions about the scope for direct government operation of 
enterprises (significantly, a course never greatly 
favoured), the role of 'development commissions,, and the 
potential value of publicly-controlled development 
corporations. There was a circularity in these discussions, 
reflecting the recurring disappointment of initial hopes. 
For instance,, the development commission idea, an early 
attempt to satisfy requirements thought to be essential to 
progress,, was translated eventually into the concept of the 
development corporation, itself, ironically, a vehicle 
increasingly attractive to big business, whose potentially 
unpalatable characteristics it had originally been devised 
0 to circumvent. When the development corporation, embodied in 
the CDC, fell short of the Colonial Office's expectations, 
4/1 
px#uing a trajectory more in keeping with Treasury ambitions -. Jz- 
than with the Of f ice Is, the need f or investigative bodies 
much 1 ike 'development commissions-' received renewed 
attention from the Office. 
Moreover,, the outward unanimity of the official voice 
concealed important divisions of opinion within the colonial 
Office. For example, some, like Gerard Clauson, while 
recognising the shortcomings of pre-war policy, continued to 
think largely in pre-war categories, resisting potentially 
09 
, 'dangerous' experimentation in development, sceptical about 
an expanded role for the colonial state and ultimately 
f 
symathetic to expatriate capital. Political pressures, 
4 
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rather than ideological conviction, gradually turned the 
weight of official opinion in favour of greater state 
intervention. The arrival of Creech Jones, a political head 
frankly committed to public enterprise, therefore only 
accentuated a pre-existing tendency among officials. 
A factor tending towards cohesion in the , official 
mind", however,, was the Colonial Office's uneasy 
relationship with externally-recruited 'specialist' opinion: 
often with justification, officials suspected outsiders' 
limited grasp of the complexity of colonial issues. For much 
of this period, officials were torn between admitting their 
own incapacity and lack of information, and opening the 
development debate to uncontrollable contributions from 
metropolitan interest groups, whether motivated commercially 
or politically, or from an emerging and ascendent generation 
of technocrats. 
Perhaps more than anything else, it was the resilience 
of entrenched metropolitan attitudes towards the colonies 
which gave the Colonial office an external threat which 
encouraged internal unity. Increased contact with other 
Whitehall departments during this period, together with 
recurrent exposure to criticism, taught the office to handle 
colonial questions, and especially industrialisation, with 
tact and caution. Attempts were made, generally without 
success, to tailor presentation of the office's policies so 
as to reflect dominant attitudes in Whitehall* only 
briefly, 
at the height of the reconstruction planning 
debate, did the 
office display much public confidence in its policy on 
manufacturing, and then only because of 
the Board of Trade's 
apparent acquiescence. The changing climate 
in Whitehall 
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after the war,, with renewed indications of metropolitan 
hostility, found the Office reverting to its pre-war 
diffidence: during 1947-48,, colonial industrial isation was 
scarcely mentioned. Having gathered momentum during the war, 
officials' interest in the subject dissipated in the 
confusion surrounding the post-war crisis. Gradually,, once 
more in response to prompting from the periphery, the 
Colonial office resumed its discussions on manufacturing,, 
only to encounter again the indifference, even opposition, 
of other departments. 
Commonly,, the Colonial office was obliged to proceed 
without clear indications of other departments' intentions. 
officials sifted through fragments of information in order 
to construct a broad sense of predominant metropolitan 
attitudes to colonial industrialisation. This was made all 
the more difficult when contradictory signals were detected, 
or when the practice of other departments, especially the 
Board of Trade, belied stated policy. 
The Colonial office failed, in these years, to overcome 
a longstanding metropolitan predisposition to assume the 
complementarity of the British and colonial economies: such 
claims received new currency after 1947, when a division of 
labour on "neo-mercantiliSt" lines held strong attractions 
for a British government enduring repeated financial crises 
while engaged in major domestic social reform. The practical 
consequences were seen in ever-increasing metropolitan 
control over colonial economic activity and imports. At the 
end of the period studied,, the colonial office had not 
succeeded in persuading the rest of Whitehall to embrace 
its 
catholiC interpretation of 'development, as a series of 
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interlocking processes, reinforcing one another towards the 
goal of viable nationhood: instead, attitudes of an older 
pedigree resurfaced, geared to the protection of sterling 
and British living standards. 
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Table 1: Nigeria and Gold Coast: Total imports of merchandise, t 1928-1951 (LO00s) 
Gold Coast (from UK) Nigeria (from UK) 
1928 11,302 5,655 15,761 11,391 
1929 9,626 4,628 13,216 9,316 
1930 8,, 507 4,335 12,614 8,622 
1931 4,434 2,402 6,509 4,596 
1932 5,350 3,168 7,194 5,355 
1933 5,096 2,825 6,339 4,391 
1934 4,390 2,491 5,364 3,150 
1935 7,376 4,213 7,804 4,784 
1936 8,531 4,628 10,829 6,294 
1937 12,307 6,049 14,624 7,960 
1938 7,657 4,289 8,632 4,713 
1939 7,318 4,134 6,757 3,648 
1940 6,878 6,878 7,479 4,329 
1941 6,137 3,613 6,505 3,695 
1942 8,732 4,647 10,490 4,923 
1943 8,598 4,833 12,418 7,437 
1944 8,580 4,616 15,748 7,958 
1945 10,207 5,868 13,583 7,935 
1946 12,861 8,424 20,456 12,702 
1947 21,842 11,381 32,466 16,168 
1948 30,, 114 17,647 41,215 21,365 
1949 44,500 25,901 57,539 29,253 
1950 48,000 30,270 61,900 37,026 
1951 63,300 38,, 163 83,200 43,467 
Source: Statistical Abstracts 
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Table 2: Gold Coast: imports of selected goods, 1928-51 
Cotton piece goods Iron and steel Machinery and (000 sq yds) (LO00s) apparatus 
(LOOOS) 
1928 35,, 968 795 456 
1929 31,, 534 621 328 
1930 34j, 777 563 430 
1931 25, F976 216 144 
1932 48,, 421 310 305 
1933 42, F 616 356 252 
1934 31j, 960 335 503 
1935 61, F 147 654 895 
1936 65,, 843 843 11053 
1937 67,, 028 1,, 214 1j, 454 
1938 30, F 902 668 1, f341 
1939 38j, 439 622 1.. 078 
1940 29,, 273 480 11010 
1941 27j, 413 274 546 
1QA7 Al-954 490 507 
1943 37,500 279 424 
1944 36,305 343 560 
1945 36,383 483 611 
1946 37,022 891 1,137 
1947 42,651 1,651 1,671 
1948 62,324 2,000 2,455 
1949 102,744 3,678 3,033 
1950 84,910 3,542 n. a. 
1951 83,371 5,375 n. a. 
+- gn source: stracts 
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Table 3: Nigeria: imports of selected goods, 1928-51 
Cotton piece goods Iron and steel Yac-inery and 
(000 sq yds) (LO00s) apparatus 
(LO00s) 
1928 119,601 1,754 551 
1929 100,646 1,418 453 
1930 100,280 1,222 372 
1931 64,810 634 198 
1932 112,132 414 57 
1933 92,876 500 60 
1934 63,197 512 102 
1935 115,169 747 108 
1936 174,353 1,061 205 
1937 163,922 1,498 559 
1938 68,795 1,032 455 
1939 60,944 700 303 
1940 79,964 583 252 
1941 59,909 592 213 
1942 84,919 761 272 
1943 84,812 1,059 370 
1944 107,432 910 402 
1945 83,340 1,195 470 
1946 82,551 1,817 984 
1947 104,852 2,920 1,284 
1948 124,969 3,497 2,437 
1949 186,205 6,035 3,109 
1950 148,339 n. a. n. a. 
1951 120,954 n. a. n. a. 
Source: Statistical Abstracts 
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